The ‘incomplete’ failure of political Islam: The Justice and Development Party and the Freedom and Justice Party as case studies

Identification and differentiation

Respondents’ accounts on the AKP’s political engagement have unanimously highlighted its uncontested success from 2002 to 2014 due to its unique self-reference framed around an exclusive and unprecedented slogan, the reformulation of the centre. Although the party did not maintain a similar pace of electoral and economic success from 2015 onwards, it sustained its rule, thanks to its ability to formulate malleable political identifications and rally priorities in line with national and regional exigencies.

From 2002 until 2014, informants at the AKP headquarter and Turkish Prime Ministry highlighted the inability of secular and Islamic parties to maintain governmental coalitions in the 1990s and the necessity of embarking on urgent economic and political reforms as a combined opportunity for the AKP’s successful self-identification as a conservative democratic party. They asserted the singularity of the conservative democratic label in light of its capitalisation on the reformulation of the political centre as the main tactic towards national stability and economic recovery.

While the failure of successive governmental coalitions has obstructed the implementation of a sustainable vision for economic and political development, the AKP’s identification as a conservative democratic party emphasised its unicity among secular and Islamic parties. Formed in 2001 by dissident members of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party Refah Partisi, the AKP’s identification circumvented the secular-Islamic polarisation in national politics and rallied supporters from various ideological backgrounds (Interviews at the AKP headquarter 2011 and 2012). Encompassing members who accommodated their conservative views with the political order’s secular norms, the AKP called for normalisation between Kemalism and Political Islam. Former Turkish Prime Minister and President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2004, 2006, 2008) highlighted the party’s reconciliation of Islamic and traditional values with modernity and democracy in emphasis of its leaders’ belief in the compatibility between Islam and secularism. In this vein, Former Prime Minister Advisor, Bülent Arinç (2006), referred to conservative democracy as a grassroots affiliation that capitalised on national priorities such as the promotion of democracy, individual rights, religious freedom, the fight against poverty, corruption, and unemployment.

The AKP elaborated on its conservative democratic affiliation in a pragmatic and conciliatory political programme that aggregated national priorities behind the reformulation of the centre. According to Yalçin Akdoğan (Interview 2011), the AKP’s former spokesman, the party, thanks to its conservative democratic system of belief, highlighted the urgent need to broaden political participation, conciliate between secular and Islamic masses, and confirm the state as the expression of people’s sovereignty. It adopted a revisionist position towards the Republican secular foundations that have marginalised Islamic and conservative parties from the political centre and called for the normalisation of the state-society relations where the former responds to the latter’s expectations regardless of its identity.

Without opposing secularism, the AKP emphasised the priority of formulating the periphery or conservative majority’s rights and freedom into constitutional provisions and policies that are compatible with the centre. It introduced a flexible definition of secularism that guarantees individuals’ rights and freedom and fulfils citizens’ demands instead of being an instrument of social oppression. In emphasis of its conservative democratic character, the party promised to create an inclusive political centre through the adoption of ‘social Islam’ (Interviews at the AKP headquarter 2010 and 2012). Building on his experience as the Mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s, Erdoğan used ‘social Islam’ in reference to the ethics of service, a pragmatic vision, geared towards solving the society’s problems and achieving its well-being without resorting to religion as a political tool.

Respondents contended that the party’s framing of its 2002, 2007, and 2010 electoral programmes around the reformulation of the centre has attracted conservative and secular electorates (Interviews at the Prime Ministry, 2011). The AKP’s reformulation of the centre revolved around the promotion of a democratic order, the improvement of economic performance, and the inclusion of conservative groups alongside secular ones into the centre. These demands coalesced with conservative and secular groups’ interests in terms of political stability, economic growth, progress in the European Union (EU) negotiations, and the adoption of an active foreign policy. The party’s success in overcoming the 2008 financial crash, progressing in the EU accession negotiations, neutralising the army’s national power, and insuring political stability allowed it to succeed during the 2007 and 2010 elections.

The AKP officials’ speeches from 2015 onwards underlined that the emergence of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party Halk Demokratik Partisi (HDP) as the party’s main rival during the 2015 elections and the escalation of regional security threats have prompted the AKP to adopt a nationalist outlook with the war on terror slogan as a strategy for political dominance. In spite of the AKP’s declining popularity following the 2013 Taksim Square protests and tight authoritarian grip on power, the party, because of its nationalist outlook and slogan, succeeded to secure a parliamentary majority during the 2015 re-election and suppress the HDP’s popularity.

