Legislative turnover and its sources: It’s the selection

Abstract

The research note argues that legislative turnover can be decomposed into two main sources of newcomer entry into the legislature: entry by election and entry by selection. This is demonstrated using available data on political mandates in the lower chambers of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the period 1945–2015. We observe that selection is the leading source of new member entry across country and across time. Most turnover happens prior to general elections. This appears to be a general rule characterizing the phenomenon. We speculate as to the reason why. The conditions under which election appears to overtake selection as a major source of new member entry are investigated.

Keywords

circulation of political elites legislative turnover parliamentary turnover political elites representative elites

Introduction

In this research note, we decompose legislative turnover into its constituent parts. We use as an example turnover in four European lower chambers for which data are available: the Austrian Nationalrat, the Belgian De Kamer/La Chambre, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the UK House of Commons. Turnover is understood as the proportion of members of a legislative assembly that change after general elections. As Matland and Studlar (2004: 106) argued, ‘the decomposition of turnover in its constituent parts is a useful first starting point for internationally comparative research on the topic’. However, such a descriptive decomposition of turnover has not merited enough attention by researchers outside the US context. Moreover, where turnover has been decomposed, the approach was primarily pre-occupied with the fates of incumbents. As a result, turnover is usually decomposed into forms of incumbent exit like death, retirement, failure to gain re-nomination and failure to be re-elected.

In this research note, we retain the descriptive goal of decomposing turnover into its constituent parts, but we depart both from the US context and from incumbent exit-oriented approaches. Our contribution consists of both the addition of new empirical cases in the literature and taking a fresh look at turnover by investigating political life from a non-incumbent’s perspective. In relation to the latter, we argue that turnover can be decomposed into two parts, both of which represent sources of non-incumbent entry into the legislature. There are two such main sources of entry: election and selection. Election refers to decisions of voters at the electoral stage, while selection refers to decisions of party selectorates at the pre-electoral stage. We observe that the majority of members of parliament (MPs) turn over before general elections.

The research note is structured as follows. First, we embed this work into the existing literature on turnover and highlight its original contribution. Second, we present our approach to decomposing turnover into newcomer entry by election and newcomer entry by selection. Third, we present our data and measurement, as well as the cases we use to illustrate the main point raised in the research note. Fourth, we present results on the decomposition of turnover. Fifth, we discuss the results and speculate about potential explanations. We conclude with a discussion on the significance of the findings and offer leads for future research.

The literature

Past research on legislative turnover has focused primarily on answering explanatory questions, without addressing certain fundamental descriptive issues. Such a fundamental descriptive research question is the following: In what forms is legislative turnover manifested? Answering it allows researchers to clarify certain facts about the phenomenon (decomposition of total turnover) before engaging with explanatory research (determinants of legislative turnover) or normative arguments (what is the optimum level of turnover). The paucity of descriptive research and therefore of basic factual data on turnover leads Matland and Studlar (2004) to point that the research agenda is wide open not only in terms of fundamental explanations but also in terms of basic descriptions that are much needed as a starting point for comparative research. A narrative review of the literature on turnover for the period 1938–2015, followed by a systematic review of past research on the determinants of legislative turnover in the period 1965–2015 by Gouglas, Maddens, Brans (2016), corroborates this.

The limited available literature reveals that there are two approaches to decomposing turnover. According to the first and most common approach, ‘gross’ or ‘total’ turnover can be decomposed into various forms of incumbent exit. In what could be regarded as a landmark descriptive study on the topic, Swain et al. (2000: 437) divide turnover into four forms of incumbent exit: death, retirement, failure to gain nomination and general election defeat. They then collect data for both ‘total’ turnover and its forms for the US House of Representatives in the period 1789–1998. The longitudinal dataset is impressive. Nevertheless, they are neither the first nor the only ones to have decomposed turnover along those forms. In his study of turnover in the Indiana House for the period 1954–1984, Crawly (1986) discerns between those incumbents who leave electoral politics, those who run for higher office and those who are defeated in re-election. Jackson JS (1994) decomposes US House turnover into essentially the same forms as Swain et al. (2000) for the period 1945–1994. Ysmal (1994) decomposes turnover in the French Assemblée Nationale for the same period into three categories: died in office, stopped running and defeated in elections. In his study of the unicameral assembly of New Zealand, Jackson K (1994) decomposes total turnover into percentage of defeated incumbents and percentage of retirements, resignations and vacancies. Gallagher (2000) discerns between retiring (resigned or died) and defeated incumbent deputies (Teachta Dála - TDs) in Ireland and MPs in Malta, respectively.

