Facebook Rules: Structures of Governance in Digital Capitalism and the Control of Generalized Social Capital

Literature

While the literature on social network sites thrives, two common tendencies shift it away from a thorough analysis of social network sites governance.

First, post-Marxist scholars conceptualize the relationships between social network sites and their users exclusively in economic terms (Cohen, 2008; Coté and Pybus, 2007; Fisher, 2015; Fuchs, 2011; Gehl, 2011; for a critique: Skeggs and Yuill, 2016). These scholars study the ‘exploitation’ of unremunerated user labor, as users create surplus value without even noticing as they turn their relationships, emotions, judgments and everyday into both valuable contents that seduce other users to view ads and profitable data (sold to advertisers in the form of audience-derivatives: Arvidsson, 2016). This literature offers important insights on the political economy of social network sites on which I rely, yet it often fails to recognize that the relationships between social network sites and users are not merely of exploitation; both parties often frame their relationship in terms of governance. As shown below, social network site politics and political economy, although studied separately (the latter is absent from the most thorough reviews of internet governance, e.g. Ziewitz and Pentzol, 2014), are closely interrelated.

Secondly, scholars who do study social network site power and governance (Arvidsson, 2016; Bucher, 2012; Karppi, 2011; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010; Terranova, 2015; Zwick et al., 2008) tend to view the internet as epitomizing a more general shift from sovereignty and discipline towards neoliberal decentralized governance through freedom and seduction (Bauman, 1998; Jessop, 1996). For Cheney-Lippold (2017), digital governance through algorithms exercises control through rarely felt ‘power at a distance’; Van Dijck (2013) showed how Facebook governs users and transforms social norms and practices through platform design. Disciplinary panopticism bounded within institutional boundaries is viewed as a thing of the past (Gane, 2012). These studies offer highly original insights on Facebook’s ‘security dispositive’ (Terranova, 2015) and ‘derivative logic’ (Arvidsson, 2016). Yet, early accounts of the internet’s resistance to centralized governance (Boyle, 1997) lose validity in today’s web of centrally-governed online ‘closed gardens’ and ‘gated communities’. While acknowledging that social network sites must be governed to exploit users’ free labor, this literature neglects important aspects of governance that do not fit within its macro-narrative. ²

Some important work has been done nevertheless. A few law scholars conceptualized site operators as sovereigns: Lessig (2006) criticized non-democratic merchant-sovereignty online. Chander (2012) explored Facebook’s non-statist governance. Laidlaw (2015) conceptualized Facebook as mere gatekeeper, yet one that must be accountable for violating human rights of the gated. Media scholars started exploring mechanisms of governmentality (Bucher, 2012, showed how Facebook’s algorithm encourages user productive participation through threats of invisibility) and sovereignty (Crawford and Gillespie, 2016, on flagging; Roberts, 2016, on content moderators; Massanari, 2017, on Reddit’s governance structure and its political consequences). Gehl (2014) criticized the division of labor between social network site operators and users and the incapacity of the latter to shape site structures. Yet a thorough systematic account of Facebook governance, its logic and mechanisms, is still missing.

Why Facebook Governs

To understand why social network site operators engage in governance much more extensively than corporations used to, we must cease to study their politics and political economy in isolation, and explore their interconnections. Historically, corporations exercised governance (in Foucault’s broad sense, the conduct of conduct), yet their governance targeted individuals in particular, well-bounded roles – mainly as employees. Corporations attempted to increase productivity through rational governance of work processes and workplace social and emotional relationships, utilizing management theories, industrial psychology, and surveillance technologies to govern employees (Illouz, 2008; Zuboff, 1988). As consumerism developed, Taylorist management was expanded from workers to consumers (Lyon, 1994: 138ff.). However, Facebook governs users in multiple other roles: as friends, lovers, politically involved citizens, freelancers, small business owners, etc.

