A Century After Weber and Simmel

Max Weber, Zur Logik und Methodik der Sozialwissenschaften. Schriften 1900–1907. Edited by Gerhard Wagner, with the assistance of Claudius Härpfer, Tom Kaen, Kai Müller and Angelica Zahn. Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe I/7. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018, xv + 774pp (hbk). ISBN 9-883-16153-774-5. €349.00.

Max Weber, Verstehende Soziologie und Werturteilsfreiheit. Schriften und Reden 1908–1917. Edited by Johannes Weiß with the assistance of Sabine Frommer. Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe I/12. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018, xv + 648pp. (hbk). ISBN 9-3-16150-296-5. €269.00.

Writing in the early 20th century, Max Weber paused to look back on the intellectual world of the early 19th century in a way that speaks uncannily to our own dilemmas in the early decades of the 21st century. Literary scholars and social scientists, he mused, seem to waver between the extremes of ‘material seekers’ and ‘meaning seekers’ – those who tirelessly gather facts, statistics, and documents on the one hand and those who impatiently collect worldviews, essences, and profound ideas on the other (‘Stoffhuber’ and ‘Sinnhuber’, alluding to Theodor Fischer’s cynical caricature of approaches to Goethe’s Faust). In concluding this article (which has since become canonical), ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’, he uncharacteristically trails off with a poetic flourish that contrasts starkly with the dense scholarly prose of the rest of this programmatic piece. He suggests that in an age where everyone who works in the cultural sciences must be a specialist, the occasion to reflect on how each fact is somehow anchored in ultimate ‘value ideas’ only rarely presents itself. Nevertheless, points of view that had once seemed to illuminate one’s field of study may change their colour as ‘the way forward fades away in the twilight’:

The light shed by the great cultural problems has moved on. Then science, too, prepares to find a new standpoint and a new conceptual apparatus, and to contemplate the stream of events from the summits of thought. It follows the stars that alone can give meaning and direction to its work:

… the new impulse awakens,

I rush to drink its eternal light,

The day before me, and behind me night,

The heavens above me, under me the waves.

With the recent publication of two major handbooks (Müller and Sigmund, 2014; Hanke et al., 2019), several planned commemorative conferences and special journal issues, and the completion this year of the Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works), we seem to be leaving the ‘collect and correct’ phase of Weber scholarship and entering into an era of ‘the search for significance’ in light of new problems that concern us today. The Gesamtausgabe, which has been under construction since 1982, comprises 47 massive volumes of Weber’s published writings, manuscripts, correspondence, and lecture notes meticulously presented according to the formidable historical-critical principles of German scholarship. Working within the rules of editorial restraint and interpretive minimalism, each volume is handled with varying degrees of intellectual license according to each editor’s sense of the scholarly importance and contemporary relevance of these writings. For instance, Gerhard Wager’s 32-page introduction to MWG I/7 may be compared to Johannes Weiß’s 92-page introduction to MWG I/12 (see the recent reviews by Oakes, 2019, and Bruun, 2019). The most substantial pieces in these two volumes first appeared in pathbreaking journals such as the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for Social Science and Social Policy), including the ‘objectivity’ essay (cited above), which Weber co-edited, and Logos, which Georg Simmel co-founded in 1910 (including the influential essay on ‘value-freedom’ discussed below). Most were republished shortly after Weber’s death in collections edited by his wife Marianne, and selections in English appeared after the Second World War in a volume edited by Edward Shils and in numerous journals and anthologies. (The most comprehensive collection is now the Complete Methodological Writings edited by Henrik Bruun and Sam Whimster in 2012.) From this publication history we can see that the fate of Weber’s legacy and the fortunes of his writings have themselves been subject to the shifting lights of cultural problems, historical events, and intellectual concerns that he himself anticipated.

Besides speaking poignantly to the changing meanings of intellectual work and new methods of scholarship today, these two volumes surprisingly reveal Weber’s indebtedness to the writings of Georg Simmel, the centenary of whose death was commemorated in 2018 with several conferences, special journal issues, and monographs (the 24 volumes of Simmel’s collected works in German were completed in 2016). Essays by Weber included in Zur Logik und Methodik der Sozialwissenschaften (On the Logic and Method of the Social Sciences), writings from 1900–7, contain over a dozen strategic references to Simmel, including an extended discussion acknowledging Simmel’s original formulation of the concept of ‘Verstehen’. Likewise, Verstehende Soziologie und Werturteilsfreiheit (Interpretive Sociology and Freedom from Value-Judgment), writings from 1908–17, opens and closes with notes and drafts from Weber’s close readings of Simmel. For the first time we can now locate precisely the key points of convergence between these two classics of social theory – especially their relational approach to social reality from the starting point of ‘interpretive understanding’ – as well as the places where they diverge – particularly with respect to Weber’s commitment to ‘objectivity’ and ‘causal explanation’. Since many of these questions are still raised or revisited today, it is worth following the light that Weber’s references to Simmel shines on these often forbidding writings. Even as these two thinkers ‘gaze on the heavens above’ while navigating ‘the turbulent waves beneath’, each pursues in different ways what today we would call an anti-foundationalist theory of knowledge and a relational conception of reality.