Although the AKP has adopted the EU legal harmonisation packages that limited the army’s political prerogatives and secured civil and individual rights since 2004, it has ascendingly embarked on restrictive legal and constitutional measures that have visibly discredited its conservative democratic affiliation and undermined its slogan, the reformulation of the centre. From 2007 to 2017, the General Prosecution has accused highly ranked military officers alongside reporters, academicians, and lawyers for membership in a terrorist organisation that was accused of complicity in illicit activities and plotting for the eviction of the ruling regime. These incidents, known as the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer affairs Balyoz Davası, coupled with wide arrest campaigns that were initiated against opponents and minority groups during and after the 2013 Taskim Square protests. These restrictive measures combined with economic stagnation, the increase of refugees’ inflows, and the interruption of the EU accession negotiations have left the party with limited choices but the recourse to anti-terror rallies during the 2015 reelection campaign in November following the AKP’s failure to secure a parliamentary majority and the rise of the pro-HDP votes in June.

During the re-election campaign, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2015) and Erdoğan in Arango (2015) adopted a highly securitised discourse. They underscored the necessity of voting for the AKP against foreign conspirators and national accomplices, in an implicit reference to the HDP’s involvement in bombing attacks in order to diminish the AKP’s prospects for gaining a parliamentary majority. The AKP’s alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) has consolidated its nationalist outlook and slogan during the 2015 general elections. Having an electoral success with a parliamentary majority, the AKP introduced the 2017 referendum that changed the country’s political system and increased the party’s legal and institutional authorities, notably with regard to the declaration of the state of emergency under the banner of fighting terrorism.

Alliance formulation and consolidated mandates

Respondents in Turkish philanthropic NGOs, business associations, and Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs emphasised the AKP’s success in attracting allies based on increasing margins of political participation and economic incentives. From 2002 to 2013, NGOs, businessmen, and ministerial officials confirmed the AKP’s success in consolidating its rule through the translation of its slogan, the reformulation of the centre, into active national and foreign policies that increased secular and conservative actors’ manoeuvres in the decision-making process and multiplied their profits vis-à-vis the state establishment. In spite of shifts in the AKP’s affiliation, slogan, and allies since 2015, the analysis of the AKP leaders’ speeches asserted the party’s success to attract supporters and allies with similar means.

Following the AKP’s success in the 2002 elections until 2015, an implicit alliance has been forged between the party and the conservative and secular civil society vis-à-vis the state establishment, notably the army in support for the adoption of the EU principles that defied the latter’s authorities. Respondents in NGOs indicated that, by tying demands for democratisation, economic development, and an inclusive political centre to progress in the EU membership negotiations, the AKP ensured equality among citizens (Interviews at Kimse Yok Mu 2011 and Deniz Feneri 2010). Although AKP officials have declared that Turkey do not need to become an EU member, the party’s staunch commitment to the EU accession negotiations stemmed from its need to embark on a series of legal and constitutional harmonisation packages encompassing 533 laws to reverse power balance in the civil-military relations in favour of the former.

According to MFA officials (Interviews at 2010 and 2011) and AKP members (Interviews 2011), the party supported regional openness as the main arena for the consolidation of civil actors in order to counterbalance the state establishment’s power. By underlining the necessity of conforming to the EU conditionalities in the formulation of an active foreign policy, the AKP broke with the secular elite’s Western determinism and Islamists’ anti-Western rhetoric. The AKP leaders’ speeches revealed that the party has reconsidered the secular elite’s marginalisation of diplomatic ties with Arab and Muslim countries and refused Islamists’ rejection of Turkish relations with Western countries (Davutoğlu, 2007; Erdoğan, 2004, 2005, 2006; Gül, 2004, 2005). By underlining the difference between modernisation and Westernisation from one side and subordination to the West from the other, the party abandoned the Welfare party’s National Vision Milli Görüş, a national formulation of Turkish identity based on a religious reference, and called for improving Turkish ties with all countries around the world. Davutoğlu (2001) theorised this initiative with the ‘strategic depth’ concept that called for the investment of Turkish geography and history in a Post-Cold War era towards the adoption of an influential role on the regional and international levels based on the consideration of Arab and Muslim countries side by side to Western allies.

Following the adoption of the EU legal and constitutional reforms that limited the army’s prerogatives in the decision-making process in favour of civil society, the AKP’s secular and conservative constituencies among economic associations, NGOs, and their transnational coalitions became Turkish foreign policy’s main actors. According to officials at the Ministry of Economy, being a member of international economic associations, Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (TOBB) sponsored the activities of economic institutions such as the Foreign Economic Relations Platform (DEIK) and its affiliated business councils, the Economic Development Foundation, TEPAV research centre, and TOBB University.

