From ‘the Bads of Goods’ to ‘the Goods of Bads’: The Most Recent Developments in Ulrich Beck’s Cosmopolitan Sociology

Abstract

The article critically assesses Ulrich Beck’s body of work and its importance for contemporary sociology. It demonstrates that Beck’s elaboration of his original theory of the ‘risk society’ into a theory of the ‘world risk society’, ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘metamorphosis’ involved several key theoretical innovations. Firstly, Beck adjusted his notion of risk to include the threat of international terrorism in his diagnosis of the (world) risk society. Secondly, he introduced a distinction between (normative) ‘cosmopolitanism’ and (real existing) ‘cosmopolitization’ in order to capture the specificity of contemporary social change. Thirdly and most recently, Beck outlined a theory of ‘the metamorphosis of the world’ which marks an important shift of emphasis from ‘the negative side effects of goods’ to ‘the positive side effects of bads’. In conclusion, the article identifies a number of theoretical ambiguities and unresolved questions in Beck’s theory.

Keywords

Ulrich Beck cosmopolitanism emancipatory catastrophism global risk communities metamorphosis world risk society

With Ulrich Beck’s sudden and unexpected death on New Year’s Day 2015, not only the global sociological community but also the wider public lost one of its most socially engaged, thought-provoking and inspiring thinkers. As Anthony Giddens wrote in his obituary published in Züddeutsche Zeitung a few days after Beck’s death:

Ulrich Beck […] was the greatest sociologist of his generation. [He] was a dedicated and conscientious scholar, with an encyclopaedic knowledge of the social sciences. For such a distinguished figure he was refreshingly down to earth and approachable, highly popular with his students everywhere. I used to tease him quite often, since he never mastered the British sense of humour, with its mixture of self-deprecation and smug superiority. More often than not though I was the one who ended up looking foolish. He had a good line in put-downs when he needed to.¹

The fact that Beck died while he was in the midst of an exciting and promising development of his theory of the (world) risk society and cosmopolitanism has only heightened the loss. The literature about a wide range of aspects of Beck’s sociology is already huge, and since his further theory development unfortunately has now become impossible, the time seems to have come to try to critically assess Beck’s entire oeuvre and its importance for contemporary sociology. As a modest contribution to this, I will in the following attempt to outline the contours of Beck’s most recent theoretical developments, which represent an interesting and novel theoretical orientation that in some respects goes beyond the ‘classical’ risk society argument. However, to provide a backdrop for this, I will first sketch out some of the main components of Beck’s ‘classical’ risk society argument. On this basis, I will then outline the key elements in Beck’s most recent theory, namely his ideas of ‘metamorphosis’, ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘global imagined risk communities’ – ideas that in certain ways break with his original argument. Finally, I will discuss the theoretical perspectives of these ideas and point out some theoretical ambiguities and questions that spring from Beck’s most recent theory.

The ‘Classical’ Risk Society Argument: ‘The Bads of Goods’

If we look at Beck’s overall body of work it can be divided into four main stages, namely:

The original formulation of the theory of ‘the risk society’ or ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck, 1989, 1992 [1986], 1995 [1988], 1992, 1997 [1993]).

The further development of the theory of the risk society into a theory of ‘the world risk society’ (Beck, 1996, 1999a, 2009 [2007]).

The ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in Beck’s sociology, that is, the launch of a theory of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitanization’ as being an integral part of the world risk society (Beck, 1996, 1999a, 2009 [2007]).

The outline of a theory of ‘metamorphosis’ in which the notions of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘global imagined risk communities’ play a crucial role (Beck, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; cf. Curran, 2018: 30).