In contrast to the brilliant start of Weber’s career, with appointments in Freiburg and Heidelberg as a young man in the 1890s, Simmel struggled for most of his life as an untenured ‘extraordinary’ professor in Berlin, despite his popularity among students and growing list of publications. After Weber’s nervous breakdown in 1897 forced him to leave the classroom for almost two decades, among the first books he read on his road to recovery was Simmel’s Philosophy of Money (the first edition appeared in 1900, the second in 1907) and Problems in the Philosophy of History (the first edition as well as the revised one of 1905). In the so-called ‘Nervi-notes’ that Weber wrote during his convalescence on the Italian Riviera in late 1902 and early 1903, he reflects on the relationship between empathy (or in-feeling: Einfühlung) and common sense (or evidence: Evidenz); on the difference between intuition and intelligibility; and on the contrast between rationality and irrationality, in part through his reading of Simmel. The latter treats irrational psychological processes in terms of ‘intelligibility’ rather than systematically in terms of their ‘lawfulness’, he notes (Nur “Verständlichkeit” nicht “Gesetzlichkeit” der psycholog[ischen] Vorgänge; MWG I/7: 660). Developing these points in ‘Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics’, a sprawling three-part essay published in the Archiv in 1903–5, Weber finds in Simmel’s work ‘by far the most elaborate beginnings, from the point of view of logic, of a theory of “understanding” [die logisch weitaus entwickelsten Ansätze einer Theorie des “Verstehens”]’ (MWG I/7: 308; CMW: 59). Again noting the lack of a systematic method for employing this concept, he nevertheless acknowledges how Simmel distinguishes ‘the objective “understanding” of the meaning of a statement from the subjective “interpretation” of the motives of a person who is speaking and acting [das objektive “Verstehen” des Sinnes einer Äusserung von der subjektiven “Deutung” der Motive eines (sprechenden oder handelnden) Menschen]’ (MWG I/7: 310; CMW: 60). Despite his misgivings over Simmel’s inability or unwillingness to elaborate on the implications of this contrast between ‘objectively valid’ and ‘subjectively intended’ meanings, Weber takes this understanding of ‘Verstehen’ as the starting point for his own.

Weber eventually arrived at his own perspective on ‘sociology’ as a distinct discipline with its own method of interpretation and explanation after a long and sustained struggle with Simmel’s work, and after confronting the many approaches to sociology taken by fellow members of the German Sociological Association, which he co-founded in 1910 with Simmel and others (see the eight contributions he made to these discussions in MWG I/12: 201–91, 302–28; and my commentary in Weber, 2005). In his final statement in the opening chapter of Economy and Society, ‘Basic Sociological Concepts’, he defines sociology as ‘a science that seeks interpretive understanding [deutend verstehen] of social action and thereby causal explanation [ursächlich erklären] of its course and effects’ (Weber, 2019: 78; translation modified). The two aspects of this now canonical definition, which he specifies in terms of degrees of ‘intended meaning’ or ‘understanding’ on the one side and of ‘objective possibility’ or ‘adequate causation’ on the other, refine his earlier attempts to identify the parameters of the field in his pivotal 1913 essay in Logos, ‘On Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’. Here too the significance of Simmel’s sociological writings is palpable, not just in Weber’s formulation of these categories but also for his overall conception of the ‘interpretive understanding’ of social action. Weber follows Simmel’s concern with dynamic processes rather than with static states of group formation, contrasting ‘types of communalization and association [Typen der Gemeinschaftung und Vergesellschaftung]’ before specifying how each process is characterized by either ‘communal or societal action [Gemeinschafts- oder Gesellschaftshandeln]’ with regard to affective, rational, customary, informal, and institutional contexts (MWG I/12: 406–18; CMW: 281–8; this scheme provides the structure for the first draft of Economy and Society, which he was working on at the time, but is reduced to a few pages in the final version).