Business associations such as TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD, and TÜSKON participated in Turkish economic foreign policy through the initiation of and participation in international forums such as the International Business Forum with Muslim countries and the financial support of conservative intellectual and business groups that contributed to the redefinition of Turkish policy in accordance with democracy and human rights. Encompassing Anatolian economic elites, known as the Anatolian Tigers that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, MÜSIAD’s bourgeoisie has been oriented towards investment in new markets in the Middle East. Geographical proximity and culture have prompted the development of strong business ties with Arab countries, notably Northern Iraq, Syria, and Iran in order to arrange deals, organise exhibitions, and expand markets (Interviews at MÜSIAD 2011). TÜSKON has also prepared international business events, participated in official visits and Joint Economic Commission’s meetings, and lobbied decision-makers for favourable economic legislations.

The conservative economic bourgeoisie, MÜSIAD and TÜSKON, emerged as a counterweight to TÜSIAD, the traditional secular elite following the deregulation and liberalisation of market economy that allowed the former to transcend the state’s network and develop its own model of transnational economic and financial transactions (Interviews at TÜSKON 2011 and 2012). The socioeconomic and political emergence of this elite challenged the binary division into a centre versus a periphery by presenting an alternative based on a liberal communitarian imaginary that is less-constrained by Kemalism. It constituted a ‘traditional revolution’ that modified the top-town model of Kemalist socialisation through the integration of new forces and modalities of bottom-up progress and change models. It advocated for the integration of traditional values into the centre in an attempt to moralise and normalise the state institutions and structures (Interviews at Mazlumder 2011 and IHH 2012).

In return for the AKP formulation of a regional policy that is compatible with the conservative elite’s expectations, the latter provided material and financial infrastructure and outlets in support for the AKP such as media centres, universities, and newspapers (Interviews at TodayZaman 2010 and 2011). One of the major political and cultural conservative groups that supported the AKP was the Fethullah Gülen Community, known as Hizmet, that possessed religious educational and business complexes in Turkey and abroad. Having its leader in exile since the 1980 military coup, the AKP represented an important opportunity for the community’s businesses and activities to flourish and have access to institutional positions. According to TESEV (2009), the visible economic improvement resulting from the AKP’s active economic foreign policy came at first place in securing 50% of votes in the 2007 elections.

Starting from 2015 onwards, a meticulous analysis of the AKP officials’ speeches underlined that, in spite of the party’s shift towards a nationalist discourse and allies, it maintained its constituencies’ privileged positions in the decision-making process and economic dividends. This discursive shift has antagonised a considerable part of the AKP’s secular and conservative electorate, notably after the 2013 Taksim Square protests and the launch of an aggressive security campaign against Hizmet for charges of colliding with the army in the 2016 failed coup. Yet, the AKP preserved its supporters among conservative business groups and nationalist figures. In reflection of its constituencies’ security priorities, changes in the AKP ruling style, namely the increase of arrest campaigns against opponents, the purge of pro-Kurdish rights and pro-Hizmet officials from the state administration, and the wide crackdown on Kurds in the Southeastern parts of the country, coincided with the adoption of a security-driven, anti-Western, and interventionist regional policy in pursuit of security and economic interests (Erdoğan, 2012, 2013, 2015). Following Erdoğan in Gurcan (2016) declaration of a pre-emptive security doctrine, Turkey, in expression of its mistrust of the United States in light of its support for Kurdish–Syrian rebels, has intensified its air and ground operations, the 2016 Euphrates Shield Operations and the 2018 Olive Branch Operation, in Kurdish populated cities against ISIS, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish–Syrian People’s Protection Unit, and PKK elements in Northern Syria and Mosul. In addition to its opposition to the US policy, the AKP’s repression campaign against opponents and militarised foreign policy have mutilated the progress of its EU membership negotiations that were interrupted following the conclusion of the 2016 security agreements with European leaders over Turkish management of Syrian refugees in return for financial and visa concessions.