In this section I will give a brief summary of the first three stages, followed in the next section by a closer look at the fourth stage. For Beck, the risk society is about the side-effects of industrial modernization (Nebenfolgen). While industrial society is about production and distribution of ‘goods’ (wealth), the risk society, as Beck says with his characteristic wordplay, has to do with the production and distribution of ‘bads’ (risks). This, obviously, does not mean that the logic of wealth distribution disappears, but rather that it is increasingly subordinated to the logic of risk distribution. Risks are (often) invisible, classless (egalitarian) and global, according to Beck. We cannot see, taste or smell the pesticides in the drinking water. Everyone is affected by global warming regardless of social position. And particulate pollution of the air does not respect national borders (Beck, 1989, 1992 [1986], 1992). Thus, in Beck’s ‘classical’ perspective the risk society is conceived as having to do with the negative side-effects of goods (wealth). In the course of his writings, Beck further develops his concept of risk by incorporating Luhmann’s distinction between risk and danger as well as by taking the insurance perspective into consideration (Beck, 1995 [1988]: 77–8; 1996: 11–14; 1997 [1993]: 51–2). In Luhmann’s perspective, the same phenomenon can be observed as either risk (i.e. observation of decisions with regard to the future) or danger (i.e. observation of the consequences of risky decisions for those affected) depending on the perspective of the observer (‘second order observations’) (Luhmann, 1993 [1991]). Beck, though, criticizes this for being too relativist and making it difficult to draw the lines of social conflict in connection with risks (Beck, 1993: 278–79, note 10c; cf. Rasborg, forthcoming).

On this basis, Beck puts forward a historiography of risk that distinguishes between: 1) ‘pre-modern dangers’ (hazards/threats), that are perceived by humans as determined by fate or providence; 2) ‘modern risks’, that are calculable and thus insurable, and 3) late or reflexive modern ‘large-scale hazards’ (Grossgefahren) and ‘manufactured uncertainty’, that are increasingly incalculable and thus uninsurable (global warming, atomic disasters, financial crises, international terrorism, etc.) (Beck, 1995 [1988]: 78). As Beck himself put it in a more recent article in which he summarizes his concept of risk: ‘We have to distinguish between three types of future insecurity: threats, risks and manufactured uncertainties’ (Beck, 2009b: 293). Whereas ‘modern risks’ are calculable and thus insurable, ‘large-scale hazards’ and ‘manufactured uncertainties’ are, according to Beck, ‘distinguished by the fact that they are dependent on human decisions, created by society itself, immanent to society and thus externalizable, collectively imposed and thus individually unavoidable; their perceptions break with the past, break with experienced risks and institutionalized routines: they are incalculable, uncontrollable and in the final analysis no longer (privately) insurable (climate change, for example)’ (Beck, 2009b: 293).

The transformation of industrial society to a risk society is, in Beck’s view, not synonymous with postmodernity, but rather a ‘metachange of modernity’ from ‘simple’ (first) modernity to ‘reflexive’ (second) modernity. Today we are, as Beck puts it, ‘living in the age of side-effects’ (Beck, 1994a: 8–9; 1994b: 175), that is, modernity is increasingly confronted with itself and its own results, not least in the form of new global risks, and it is precisely this ‘self-confrontation’ that makes modernity reflexive in a new way (Beck, 1992 [1986], 1994a; Beck et al., 2003). Thus, according to Beck, there is a price to be paid for ‘the modern project of the conquering of nature’ (Naturbeherrschung), since nature seems to kick back in the guise of unintended, unseen and undesired consequences (risks) (Rasborg, 2001). However, since risks are by their very nature unintended, invisible and undesired, ‘reflexivity’ in Beck’s understanding does not refer to ‘knowledge’ and ‘awareness’, but rather to ‘non-knowing’ and ‘unawareness’ (Beck, 1999b). Even if risks, ultimately, ‘arise precisely from the triumph of the instrumentally rational order’ (Beck 1994a: 9), the ‘risk producing’ logic is, in Beck’s view, not instrumental rationality as such, but rather a ‘post-purposive rationality’ (post-Zweckrationalität), since late or reflexive modern risks are neither predictable nor calculable (Beck, 1994a: 9–10, 33). Consequently, social change in the risk society is not intended, planned and conscious, but rather occurs in an unreflected, automatic and ‘reflex-like’ way, since it is driven by the undesired and unforeseen side-effects of modernization (Beck, 1994a: 181; 1997 [1993]: 3, 23, 32; cf. Lash, 1994). The resulting unpredictability, discontinuity and ambivalence mean that the more clear-cut and dichotomous ‘either-or’ categories of first modernity (e.g. ‘us and them’, ‘friend and enemy’, ‘national and global’) are replaced by a set of highly ambivalent ‘both-and’ categories of second modernity (e.g. ‘internal globalization’, ‘inclusion of otherness’, etc.). However, in order to conceive this ambivalence and discontinuity that always involves the risk of ‘counter-modern’ setbacks (e.g. neo-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, right-wing populism), it is, in Beck’s view, necessary to break with (first) modern sociology’s ‘linear’ theories of increasing rationalization and modernization (‘the grand consensus on modernization’) (Beck, 1994b: 177; 1997 [1993]: 13, 21, 24, 32, 38; cf. Lash, 2003).