While some attention has been devoted to the decomposition of turnover into types or forms of incumbent exit, attention to the various ways and sources of non-incumbents’ entry into parliament has been minimal.

Gallagher (2000: 104) is, to our knowledge, one of the few scholars who decomposes turnover by addressing the issue through the viewpoint of a ‘non-incumbent’ who wants to enter legislative politics. He identifies five ways in which one may become a deputy: (1) replacing the retiring deputy of one’s party, (2) ousting an incumbent of one’s own party, (3) ousting an incumbent of another party, (4) taking a seat from another party by replacing the retiring incumbent of that party and (5) gaining a seat owing to redistricting. Total turnover is consequently decomposed into five parts, reflecting five ways a non-incumbent can enter parliament (Gallagher, 2000: 105). Knowing the ways in which a non-incumbent replaces an incumbent can be useful. There are, nevertheless, certain challenges associated with the approach suggested by Gallagher (2000). The major one is availability of data. It is extremely difficult to find and collect data on individual incumbent replacements by non-incumbents for most legislatures. There is an alternative.

Total turnover and its sources: Election and selection

We argue in this research note that it would be more meaningful, as well as practical, to discern between two major ways a non-incumbent can enter parliament: election and selection. As Andeweg (2008: 503) has pointed out in relation to turnover in the Dutch Parliament:

the fact that the average percentage of new Members of Parliament (MPs) is almost twice the average percentage of seats changing hands indicates that the nomination process of the parties has an effect on turnover independent from that of the electoral system’s faithful translation of electoral volatility.

If election was the only form of entry into parliament, legislative turnover would be equal to the sum of voters’ party choices and individual candidate preferences. Put it differently, if there was no selection prior to election and parties nominated the same single candidate or tabled the same list of candidates in the same order in every election, voters’ choices would equal legislative turnover.

Yet, this is not the case. In every democratic system, new members enter the political game at the selection stage as candidates, either by replacing incumbents or by replacing past candidates who failed to enter parliament. Thus, every system projects a degree of candidate turnover, part of which represents intra-party incumbent turnover. This happens for various reasons. Be it for necessity, when an incumbent or past candidate, for instance, retires, resigns or dies, or for strategic reasons and in order to increase party electoral competitiveness. What this all means for turnover is that by the time voters are called to make a choice at the ballot, this has already been delimited by party selectorate choices.

Data and measurement

From a non-incumbent perspective, legislative turnover manifests itself into two forms: election and selection. In view of this, we decompose the total rate of legislative turnover into a rate of newcomer entry by election and a rate of newcomer entry by selection

Legislative turnover (%) = entry by election (%) + entry by selection (%)

Beyond theoretical advantages discussed beforehand, the practical benefit of this approach is that it allows us to decompose turnover without having to collect data on thousands of individual new MPs and the way they replace incumbents. This also means that we do not need to know the details of what happens in the stage of selection. Whether an incumbent was deselected and then replaced by a non-incumbent or whether an incumbent voluntarily retired does not matter, as in both cases the incumbent’s exit leads to the selection of a non-incumbent. What we want to know is the gross magnitude of the selection stage relative to legislative turnover. Following Andeweg’s (2008) argument above, this can be calculated using only available data on the rate of legislative turnover and the rate of newcomer entry by election

Entry by selection (%) = legislative turnover (%) - entry by election (%)

Data on legislative turnover are to be found in an internationally comparative longitudinal dataset, currently under development by Gouglas et al. (2016, 2017) for the project ‘Determinants of Parliamentary Turnover in Western Europe 1945–2015’¹

Legislative turnover = [(number of newcomers / assembly size) \times 100]

Data on the rate of newcomer entry by election are also readily available in the same dataset. It is calculated as the percentage of seats changing party hands, thanks to voters’ party swings (party choice), plus the percentage of non-incumbents entering parliament, thanks to voters’ preference votes (individual candidate choice)

\begin{array}{l} Rate of newcomer entry by election = seat volatility + \\ rate of newcomer entry by preference votes \end{array}

Seat volatility is calculated by summing up the absolute number of seats changing party hands in every election.² We divide this by 2 so as to avoid counting changes twice. As is the case with aggregate electoral volatility (Pedersen index V), a problem that needs to be addressed is how to treat party name changes, splits and mergers. We address this problem by calculating the difference between a party’s seat share and the summed seat share of its predecessor parties before a merger or the successor parties after a split. We then divide this by assembly size and multiply by 100 to get the exact rate of net seat change.

