From Scapegoating to the Culture of Cruelty: (Mis)Managing Mimetic Desire and Violence in Late Modernity

Sociability from Controlling Mimetic Violence

Since their earliest versions, social theories have aimed at explaining sociability. While seeking solutions to the challenge of social integration, they share a common presumption: they do not count the escalation of violence as among the most important challenges of modern sociability. Accordingly, these theories have little to offer for an analysis, which aims at mapping the late modern paradox of violence. For this purpose, an alternative approach is needed: one which not only focuses on the threat of escalating violence but also provides a dynamic model of recurring crises and social integration. Although Girard’s mimetic theory can be approached from many angles, in what follows, it is viewed as a dynamic social theory highlighting a basic functionality: managing contagious violence originating from ‘mimetic desire’. ¹

At the heart of Girard’s theory, we find a triangular model of inhabiting the world. The subjects do not differentiate between wanted and irrelevant objects on their own: a ‘model’ is also involved in the process. Desire is born, while engaging with the world via another subject, who already inhabits it, in their own way (Girard, 1965: 10). The subjects have no ontological or epistemological primacy: they are embedded in a matrix of others, who are also mimicking each other while relating to the world. However, the process of mimesis is neither a transparent nor an uncontroversial one. The subjects are usually not aware of their mimetic tendencies, because desire is experienced as something intimately belonging to themselves (self-identity is partly anchored in one’s desires). Consequently, mimesis is concealed: as the subjects attribute primacy to their own desire, they do not perceive the imitated other as a model, rather as a rival (Girard, 1965: 11). Such biased perception of the triangle around a mutual object of desire evokes hostile feelings, such as hatred, ressentiment or jealousy. ²

However, not only negative feelings might emerge from mimesis. Although some critics blame Girard for focusing solely on mimetic violence, while neglecting its alternatives, such as ‘passionate love’ (Strączek, 2022), the latter possibility is not entirely missing from his work. Girard argues that mimesis serves also as the basis of heroism, devotion, openness and ultimately the extreme love for others, which can be considered as important sources of countering the negative consequences of mimetic violence (Girard, 2000: 64). Despite their pro-social potential, the positive consequences of mimesis are contingent. Accordingly, the management of inevitable hostility requires more reliable mechanisms.

Ressentiment or jealousy exist either on a latent or a manifest level, depending on the distance of the model: in the case of distant models, the mediation is external (i.e. the universe of the model is not accessible for the subject, so actual rivalry is improbable); in the case of models being close, the mediation becomes internal (i.e. model and subject inhabit the same lifeworld, thus rivalry is probable). The intersubjective stakes of mimetic desire become obvious in these latter cases: relating to an object, while imitating another subject’s relation to the same object, involves not only the interaction with the object, but also the attempted transformation into the model (Girard, 1965: 88). The violence potential of desiring unfolds at this point: the real cause of hostile sentiments arising in internal mediation does not originate from a material conflict of interest (i.e. ‘scarcity’ – Dumouchel, 2014), but from the urge to take the place of the model, which can ultimately be ensured by violence (Girard, 1965: 51). Accordingly, mimetic desire represents a threat: societies must manage the potential contagious violence emerging from the triangles of subject, model and object (Girard, 1965: 97).

Even though the potential of mimetic violence is an inherent component of intersubjectivity, that does not make it completely uncontrollable: it may be tamed by being channeled towards substitute targets (Girard, 1977: 4). Religious sacrificial rites represent historical examples of such mechanisms. In archaic societies acts of violence threaten with the uncontrollable spiraling of conflict due to the logic of revenge. To prevent escalation, a substitute of vengeful violence is needed: an act of hurting, which stops further retaliation, thus breaking the chain. Such a mechanism requires a sacrificial victim, who is an appropriate target for the aggressive impulses, yet incapable of provoking further violence on its own (Girard, 1977: 18). Accordingly, violence is managed by violence: not just by any random form but by a specific, ‘disarmed’ one.

To stabilize the mechanisms promising to prevent the spreading of violence, the sacrifice needs to be repeated on a regular basis. Gradually, rituals are crystallized, serving as the performative foundation of religions. Sacrificial violence differs from everyday violence because of its consequences: the lack of revenge is not only a negative experience, but also a cathartic one (Girard, 1977: 93). As originally violence implies a chain of revenge, which spirals into a crisis of disintegration, the preventing of the expected escalation results in relief. Such experience is perceived as a miracle: suddenly, the feared turmoil is suspended and replaced by a newly-found harmony originating from the precedence of a non-retaliatory violence. As there are no other obvious agents involved, the miracle is attributed to the sacrificed subjects themselves, who bring peace for the community through their death. Retrospectively, the sacrificed ones are recognized as having transcendental powers, which are proven by their ability to prevent the escalation of violence. This metaphysical transformation is inevitably dramatic: the sacrifices are originally treated as the causes of the turmoil, until they become the solvers of the problem by becoming victims of a non-continuable violence (Girard, 1977: 250).