From the mid-1990s and onwards, Beck further develops his theory of the risk society into a theory of the ‘world risk society’, which at the same time marks the beginning of a ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in his sociology (Beck, 1996, 1999a, 2005 [2002], 2006 [2004], 2009 [2007]; Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]). With the notion of the ‘world risk society’, Beck, at first glance, merely seems to take the consequence of his initial idea that late modern risks are inherently global, since they are borderless and classless (egalitarian). However, if we take a closer look, we recognize that Beck now makes an important adjustment of his concept of risk, which makes it possible for him to include the threat of international terrorism – which is, obviously, not unintentional but deliberate, intentional and ‘lives on’ the fear that it creates – in his diagnosis of the risk society (Beck, 2002b). Contrary to his early writings, in which he stated that the risk society is a ‘catastrophe society’ (Beck, 1989),² Beck now emphazises that the ‘world risk society’ is not a ‘catastrophe society’, but rather is a society in which global threats and disasters are constantly anticipated. Hereby, Beck wishes to underline that the anticipation of the catastrophe has consequences at least as extensive as the catastrophe itself, since it creates uncertainty and fear with resultant demands for security that can promote tendencies to a regulated society and, ultimately, threaten freedom and democracy (Beck, 2009 [2007]: 9–11, 14). As Beck himself puts it: ‘we have to understand the key distinction between risk and catastrophe. Risk does not mean catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe. Risks exist in a permanent state of virtuality, and only become “topical” to the extent that they are anticipated. Risks are not “real”, they are “becoming real”’ (Beck, 2009b: 292).

Thus, one can perhaps say that risks, in Beck’s ‘redefinition’ of his concept of risk, ‘exist’ in ‘the gap’ between anticipation and the actual occurrence of the incident. This makes it possible for Beck to include international terrorism in his diagnosis of the world risk society, as he can now distinguish between ‘unintended catastrophes’ on the one hand (environmental and financial risks, equivalent to his original definition of risk) and ‘intended catastrophes’ (international terrorism) on the other (Beck, 2009 [2007]: 13–14). Hence, the world risk society is in Beck’s view characterized by three main types of global risks, namely environmental risks, financial risks and the risk of terrorism (Beck, 2009 [2007]: 13–14). Obviously, this typology of risk must, as Beck emphazises, be understood in ideal-typical terms, whereas in reality the different types of global risk intersect and commingle (Beck, 2009b: 293).