I suggest the emerging interest of capitalist corporations in regulating multiple spheres of social life derives from a shift in forms of capitalist accumulation: the rise of immaterial biopolitical production (Hardt and Negri, 2000), which is ‘the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap’ (p. xiii) and production is no longer a bounded social sphere, as value is produced outside the factory by capturing the totality of social life. Facebook monetizes the very fabric of social interaction, turning social, emotional, political, familial and phatic interactions, affinities and relationships into data, metadata, attention, affect and engagement, which are all captured and sold to advertisers. Of its 2017 revenues, 98.3 percent came from targeted advertising, selling advertisers the attention of highly-specific clusters of users. This attention is collected by offering users social ‘connectedness’ (Van Dijck, 2013) and free access to content produced by other users, and through algorithmic surveillance and analysis of users’ activity (Cohen, 2008). In this business model users are not customers (the customers are advertisers) but ‘value creators’ (Van Dijck, 2013: 63). While each user makes only a modest contribution to Facebook’s profits (in 2017 it reported net income of $15.9 billion for 2.13 billion users), governing the conduct of users as a population becomes crucial for retaining Facebook’s profitability. Thus, the new logic of accumulation that Zuboff (2015) associated with ‘surveillance capitalism’ begets new interests.

When human interactions becomes sources of profit, they can also be maximized through their rational governance – for example, by preventing users from saying or doing things that might offend other users and discourage them from using the site intensely as productive unremunerated workers. Restrictions on political and sexual content serve this cause. Hence Facebook struggles to formulate universal rules of conduct and enforce them on its multicultural usership. By demonstrating good governance Facebook may also fend off external regulatory pressures that might restrict its control over biopolitical production. Facebook prohibits users from producing lower-quality data by opening multiple accounts (Skeggs and Yuill, 2016). It also retains user populations biopolitically by blocking programs that turned ‘digital suicide’ (account deletion) automated and viral through legal and technological tools (Karppi, 2011), and by sending users willing to quit automated ‘miss you’ messages from friends (Van Dijck, 2013).

Regulating social interaction is thus inseparable from its exploitation. Biopolitical production draws capitalist corporations closer toward the core of the political sphere, motivating them to design governance apparatuses to regulate social interactions. Zuboff (2015) suggests that in this new accumulation regime users turn from workers or consumers into raw materials that may be used without their consent. If so, disciplinary power becomes redundant (in line with Lash’s (2007) account of post-hegemonic power). However, in social network sites users are not passive: their conduct may influence and threaten profits, hence they must be governed.

Facebook’s interest in governance results from the shift of social and political interaction into private spaces where their conduct influences profitability. This dynamic has offline precedents, even if offline political and social interaction is subjected to private merchant-sovereignty (Lessig, 2006) to a much smaller degree. Already in the 1980s, Shearing and Stenning studied the rise of ‘mass private property’ like malls, privately-owned spaces for public functions where a growing part of public life is governed by property owners, and where private policing exerts quasi-juridical authority to serve owners’ contingent commercial interests. Unlike public policing, private policing is not even nominally impartial, and often ignores suspect rights, due process, rules of evidence and equality before the law. It prioritizes minor rule-breaking which threatens commercial interests over severe crimes, and unlike state policing, the main punishment it inflicts is exclusion (Shearing and Stenning, 1983).

As socializing and political activity shifted from town-squares to malls, mall managements started making political decisions, such as banning political activity on specific sensitive issues while allowing it on other issues; or banning entry from specific people (unaccompanied teenagers, or those appearing to be poor) to maximize profits. They enforce quasi-laws (codes of conduct) through constant surveillance, defending civility at the expense of civil liberties, and leaving citizens deprived of truly public space (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2006).

Visitors subject themselves to this private governance since malls are experienced as safer than town squares. Bauman (1999) suggested that as citizens are transmuted into consumers they substitute protection for civil participation. Similarly, keeping digital spaces safe from pornography, violence, bullying, spam, and anonymity motivates and legitimates private policing online. Unlike Myspace, Facebook created a ‘safe’ middle-class white space in times of moral panic around fake identities, cyberbullying and sex predators (Gehl, 2014: 71–91). As MacKinnon (2012) suggests, users are offered a Hobbesian contract to avoid a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. Safety and security are highlighted in Facebook’s legal code (‘Community Standards’) as main legitimations for governance and for particular controversial policies.