Consequently, a sacred order is born: the community develops ritualized sacrificial practices, which prevent the contagion of violence. These rites enable the birth of religious narratives and mythologies summarizing the previous experiences of mimetic crises, along with their resolution. Such cultural praxes define not only prohibitions and taboos (derived from the attributed preconditions of the paradigmatic crisis), but also the means of handling the inevitable future crises. These tools are central to the birth of political power, which is inherently linked to the realm of the sacred (Palaver, 2013: 275). Among the preventive normative-political measures, the regulation of mimetic desire is crucial: taboos revolve around those desires which have the highest potential of triggering contagious violence. Furthermore, choosing the right sacrificial subject is also central (Girard, 1977: 269): it must come from outside of the community (so that its sacrifice cannot be revenged); its activity should be interpreted as the cause of the crisis (so that its sacrifice can be narrated as a solution); the rite of sacrifice should enact the drama of a crisis and the catharsis (so that the sacrificial performance can replace the actual resurgence of violence).

Scapegoating is a crucial element of the sacrificial prevention of mimetic violence. The scapegoat is originally an insignificant stranger appearing on the horizon accidentally. Independently from their acts, the strangers are characterized by the inherent ‘sin’ of differing from the community. The difference is already a threat, as it refers to the possibility of diverging interpretations of those taboos and prohibitions which regulate mimetic desire. The position of the stranger inevitably evokes a moral suspicion – a potential which is easily transformed into actual persecution in times of crises (Girard, 1986: 35). If the chance of contagious violence is already high (due to the weakening of the binding force of sacrificial rites), the presence of a stranger (further increasing difference) pours oil on the fire. Being an obvious source of threat to the unity, the stranger represents a unique opportunity: the weakened order based on sameness is reinforced by turning against the suspect at hand. At this moment, the random stranger turns into a scapegoat who holds the potential of reinforcing the weakened religious-moral order of the community by becoming the object of its sacrificial violence (Girard, 1986: 87).

Such logic of preventing contagious violence through the cycles of scapegoating and ritualized sacrifice is detectable in many archaic societies. A decisive turning point in the history of mimetic desire is related to the birth of Christianity. The ‘Passion of Jesus’ denies the very logic of sacrificial violence control: because the story is told from the perspective of the innocent victim, it invalidates the justification of sacrifice (Girard, 1986: 119). To prevent the escalation of violence, the sacrificed victim needs to be consensually viewed as an evil entity, who is responsible for the turmoil – by altering the original script of the rite, the effect of the sacrifice is fundamentally changed. The community cannot blame anymore the scapegoat; taboos and regulations cannot be related to the scapegoat’s acts. The perspective of the Passion implies an alternative track of violence control: instead of channeling violence towards a scapegoat for the sake of preventing its escalation, overcoming through self-restraining becomes the new solution. Christianity indicates a demarcation line between the ‘violent sacred’ and the ‘holy’: while the former is based on the logic of scapegoating, the latter is based on the denial of its violent logic (Girard, 2017: 157). As the unveiling of the logic of scapegoating makes sacrificial violence inadequate, there is no other way but to condemn violence. In the long run, this transformation enables European civilization, which aims at overcoming mimetic violence not by redirecting it towards a scapegoat but by trying to eliminate it (Elias, 2000).

A Fragile Balance: The Classic Modern Paradigm of Controlling Mimetic Desire and Violence

While being preoccupied with the reconstruction of mimetic desire and violence, Girard was primarily focusing on archaic societies: from the perspective of mimetic desire and scapegoating, the key historical turning points are related to the birth of Christianity, not the structural transformations of early modernity (Cowdell, 2013: 169). However, from a sociological perspective, these latter transformations prove to be central: rationalization and functional differentiation reconfigure not only the political and economic institutions but also the mechanisms related to mimetic violence. The emergence of the secular nation-state (as a monopolist of violence) and the capitalist market (as an arena for fighting over desires in a non-violent yet morally unbound manner) reconfigure not only the space of violence but also the cultural context of mimetic desire. Since early modernity, social theories have conceptualized different aspects of these transformations. In what follows, they are combined with contemporary mimetic theories to map the transforming structural constituents of mimetic desire and violence.

The first question which needs to be addressed concerns the status of mimesis itself. According to classic social theories, the modern subject is shaped by the processes of individualization (Simmel, 1890) and rationalization (Weber, 1978). Because of these parallel transformations, modern subjects are framed as potentially autonomous, rational, authentic agents – i.e. independent from mimetic urges. They are not simply unaware of the mimetic aspects of their own behavior; rather, their self-identity is based on the denial of mimesis. Concepts such as autonomy or authenticity imply a self being in control of interpreting and shaping the world. Such subjects follow their own intentions independently of – or, if needed, even against – the other’s influence. They try not to copy the other but act as the author of their own life. This agency implies self-control over desires: the autonomous subject can demonstrate its independence not only by not mimicking but also by resisting desire (i.e. a modern version of asceticism). However, the denial and self-restraining of mimesis does not make imitation disappear; instead, it banishes it to the realm of the unconscious (Lawtoo, 2013: 12).