However, the world risk society not only creates new global threats to humanity but also leads to an increasing awareness of the need to find common solutions to cross-border issues, which, according to Beck, creates the ground for the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan society’ (Beck, 1996, 2002a, 2005 [2002], 2006 [2004], 2009 [2007]; Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]). As the problems (e.g. global environmental issues, migration crises, cross-border crime, etc.) are not confined to the nation-state, they cannot be resolved at a national level, but require the establishment of trans- and/or supranational political structures, for example in the form of the EU, UN, NATO, WTO, etc. In Beck’s view, this means that we tend to become ‘global citizens’ who are not merely oriented towards the local and the national but also towards the global. In the cosmopolitan society, we, as Beck says with reference to Kant, are at the same time ‘citizens of the nation-state’ (polis) and ‘citizens of the world’ (cosmos) (Beck, 2002a: 18). In other words, the cosmopolitan society is a ‘nation-state-’ and a ‘world-citizen-society’ based on ideals of humanity, democracy, human rights, recognition of diversity, etc., and it encourages increased cooperation between the European countries around the solution of common affairs (e.g. the present refugee crisis; Beck, 2005 [2002], 2006 [2004]; Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]). However, the cosmopolitan society should not be understood as a fully realized social condition, but rather is Beck’s vision of an alternative to a market-driven globalization, for which he believes the current societal development lays the foundation (Beck, 2005 [2002]: 212, 309–10).

Thus, what we are witnessing today, according to Beck, is the emergence of an ongoing process of ‘cosmopolitization’, which he also describes as a ‘globalization from within’ that implies the recognition of ‘the otherness of the other’ (diversity), humanism, global justice, human rights, etc. (Beck, 2002a, 2011, 2016b). In today’s globalized and cosmopolitanized world, says Beck, we work globally, we study globally, we fall in love globally, we eat globally, etc. (Beck, 2002a: 31). In order to better understand these novel and complex forms of global interconnectedness, Beck distinguishes between three main forms of cosmopolitanism, namely: 1) normative-philosophical cosmopolitanism (e.g. Hegel, Kant, Habermas); 2) analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism (e.g. Beck himself); and 3) institutional cosmopolitanism (transnational institutions such as the EU, NATO, the European Court of Human Rights, etc.). Moreover, he, as already indicated, distinguishes between ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitization’. While the first refers to cosmopolitanism as a normative complex of ideas (normative-philosophical cosmopolitanism), the latter, as mentioned, refers to the ongoing process of ‘cosmopolitization’, which he also describes as ‘side-effect cosmopolitization’ (Nebenfolgen-kosmopolitisierung), ‘real existing cosmopolitization’ or ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ (analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism) (Beck, 2006 [2004]: 17–24).

Thus, even if Beck in general becomes still more ‘constructivist’ (cf. Rasborg, 2012), his notion of ‘real existing cosmopolitization’ is markedly realist, since it stresses that cosmopolitization exists whether we are aware of it or not and whether we want it or not (Beck, 2006 [2004]). Although neo-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and right-wing as well as left-wing populism are gaining ground in all European countries, Beck claims that we nevertheless are becoming ever more transnational and thus cosmopolitan in our minds, actions and everyday lives. In a wider – institutional – perspective, real existing ‘side-effect-cosmopolitization’ may, according to Beck, lead to a ‘cosmopolitization of Europe’ and, ultimately, to a realization of Kant’s (2006 [1795]) ideal of a civitas gentium, that is, a ‘cosmopolitan state’ run by a ‘world citizens parliament’, ‘world citizen parties’, etc. (Beck, 2005 [2002]: 8–10, 92–6, 217, 299, 308).

Hence, while first modernity is a nation-state-based modernity, second modernity is a – globalized, cosmopolitanized and individualized – trans-national modernity. In the scientific observer’s perspective, this, in Beck’s view, means that contemporary society, due to increasing globalization, migration and intercultural impact, transcends its ‘national framework’ and is centrifuged into a global interdependency; that is, it is deterritorialized. However, according to Beck, since sociology until today has been restricted by a national outlook, that is, by what he terms ‘methodological nationalism’, a ‘paradigm shift’ from ‘methodological nationalism’ to ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ is needed in order to be able to conceive this new global interconnectedness. Thus, what Beck calls for is ‘a new critical theory with cosmopolitan intent’ (Beck, 2005 [2002]: 22–4; cf. 2006 [2004], 2009 [2007], 2009a; Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]; cf. Featherstone, 2002: 3–4).