While malls are isolated neo-feudal estates (Shearing and Stenning, 1983), Facebook is an empire striving to monitor all human relationships, interactions and emotional reactions worldwide and map them into its ‘social graph’. Expanding its jurisdiction to be coextensive with social life, it takes the ‘mass private property’ model to the extreme. Furthermore, while the legitimacy of merchant-sovereignty relies on the easiness of leaving them and the competition between them (Post, 1995, cited in Lessig, 2006), this hardly applies when users are invested in accumulating social capital within social network sites. Like malls, Facebook governs through threats of exclusion, yet its threats are much more consequential, due to its status as a central bank of social capital.

The Sources of Facebook’s Power: A Central Bank of Social Capital?

To understand what enables Facebook to effectively discipline its users through threats of expulsion, we must understand the benefits it offers users and deprives them from at will. Facebook turned into a main medium of the social, through which individuals and organizations create, represent, maintain and enact social relationships. Individuals use Facebook to keep in touch with friends and family, meet romantic partners, get to know new acquaintances better, express identity, and engage in community life, public debate and political activism. Some also use Facebook for advertising, marketing, career promotion, group formation, political campaigning and mobilization. All these activities take place within this privately-owned, centrally-governed public space.

Most of these uses may be conceptualized as efficient ways to accumulate and maintain various forms of social capital. Social capital is the capacity to effectively mobilize resources dispersed in one’s social network (Bourdieu, 1986). Connections, group membership and network position may grant access to valuable information, economic resources, status and political power. Despite substantial theoretical differences, scholars such as Bourdieu (1986), Burt (1992) and Lin (1999) share a common understanding of social ties as convertible resources.

Facebook facilitates the accumulation, maintenance and mobilization of social capital in various ways: it objectifies egocentric social networks in a stable form, thus making ephemeral connections persistent; it protects ties from natural decay (once parties have left the social institutions they had shared), keeping communication paths open; and it allows low-cost maintenance of larger networks, as a single message may keep thousands of ‘friends’ updated (Ellison et al., 2007, 2010). It thus operates as a bank, where users invest their social capital to maintain and increase its value, but cannot withdraw it against the bank’s policy.

This applies not only to individual users. Unlike specialized social network sites (e.g. LinkedIn), Facebook wishes to capture and monetize on social relationships in various social spheres. It allows actors in different commercial, political and cultural fields to use it to accumulate social capital and exchange it for economic capital or privileged position in the respective field. In an isomorphic process, politicians, firms, artists, brands, social movements and charities create communities, accumulating Facebook fans like-by-like. Through the ‘like’ button they turn momentary sympathy into sustainable ‘relationships’, which are accumulated as a form of capital. They invest resources in maintaining these relationships in order to mobilize economic and political resources within these networks.

My argument is that Facebook Inc. uses the material affordances of digital communication to remold various field-specific forms of power into a single form, generalized social capital. Monopolistic control over generalized social capital grants it power to govern its users. This is evident in multiple spheres, including the following:

Interpersonal ties. for individual users, Facebook may help preserve and strengthen weak ties and gain access to resources like job information, advice, accommodation while travelling (Ellison et al., 2007), information about social events or houses for sale, alongside emotional support and a sense of community. Some users gather a relatively large audience for their posts, beyond their offline acquaintances, acquiring a micro-celebrity status (Marwick, 2013), which may prove hard to smuggle out of the platform. Social ties are not merely capital (exchange-value), they have use-value too, as sources of emotional support and intimacy. Once social life (from everyday conversations to event invitations) goes online, users ostracized from Facebook may be deprived of both.

Politics. For Bourdieu, capital is always a field-specific currency. Facebook’s role in the political field deserves special attention. Facebook allows users to communicate political emotions of outrage and hope and to initiate protest and social movements by mobilizing weak ties and friends-of-friends. By reducing organization costs Facebook frees political entrepreneurs from dependence on institutional resources, thus becoming a nearly obligatory point-of-passage for grassroots activism. Political entrepreneurs and social movements use Facebook to mobilize activists, diffuse information and propaganda, and coordinate offline mass activism, and as a site for online activism, broadening existing repertoires of contention (Castells, 2012; Earl and Kimport, 2011). They accumulate ties with sympathizers as political capital, turning ephemeral sympathy into online group membership. Established politicians and political parties similarly accumulate fans, interacting with them in an informal style similar to interaction among friends. Campaigners use this informal communication path to disseminate messages, assess their effectiveness by analyzing user comments, raise funds, and engage supporters in campaigns (Bor, 2014). Facebook views politicians as ‘partners’, who should succeed in accumulating and mobilizing ties as capital, and hence keep giving Facebook free high-quality ‘content’ (Hoffmann et al., 2018: 210). Since fan numbers are interpreted as indices of public support, accumulating fans becomes necessary in order to be taken seriously in the political field (Dalsgaard, 2008). By controlling this political infrastructure, Facebook controls who can use it, how, and for which political aims (e.g. by tolerating groups that aimed to topple the Egyptian President Mubarak’s regime while dissolving those aimed at toppling Israel’s occupation of the West Bank).