By including the dimension of mimesis in the concept of the unconscious, not only can modern subjectivity be reinterpreted but also those institutions which emerge from their intentional and unintentional activity. According to classic social theory, the modern institutions are created by autonomous, rational actors relating to each other primarily through contractual relationships instead of traditional interactions based on personal familiarity and customs. Based on the contractual integration mechanisms, a functionally differentiated system of the ‘division of labor’ emerges (Durkheim, 1997). However, the classic modern market and state institutions can be reinterpreted by complementing the concept of an autonomous, rational agent with the mimetic unconscious. Besides ‘rationalization’ or ‘functional differentiation’, the latent dynamics of mimesis (and its ambiguous interconnectedness with intentionality) also play a constitutive role in the operation of modern institutions. From the perspective of mimetic theory, ‘phantoms’ haunting the modern ego and their institutions are revealed (Lawtoo, 2013: 19).

The consequence of banishing mimesis to the realm of the unconscious results in a fundamental self-misunderstanding. The egos built upon such premises are affected by several illusions: they perceive themselves as independent, stand-alone entities having the ability (and the duty) of self-fulfillment and the potential of overcoming their own violent drives (while expecting others to do the same). This self-misunderstanding plays a central role, when it comes to shaping modern political and economic institutions: the modern subject seeks warranties for individual independence and a chance for self-fulfillment. While modern institutions seemingly aim at providing such guarantees, they also have the potential of misusing the neglected mimetic urges of the modern subject. The capitalist market has the potential of reducing the subject to a mere consumer (Ray, 2013), while the nation-state threatens with reinforcing ‘phantom communities’ (based on the mimetic dynamic between the ‘leader’ and the ‘followers’; Lawtoo, 2019: 94). As these examples show, the self-misunderstanding of the subjects holds the danger of exploiting the forgotten mechanisms of mimesis by modern institutions managing mimetic desire and violence in a secular way.

Since Christianity dissolves the ‘violent sacred’ by the ‘holy’, religious sacrifice does not have a cathartic potential required for social integration. However, the deconstruction of sacrificial logic did not automatically result in the emergence of secular control mechanisms. The initial impact of Christianity was a disintegrating one: the disillusionment with existing sacrificial rites implied proto-secularization, as it weakened religious authority (Cowdell, 2013: 117). This inherent tendency of undermining authorities also affected the Christian institutions in the long run: the birth of the modern secular state is inseparable from the emergence of those worldly technologies of power which restrain mimetic violence more effectively than the religious ‘pastoral power’ (Foucault, 1982). A consequence of dissolving both the sacred and the ‘holy’ is that all those pro-social mimetic potentials, which were originally related to these moral orders (e.g. compassion), are also weakened. The community-based solidarity was gradually replaced by the expert state institutions of social security (Castel, 2002). Because of such ‘atomization’, the space of ‘mimetic openness and love’ (Girard, 2000: 64) – as potential counters to mimetic violence – shrunk.

The fundamental consequences of atomization were first explored by Hobbes’ social contract theory, which outlined a completely secular grounding of state power, exclusively building on generalized self-interest. The modern state is constituted by its capacity of functioning as the monopolist of violence (Dumouchel, 2014: 227). Based on these premises, gradually the surveillance technologies relying on religious discursive power were replaced by the technologies of law enforcement practiced by the institutions of the state. Contagious violence is not managed on a sacred level but on a physical one: it is reinterpreted as a profane threat, which can be best prevented by efficient countermeasures (Lawtoo, 2013: 293). These countermeasures include the emerging technologies of surveillance and corrective punishment (Foucault, 1995), developments which are justified by the promise of the ‘common good’.

The transformation of violence control is interrelated with the changing context of its main cause, that is, mimetic desire. While the solutions based on the technologies of surveillance can hold at bay the extreme escalation of mimetic violence, they are less effective against the more subtle conflicts arising around mimetic desire. Accordingly, the state policies of monopolizing physical violence are complemented by alternative technologies aiming at managing mimetic desire. On this level the main transformation concerns the deregulation of desiring, which is enabled by technological and economic progress (Tijmes, 1999). Embracing desires not only ceases to be a sin (as Christian ethics lose ground), but it also becomes a new norm: the logic of the free market (i.e. the terrain of freely satisfying desires), the discourses of development and meritocracy (i.e. the justification of unlimited accumulation and consumption) express complementary dimensions of a social context encouraging the cultivation of desire (Palaver, 2013: 69). The new capitalist norms and the emerging markets created opportunity for organizing one’s life around mimetic desire while maintaining an institutional setting hosting such activities (Cowdell, 2013: 118).

Furthermore, the free market offers an alternative mechanism of violence management: like the logic of sacrifice, it replaces a greater, uncontrollable violence with a smaller, controllable one, in the form of market competition (Kitzmüller, 1995). Violent urges are not enacted in physical form but transformed into more subtle, symbolic praxes. The justifications referring to meritocracy, utilitarianism or equilibrium veil the repressed violence of market competition, at the cost of contaminating morality (Dupuy, 2014: 19). Among these justifications, the ones related to ‘scarcity’ play a special role, because they frame competition as an inevitable environmental constraint. However, scarcity itself is far from being a natural facticity: its genesis is interrelated with the dissolving of community-based solidarity ties. Scarcity as a justification for competition is inseparable from the ‘moral economy’ of atomized subjects being responsible only for themselves (Dumouchel, 2014: xi). Accordingly, scarcity is the consequence of a structural setting: by being presented as a ‘natural’ cause of social turmoil, it intensifies competition, while granting the state the authority of handling the conflicts revolving around scarce resources (Dumouchel, 2014: 133).

