Abstract
Nigel Stone, Visiting Fellow in the School of Social Work and Psychology, University of East Anglia, reviews recent appeal judgments and other judicial developments that inform sentencing and early release.
Sexual crime
The Court of Appeal has frequently reiterated that a sexual offences prevention order (SOPO) can be a valuable and flexible tool in the control of sexual offending, as part of ‘the total protective sentencing package’. However, the sentencing court is commonly concentrating on the crucial question of whether imprisonment is called for, and, if so, for how long, with the consequence that the scope for possible ancillary orders and their terms can receive insufficient attention. Judges can be presented with hastily and inadequately prepared drafts of orders at a late stage in the sentencing process, sometimes almost as an afterthought, notwithstanding that the penal consequences in the event of non-compliance can, as in respect of SOPO breach, be substantial. This edition of ‘In Court’ seeks to offer an update on this important but often ill-applied aspect of what might be termed ancillary sentencing, together with some other developments relating to sexual offenders.
Smith: Towards greater consistency, accuracy and proportionality
Seeking to bring greater clarity, consistency and discipline to the exercise of SOPO imposition, the Appeal Court heard various unrelated cases together, each involving access to child pornography. The Court recognized that other considerations are posed by offending involving physical sexual contact and cautioned that its judgment should not be viewed as fully comprehensive SOPO guidance.
Beginning with some fundamental starter considerations, Hughes LJ reminded sentencers and those involved in making SOPO proposals of the twin tests of necessity and clarity. In respect of the former, the Court commended the set of questions originally offered in its judgement in Collard (2004):
Is the making of an order necessary to protect from serious sexual harm through the commission of scheduled offences? If some order is necessary, are the terms proposed nevertheless oppressive? Overall are the terms proportionate? The terms of a SOPO must be sufficiently clear on their face for the defendant, those who have to deal with him in ordinary daily life, and those who have to consider enforcement, to understand without real difficulty or the need for expert legal advice exactly what he can and cannot do. Real risk of unintentional breach must be avoided.
Indeterminate Sentences Though acknowledging that a conviction for SOPO breach can carry greater transparency and public condemnation, and that if a defendant should be convicted again on a future occasion a conviction for breach of a SOPO may be more readily apparent on his record than would recall for breach of licence conditions, the Court did not consider that such considerations should outweigh ‘the usual rule’ that an indeterminate sentence needs no SOPO, ‘at least unless there is some very unusual feature which means that such an order could add something useful and does not run the risk of undesirably tying the hands of the offender managers later’.
Determinate, extended and suspended custody In each instance, a SOPO can (or in the case of a suspended sentence order will) extend beyond the defined and limited life of any licence or SSO and may be necessary in the interests of public protection.
Other applicable regimes With regard to the other statutory controls to which the offender may be subject, Hughes LJ was firm that ‘no SOPO is needed if it merely duplicates such a regime’, nor must a SOPO interfere or conflict with such a regime. The most obvious ‘regime’ involves liability to sex offender notification requirements, another being disqualification from working with children, either by court order or further to the provisions of the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act (SOVGA) 2006 and the controls of the Independent Safeguarding Authority, and licence obligations on release from a custodial sentence. As regards notification requirements, it may be noted in the earlier case of Hammond (2008) the Appeal Court had stated that ‘generally it is appropriate for a SOPO to run for the same period as the notification requirement for any given case’. This was reinforced in Guest (2011) where the offender had been made subject of a three year community order considered to offer a better prospect of public protection than a shorter prison sentence by obliging the offender to undergo treatment, that sentence attracting a notification requirement period of five years. The Appeal Court overturned an indefinite SOPO period in favour of a matching duration. In Smith, Hughes LJ agreed that ‘it is not normally a proper use of the power to impose a SOPO to use it to extend notification requirements beyond the period prescribed by law. … But it does not follow that the duration of a SOPO ought generally to be the same as the duration of notification requirements.’ If the circumstances require it, we can see no objection to the prohibitory provisions of a SOPO extending beyond the notification requirements of the statute. It may also be possible that a SOPO for less than an indefinite period might be found to be the right order in a case where the notification requirements endure for ever. A blanket prohibition on computer use or internet access is impermissible. It is disproportionate because it restricts the defendant in the use of what is nowadays an essential part of everyday living for a large proportion of the public, as well as a requirement of much employment. Before the creation of the internet, if a defendant kept books of pictures of child pornography it would not have occurred to anyone to ban him from possession of all printed material. The internet is a modern equivalent. Even a formulation that has recently found favour (such as: ‘Not to use the internet for any purpose other than seeking employment, study, work, lawful recreation or the purchase of goods or services’) suffers the same flaw since it prevents an offender from such innocuous internet avenues as ‘looking up the weather forecast, planning a journey by accessing a map, reading the news, sending the electricity board his meter reading, conducting his banking across the web and sending or receiving e-mail, at least unless a strained meaning is given to ‘lawful recreation’. Some courts have been attracted to a prohibition upon the possession of any computer or other device giving access to the internet without notification to the local police. It may be that this might occasionally be the only way of preventing offending, but the vast increase in the number and type of such devices makes it onerous both for defendants and the police. Its effect is, inter alia, to require the defendant to tell the police when he buys a new mobile telephone, or a play station for his children. ‘It seems to us that in most cases the police will need to work on the basis that most defendants, like most people generally will have some devices with internet access, and that a requirement that they be notified of it adds little of any value.’ There are fewer difficulties about a prohibition on internet access without filtering software, but there is a clear risk that there may be uncertainty about exactly what is required and the policing of such a provision seems likely to be attended by some difficulty.
As regards clarity, Hughes LJ commented:
In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that the formulation most likely to be effective is one ‘requiring the preservation of readable internet history coupled with submission to inspection on request’. There is no need for a SOPO to give the police power of forcible entry into private premises beyond their inherent statutory powers. It is sufficient to prohibit use of the internet without submitting to inspection on request. If the offender were to deny the officers sight of his computer, either in his home or by surrendering it to them, he would be in breach. Where the risk is not simply of downloading pornography but consists of or includes the use of chatlines or similar networks to groom young people for sexual purposes, it may well be appropriate to include a prohibition on communicating via the internet with any young person known or believed to be under the age of 16. In some such cases, it may be necessary to prohibit altogether the use of social networking sites or other forms of chatline or chatroom.
Contact with children based on age The majority of offences relating to children are committed only when the child is under the age of 16. The exceptions are offences committed against those in respect of whom the defendant stands in a position of trust, together with some family-based offences. If the risk is genuinely of that kind, prohibitions on contact with children under 18 may be justified. Otherwise, if contact with children needs to be restricted, it should relate to those under 16.
Contact with children generally Though designed to be preventive it is not legitimate to impose multiple prohibitions in a SOPO just in case the offender commits an offence of a different kind to that which has led to conviction. In respect of an internet offender there must be an identifiable risk of contact offences before the kind of prohibition against unsupervised contact with any child can be justified. That may be necessary in some cases of predatory paedophiles who seek out children for sexual purposes but, even then, care must be taken with their terms. The defendant may have children of his own, or within his extended family. If his offences are within the family, or there is a risk that offences of that kind may be committed, then those children may need protection. But if they are not, and there is no sign of a risk that he may abuse his own family, it is both unnecessary and an infringement of the children’s entitlement to family life to impose restrictions which extend to them. Even if there is a history of abuse within the family, any order ought ordinarily to be subject to any order made in family proceedings for the very good reason that part of the family court process may, if it is justified, involve carefully supervised rehabilitation of parent and child. Even in instances where it really is necessary to impose a prohibition on contact with children it is essential to include a saving for incidental contact such as is inherent in everyday life.
Preventing activities or occupations likely to involve contact with children If there is a real risk that the offender may undertake some activity outside the safeguarding prohibitions, then such a term may be justified. Otherwise it is not. Judges should ordinarily require the Crown to justify an application for a SOPO term relating to activity with children by demonstrating what the risk is which is not already catered for by SOVGA.
Draft orders These should be served on the court and the defendant before the sentencing hearing – normally not less than two clear days before but in any event not at the hearing.
The Appeal Court went on to deal with the individual appellants.