Marketing. Facebook ties are also a capital in the commerce sphere, as marketing scholarship on ‘brand communities’ demonstrates (Laroche et al., 2012). By ‘liking’ brands, users volunteer to receive commercial contents. Facebook thus remolds advertising and public relations as interactive long-term ‘relationships’ between brands and ‘fans’ or ‘frustomers’ (Van Dijck, 2013: 64–5). These ties have economic value, as Facebook brand communities may increase brand trust and brand loyalty. Some fans also distribute marketing contents through sharing and commenting (thus raising brand awareness), or even produce brand-related content as they preach the brand (‘brand advocacy’), share new ways to use products, and initiate new users (Laroche et al., 2012). Business investment in brand communities is investment in brand social capital, as these ties drive users to provide unremunerated labor for the brand and feel committed to keep consuming it – thus brand social capital yields economic capital. Even if brand communities rarely exist in the idealized way marketers imagine them (Zwick and Bradshaw, 2016), what matters is the huge importance marketers ascribe to brand communities and biopolitical marketing (Zwick and Bradshaw, 2016), and hence the power Facebook holds by controlling them.

Measure of value. In both the economic and the political fields, the number of fans is a rough measure of social capital, the number of people an actor (be it a brand, a celebrity, a social movement or a politician) may be able to mobilize (into buying, unpaid promotional labor, voting or volunteering). However, accumulated ties also have a semiotic sign-value (Dalsgaard, 2008): their number is widely interpreted as indicating worth and power, thus it performatively grants power. ‘Likes’ serve as a universal token of worth, value and affect, the currency of general sentiment (Arvidsson, 2012; Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). With one million fans, a protest, a startup or a politician cannot be ignored.

Much of this social capital does not exist independently of Facebook: if not objectified as ‘Facebook friendships’, many of these ties will immediately cease to exist, while others will gradually fade away, along with the opportunity to mobilize resources. Social network analysis suggests brokers gain power from controlling bridges over network structural holes (Burt, 1992). In Facebook this applies not only to central nodes (popular profiles) but also to network operators, who exercise ‘networking power’, denying access to the resources accumulated within the network from those they believe do not add value (Castells, 2009).

Facebook’s power relies on its status as an emergent central bank of generalized social capital. Central banks issue currencies used by economic actors while competing with one another. While actors accumulate banknotes, their value remains dependent on the issuing bank, which may remove them from circulation or devaluate them at will. Bourdieu (1994, 1996) used the central bank metaphor for state control over other forms of capital such as academic certificates, for which actors compete, and the value of which depends on state recognition. While Facebook’s status relies on technological power rather than on symbolic power, this metaphor remains instructive.

Since Facebook streamlines the accumulation and maintenance of social capital, those who avoid using it are disadvantaged. Yet those who deposit their social capital in Facebook become increasingly dependent on Facebook Inc. and cannot withdraw their capital against its policy. They may invite ‘friends’ to parties or demonstrations, but not to participate in an uprising against the Israeli occupation. Facebook effectively restricts the mobilization of ties (e.g. by censoring posts); charges commissions (by algorithmically reducing fans’ exposure to page content and charging firms and social movements for ‘sponsored posts’ to avoid devaluation of their social capital); blocks currency transfers by emigrants (blocking applications that allow users to export their friend lists and thus retain the social capital they accumulated while immigrating to its competitor Google+); and confiscates social capital by deleting accounts, groups and pages. Facebook’s disciplinary power thus relies on its emergent status as a central bank of generalized social capital which it can devaluate, freeze or confiscate.