Rate of newcomer entry by preference votes is calculated by dividing the number of newcomers who disturbed the party list by assembly size and then multiplying by 100.³

Cases

As the dataset is under development, we decompose legislative turnover into its constituent parts in four lower chambers for which data are most readily available: the Austrian Nationalrat, the Belgian De Kamer/La Chambre, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the UK House of Commons. The selection criterion here is pragmatic, meaning that we use available data to illustrate the research point. Beyond pragmatism, though, the four selected chambers also represent two broader sets of parliamentary democracies. The House of Commons represents a Westminster system, while the Austrian, Belgian and Dutch lower chambers represent three of the original consociational democracies. Overall, we are dealing with 79 cases of turnover after general elections in four lower chambers in the period 1945–2015.

It’s the selection

The data reveal that selection is the leading source of newcomer entry into the legislature in all four lower chambers under examination. Essentially, what happens prior to general elections at the stage of selection is the body of the iceberg we do not see, elections being its permanently visible tip.

In Figure 1, we observe that in the case of the Austrian Nationalrat, there is not a single instance out of 20 general elections post-war, where election overtakes selection as a source of political alternation in the lower chamber.

Figure 1.

Austrian Nationalrat 1949–2013.

Figure 2 reveals that in Belgium, in 21 cases of general elections for entry into De Kamer/La Chambre, election overtakes selection as a source of newcomer entry only once. It is in the 1950 general election.

Figure 2.

Belgian De Kamer/La Chambre 1949–2014.

In 20 general elections for the Dutch Tweede Kamer, we observe that election overtakes selection as a major source of new member entry four times: in 1982, 2002, 2003 and 2010 (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Dutch Tweede Kamer.

Finally, Figure 4 reveals that in 18 general elections for the UK House of Commons since 1950, election overtakes selection as a source of newcomer entry five times. Those are the general elections of 1950, 1966, 1970, 1979 and 1997.

Figure 4.

UK House of Commons.

When does election matter?

An important question raised on the basis of the above data is under which conditions does election become a leading source of newcomer entry? Undertaking a descriptive analysis of the general elections, where election is the major source of newcomer entry (Table 1), we can see two patterns emerging.

Table 1.

Cases where election is a leading form of turnover.

Assembly	Year of election	Legislative turnover	Seat volatility	Entry by preference votes	Entry by election (% of total house membership)	Entry by selection (% of total house membership)	Entry by election (% of turnover)	Entry by selection (% of turnover)
Belgian De Kamer/La Chambre	1950	10.4	7	0.0	7	3.8	63.6	36.4
Dutch Tweede Kamer	1982	18.0	10	0.0	10	8.0	55.6	44.4
Dutch Tweede Kamer	2002	47.3	31	0.7	31	16.0	66.2	33.8
Dutch Tweede Kamer	2003	30.0	15	0.7	16	14.0	53.3	46.7
Dutch Tweede Kamer	2010	47.3	23	1.3	24	23.3	50.7	49.3
UK House of Commons	1950	25.8	15	0.0	15	10.6	59.0	41.0
UK House of Commons	1966	13.8	8	0.0	8	5.7	58.6	41.4
UK House of Commons	1970	24.6	13	0.0	13	11.3	54.2	45.8
UK House of Commons	1979	19.8	11	0.0	11	9.3	53.2	46.8
UK House of Commons	1997	39.6	27	0.0	27	12.6	68.2	31.8

First, newcomer entry by election is a phenomenon observed mainly in watershed general elections, where there is big-scale party realignment and high by historical levels seat volatility. This is the case not only of the 2002 and 2010 Dutch general elections but also of the 1979 and 1997 general elections in the United Kingdom. Seat volatility in the Netherlands in 2002 is the highest ever, while in 2010 it scores its second highest score. The 2002 Dutch general election was among the most dramatic ones in Dutch history, overshadowed by the assassination of Pim Fortuyin and leading to the collapse of the purple coalition between Labour, Liberals and Social Liberals. The 2010 general election, respectively, saw a wide electoral realignment with the collapse of the Christian Democratic Appeal from first to fourth place and the emergence of the Liberal party as first. The election was also noted for the rise to third place of the controversial Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders.