The political and economic structures encouraging mimetic desire, while controlling contagious violence, are interrelated: the state becomes responsible for the outbursts of physical violence, while it also maintains a platform (i.e. the free market) where non-physical violence (i.e. exploitation) can be practiced in the process of satisfying mimetic desire (which depends on accumulation). The state and market coalition of the secular management of contagious violence is further reinforced by the justifications elaborated in public discourses. The industrial, civic and market ‘cités’ refer to the values of scientific development, the expansion of equality, inclusion, profitability and efficiency (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). These values and narratives are functionally like the archaic religious mythologies: by grounding a normative order of desiring, they reinforce the state and market institutions which are responsible for managing mimetic violence. These values are internalized by the modern subjects: the institutional justifications imply the application of the principles of expertise, justice and efficiency when it comes to managing desire and self-controlling mimetic violence.

However, even this refined system has its flaws: the combined institutional mechanisms of the state and the market are not capable of completely controlling violence: crisis is an inherent potential of the markets, which might turn into contagious violence (Cowdell, 2013: 128). In the moments of escalating crisis, the seemingly modern infrastructure of the state and the market collapses, while regressing to the archaic patterns of scapegoating. Modernity provides several examples for the re-emergence of scapegoating in times of crises, especially in the case of financial bubbles (Reveley and Singleton, 2019: 12). ³ However, these attempts at scapegoating significantly differ from the archaic ones: because of secularization, no one expects them to ground a new quasi-religious normative order by re-directing violence towards the scapegoat. Instead, their limited functionality is the acting out of destructive impulses (while providing opportunity for taking over the desired property of the persecuted group). Without attaching a sacred meaning to sacrificial violence, its contagiousness is not prevented: the modern form of scapegoating does not bring peace, not even temporarily. It needs to be practiced recurringly, so that the repetition of an authorized form of violence itself could continuously satisfy the escalating mimetic desire (Lawtoo, 2019: 112).

Accordingly, the modern state violates its fundamental promise: by expansively using instrumental violence, the protection of citizens fails (Dumouchel, 2015). Despite the seeming success of the civilizing process, the modern state cannot entirely secure peace. As is exemplified best by the interwar history of Germany, the state monopoly of violence is never evidently given: the process of civilization might be reversed, which threatens with the escalation of internal violence (Elias, 1997: 214). The logic of mimetic doubles has haunted nation-states since their birth, which not only resulted in the world wars but also re-emerges in contemporary ‘new wars’ (Farneti, 2015: 28). These outbursts of internal and external violence exemplify the imperfection of modern violence management mechanisms. Because secular market and state mechanisms cannot provide a long-term resolution to the challenge of mimetic violence, its potential remains a constant, latent threat.

In sum, the classic modern paradigm of managing desire and violence can be described as a fragile balance. Mimesis itself is denied by the individualized subjects, so it becomes unconscious; the modern actors seek warranties for their individual life and the right to fulfil their desires, so institutions emerge along these lines; on the one hand, the state becomes the monopolist of violence, thus institutions of surveillance are developed; on the other hand, the market (promising virtually unlimited access to goods) becomes a space for acting out mimetic desire and non-physical violence (i.e. market competition); the coalition of state and market is justified by discourses of development, equity and efficiency, which serve as secularized normative regulations; as a final complementary mechanism, in times of mimetic crises (often originating from the crises of the market), a secular version of scapegoating is practiced in the form of political violence. While the major elements of this constellation have been operational since early modernity, by the end of the 20th century every constituent was reconfigured due to parallel structural and phenomenological transformations. Consequently, the classic modern paradigm of managing desire and violence is turned inside out. In the following section these transformations are overviewed, so that the contemporary paradigm of mimetic cycles can be elaborated.

A Balance in Turmoil: The Late Modern Paradigm of Controlling Mimetic Desire and Violence

Classic modernity resulted in the emergence of an autonomous and rational subjectivity denying mimesis. In late modernity, the structural processes which used to enable such subjectivity are fundamentally reconfigured. The ‘system colonization’ of the lifeworld reduces autonomy and authenticity by dissolving those intersubjectivities, where they could be developed (Habermas, 1987). The ‘risk society’ undermines the authority of those expert knowledges which used to ground rationality (Beck, 1992). Because of these tendencies, the mechanisms which used to enable relatively autonomous, rational and authentic subjectivities are gradually replaced by new ones, implying dependent, uncertain and inauthentic subjectivities. The formative experience of late modern subjectivities is fundamentally negative: their identity cannot be anchored in ‘grand narratives’, yet they still aspire for autonomy, rationality and authenticity. This creates a paradoxical pattern of self-identity: mimesis continues to exist in the realm of unconsciousness, while at the same time the ego is gradually emptied. Within this paradoxical constellation, the overall impact of mimetic drives becomes more decisive: as classic modern sources of the self become unavailable, consumption (fueled by mimetic desire) remains the main source of identity formation. Consequently, despite the subjects’ insistence on authenticity, they merge into the crowd constituted of the masses of inauthentic others (Lawtoo, 2013: 289).