In addition to the provision of logistical support for the Syrian Free Army and al-Nusra Islamic rebel group, the AKP officials focused on the securitisation of economic interests. Following the MB’s ouster that ended the AKP’s vision of regional alliance and economic complementarity with Egypt, Erdoğan (2013), Davutoğlu (2013), and Arinç (2013) adopted an antagonistic tone against the Egyptian regime and condemned the military coup against the first democratically elected President, Mohamed Morsi, on regional and international platforms. Also, in confirmation of its drilling rights in the East-Mediterranean Region versus Greece and Cyprus claims, the Turkish Parliament, in spite of Egyptian security reserves, issued a bill allowing the dispatch of national troops to Eastern Libya in support for Fayez al-Sarrag’s Islamist government against General Khalifa Haftar, Head of the army-backed Libyan Parliament (Bostanci, 2019). The AKP confirmed its military commitment towards Libya within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed with al-Sarrag for sharing oil and gas fields in the East-Mediterranean region. In addition, the AKP launched military operations in support for its Azeri ally and partner in energy projects with Europe, in its war against Armenia over the resources-rich region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 in spite of its independence in 1994.

However, calls for boycotting Turkish products in Egypt, Gulf countries’ reserves over Turkish support for the MB and ties with Qatar, and military presence in Northern Iraq that antagonised the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, have hampered Turkish investments with its main regional partners. Following Egypt’s conclusion of an agreement on Exclusive Economic Zones in 2020 with Greece and marginalisation of Turkey from the East-Mediterranean Gas Forum, the AKP officials started to reconsider their supportive stance towards the MB and announced a reconciliation plan with Egypt in 2021 (Kalın, 2021).

Identification and differentiation

Respondents among the FJP members and former MB youth branch members have underlined the party’s success in its identification as a moderate Islamic party in contrast with the Salafi and secular parties’ unpopular calls for religious strictness and secularism respectively. Being an outlawed organisation without a partisan structure, the Revolution constituted an opportunity for the MB to create the FJP in June 2011 in order to run for elections and have access to power. Facing growing public calls for establishing a civil state during the uprising, the FJP officials, in the aim of surmounting the dominant secular-Islamic dichotomy on the civil state debate, introduced a conciliatory vision for Egypt’s political system. FJP members (Interviews 2012) highlighted that the popularity of the party’s vision stemmed from the resonance of its historical framing vis-à-vis Salafi and secular parties. While the FJP referred to the 1952 military coup against the Royalist regime as a point of departure in its argument for an Egyptian civil state, secular parties referred to the European history of civil state that was born out of separation from religious authorities. Supporting an Islamic state with a civil elite, the FJP aligned with revolutionaries’ demands of excluding the army from politics (Interviews 2012). In emphasis on its victimhood under the army rule since 1952, members underlined their attachment to a civil state with moderate religious jurisdictions under a ruling elite with no military background. Capitalising on public opposition to secularism as a normative change to the nation’s cultural and religious identity, members have publicly embraced al-Azhar’s moderate views of civil state. They acknowledged civil state as a democratic instance based on constitutional articles inspired by sharia’s general rules and principles that are subject to legal interpretations. While al-Nour and the Development and Reform Salafi Parties have explicitly rejected the notion of civil state as a Western innovation based on secular governance, FJP leaders asserted that sharia condones civil state as a legitimate form of governance based on people’s will in the interpretation and application of Islamic rules. In his speech, former Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi (2013), defined civil state as a democratic, constitutional, and modern state based on equal citizenship, consultation, check and balance between authorities, the rule of law, and rulers’ civility. Mohammed al-Biltagi (Interviews 2012), the FJP Secretary General, underlined the conciliatory nature of the state’s Islamic character that is limited to the definition of its mission and legislation without imposing a specific type of rule or breaching freedom and rights.

During the 2011 and 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, the FJP dwelt on the MB’s organisational history, socioeconomic activities, and political experience under the Mubarak’s regime. In emphasis on their political experience as activists in student unions in the 1970s and members of parliamentary coalitions with the New Wafd and Labour parties in the 1984 and 1987 elections, the FJP stood out among rivals and succeeded to identify with revolutionaries. Unlike secular parties, FJP members, notably Farid Ismail (Interviews 2011) and Saad al-Katatni (Interviews 2011), built on their opposition to Mubarak’s corruption and electoral fraud during their 2005 parliamentary mandate in identifying the party as the ‘best alternative to purge the state administration from the old regime’s corruptive and authoritarian remnants’. Prior to elections, FJP members inspired from the revolution’s slogan, ‘bread, freedom, and social justice’, in framing public demands. According to respondents, these demands revolved around the end of the rule of fear, the abrogation of the emergency law, the protection of political rights and civil freedoms, the hold of free and fair elections, the end of police brutality, the establishment of elite accountability, and the end of unemployment, inflation, and social inequality (Interviews 2011 and 2012).