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, in the 1950 general election we observe the second highest seat volatility in the period 1950–2015. This is only partly explained by Labour’s loss of many seats to the Conservatives. It also arguably reflects the major changes brought about by the ‘Representation of the People Act’ in 1948 and the ‘Redistribution of Seats Act’ in 1949, which created new seats and abolished old ones while altering the constituency borders for a great number of districts around the United Kingdom. The 1970 general election projects the third highest seat volatility, largely reflecting the surprise victory of the Conservatives over Labour during that election. In 1979, seat volatility is the fourth highest post-war. This is the year when the Conservatives under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher came to power, following a Labour term that started with a change of prime minister and ended with the events of the Winter of Discontent. The swing from Labour to the Conservatives was the largest such party swing since 1945 when Clement Attlee won for Labour. In 1997, seat volatility is the highest since 1945. This was the year when new Labour managed a landslide victory over the Conservatives changing the tide of the party after 18 years in opposition since 1979.

Second, except for watershed elections, there are also those with relatively lower levels of candidate turnover. These are usually snap elections being called very close to the previous ones. The 1966 UK snap election is a typical example. Taking place just 532 days after the 1964 general election, changes in the candidates’ rosters of all parties were minor. The ‘Members of Parliament 1832–2005 database’ reveals that in 1966, there had only been 29 incumbent resignations in comparison with an average of 62 before every election post-war. At the same time, voters re-affirmed their preferences for Labour in 1966 by giving the party an extra 59 seats, thus leading the way for an influx of new members to parliament. Although we lack data on candidate rosters, this we speculate could have been the case for the other lower chambers too. The 1950 Belgian general election was called 463 days after the 1949 one. The historically low legislative turnover rate is an indication that selectorates did not have the time or the desire to greatly change their party lists. In view of this and following a divisive referendum on the return of King Leopold III, Belgian voters voted massively for the winners of the 1949 election, the Christian Social Party, making it the last party in Belgian electoral history to have achieved an absolute majority in the lower chamber. The same we argue holds for the 1982 and 2003 Dutch general elections, which were called within 470 and 252 days after the previous general election, respectively. Candidate turnover remained limited. Faced with similar candidate rosters, while having changed their party preferences, voters lead the way for non-incumbents entering the legislative assembly. In 1982, this was reflected in an electoral realignment which turned the Dutch Labour Party (PvDA) into first party, deposing the Christian Democratic Appeal from the first place. In 2003, the the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) lost as spectacularly as it had come into the scene less than a year ago in 2002.

Explanations and hypotheses for future research

A first explanation as to why selection springs up as a leading source of newcomer entry into parliament could be the fact that large number of incumbents consistently do not stand for re-election across country and across time. Past studies reveal that a principal source of turnover is the ‘failure’ of incumbent members to stand for re-election (Blair and Henry, 1981; Crawly, 1986; Jackson JS, 1994, Jackson K (1994), 1994b; Katz, 1986; Moncrief, 1998; Ray, 1976; Swain et al., 2000). In this respect, what we may be observing here is the mirror reflection of incumbent exits at the pre-electoral stage. Why do incumbents not stand for re-election? According to the literature, the majority appears to resign voluntarily, while only a smaller percentage is deselected (Matland and Studlar, 2004). In our case, the ‘Members of Parliament 1832–2005 database’ reveals that, on average, in every election in the United Kingdom since 1950, 50.5% of the incoming members replace retired MPs. This number increases when other forms of incumbent exit, like resignations or death are accounted for. We do not have available data on incumbent exits for the rest of the country cases. However, in view of what we know from the literature and based on the UK case for which data are available, a first interesting hypothesis to be tested in the future is the following. To the extent that democracies are not characterized by chronic high electoral fluidity or watershed elections, selection always overtakes election as a source of non-incumbent entry into the legislature thanks to the high numbers of MPs who do not stand for re-election.

Another possible explanation reflects the effects of preferential voting. When it comes to preferential voting, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands effectively behave as non-preferential systems, much like the United Kingdom. For the whole period under examination, we count only seven instances of Austrian MPs who would not have gotten into the Nationalrat without their preference votes. After a cross examination with our newcomer data, we found out that only three of the seven MPs were newcomers. This, in turn, means that the proportion of newcomers entering the legislature as a share of the total Nationalrat membership is, on average, 0.08% and 0.2% of gross turnover. This is simply negligible. Since 1948, all in all only 12 candidates entered the Tweede Kamer by disturbing the party list thanks to preference votes. From those 12, only 6 were newcomers. This is a mere 0.23% of the Tweede Kamer membership and 0.53% of total legislative turnover. When it comes to preference voting, the Belgian case is somewhat different than Austria and the Netherlands. The Belgian lower chamber has witnessed the largest number of candidates entering office thanks to preference votes: 76 in the period 1949–2014, of which, however, 53 entered office since 2003. Preferential voting appears to be more effective in Belgium, especially since the electoral reform set into motion in 2003. However, one should not over-exaggerate. Of those 76, only 38 are newcomers. As a result, Belgium does not constitute a major exception to the rule of minimal preference vote effect on legislative turnover. Since 1949, on average, the number of newcomers entering the Belgian lower house, thanks to preference votes, stands at a mere 1.1% of the total house membership, which makes 2.6% of gross turnover.