As the transformations of subjectivity result in the dissolving of an ego, which used to serve as the basis of self-controlling unconscious mimetic urges, the related institutions also reconfigure. The risk of violence increases, while new control mechanisms emerge. These mechanisms are less sensitive to the autonomy or rationality of the actors; rather they ‘govern’ the population through efficient system intervention. Besides the monopoly of physical violence, the state expands its operation through technological invention, the expansion of discursive power and new ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1997). The new methods of algorithmic surveillance enable not only the control of the visible forms of violence, but they also reach its hidden forms (Laufs and Borrion, 2022). The biopolitically motivated expert discourses set new standards for the normalcy of human existence: violent drives are defined as ‘pathological’. The institutions promoting and applying the principles of psy-sciences sanction not only physical violence but also the related dispositions and their presumed causes. The distortions of nurture and ego-development are treated as causes of violent dispositions, which require therapeutic treatment and state intervention (Rose, 1999).

However, the increased control of violence is far from being an unambiguous process. Instead of preventing violence, the increase of surveillance and discursive pathologizing could result in its hiding or tabooing (Sampson, 2005). If applied in a dogmatic manner, the moral judgments surrounding violence might turn into hypocritical moralizing, which leads to insincerity: instead of disappearance, violence transforms along the lines of the taboos. Consequently, a new dynamic emerges: if violence is framed as completely unacceptable, but violent drives still operate as constitutive mechanisms of the human psyche (Freud, 1981: 211), then the new restrictions inevitably lead to the transformation of violence. Those forms start to spread, which are undetectable by the current technologies of surveillance and discursive power. In sum, even if the combination of surveillance and discursive power results in the further decrease of public physical violence, the cost of such pacifying attempts is pathologizing, hypocritical tabooing and the consequent emergence of undetectable forms of violence.

While the threat of contagious violence is partly managed by enhanced surveillance, the contemporary transformations of capitalism have an opposite effect. On the one hand, capitalism also develops algorithmic technologies, like the ones applied by the state: these create individualized profiles of the customers (Zuboff, 2018). Such refined mechanisms represent a new ‘system’ level of cultivating mimetic desire: the individuals are trapped in the seemingly endless loop of craving and satisfaction (Machuco Rosa, 2003; Weigand, 2008). Consequently, existence is fundamentally organized in an addictive way (Schalow, 2017). If classic modern capitalism was based on the encouraging of desiring and accumulating, contemporary capitalism brings these tendencies to a new level by personalizing the horizon of desire and refining the technologies of enjoyment (Reveley and Singleton, 2019: 23).

On the other hand, the structural transformations of contemporary capitalism do not favor the masses of would-be consumers. Globalization leads to the increase of inequalities and the destabilization of employment positions at the same time (Standing, 2012). In the era of network capitalism, only the horizon of mimetic desire expands globally, while the opportunity of realizing these desires is still distributed unequally (Castells, 2010). These processes are partly responsible for paradoxical market dynamics: the motivation for consuming beyond one’s financial capabilities might result in market bubbles (such as the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008; Cowdell, 2013: 128). Besides structural paradoxes, they also create anger and frustration originating from the unfulfillable desires. The heightened yet unrealistic expectations have the potential of turning into contagious violence, which implies the more frequent use of secular scapegoating in times of financial crises (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014).

All in all, the fragile balance of state and market mechanisms managing contagious violence while enabling mimetic desire at the same time is upset in late modernity. The intensification of desiring already increases the risk of escalating violence (by overburdening the mechanisms of surveillance and discursive power) and the development of hidden, new forms of violence. These tendencies are aggravated by the increasing contrast between globally distributed models of desire and the unequal chances of consumption. To reduce the tension, secular scapegoating mechanisms are applied more frequently (Dumouchel, 2008), up to the point where they become basic parts of the political toolbox (Nonini, 2002), especially in the hands of contemporary populism. Mimetic dyads from the past (e.g. inter-ethnic conflicts) are not only resurrected, but – while entering into the global public sphere – they also intensify tensions (Farneti, 2015: 71). The global contagious violence would require supranational control mechanisms, which are made improbable by the proliferation of unhandled political cleavages.

The late modern paradigm of mimetic desire and violence is on a spiraling trajectory: as the pressure from unleashed mimetic desire is out of control, the ambivalent countermeasures developed by the classic modern state and market become insufficient. The already upset balance is even more destabilized because of the transformations affecting the narrative justifications. While classic modern institutions were justified by the narratives of industrial, civic and market cités (e.g. truth, justice, merit), their legitimacy is severely weakened in late modernity. Not only because the subjects who could apply the justifications are dissolved by ‘negative integration’ (Sik, 2021), but also because the justifications themselves are greatly discredited. The ‘grand narratives’ of modern states as a safeguard of justice are undermined by historical experiences related to collective traumas (e.g. the Holocaust, totalitarianism or colonization). These experiences have showed that the modern state is far from being a haven against contagious violence (especially in the era of globalization; Gallego and de Frutos, 2021). On the contrary, the state combines the mechanisms of secular myth-creating and scapegoating with the refined technologies of surveillance and biopolitics (Lawtoo, 2019: 146). The justifications of scientific and technological progress are undermined by the experiences of irreversible risks such as nuclear catastrophes and pollution (Beck, 1992). Consequently, the modern state and market are viewed as being responsible for an unsustainable trajectory: instead of providing a livable future, they burden contagious violence on the exploited socio- and ecosphere (Cowdell, 2013: 131).