The Metamorphosis of the World: ‘The Goods of Bads’

Above, I have sketched out some of the key elements in Beck’s elaboration of his original theory of the risk society into a theory of the world risk society as a cosmopolitan society. However, in 2015/16 yet another significant theoretical reorientation was taking place in relation to Beck’s ‘classical’ risk society argument.

In his last years (within the framework of the research project ‘Methodological Cosmopolitanism – in the Laboratory of Climate Change’, funded by the European Research Council) Beck developed further his theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism into a theory of ‘the metamorphosis of the world’, that is, a theory about a radical social change leading to what Beck describes as ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and the emergence of ‘global imagined risk communities’ (Beck, 2012, 2015, 2016a). Beck’s theory of ‘metamorphosis’ is, at the same time, a continuation of, and a move ‘beyond’, some of the central lines of argument of his theory of the (world) risk society (Beck, 2015: 75, 78–9; 2016a: 4). On the one hand, the theory of metamorphosis (and ‘emancipatory catastrophism’) is inextricably linked to the theory of world risk society, cosmopolitanism and individualization – and thus also to reflexive modernization and second modernity (Beck, 2016a: 21, 40); on the other hand, it goes beyond the classical (world) risk society argument, as it represents a new view on the relationship between the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ of the (world) risk society (Beck, 2015: 78).

The aim of the theory of the metamorphosis of the world is, as Beck says with one of his characteristic paradoxical formulations, to try to understand why we cannot understand today’s world where social change is so rapid that what was unthinkable yesterday is possible today, cf. the fall of the Berlin Wall, September 11, climate change, Fukushima, the financial crisis, the Euro crisis, etc. (Beck, 2016a: xi). The very word ‘metamorphosis’, which is derived from the Greek ‘meta’ (change) and ‘morphe’ (form), denotes a Verwandelung, that is, a ‘transformation of form’ or a ‘transfiguration’ (as opposed to a ‘refiguration’) (Beck, 2016a: 6, footnote). Beck’s point in introducing the concept of ‘metamorphosis’ is that it is, in his view, more appropriate than the concept of ‘social change’ to describe the radicality (dynamics, speed and intensity) of the social transformation of the world risk society, a radicality which is a result of how first modernity’s ‘change in society’ has been replaced by second modernity’s ‘metamorphosis of the world’ (Beck, 2016a: xi, 6, my emphasis).

This, however, raises an important question that Beck’s theory of metamorphosis must be able to address if it should appear plausible, namely, how ‘metamorphosis’ differs from other concepts of social transition, such as ‘social change’, ‘social evolution’, ‘social transformation’, ‘acceleration’ and ‘revolution’. Beck’s suggestion regarding this is that, unlike ‘social evolution’, which has a built-in ‘telos’ (i.e. a purpose), metamorphosis is an open and unfinished process that has no end goal. Unlike ‘revolution’ that follows an either-or logic, metamorphosis follows a both-and logic (Beck, 2015: 77). And unlike ‘social change’ or ‘transformation’, which in social theory are typically conceived as ‘linear’, continuous and predictable processes, metamorphosis is ‘non-linear’, discontinuous and unpredictable (Beck, 2016a: xi). Whereas social change, according to Beck, is characterized by the fact that everything is changing, except for the principles of change, metamorphosis is characterized by the fact that the principles of change are themselves involved in the change dynamics, that is, are changed and destabilized (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: xi). Metamorphosis therefore, as Beck puts it, is about a change in the dynamics of change in ‘the age of side-effects’ (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: 20). Metamorphosis, in other words – like reflexive modernization – is not deliberate and intentional but rather is ‘reflex-like’ since, according to Beck, it reflects that social change in the (world) risk society/reflexive modernity assumes the character of unintended consequences (global risks) (Beck, 2015: 78, 81; 2016a: 63, 123).