Substituting more appropriate terms, intended to illustrate sound practice, the Court imposed the following prohibitions:
using any device capable of accessing the internet unless: (i) it has the capacity to retain and display the history of internet use, and (ii) he makes the device available on request for inspection by a police officer; deleting such history; using the internet to contact or to attempt to contact any female known or believed to be under the age of 16; possessing any device capable of storing digital images unless he makes it available on request for inspection by a police officer; having any unsupervised contact of any kind with any female under the age of 16, other than (i) such as is inadvertent and not reasonably avoidable in the course of lawful daily life, or (ii) with the consent of the child’s parent or guardian, who has knowledge of his convictions.
The Appeal Court agreed that a SOPO for seven years was justified but focused on the terms that clearly reflected concern that H. posed a risk of contact sexual offending. The Court acknowledged that the combination of his sexual fascination for pre-teenage girls of that age and the close proximity which would ensue if such a girl, unrelated except by marriage, were suddenly to arrive in his home, ‘creates a very clear danger of the temptation to contact offences being greater than he can resist’. Against this, ‘it is perfectly possible that if the marriage is a success, and if his wife is a strong companion and mother, and with the benefit of the challenging sex offender programme behind him, he will not feel the same need as he did when living an isolated life to satisfy himself via an interest in young girls, in person or in photograph’. The Court anticipated that the relevant Children’s Social Services Department would be taking a very close interest in the welfare of his wife’s children and would not permit them to live with him unless satisfied that they would be safe. If that was the case ‘it would be wrong for the terms of the SOPO to override that judgment and prevent the family living together’. ‘Conversely, if Social Services are not so satisfied, the child will not be living with the defendant and there is no occasion for terms preventing contact with children.’ As regards the regulation of activities that H. might undertake, the Court noted that he had in the past operated a discotheque and acknowledged that if he resumed that role, on that is not governed by SOVGA, it would be likely to present him with significant temptations. Accordingly, the Court revised the relevant SOPO terms to prohibit H. from:
living in the same household as any female under the age of 18 unless with the express approval of Social Services for the area; (in addition to the unsupervised contact term specified in Clarke above) practising as a discotheque operator at events attended by children under 16.
Though agreeing that a SOPO was justified, the Court accepted that the indications were that D. ‘would not translate his fantasies about sexual activity with minors into contact offending’. Accordingly, the clause prohibiting contact was quashed. As for the internet clause, the Court observed that D.’s ‘life revolves around the use of computers and the internet. It is simply not practicable to define in advance the kinds of use which he can make of it.’ Accordingly, the Court substituted the narrower terms specified in Clarke (above).
R v SMITH and OTHERS [2012] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.) 82.
Applying Smith: Voyeurism
The following two cases illustrate the dilemma posed in respect of a SOPO’s ambit where the offender has gone further than accessing indecent images of children, seeking an opportunity to take photographs of children accessible to the offender.
Changing room filming
Observed by a girl aged 13 to be filming her with a camcorder under the door of her changing cubicle at a swimming pool, a French national A. was found to have multiple indecent images of children extending up to level 5 stored on his computer. On conviction of voyeurism and making indecent photographs he incurred a three-year community order and a ten-year SOPO. A. appealed, arguing that the duration and terms of the SOPO were oppressive and disproportionate.
Dealing first with the SOPO’s length, the Appeal Court agreed with the sentencing judge that though a 12 to 14 month prison term, with associated notification liability for ten years, had been merited, such a sentence would not protect the public or aid A.’s rehabilitation as effectively as the community order imposed, carrying notification commitments for five years. In this case A. ‘had progressed from simply viewing images discovered on the internet to positively seeking out children to create his own images’, indicating that he presented a greater risk which required a longer period of time to manage than provided by that shorter period. Though A. argued that his risk would be reduced through intensive supervision and programme participation under the terms of his order, this was not the inevitable outcome and the judge had been right to set a longer SOPO period extending beyond the notification requirement period.
As regards the terms of the SOPO the Appeal Court reiterated that these ‘must be tailored to meet the dangers presented by a particular offender, in this case a perverted young man who had derived an unhealthy thrill out of filming naked teenage girls and watching pornography involving young girls for his own sexual gratification’. Noting A.’s claim that there was no evidence that he was ‘seeking to graduate from distant or covert intrusion into the private lives of the young girls who he observes or films to direct contact in any event’, the Court agreed that it was the better course to set aside the SOPO clause prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact or communication with any girl aged under 16. In its place the Court substituted a prohibited activity requirement within the community order (under CJA 2003 s203), preventing A. from entering any changing facilities to which girls aged under 16 have access. As a final thought, the Court amended the SOPO by removing reference to the remaining prohibitions applying ‘in any jurisdiction’. ‘Protecting the public’ in this context means the public in the United Kingdom and sentencers do not have power to seek wider ambit of application.