Social criticism indicates not only the end of a naïve identification with the justifications of modernity, but also the ‘exhaustion of utopic energies’ (Habermas, 1986). From the perspective of mimetic theory, this reveals the impossibility of producing such secular substitute narratives which could serve as the normative basis of controlling desire. Without such narratives, contagious violence is even less containable: not only are the failed mechanisms of the coalition of state and market responsible for an explosive constellation, but the threat is further aggravated by the inadequate technologies of regulation. The consequence of these tendencies is the collapse of the modern paradigm of managing mimetic desire and the constant threat of contagious violence (Girard, 2010), as is indicated by the phenomena of genocide, war and terror (Cowdell, 2013: 144).

Even if these tragic outcomes outline the final stakes of contemporary mimetic crises, they are not the only consequences of the collapsing paradigm of violence control. More subtle forms of violence also emerge outside of the radar of state surveillance and discursive power. These phenomena refer to the everyday praxes of cruelty, operating in secrecy, often in a silenced, unconscious manner. Along with the banalization of secular scapegoating, these mechanisms function as the most common valves for releasing the steam of contagious violence.

Conclusion: Naturalized Cruelty and Alternative Sacrificial Rites

After overviewing the classic and late modern transformations of mimetic desire and violence, in the final section an attempt is made to outline some general conclusions (Table 1 summarizes the previously discussed transformations).

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Table 1.

The structural transformation of mimetic desire and violence control.

	archaic societies	classic modernity	late modernity
mimetic desire	mimesis is the basis of social interactions; restricted by cultural-religious regulations	birth of subjectivity makes mimesis unconscious; autonomous subjects self-regulate desire; institutionalized platforms of desire (market)	dissolving of autonomous subject (previously responsible for self-regulation of desire); enhanced platforms of desire (personalized market) in contrast with the structural inequalities of consuming
main technologies of violence control	channeling contagious violence into sacrificial violence	surveillance of the secular state (i.e. the monopolist of violence); self-regulation of the subjects	enhanced external surveillance and internal governance (discursive technologies of the self); spiral of tabooing and transforming violence
supplementary technologies of violence control	in times of mimetic crisis scapegoating renews/ reinforces the cultural-religious regulations	in times of mimetic crisis secular version of scapegoating is used as an extraordinary political praxis	the recurring economic crises and the repressed social tensions are routinely handled by secular versions of strategic scapegoating (populism); naturalized cruelty (private forms of hurting)
cultural patterns of violence control	religious taboos outlining the space of forbidden desire	justifications of modernity (development, equity, efficiency) internalized by autonomous subjects	emptied utopic horizons, disillusioned subjectivities reproducing a culture of cruelty
stability of the paradigm of violence control	cycles of contagious violence and sacrifice	fragile balance of the state restricting violence and the market generating desire	uncontainable, shapeshifting mimetic violence

In late modernity, the high level of mimetic desire is further increased by the emergence of a quasi-universal set of models (transmitted by the globalizing media and information society), while the satisfaction of the aroused desires is undermined by the drastic material inequalities. Despite the refining technologies of surveillance and discursive power, the state control of contagious violence cannot keep up with the pace. The subjects losing the horizon of autonomy, rationality and authenticity become less ‘governable’ by the discursive technologies of the self, while the disillusioned justifications of modernity further destabilize the cultural basis of violence control. On the one hand, this results in the overuse of the originally supplementary mechanisms of secular scapegoating, which becomes a central element of a political sphere dominated by postmodern populism. On the other hand, this results in the expansion of violence outside the scope of state surveillance, resulting in latent patterns of hurting and self-harming (Girard, 1996). Overall, late modernity is not only characterized by the constantly high level of interpersonal and intra-group violence, but also the naturalization of these patterns (Malešević, 2013).

The various forms of violence are integrated into the late modern social and existential structures. Cruelty is naturalized both in the case of the routinized mechanisms of scapegoating and the latent, everyday mechanisms of harming (e.g. Lebreton et al., 2019). These phenomena constitute an interrelated structure of private and public violence, wherein new forms emerge constantly. As the state is only interested in preventing escalation, it does not stop but rather transforms violence. In the case of populist scapegoating, direct physical violence against stigmatized social groups is partly replaced by indirect, symbolic violence. In the private sphere, the extreme, potentially destructive forms of physical violence are partly replaced by less striking, often mental forms of torment and self-harm. By approaching these contemporary forms of naturalized cruelty from the historical perspective of mimetic desire, their broader structural context can be revealed: they appear as consequences of the collapse of the – ambivalent yet operational – classic modern paradigm of violence control. By providing space for violence in everyday life, they constitute a new, ambivalent ‘culture of cruelty’, which is based on the mixture of tabooing and cultivating violence. ⁴ The routinized public praxes of secular scapegoating and private forms of harming mutually reinforce each other: they provide space for internalizing the apathy towards the suffering other and also entitle the subjects to fulfil their violent drives.