Regarding the analysis of the radicality and unpredictability of metamorphosis, major parts of sociology – not least sociologists such as Durkheim, Parsons, Foucault, Bourdieu and Luhmann – fall short in Beck’s view, as they focus excessively on systems, structures and social reproduction rather than individuals, actors and social transformation (metamorphosis): ‘the major theories of a Foucault, a Bourdieu or a Luhmann, as well as rational choice theories, notwithstanding all their differences, have one thing in common: they focus on the reproduction, and not on the transformation, let alone the metamorphosis, of social and political systems’ (Beck, 2016: 50; cf. 70). In line with his criticism of sociology’s ‘theoretical collectivisms’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxii), Beck is accordingly sceptical of the above-mentioned sociologists’ (apparent) focus on social reproduction, which he believes is blocking insight into the radical change of contemporary society, and instead he advocates for a change-oriented sociology. Hence, ‘theorizing metamorphosis’, in Beck’s view, demands a ‘metamorphosis of theory’, that is a ‘scientific revolution’ (Kuhn, 1962), which replaces ‘methodological nationalism’ with ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: 20, 71).

But at the same time, Beck emphasizes that not everything is characterized by metamorphosis. However, regarding sociology’s, in his view, excessive focus on social reproduction, or on social change within the framework of social reproduction (Beck, 2015: 77; 2016a: 19), Beck wants to explore the relationships between metamorphosis, change and social reproduction; the relative weight of these factors cannot be determined theoretically but is, according to Beck, an empirical question. That is, Beck understands his theory of metamorphosis not as replacing but rather as supplementary to existing theories of social change (Beck, 2016a: 19). Beck also emphasizes that metamorphosis is not a universal process that manifests itself uniformly throughout the world; on the contrary, it is a complex and differentiated process that takes place locally, nationally, regionally and globally (Beck, 2016a: 20). In other words, metamorphosis is an open concept that does not say anything about whether social change is negative or positive. It is not a normative but rather a descriptive term, which indicates that the world risk society can lead to disasters as well as to what Beck calls ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ (Beck, 2015: 81; 2016a: 18, 20).

With the notion of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’, which is closely linked to the concept of metamorphosis, Beck seeks to conceptualize the transformative potentials of the world risk society, that exactly have to do with ‘the hidden emancipatory side effect of global risk’ (Beck, 2015: 75). Here we are arriving at the probably most important theoretical reorientation in Beck’s most recent authorship, as he now emphasizes that while the classical (world) risk society argument is about ‘the negative side effects of goods’, ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ is about ‘the positive side effects of bads’ – which in turn create a normative horizon of ‘common goods’, e.g. in the form of normative ideals regarding equality, justice and humanity (Beck, 2015: 75, 78–9; 2016a: 4, 116). As Beck himself expresses this:

Global risk is about the co-production and co-distribution of goods and bads. […] In this article I go an important step further. I argue that the talk about bads produces ‘common goods’. As such, the argument goes beyond what has been at the heart of the world risk society theory so far: it is not about the negative side effects of goods but the positive side effects of bads. They are producing normative horizons of common goods. (Beck, 2015: 78–9)

In this way, according to Beck, a cosmopolitan view is emerging that transcends the nation-state (Beck, 2016a: 4). Consequently, global risks are not only ‘cosmopolitanizing’ but, in Beck’s view, they are also ‘emancipatory’ (Beck, 2015: 79). In this way, Beck turns his own notion of risk on its head, since risk no longer merely denotes something ‘undesirable’ (negative) but in a peculiar way also something ‘desired’ (positive).