Respondents indicated that the FJP, by capitalising on the MB philanthropic, educational, and religious activities, and legacy of fighting against the British occupation and Zionist expansion in Palestine, developed a ‘grassroots’ political programme that broke with the MB’s traditional worldview (Interviews at FJP 2012). Unlike the 2005 and 2010 electoral programmes, the 2011 FJP’s programme embraced the revolutionaries’ demands for reconsidering Egypt’s ‘submissive’ policy towards the US regional directives and apathy towards Israeli violations of Palestinians’ rights. In addition to its emphasis on a conciliatory worldview in support for democracy and the appropriation of the Islamic concept of consultation, shura, to the former’s exigencies (Morsi et al., 2013), the FJP programme deemphasised the importance of Egyptian relations with the United States and Israel. In doing so, the foreign policy section prioritised the formulation of stronger relations with Arab, African, and Muslim countries while keeping a neutral tone towards Egypt’s alliance with the United States, normalisation with Israel, and engagement into the Camp David Accords.

Fragile alliances and an unachieved mandate

Former MB’s accounts on personal experience in the movement and the party revealed the FJP’s inability to develop solid and reliable alliances among different constituencies. Following Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, the Islamic-Secular battle over the nature of the state’s regime and legislation has dominated national politics and debates, notably during the 2012 constitution. According to respondents (Interviews 2011 and 2012), the FJP officials’ profile as prominent MB leaders with a limited experience in ruling has impeded their acceptance among politicians and masses from different orientations. Accusing FJP officials of dividing the country along confessional and ideological lines and marginalising minorities for political dominance, secular parties, and intellectual figures opposed the MB’s recourse to religion as a legal reference for governance in contrast with nation-state’s civil, rational, and inclusive foundations. Although the FJP adopted a conciliatory programme that promised to respect the country’s religious diversity and civil rights and freedom, secular parties boycotted the constitutional committee that was responsible for drafting the 2012 constitution (Interviews 2012). Political figures from liberal and leftist parties have rejected their nomination for ministerial positions in the FJP government following the 2012 presidential elections.

Former MB (Interviews 2012) underlined the FJP’s lack of credibility among political activists because of leaders’ short-term political vision and intellectual deficit. They contended that leaders were wrongly convinced that they could consolidate their political mandate by rallying the army and Salafi groups into their constituencies while sidelining revolutionaries’ demands. Besides, the MB’s unsettled internal debates over the conciliation between modernity and religion, hesitation to abandon their old accommodating strategy with the Mubarak regime after the uprising, stalling debates over the sharia appropriation, and lack of concrete visions for its application have interfered with the party’s internal management and negatively impacted its political performance (Kandil, 2016). Benefitting from the army’s political domination and Salafis’ wide constituencies, the FJP allied with two of the MB’s traditional adversaries, the Salafis and the army. Going against the revolutionaries’ call for a democratic civil state, freedom, and liberties, the FJP secured the army’s privileges and Salafis’ strict religious views in the 2012 constitution. Articles 2, 4, and 219 confirmed the state’s legal compliance to sharia. Article 2 mentioned sharia as the main source of legislation while articles 4 and 219 underlined sharia’s incorporation into the state legislation. Article 198 granted the army the right to sue civilians before military courts while articles 50 and 51 conditioned the right to protest to the state’s approval and imposed legal censorship on NGOs. Moreover, article 197 initiated the Council for National Defense and Security that is in charge of the state security affairs and the army’s budget and bills that cannot be discussed in the Parliament.

Based on their political experience following the revolution, five former MB members (Interviews 2011 and 2012) asserted that leftist and liberal groups have questioned the FJP intentions and accused its leaders of political opportunism. Although the party, by securing the army’s prerogatives and Salafis’ strict religious views, has failed the revolutionaries, the latter has already expected this outcome in light of the FJP deputies’ support for the army throughout violent confrontations that took place following Mubarak’s ouster. Whereas Morsi has discarded Generals Mohamed Tantawi and Sami Anan, the old guardians of the Mubarak regime, from the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, the party remained silent over the police and army’s violent repression of protestors. During confrontations between revolutionaries and the security apparatus in the Maspero and Mohamed Mahmoud incidents in September and October 2011, FJP deputies abstained from holding investigations over the killing, deformation, and maiming of protestors by military chars and live ammunitions. By keeping their accommodating strategy with the state, FJP members were reluctant to speed up the prosecution of the old regime’s figures who were later released without charges.