While these potentials depend on many factors, the ideal-typical reconstruction of late modern mimetic cycles implies some hints about the potential ways out from these destructive scenarios. The central conclusion of combining mimetic and modernization theories is that contemporary contagious violence cannot be explained based on the triangle of the subject, the model and the object. The fragile balance of classic modernity seems to be irreversibly in turmoil: the external and internalized technologies of state surveillance are not capable of keeping under control the increased mimetic crisis potential, so political scapegoating becomes part of the ordinary toolset. However, the frequent use of scapegoating does not establish new moral orders: these attempts can neither catch up with the accelerating pace of unleashed mimetic desire nor handle the increasing meaninglessness of sacrificial rites. Populist scapegoating represents a desperate effort: sacrifice is overused because political actors see no alternative mechanisms which could keep contagious violence at bay.

Finding such alternatives requires reflection on the dialectics of sacrifice. According to Nancy, the exemplary stories of Socrates and Christ reconfigured the script of sacrifice: instead of targeting another individual, it becomes self-sacrifice. These paradigmatic self-sacrifices are ‘unique and accomplished for all’ (Nancy, 1991: 22). They reveal an essential truth of sacrifice: the necessity to gradually overcome sacrificial logic itself. From the perspective of these unique and universal acts of self-sacrifice, any further attempts are mere mimeses. Despite being continuously practiced, the mimesis of sacrifice fundamentally differs from the original rites. Such mimetic praxes result in a negative conclusion: by revealing the ‘unsacrificeable’, they demonstrate the impossibility of a meaningful sacrifice (Nancy, 1991: 38). However, the dialectically unfolding, existential impossibility of sacrificing other subjects does not imply the empirical disappearing of these rites. Instead, it results in their transformation into meaningless acts of destruction – as is exemplified by the Holocaust and genocides (Kouba, 2019: 384).

From this perspective, the contemporary failure of sacrificial violence control appears in a new light. Such failure is not simply the consequence of the intensifying mimetic desire, but also the dialectical dissolving of meaningful sacrifice. Within this context, forcing sacrifice is inevitably a futile attempt: instead of resolving mimetic violence, it can only result in the destruction of individuals and existential structures. Accordingly, a paradox of contemporary sacrificial violence control becomes visible: to manage the unleashed mimetic desire, the increase of meaningful sacrifice is needed; however, meaningful sacrifice cannot rely anymore on the destruction of subjects characterized by unalienable existential and moral features. To address this paradox and provide an actual alternative for contemporary violence control, sacrifice needs to be reconfigured both on the level of its targets and its script.

When it comes to finding valid targets, the realm beyond the unsacrificeable needs to be mapped. The experience of impossible sacrifice evokes an endless ethical ‘call to responsibility’ towards other human beings (Keenan, 2005: 185). However, this ethical delimitation is not strictly negative: it also helps to explore the complement of the unsacrificeable. Social entities appear as alternative sacrificial targets: they do not imply the destruction of subjects while having the potential of resolving social turmoil through ritual violence. However, not just any social entity can fulfil such a role. To make sacrifice meaningful for violence control, the scapegoat must be fundamentally linked to the mimetic cycles of the subjects. According to Girard, the ideal scapegoat is an obvious yet distant cause of social turmoil: it is involved in mimetic rivalry, while also belonging to the outside world (so that it does not provoke an endless chain of vengeful violence). The appropriate institutional sacrificial targets need to have functionally equivalent features: to get involved in mimetic rivalry, they must mediate individual desires through their institutionalized channels; to prevent the escalation of the chain of revenge, they must be dispensable.

To mention a few examples, globalized market institutions, biopolitical structures of governance or the information technological tools of surveillance equally play a fundamental role in mimetic cycles: the subject relates to the models and objects of desire through these mediators. Accordingly, the actors’ mimetic desires are fundamentally linked to them: they rely on their outputs and identify with their semantic universe, while also reproducing them. Furthermore, they are dispensable: despite their interrelatedness with individual existence, their destruction neither involves the death of the subject nor implies inevitable violent revenge. This makes such institutions ideal targets of sacrificial violence control: their sacrifice is not inherently meaningless (because they are non-human entities mediating human desire), while also having the potential of preventing contagious violence (via eliminating the attributed cause of turmoil).

History provides several examples of sacrificing social entities for the sake of reinforcing a new moral order. Boycott exemplifies the sacrificing of economic institutions: by suspending market interactions with a morally condemned company, the boycotters intentionally make its operation impossible. The various intentions behind boycott might range from avoiding complicity, protesting, exercising social punishment, or even coercion (Radzik, 2017). These strategies differ in their violence potential; however, they equally express the strategy of undermining certain institutions for the sake of eliminating a general threat to moral order. Civil disobedience exemplifies the similar sacrifice of laws and state institutions: by intentionally violating certain laws due to their moral unjustifiability, the disobedient citizens suspend state authority and legitimacy, in a potentially violent manner (Arendt, 1972).