In contrast to an ‘apocalyptic’ or a ‘technocratic catastrophism’, Beck’s ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ is, paradoxically, a ‘liberating’ catastrophism that is based on three main elements: 1) The anticipation of a global catastrophe violates unwritten norms concerning human existence and civilization; 2) which creates an ‘anthropological shock’ that ‘shakes’ our basic ideas about the world, or – in Giddens’ sense – destabilizes our ‘ontological security’; 3) which in turn creates the basis for a ‘social catharsis’, that is, a ‘purification process’ that allows for the emergence of a new view of the world – hence the ‘liberating’ element (Beck, 2015: 75, 79; 2016a: 117–18). As an example, Beck mentions the hurricane Katrina that in 2005 moved from northern Cuba across Florida to New Orleans and in total cost over 1800 lives. According to Beck, this led to a ‘social catharsis’ as Katrina connected the previously separate – climate disasters with social and racial inequality – whereby it created the basis for the emergence of a new normative horizon of global justice (Beck, 2015: 79–81; 2016a: 118–22). With his change of emphasis from the ‘bads of goods’ to the ‘goods of bads’, Beck thus points out the transformative capacity of the world risk society, as he highlights the ‘cosmopolitizing’ and even ‘emancipatory’ potentials of global risks, that may, perhaps, even herald a ‘rebirth of modernity’ (Beck, 2015: 79, 85; 2016a: 117).

In his most recent writings, Beck also increasingly focuses on the role of mass media in the discursive ‘staging’ of global risks that, in his view, plays a key role in the ways in which states, individuals, social movements, NGOs, etc., act in relation to the risks of cosmopolitan society. This takes place within the framework of a global public, which, according to Beck, is not based on decisions but on the (unintended) consequences of decisions. The public thus becomes a ‘Nebenfolgen-public’ where the media’s news about unintended consequences of actions in terms of global risks plays a key role (Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]: 209–12; Beck and Levy, 2013: 12). The media thus play a crucial role in the globalization of risk awareness. Consequently, the perception of what constitutes the ‘current threat’ becomes largely dependent on what the media choose to focus on (Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]: 209–10). Thus, according to Beck and Grande, politics in the world risk society is increasingly detached from its local bonds to place (the ‘place of politics’) and is dislocated to the global electronic mass media – i.e. is ‘mediatized’ – while the transnational advocacy movements capable of staging latent threats in the mass media become the key political actors (the ‘subject of politics’) (Beck and Grande, 2007 [2004]: 210–11).

Hence, Beck points out, based on global risks the media play a crucial role in generating ‘cosmopolitan events’, that is, events with a potentially explosive range, that are experienced globally (e.g. terrorist attacks, nuclear accidents, climate disasters, etc.) and therefore cause ‘strangers to become neighbours’ (Beck, 2012: 101; 2015: 81; 2016a: 123). This creates the basis for the emergence of what Beck describes as ‘global imagined risk communities’, i.e. cosmopolitan communities constituted around the perception of global risks (Beck, 2012: 104–6; 2016a: 164–74; Beck and Levy, 2013: 17–21, 23). These new communities and political structures may include the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions (e.g. the EU, UN, WTO), as well as civil society-based global NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace, Attac, Occupy Wall Street). However, the basis for the new cosmopolitan communities is neither altruistic solidarity nor Christian charity, but rather (utilitarian) self-interest, namely the interest in survival (Beck, 2012: 105; 2016a: 44, 170; Beck and Levy, 2013: 16–17, 23). Beck thus, tellingly, speaks about the ‘cosmopolitan imperative’, which simply reads: ‘cooperate or fail!’ (Beck, 2012: 104; 2016a: 171; 2016b: 261). Ultimately, it seems therefore to be the interest in survival that makes us join together in a common effort to counter global risks, that is the interest in survival of all people becomes the individual's self-interest, and vice versa (Beck, 2012: 106; 2016a: 44, 170). Thus, Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ is not an ‘idealistic’, but rather a ‘realistic’ and in a way a ‘forced’ solidarity arising out of the inherent imperatives of the world risk society (Beck, 2012: 104; Beck and Levy, 2013: 17, 23).