Following the FJP candidate’s success in Presidential elections, the party leaders used religion as a tool for mass mobilisation against opponents and adopted repressive measures against rivals. In November 2012, Morsi declared a constitutional amendment rallying executive and judicial authorities under his tutelage, which instigated public discontent and resulted in the organisation of protests in front of the Presidential Palace in contestation of the declaration. However, the MB’s riposte with calls for mobilisation against protestors in support for the President has resulted in violent confrontations, casualties, and arrests among demonstrators (Interviews 2012; Pew Research Center, 2012; Yasun, 2020).

Former MB’s online biographies and writings underlined that the FJP’s intellectual deficit had mutilated its capacity to respond to economic and political challenges. Revolutionaries’ demands related to elite’s accountability, economic redress in response to sectorial demands of better wages, and the organisation of presidential elections before drafting the constitution and holding parliamentary elections were left unaddressed (Interviews 2011; Al-Kharabawi, 2013). Reproducing Mubarak’s accelerated neoliberal take-off with an Islamic garnish, the FJP’s economic vision consisted of the association of Islamic opposition groups, state institutions, and entrepreneurs under the control of an Islamic bourgeoisie and businessmen without addressing capitalism flaws, social injustice, and unemployment. The party initiated the Renaissance Project, Mashrou’ al-Nahda, under the auspices of its businessmen, that encouraged privatisation, the deregulation of the public sector, the promotion of foreign investments, and the elimination of subsidies.

FJP leaders’ speeches in foreign policy underlined the party’s prioritisation of the consolidation of its rule over the consideration of revolutionaries’ demands related to the revision of the Egyptian-American and Egyptian-Israeli relations on equal basis. Aiming to reassure the West over its political intentions, the FJP’s foreign policy manifested a continuity with Mubarak’s special alliance with the United States and Israel following Morsi’s ascent to power. In April 2012, an FJP delegation paid two visits to Washington DC where the party’s representatives confirmed their respect of minorities, women, individual, and religious rights. They reassured the US administration about the party’s intentions to move forward towards democratic transition, develop a constructive role in the Middle East, and respect the Camp David Accords. Although the party officials have sympathised with Gaza during the 2012 Israeli operations by expelling the Israeli ambassador in Cairo, sending the Egyptian Prime Minister to Gaza, deemphasising the reference to Israel in official statements, and delegating the Israeli-Egyptian relations to the army and the Intelligence Services, it preserved traditional relations with Israel (Morsi, 2012). The FJP support for an equitable resolution of the Palestinian cause was overshadowed by the deterioration of security conditions in Sinai, the subsequent elimination of secret tunnels, and closure of common borders with Gaza following terrorist attacks in Sinai in August 2012. In this vein, Egypt’s General Intelligence Directory valued strategic and security coordination with Israel in the fight against weapons’ smugglers and militants and mediation during peace talks. However, the US appreciation of the Egyptian-Israeli coordination and the ‘usefulness’ of the Morsi administration to Israel in addition to the leakage of official greeting letters exchanged between the Egyptian President and his Israeli counterpart have ignited public resentment (Interviews 2012).

In spite of the FJP’s alliance with Salafi groups and the army, the party was unable to sustain its ties with both groups following its success in presidential elections. Relations with Salafis have shifted to animosity due to political rivalry over ministerial positions and the marginalisation of al-Nur party, the second winning block in the 2011 parliament, from the decision-making process. The latter discredited the FJP leaders for disrespecting the sharia dispositions by encouraging neoliberal practices, developing relations with Iran and Western countries, and unbanning night clubs and alcoholic drinks in public spaces. In addition to its support for the MB dissident member, Abdul-Menem Abul-Futouh, during the 2012 presidential elections, al-Nur party joined an opposition front against the FJP calling for immediate political reforms and the inclusion of political parties in the decision-making process (Interviews 2012). However, in spite of the FJP’s rapprochement towards the army, the state institutions showed a little support for the government in carrying out its duties, which accelerated the party’s failure in addressing terrorist attacks, maintaining the state infrastructure, and responding to fuel shortage. In 29 June 2013, the army sided with the public Rebellion campaign Tamarod by declaring an ultimatum that ended with Morsi’s eviction on 1 July 2013, a year after his inauguration. Launched in December 2012, this anti-MB campaign gathered millions of citizens’ signatures in support of Morsi’s ouster from office, which paved the way towards the most repressive phase in the MB’s history.