While the best-known examples of boycotting and civil disobedience do not explicitly aim at sacrificial violence control, their specific versions hold such potential. Those attempts of undermining economic or legal institutions fit the requirements of sacrificial violence control, which focuses on ordinary social entities. Instead of boycotting widely known yet distant companies or laws, such sacrificial rites are embedded in the actors’ own network. On the one hand, sacrifice requires the ability to ruin a social entity (by suspending the interactions responsible for its reproduction): in the case of locally embedded institutions, even a small-scale collective action might have a major impact. On the other hand, to become meaningful, the sacrificed institution must mediate the actors’ mimetic desires and provide a platform for the related rivalries. The ordinary institutions embedded in one’s social network have explicit existential significance: boycotting companies whose products and services are used regularly by the local actors, or disobeying local authorities providing otherwise necessary public functionalities, is an actual (self-)sacrifice, as it destroys elements of the shared social world (for the sake of preventing an anticipated larger-scale turmoil). Although the disruption of these ordinary structures is fundamentally ambivalent, it still represents a unique alternative to the existing mechanisms of failed sacrificial violence control.

Even if the sacrifice of those local institutions which are responsible for contagious violence but also play a constitutive role in the personal social world is generally improbable, it is not outright impossible. ⁵ To increase its probability, the script of sacrificing needs to be revised. Instead of being practiced as an irreversible act, institutional sacrifice needs to be turned into a reversible process. Sacrifice is fundamentally based on trading violence: it exchanges the more threatening contagious violence for the sacrificial violence targeting only the scapegoat. While the sacrifice of a subject (i.e. a ritual murder) is an irreversible act, sacrificing abstract entities is inherently flexible. It is a prolonged process, which does not happen instantaneously (unlike the ritual murder) but unfolds gradually as the interactions reproducing institutional structures are suspended. This extended timeframe provides opportunity for rewriting the script of sacrificing: by interrupting, the process might be reversed at any points.

Instead of aiming at elimination, the sacrifice of market and state institutions might be redesigned as a process of ‘provocation’. While provoking locally embedded institutions, the interactions reproducing them are not entirely suspended, instead constantly challenged or obstructed – up to the point that their operation and existence become uncertain. Like elimination, provocation is also a form of violence: the challenging or obstructing of a target holds the potential of an escalating confrontation or a prolonged process of ruining (Boudana and Segev, 2017). However, provocation is inherently open-ended: besides the escalation of violence, it can also be interrupted and reversed. While the motivation for eliminating ordinary institutions is generally improbable, the motivation for interrupted sacrifice is not necessarily. As the actors are already embedded in a culture of cruelty, the possibility of provoking is constantly on their horizon – such a drive only needs to be redirected towards ordinary institutions generating contagious violence. To turn it into a sacrificial rite, provocation needs to be organized as a collective action targeting those otherwise naturalized institutions, which are involved in mimetic cycles. Such a reversible sacrificial process creates a previously unimaginable horizon: a post-sacrificial time shared by the target and the executioner, who are both transformed by the interaction. This horizon could represent the next step in the dialectics of sacrifice: in the era of the unsacrificeable, the reversible sacrifice of institutional entities provides an alternative, meaningful mechanism of violence control, while also opening new reflective directions beyond destruction and self-sacrifice.

On the one hand, the involved actors might realize that their provocation weakens the institutions they depend on; that they are not helplessly subordinated to the structures (but can collectively resist them); that they are not innocent victims (but have a role in the reproduction of the distortive structures fueling their mimetic desires). The indirect act of sacrificing – i.e. suspending the involvement in the reproduction processes – retrospectively reveals the actors’ naturalized, tacit contribution to contagious violence. Although such ambivalent experience does not establish a new sacred order, it might still have an impact like the original sacrificial rites: by revealing the personal responsibility for mimetic desire and the dynamics of contagious violence, it motivates the actors to self-restrain their future urges. These actors practice (self-)sacrifice in a mediated and secular way: they become aware of their involvement in mimetic cycles by shaping the social environment they rely on.

On the other hand, the sacrificed institutional actors might also realize that their operation is not evidently secured (it depends on those subjects who can provoke or even eliminate them); that they have an unreflected, unintentional role in the escalation of contagious violence (either by propelling desire or failing to prevent contagious violence); that they have responsibilities beyond the system functionalities of legality and efficiency. The – potentially shocking – experience of being sacrificed (even if the process is interrupted) implies reflection on their mediatory involvement in mimetic cycles. Economic institutions might re-evaluate their strategies of generating desire and normalizing competitive violence. State institutions might reconfigure their discursive and surveillance strategies of violence control.

The collective provocation of social institutions (as an interrupted sacrifice) grants a unique perspective of reversible violence. It provides a mimetic model capable of countering the escalation of both private forms of tormenting and public outbursts of violence. Although the details of such praxes are yet to be explored through social experimenting, they might represent the next step in the history of mimetic desire and violence. ⁶ Just as modernity developed symbolic forms of sacrifice (such as market competition replacing physical violence), contemporary societies are also at a crossroads. There is no way back either to substantive forms of the sacred or to increased violence control exclusively based on surveillance and scapegoating (as they produce an unsustainable culture of cruelty). A paradigm shift is needed on the level of violence management, which requires adjustment to the structures of late modernity. Ordinary, interrupted institutional sacrifices must be explored, which enable the simultaneous internalization of victimhood and responsibility. The praxes of reversable sacrifice represent an alternative to the logic of overused and meaningless scapegoating: by helping to reflect on the individual and institutional responsibility for contagious violence, they might open a new path in the history of mimetic desire and sacrifice.