R v ALARY, May 2012 (not reported at time of writing).
Photographing children in public places
When E. asked a computer repair firm to remedy a virus problem affecting his PC, files containing child pornography were detected. He was also found to be in possession of extreme pornography. Additionally, he had other photographs taken of young children who were naked on a beach and also photographs taken of older children, clothed, from his bedroom window. Those matters were not the subject of any charge. He incurred 30 weeks imprisonment plus a SOPO. On his appeal against aspects of the SOPO, including a prohibition against contact with children, he argued that this clause was unnecessary, oppressive and disproportionate. Though the Court of Appeal found those aspects of his case to be ‘extremely troubling’, noting that though there had been no contact with children ‘taking the photographs … is coming troublingly close to that particular activity’. However, in light of recent judgments of the Appeal Court cautioning against unjustified extension of SOPO restrictions, and after ‘long and hard’ deliberation, the Court removed the no contact paragraph, cautioning E. that he ‘should not understand in any way, shape or form that this … is any form of victory because if he continues upon release to engage in the sort of activity to which we have referred, very serious consequences will flow’.
R v EDWARDS, May 2012 (not reported at time of writing).
SOPO: Contact offending and ambit of risk
When M., a man of previous good character, was aged around 20 and still living at home with his parents a family moved in next door. He became friendly with them, including their daughter L. aged ten, becoming gradually very tactile towards her. Following a particular occasion which concerned her mother, causing her to confront him about his inappropriate behaviour towards L., M. apologized and he was gradually allowed back into her family after giving assurances that nothing like that would happen again. However, he would often stay late in her home alone in L.’s company and in time engaged in sexual activity with her, starting with kissing and cuddling and extending to oral sex and intercourse when she was aged 15, continuing until she was 16 when she ended the relationship. L. had kept a diary of these encounters which when read by her parents caused them to report M. to the police. L. was particularly upset when M. initially denied the offences and accused her of lying. Having thought he had loved her she now felt that she had been manipulated by him into a sexual relationship. She had become depressed and suffered nightmares, and even at one stage contemplated suicide. By time of sentence, M., a film editor with some obvious talent, was married with a baby daughter. The PSR author assessed him to pose a medium risk of serious harm to female children.
M. appealed against 30 months imprisonment following guilty pleas, and an associated seven-year SOPO that prohibited him from residing, associating or communicating with any child under the age of 16, other than inadvertently and with his own children: (i) without the supervision of another adult who is the legal guardian of the child, or (ii) without the express permission of the parent or legal guardian of the child who has knowledge of the defendant's previous convictions. The Court of Appeal considered that the PSR writer’s conclusion regarding his risk had to be viewed with considerable caution. Though M. had faced other counts on the indictment, including making an indecent photograph of a child and possessing indecent photographs of a child, these had been left on the file, but the Probation Officer was acting under the impression that the appellant had pleaded guilty to these offences.
As regards offence gravity and sentence length, the Appeal Court noted that M.’s offending had arisen ‘out of a genuine and sincere relationship’ between M. and L., demonstrated by the length of the relationship. It had progressed slowly so that there was no sexual intercourse until the appellant and L had been in a relationship together for some 10 months, and the relationship continued for some seven months after L's 16th birthday when it fact it was she who terminated the relationship. Overall, it had lasted some 30 months. M. thus argued that he had not been a sexual predator. However, he had been warned that he was getting too close to L and whilst this did not constitute a breach of trust, it was moving in that direction. He had given his undertaking to behave honourably towards L and he failed to do so. Furthermore, he was an intelligent man, some 10 years older than the victim, and obviously in a position of influence. He knew that what he was doing was wrong. Further, his initial denials had inevitably increased L.’s sense of humiliation. After anxious consideration, the Court determined to reduce sentence length to 21 months.