This status is comparable to Bourdieu’s famous account of the state as ‘the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1994: 4). Bourdieu claimed that as a central bank of multiple sorts of capital, the state has the privilege of setting their exchange rates, regulating social games in different fields, and thus influencing capital redistribution within its jurisdiction.

Facebook strives to gain a comparable status by becoming a necessary point-of-passage in multiple social spheres (including consumerism, culture and politics), a universal mediator and regulator of social life. Its privileged position allows Facebook Inc. to exert economic, political and socio-cultural influence by enforcing norms of conduct on its users, that is, to govern them.

How Facebook Governs

The next section explores Facebook’s governance toolkit – the set of mechanisms, technologies and strategies it employs to govern users. Indeed, any design decision may be framed as ‘governance’ in the broad sense. Online as offline, architecture shapes subjectivities, knowledge and power relations. For example, Facebook’s public like-counters quantify the value of user-generated contents, encouraging users to compete over attention, produce more contents and adapt content to their audience’s preferences (Coté and Pybus, 2007); rewarding intensive participation with increased visibility disciplines users (Bucher, 2012), while emoticons normalize emotional expression. Power should not be reduced to sovereignty and negative repression. Yet neither should we neglect their crucial role. Alongside design and seduction, digital capitalism governs through discipline, surveillance, legislation and punishment.

As suggested above, Facebook has an interest in governing its usership to maximize biopolitical production, yet governing billions of users may require high costs. While struggling to streamline governance, internet corporations have developed an apparatus consisting of algorithmic automated governance, free peer-produced policing labor, and proletarian judicial labor. Below I briefly review these components, while also addressing other characteristics of social network site governance: ambiguity; punishment by isolation; and constitutional legitimation.

Conclusion

As shown above, the political economy of social network sites and their politics are intimately interrelated. Without addressing the former, we can hardly explain why social network sites became interested in governing interpersonal, romantic, cultural and political interactions between users – human interactions in spheres not governed traditionally by corporations. This interest derives, I suggest, from their new capacity to extract surplus value from all these social interactions by translating them into content and data.

Facebook thus teaches us a general lesson. In the contemporary digital economy of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015) – where capitalism reorganizes around immaterial goods such as data and emotions and where surplus value can be extracted from all human interactions – capitalism extends its interest in governance from ‘management’ (governing employees) to the regulation of social interactions and emotions across life-spheres. Internet corporations govern in order to secure ‘safe’, unintimidating social spaces; protect enclosure; and intensify and streamline biopolitical production. This is a modernist project of gardening society by subjecting all digital interactions among users to rational governance. By regulating social life corporations like Facebook influence power-relations and encroach upon the political sphere. In digital capitalism there is thus a strong linkage between exploitation (the capture, enclosure and valorization of social relationships) and governance (attempts to regulate them).

Hence, Facebook simultaneously employs two complementing forms of surveillance, commodifying surveillance and panoptic surveillance, which are similarly interrelated. The first, widely discussed in the literature, turns human actions and affect into commodified data. But there is a second form, which is no less crucial for surveillance capitalism: Facebook monitors and disciplines users to improve biopolitical production and thwart sabotage. Users are more than raw materials: their actions influence production, and as environmental intervention fails to produce docility, surveillance capitalism deploys the heterogeneous governance apparatus portrayed above.

Bauman’s mistake in prematurely announcing the ‘collapse of the “panoptic” model of securing and perpetuating social order’ (Bauman, 1998: 22) in favor of consumer seduction (Bauman, 1998, 1999) derived from his assumption that postmodern capitalism targets us merely as consumers. Internet corporations actually target us mostly as biopolitical producers whose immaterial labor can be captured, and they integrate panopticism into their apparatus of governance-cum-accumulation.

Given the account of Facebook governance offered above, Facebook can hardly be described as demonstrating ‘corporate power that is no longer aimed at disciplining consumers and at giving orders or shaping actions according to a given norm’, or as replacing technologies of surveillance and discipline with ‘provision of ambiences’ and governance through freedom (Zwick et al., 2008: 184–6), an ‘environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals’ (Foucault, 2010, cited in Terranova, 2015: 124). The vast number of Facebook’s quasi-juridical decisions can hardly be reconciled with claims that ‘Facebook does little to dictate how its users use the site, but rather lets them use it the way they wish’ (Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010: 31).