Significantly, Weber’s earlier excerpt notes on Simmel’s Soziologie shed new light on their shared approach to the study of social relationships and social interactions. For instance, Weber is intrigued by Simmel’s perspective on ‘society’ as ‘the reciprocal interaction between individuals [die Wechselwirkung von Individuen]’, while insisting that ‘reciprocity is always only potentially present! [Das Gegenseitige ist stets nur potentiell vorhanden!]’ (MWG I/12: 528, 529). As he argues in commenting on Simmel’s discussion of domination and subordination in Soziologie, ‘Absolute coercion would no longer be “sociological”, since [there would be] no “interaction” (conceptual play?) [Absoluter Zwang wäre nicht mehr “soziologisch”, da keine “Wechselwirkung” (Begriffspielerei?)]’ (MWG I/12: 539). Weber is even more skeptical of Simmel’s analogies between organisms and individuals, even calling them ‘not at all true [gar nicht Wahr]’ and ‘sheer nonsense [reiner Unsinn]’ (MWG I/12: 529, 535). Despite their differences, each thinker begins with a relational and processual understanding of social reality even as they disagree on exactly how to assess the degree to which such relations are actually manifested, not just in theory but in practical and institutional contexts.

Weber is less likely to be remembered today for his particular approach to ‘interpretive sociology’ than for his principled distinction within the social sciences between ‘knowledge of “what is” and of “what ought to be” [Erkenntnis des “Seienden” und des “Sollenden”]’, as formulated in one of his most cited essays, ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’ (MWG I/7: 145; CMW: 101). Already in this early piece from 1904 he notes that this distinction is not reducible to the contrast between professional neutrality and fanatical partisanship, nor is it a question of allowing ‘the “idea”, in the sense of the ideal, grow out of the “idea” in the sense of the “ideal type”’ (MWG I/7: 210; CMW: 130). Instead, he argues, analytical constructs such as ‘ideal types’ are heuristic devices for acquiring ‘knowledge about the culturally significant aspects of the manifestations of life [die Lebenserscheinungen in ihrer Kuturbedeutung zu erkennen]’ (MWG I/7: 181; CMW: 116). Not only is knowledge of cultural significance related to and conditioned by values (wertbezogen), but such knowledge is also refracted through the value ideas of the investigator, as if in the soul’s mirror (‘die Farbenbrechung der Werte im Spiegel seiner Seele’; MWG I/7: 191; CMW: 120). In this regard as well, the personal and perspectival approach Weber embraces is closer to Simmel’s view than is usually acknowledged, who concludes his famous essay ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ with the reminder that, whatever our personal values or feelings about cities, ‘our task is not to complain or condone but only to understand’ (Simmel, 1997: 184).

Simmel’s training as a philosopher and his vocation as a sociologist arguably afforded him a greater freedom than Weber allowed himself in exploring the connection between statements about ‘what is’ and judgements concerning ‘what ought to be’. Simmel ultimately arrived at a metaphysical resolution to the tension between these ways of approaching ethics and existence in terms of what he calls ‘the individual law’, where ‘life, proceeding in its totality as Ought, means law for the very same life that proceeds in its totality as Actuality’ (Simmel, 2010: 107). Weber’s way of addressing these questions is notoriously more intellectually restrained and discipline-specific, especially in ‘The Meaning of “Value-Freedom” in the Sociological and Economic Sciences’, published in 1917 in Logos, the journal which Simmel co-founded and where many of his later essays also appeared. Rather than puzzle over broad philosophical problems, Weber focuses on the particular institutional conditions under which explicit distinctions between practical evaluations (appealing to value-judgements) and strictly academic arguments (based on factual statements) are both relevant and necessary. For this reason, the origins of the essay as an intervention at a 1914 conference of the Association for Social Policy is key to understanding his larger sociological argument (and its place with the conference discussions included in MWG I/12: 302–82). Often overlooked in discussions of Weber’s repeated insistence on the logical and principled separation between facts and values is how he highlights the rhetorical and the institutional contexts in which this distinction becomes relevant or required. For example, he emphasizes how the lecture hall (Hörsaal), the professor’s podium (Katheder), the academic journal, and the scholarly society (Gesellschaft, Verein) may each invoke some version of the postulate of ‘value-freedom [Wertfeiheit]’ as a condition for ensuring the intellectual integrity (intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit) and professional office (Amt) of scholarship, and often as a matter of university policy (Universitätspolitik) (MWG I/12: 445–59; CMW: 304–10; on Weber’s own rhetorical performance of these principles see Kemple, 2014: 29–59). In addition to his familiar admonitions against ‘prophets’, ‘propagandists,’ and ‘demagogues’ in the classroom, Weber notes that an empirical or theoretical treatment of ‘progress’ in the aesthetic sphere is not necessarily a value-laden question of personal taste or collective preference. Referring in this context to Simmel’s Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, he notes that ‘artistic progress’ need not be evaluated in terms of aesthetic or ethical criteria but can also be assessed in light of the evidence for increasing psychic differentiation, the expansion of cultural horizons, and the intensification of intellectual refinement among artists and publics alike (MWG I/12: 484; CMW: 321).