As regards the SOPO issue, the Court agreed that the order as drafted was too sweeping. ‘It would, for example, prevent M. having children into his house for a birthday party for his own child, unless at least all the other parents knew of his previous convictions and gave their permission. That would be so even though there is no evidence of misbehaviour with young children.’ Given the notification restrictions to which he would be subject and the fact that ‘this was a consensual affectionate relationship, it was not an appropriate case in which to impose the Sexual Offences Prevention Order in order to protect properly the interests of the public and, in particular, other young teenage children’. Accordingly, the SOPO was set aside.
R v MICKLEWRIGHT, May 2012 (not reported at time of writing).
SOPOs and indeterminate sentences
In light of the guidance in Smith that SOPOs should not, save in rare instances, be ordered when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for public protection (IPP), offenders who were made subject of a SOPO when incurring an IPP sentence prior to that judgement may understandably have a case on appeal to set aside their order on the basis that it would not be imposed if they faced sentence today. Dealing with two such (unconnected) appellants in R v I. and Others (July 2012, not reported at time of writing) – A. in respect of whom a 20-year SOPO had been imposed in 2006 (his minimum term being four years); and I. who had incurred an indefinite SOPO (accompanying a 12-month minimum term) in 2008 – both serving prisoners convicted of serious sexual assault of children, Lord Judge CJ observed that their SOPOs ‘cause them no prejudice’.
The orders do not and have not impeded their release. They are both still in custody. If they were caused any inconvenience in relation to the proper application of the conditions under which they may be released on licence, it would be open to them to apply for a variation order under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s108. The basis of the variation would be that the new conditions, as they would then be, of their licences meant that the SOPO (or parts of it) were no longer appropriate.
Further, as a matter of general principle, a sentence is imposed on the basis of the relevant legislation, the principles, practice and guidance, whether from the Court of Appeal or the Sentencing Council, which are current at the date when sentence is imposed. ‘An existing sentence should not be varied on appeal because of subsequent changes to them.’ Accordingly, their appeals were dismissed.
Moving on to deal with a further appellant, Pinney, with an associate had enticed two young women, each on a separate occasion, to a flat where the victims had been subjected to sustained physical and sexual assault involving calculated terror and extreme humiliation in a quest for power and gratification. These offences had attracted an IPP with a minimum term of nine years in September 2011, two months after the Smith judgement. The associated indefinite SOPO prohibited him from contacting either of the two victims. Lord Judge considered that the SOPO had been imposed as a gesture of sympathy to the two victims. Though readily acknowledging that they had indeed suffered ‘the most dreadful ordeals’, he concluded: ‘we do not think that a SOPO is an appropriate way in which the court should express its sympathy, concern and understanding for them. They can be amply protected if either of these two men has the nerve to seek to make any contact with them’.
Repeat hospital order or IPP?
Having been allowed unescorted leave for two hours from his low secure mental health unit, T., a psychiatric patient subject since 1988 to a MHA 1983 s37 hospital order with a s41 restriction direction, imposed for indecent assault of a male child, approached two boys, luring one to accompany him into woodland where he subjected the ten year-old to a serious, prolonged and very frightening sexual attack. An in-patient for 24 years he had at no stage been conditionally discharged from hospital. When caught, T. readily admitted the crime and subsequently told the reporting probation officer that if he were released into the community he would definitely re-offend against children. On his guilty plea to attempted rape and sexual assault, it was uncontested that T., a paedophile suffering from mild mental impairment and dissocial personality disorder, was dangerous within the meaning of CJA 2003 s225(1)(b). The essential question for the judge was whether to make T. subject to a further s37/s41 order or to imprison him indefinitely for public protection (IPP). The Crown Court received a full and unambiguous psychiatric report that advised that though T. continued to meet the criteria for the diagnosis of mental disorder and the nature and degree of his disorder would normally warrant detention in hospital for treatment, ‘in this case the evidence is that treatment has failed’, despite the length and extent of intervention and the indications that T. appeared to be responding. Further treatment was very unlikely to make any difference and the consultant psychiatrist concluded that she could not recommend further detention in hospital for treatment. Counsel for T. sought to persuade the judge that, given the stark alternative which the court had by way of sentencing options, he should adjourn the sentence hearing for the preparation of a second psychiatric report. While suggesting that this step was likely only to have the effect of ‘putting off the evil day’ as far as T. was concerned, the judge initially appeared minded to agree and to obtain a second opinion as a precaution but ultimately opted against this course of action and imposed an IPP. In doing so he expressed his concern for the victim’s family, having been informed how anxious they were to avoid a further delay before knowing the outcome and indicating that he did not wish to add to their distress.