This raises the question as to what would happen to the sources of legislative turnover, if we moved from weaker to stronger preferential voting systems. One consequence could be greater exposure of incumbents to electoral defeat by running mates of the same party (Matland and Studlar, 2004). A second consequence, to the opposite direction, could be that individual candidates matter more and that party control of the ballot diminishes (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Matland and Studlar, 2004; Wallack et al., 2003). As a result, parties would be expected to be more careful when deselecting incumbents in fear of loss of a personal vote. Thus, a hypothesis to be tested here would be that as we move from non-preferential (closed list), single-member district (first past the post or two round majority) and weak preferential voting (flexible list) towards stronger preferential voting ones (open list, Single transferable vote (STV), Single non transferable vote (SNTV)), we would expect election as a source of newcomer entry to also increase.

Concluding remarks

In this research note, we undertook a descriptive analysis of legislative turnover. We examined its different forms by decomposing total turnover into two parts or sources of newcomer entry into a legislature: (1) entry by election, which is the outcome of the various possibilities given to the voter at the ballot, and (2) entry by selection, which reflects party selectorate preferences for filling in candidate positions. By doing so, we narrowed an existing gap in the relevant literature in terms of basic descriptions in a non-US context. Moreover, we tried to take a novel approach by looking at turnover from a non-incumbent rather than the traditional incumbent perspective.

Although we selected our cases on pragmatic grounds, we did choose legislatures representing two different parliamentary systems. Moreover, our approach has been historically comprehensive. Using available data on political mandates in the lower chambers in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the period 1945–2015, we observed that selection is the leading source of legislative turnover across four different legislatures, representing two different types of parliamentary democracies in a period of 70 years.

The examination of 10 cases where election is the leading form of non-incumbent entry reveals that there are two types of elections where election overtakes selection as source of new member entry: first, in watershed elections, which project record high levels of seat volatility, meaning that record high numbers of parliamentary seats change party hands; second, in elections before which candidate rosters were not fundamentally changed. Those are usually snap elections happening after very short legislative period lengths. Such short legislative periods usually leave candidate rosters unaffected.

The central counter-intuitive point raised in this research note is that non-incumbents do not primarily enter legislative politics thanks to voter party or individual preferences, but thanks to choices made by parties at the stage of selection. Such party choices are assumed to be the result of a high proportion of incumbents not standing for re-election. However, we cannot be sure whether such selectorate choices happen out of necessity because incumbents die, resign or retire or because of party strategic calculations that lead to deselection of incumbents. In relation to the point we want to raise in this research note, though, this distinction is irrelevant.

The main implication for explanatory research is that it needs to pay more attention to what happens at the selection stage before general elections. This includes a focus on both political parties, especially selectoral practices, as well as on the formal structure of political career opportunities that structures contenders’ choices. This, in turn, means that, especially in the European context, explanations of turnover could be more strongly linked to such explanatory factors as, for instance, the power of party oligarchies and/or the impact of modes of MP and party professionalization. In general, it could be fruitful to link elite theory arguments to the long-term data on turnover. As Best and Cotta (2000) argued legislative turnover can be seen as the outcome of a representative elite production process taking place at the intersection of choices made by voters, party selectorates and contenders. Our descriptive decomposition of turnover appears to corroborate this approach.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Professor Rudy Andeweg at Leiden University. His discussions with the corresponding author during the latter’s research stay in the Netherlands in May 2015 were an inspiration for this article. Many thanks also go to the staff in the Montesquieu Institute in Hague for their invaluable assistance with the Dutch data. A great acknowledgement also goes to Dr Marcelo Jenny of the University of Vienna, as well as to Emeritus Professor Michael Rush at the University of Exeter, Professor Philip Norton at the University of Hull and Professor Meg Russell at University College London for their invaluable assistance while researching the Austrian and UK data.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Support for this project was provided by the Research Foundation Flanders (Project nr.G061514N).

Notes

Author biographies

Athanassios Gouglas is a Doctoral Researcher at the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, Belgium.

Bart Maddens is a Professor of Political Science at the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, Belgium.

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