Theoretical Perspectives and Ambiguities in Beck’s Most Recent Theory

In the course of his writings, as has been demonstrated above, Beck makes a number of important theoretical adjustments and innovations. With the elaboration of the original theory of the risk society into a theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism, as well as the corresponding redefinition of risk as the ‘anticipation of catastrophe’, it becomes possible for Beck to: 1) emphasize the globality of risk as well as its perception; 2) include international terrorism in his diagnosis of the world risk society; and 3) highlight that fear of the catastrophe may have at least as devastating consequences as the catastrophe itself. In addition, with the notions of ‘metamorphosis’, ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘cosmopolitan risk communities’, Beck introduces a novel perspective that goes beyond the classical (world) risk society argument, as it entails a shift of emphasis from the ‘bads of goods’ to the ‘goods of bads’. Thus, with these theoretical innovations Beck, more than ever, emphasizes that the theory of the world risk society and metamorphosis is not a pessimistic theory about an ‘apocalyptic catastrophe’ but is instead a hopeful theory that conceives the world risk society as a ‘self-critical society’ which provides the basis for ‘the project of a different globalization and a different modernity’. He goes on to say: ‘This project is supported by a vision of “cosmopolitan reason” that takes in the entire globe’ (Beck, 2005 [2002]: 212; cf. 2010).

All this being said, Beck’s most recent theory also contains a number of theoretical problems and ambiguities that need to be clarified if it should appear to be plausible. First, one may ask if Beck really succeeds in arguing for the novelty of metamorphosis as compared to other notions of (radical) social change, not least Marx’s analysis of the boundlessness and extreme dynamism of modern capitalism (Marx and Engels, 2015 [1848]), Giddens’ analysis of a rapid pace of change as a defining characteristic of the late-modern ‘runaway world’ (Giddens, 1991, 1999) and, most recently, Hartmut Rosa’s analysis of social acceleration as a key feature of contemporary ‘high-speed society’ (Rosa, 2010). Second, Beck’s construction of ‘metamorphosis’ as a ‘counter concept’ to a rather one-dimensional construction of what, in Beck’s view, seems to be a ‘grand consensus on social reproduction’ entails a risk of simply replacing one one-sidedness with another. In other words, theories that (apparently) focus mainly on social reproduction are replaced by a theory that focuses mainly on social change (‘either-or’), instead of conceiving the interplay between social change (global risks, individualization) on the one hand, and social reproduction (class, power) on the other (‘both-and’) – an interplay whose investigation, according to Beck, is a purely empirical question. One wonders why Beck, on this point, does not comply with his own ‘both-and’ logic, but, on the contrary, insists on thinking risk and class, as well as individualization and class, as an ‘either-or’ (Curran, 2018; Rasborg, 2017). Third, it is hard to ignore the paradox in speaking about catastrophes as ‘emancipatory’, that is, ‘liberating’; a ‘liberation’ that Beck sometimes even refers to as a ‘forced emancipation’ (Beck, 2012: 107). Should disasters be seen as a ‘condition’ for reaching a ‘different modernity’? Is Beck’s theory of ‘metamorphosis’ and ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ just another, more ‘dramatic’, version of Marx’s theory of capitalism as a ‘necessary evil’ on the way to a ‘higher society’? Or, perhaps, a sociological rendition of the saying that ‘every cloud has a silver lining’?

Very few contemporary sociologists have been so widely discussed as Ulrich Beck, which is in itself a testimony to his enormous influence on contemporary sociology. As I have tried to show above, Beck’s latest theory development at once contains a number of exciting and fruitful new perspectives and a series of paradoxes and unresolved questions. With Beck’s untimely death, he himself is obviously cut off from answering these (and many more) questions – we have been left alone to try to find the answers ourselves.

Footnotes

Notes

Klaus Rasborg, PhD and MA, is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University. He is the Danish translator of Ulrich Beck’s Risikogesellschaft (1986) and has published several contributions to the discussion of modernity, risk, individualization, inequality and class.

This article is part of the Theory, Culture & Society special section, ‘Ulrich Beck: Risk as Indeterminate Modernity’ (TCS 35(7–8), December 2018), edited by Scott Lash.

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