On T.’s appeal it was argued on his behalf that the sentencing judge had raised his legitimate expectations by giving a number of indications that he would adjourn for the preparation of such a report before ultimately deciding not to do so, and that in all the circumstances his sentence was unfair in that T. was left with a legitimate sense of grievance and feeling of injustice. It was further argued that it had been wrong in principle for the judge to proceed to sentence without allowing the defence an adjournment to obtain a second psychiatric report because, in the absence of such a report, the judge was precluded from making a fully informed decision as to which sentencing option to take.
Dealing with the second argument first, the Court of Appeal was clear that where a court ‘has at considerable public expense commissioned the preparation of a full and thorough psychiatric report’ in order to consider whether an IPP on the one hand or a hospital order on the other is appropriate, ‘the circumstances will be rare indeed where a judge who, having been provided with a negative psychiatric report, imposes the otherwise inevitable alternative’ (IPP) will be held to have acted wrongly in principle. Counsel for T. had conceded that ‘shopping around for a favourable report, particularly at public expense, is a practice which is not to be encouraged’ and the Appeal Court agreed, adding:
Whilst we are at pains to acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which a failure to allow such a course to be adopted would be open to criticism, such occasions will be exceptional. By way of example, we could envisage such a course being adopted where the reporting expert had been provided with patently wrong or incomplete information upon which an otherwise conclusive opinion had been based. No such criticism can be made of the sentencing judge in this case.
As regards T.’s ‘unfairness’ point, the Appeal Court was sure that the sentencing judge regretted the uncertainty with which he approached the sentencing exercise. With the benefit of hindsight ‘a firm decision without prevarication would have been eminently preferable’. ‘We have to ask ourselves whether the judge raised the appellant's expectations and, if so, whether by virtue of his failure to fulfil them the decision to sentence was unfair.’ Though T.’s expectations were raised, those expectations ‘were premised on the false assumption that because there was a need for a positive opinion of two doctors in order to send someone to a mental hospital indefinitely, it was only fair for there to be two doctors to consider whether prison should be the option rather than hospital’. ‘We find ourselves unable to say that the ultimate decision to sentence rather than to adjourn could properly be perceived by right-thinking members of the public as unfair, rather than as the ultimate reasoned conclusion of a judge who had found the decision a difficult one.’ The Court had no doubt that in reaching his ultimate decision not to adjourn, the sentencing judge had balanced the competing arguments and reached the right decision. T.’s IPP sentence was thus upheld.
R v TUDOR, June 2012 (not reported at time of writing).
Sex Offender Notification: Recent changes
Further to the Supreme Court’s ruling in F and Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17 that the indefinite notification requirements in s82(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 are incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in so far as they do not contain any provision for the review of the justification for continuing the requirements in individual cases, the Home Office secured the approval of Parliament for the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1883), setting out a new review mechanism and coming into force on 30 July 2012. An offender subject to an indefinite notification liability (provided that he is not also subject to a SOPO) may apply in writing to his local Chief Constable seeking a determination that he should no longer be subject to notification requirements. The application will be determined by reference to specified considerations (s91D of the Act), including information secured from the probation and prison services, the seriousness of the applicant’s offending and his risk of sexual harm, and any submissions from the offender’s victims. The earliest point at which application can be made is 15 years from the date on which the offender made his first notification to the police (eight years if the offender was aged under 18 on that date). If an applicant is unsuccessful, he may not reapply for a further eight years, though in exceptional cases the police may extend this minimum to up to 15 years. It is estimated that that up to 1200 offenders will be eligible for a review each year. For more information see the Home Office’s Guidance on Review of Indefinite Notification Requirements, accessible at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/sexual-offences-remedial-order/review-notification-requirements?view=Binary
Meantime, notification requirements have been augmented by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Notification Requirements) (England and Wales) Regulations 2012, coming into force on 13 August 2012. These include an obligation to notify the police of all travel outside the United Kingdom and more stringent requirements in respect of place of residence, banking details and forms of identification. For more information see the Home Office’s Explanatory Memorandum at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1876/pdfs/uksiem_20121876_en.pdf