Weber and Simmel spent their final years living and working in cities away from where they had always felt most at home, with Simmel moving from Berlin to Strasburg in 1914 to take up his first position as an ‘ordinary’ professor until his death in 1918, and Weber relocating in 1918 from Heidelberg to Vienna and then Munich where he taught until his death in 1920. While their methods of research and styles of scholarly argumentation often seem antiquated to us now, their efforts to formulate a social theory of modern capitalism still resonate with us today (Kemple, 2018: 56–8). In the words of Weber’s ‘Accompanying Remarks’ to the inaugural issue of the Archiv in 1904, the task of this new generation of scholars should be to advance ‘the historical and theoretical investigation into the general cultural significance of capitalist development’ [die historische und theoretische Erkenntnis der allgemeinen Kulturbedeutung der kapitalistischen Entwicklung]’ (MWG I/7: 130; CMW: 97). Weber’s draft of an unpublished essay with the working title ‘Georg Simmel as Sociologist and Theorist of the Money Economy’ (from 1908, around the time he was reading and taking notes on Soziologie) clarifies the similarities and differences in their approach to this task. Weber praises the ‘absolute abundance of new ideas and subtle observations of fundamental importance’ in Simmel’s writings, where ‘even erroneous results contain a wealth of stimulation for one’s own further reflections’ (MWG I/7: 101; CMW: 418). At the same time, he also expresses ‘reservations’ over the ‘contradictions’, ‘failures’, and ‘way of dividing the air and uniting it again’ that often enrage readers of Simmel’s work (MWG I/7: 102–3; CMW: 419). In any case, Weber states that his own misgivings are decidedly intellectual and scholarly rather than political or personal in view of their shared search for a clear and accurate understanding of where they differ and when they disagree. As he argues in general terms in the essay on value-freedom:

The true meaning of a discussion of values is to grasp what the opponent (or oneself) really means – the value, that is, which is the real [wirklich], not just the apparent, concern of each of the two parties – in order to make it at all possible to define a position [Stellungnahme] with respect to that value. From the point of view of the demand for the ‘value-freedom [Wertfreiheit]’ of empirical analysis, it is therefore far from sterile, let alone absurd, to discuss valuations: but if discussions of that kind are to be useful, one has to realize what their true purpose is. The elementary precondition of such discussions is to understand that ultimate valuations may in principle and irreconcilably diverge: Neither ‘understanding all [alles verstehen]’ and ‘forgiving all [alles verzeihen]’ nor a mere understanding [Verständnis] of the other person’s position in itself will in any way lead to approval. It may just as easily, and often with far greater probability, lead one to realize that agreement is not possible, as well as why – and where – it is not possible. (MWG I/12: 465; CMW: 312)

Whatever Weber’s differences with Simmel, including the contrasting positions they had with respect to method or ‘ultimate values’, their disagreements were tempered by a common commitment to intellectual openness and modified by their shared interest in self-clarification.

What separates us most sharply from the intellectual world of Weber and Simmel is the degree to which the scholarly profession is now shaped not just by political commitments or national concerns but above all by economic forces and capitalist interests. Weber was especially tireless in defending ‘academic freedom’ in the university against the political interference of the Prussian Ministry of Education, to which he owed his own career, and in defending unconventional colleagues like Simmel against the corrupting influence of anti-Semitism and other anti-intellectual prejudices (see his writings on the University Teachers Congresses between 1908 and 1911 in Weber, 2008, and the review of MWG I/13, Hochschulwesen und Wissenschaftspolitik by Whimster, 2019). Today, university researchers and teachers must confront the new powers of corporate funding and an ethos of managerialism along with the old networks of patronage, sexism, and careerism which threaten free inquiry. Towards the end of ‘Science as a Vocation’, Weber confesses that he himself has always taken for granted that scholarship is an objectively valid calling, a value-judgment which he does not need to pronounce in the lecture hall because it is the very precondition of academic life. In response to those young people of his day ‘who hate intellectualism as the worst of devils’, he quotes Mephistopheles’ advice to a young scholar who boasts of his ‘awakening new impulse’ (in a version of Faust’s speech earlier in the play which Weber himself had quoted as a young man, and which I cited at the beginning of this essay): ‘“Reflect: the devil is old; grow old to understand him [Bedenkt: der Teufel, der ist alt, so werdet alt ihn zu verstehen]”’ (CMW: 350, quoting Goethe’s Faust, lines 6817–18). Just as Weber asks us to resist the temptation to run away from ‘the devil of the intellect’ by acquainting ourselves with the limitations and possibilities of this devil, if not by confronting our own inner demons, so Simmel invites us to look beyond the antinomies of the modern worldview inherited from the preceding century (Simmel, 2007). Ironically, each looked back to the century of Goethe for inspiration concerning how to act on ‘what the day demands’, if not for the sake of their own scholarly vocations then for guidance in their ordinary lives (CMW: 353; Simmel, 2010: 109). Today we would do well to recall what the age of Weber and Simmel can still teach us, and what it cannot.