The governance toolkit used by Facebook and other digital corporations is highly eclectic, bringing together sovereign legislation and design choices, seduction and disciplinary surveillance, constitutionalism and A/B testing, algorithmic governance and proletarianized administration of justice. It does not easily fit into epochal accounts such as the shift from sovereignty to governmentality, from government into governance, or from discipline to consumer seduction. It is surely too centralized to be subsumed under an account of the internet as a diagram of post-Fordist decentralized governance. The coherence of this eclectic toolkit is only revealed once we shift our attention to its political economy. Online all interactions are documented, which increases accountability for casual interactions (Schwarz and Shani, 2016) and renders them more governable. The resulting increase in the volume of governance work has encouraged rationalization and a shift towards algorithmic governance and proletarian judicial labor. Whereas Facebook might well lose its monopolistic status in the future, other internet corporations employ similar governance apparatuses, shaped by a similar political economy.

What makes Facebook’s governance consequential and effective is its emerging status as a central bank for social capital. This is the result of an isomorphic process, in which power and status in various fields increasingly take the form of objectified generalized social capital accumulated in social network sites. As digital services are increasingly intertwined in our everyday practices, denial of service in general is an effective punishment, yet confiscation of social capital is particularly powerful, as it affects a central social mechanism of hierarchization and accumulation of power. Confiscating social capital for punishment is practiced by several social network sites, virtual worlds and messaging platforms. However, Facebook uses it much more effectively and powerfully, as it controls generalized social capital to unprecedented levels. Viewed from a social capital perspective, multiple changes in Facebook’s design and features over the years have moved in the same direction, making it into a central bank of ever more diverse kinds of social capital.

Facebook’s power to engage in sovereign governance relies on its power to confiscate at will capital accumulated by users, be they ordinary individuals, politicians, social movements, artists or firms. By allowing all these actors to translate momentary sympathy into sustainable ties, Facebook empowers them, while also gaining the capacity to disempower them at will, depriving teenagers of access to chitchat, gossip and party invitations; social movements and rebels of the capacity to mobilize sympathizers to coordinated collective action; and firms of capitalizing on past investment in brand communities.

Liberal sociologists and philosophers have repeatedly suggested that the separation between partly-autonomous life spheres (and multiple institutional authorities) is a prerequisite for freedom (Goffman, 1961; Walzer, 1983; Weber, 1978). Facebook’s endeavor to become a central bank of various forms of social capital which are in circulation in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres, and to become a necessary point-of-passage in all these spheres, may thus be viewed as an alarming concentration of power.

While Facebook has long drawn public criticism, it has usually been formulated in terms of privacy and data control (as in the recent outrage against Cambridge Analytica’s use of Facebook to mine data on millions of Americans for targeted political advertising). Less often public criticism addresses particular politically sensitive governance decisions Facebook made or failed to make (as in the cases listed in this article’s opening paragraph). More recently, criticism has addressed the more systematic level of algorithmic curation, when Facebook was accused of failing to block ‘fake news’ during the 2016 US presidential campaign. However, if Shearing and Stenning were right, the problem lies elsewhere, at the very shift of social interaction and public life to privately-owned digital mass private property and its subjection to rules made by platform operators.

Recent major scandals have posed a clear threat to Facebook and its business model of biopolitical production, and it has reacted to them by introducing changes; however, these changes remain within the framework of governance portrayed above. Thus, the use of algorithms to identify suspicious foreign election meddling is yet another case of algorithmic governance, which results in confiscation of social capital (as in the case of closing down protest event pages; American activists who – not knowing who had opened them – invested time and effort in co-hosting these events had to ‘start over in gathering followers and building momentum to stage an effective protest’; Conger and Savage, 2018). ⁷

The scandals of recent years have raised consciousness about algorithmic curation, and few now consider Facebook to be a neutral medium, but neither is it a ‘publisher’, as some suggest; saying so would amount to a textualist reduction of the richness of mediated social life. ⁸ It is a quasi-sovereign power ruling its subjects. Since its governance apparatus was designed as a business investment in cultivating user populations and increasing their productivity, Facebook refuses to allow users to shape the laws that govern them. It remains open whether the governed will accept it in the long run.