Religious pluralism,public religion,and principled pluralism in Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia is a very diverse nation in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture (Geertz, 1963: 24; Sadya, 2022). Yet the fact of its diversity has at the same time posed a problem. The problem of plurality, in particular religious pluralism, has since Indonesia's independence become its greatest internal problem. With regard to religious life, all of the world's main and important religions are represented in Indonesia along with a good number of ethnic as well as animistic beliefs. Among these religions and beliefs, Islam is adhered to by 86.9% (Rizaty, 2022) of the total 279 million population (Isabela, 2022) and, thus, becomes the largest religious group in Indonesia.

The seriousness of the human rights problem in Indonesia—due to religious violence and offenses committed against religious minority groups—is such that the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United Nations Human Rights Council has repeatedly reported on it (Universal Periodic Review, 2023). The SETARA Institute notes that in 2020, there were 180 cases of violation against freedom of religion/belief, which involved 424 acts of violence, 239 of which were conducted by state agents and 185 by non-state groups (Sigit and Hasani, 2021: 24, 28).

Acts of intolerance were usually committed against religious minority groups—both non-Muslim and Muslim. Of the non-Muslim groups, it was usually the Christians who were targeted, particularly with regard to worship places. Until 2015, more than 1500 churches had been destroyed or burned (Pratama, 2015). Commenting on the enormous burning and destruction of churches, Franz Magnis-Suseno said that Indonesia could be regarded as the world champion of church destruction and burning (Magnis-Suseno, 2003: 19). Regretting the demolition of so many churches by irresponsible people, Stephen Tong has questioned why not a single one of the perpetrators was prosecuted (Tong, 2023).

Acts of intolerance were also committed against Muslim minorities. On 6 February 2011, about 1500 men committed a bloody attack against an Ahmadiyah congregation in Cikeusik, Banten, killing three and causing five heavy injuries (George, 2016: 127). Religious radicalism against Ahmadiyah is still happening today. The SETARA Institute notes that in 2020, eight religious freedom violations were committed against Ahmadiyah. The severity of this intolerance has led the author to conclude that religious violence toward Muslim minorities was even more severe compared to the ones committed against non-Muslims (Intan, 2015: 253).

Religious violence in Indonesia has global relevance and involves other religions as well. José Casanova observes that during the 1980s, all religions and local fundamentalists in the Middle East—Jewish, Christian, and Islam—had fought in various civil as well as non-civil wars. Branches of these three religions have also been involved in wars between them, spanning North Ireland to Yugoslavia, India, to the Soviet Union (Casanova, 1994: 3).

Considering the harsh face of religion, some people have raised the question of whether the involvement of religion in the social and political life of a nation should be permitted at all. The presence of religion that instigated social conflicts should have made us pessimistic toward its role in the public sphere and view its role negatively. In other words, religion should be privatized and marginalized. However, if this is the case, is it not at variance with the nature of religion that regards life as religious and human beings as religious creatures? (Calvin, 2006: 107–109).

So how should the presence of religion in the public sphere bring peace and benefit instead of detriment and calamity? The author offers the concept of “principled pluralism” initiated by Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), who pioneered the Dutch neo-Calvinist movement. Based on Reformed theology and the thought of John Calvin (1509–1564) in particular, Kuyper's principled pluralism has proved successful in establishing a pluralistic and tolerant community in the Netherlands. The important role of principled pluralism in “embracing pluralism” is not limited to Europe only but has spread to the United States. As James K. A. Smith states, “[Principled pluralism] was ahead of its time and should have new resonance and uptake in the fraught pluralization of the democratic West” (Smith, 2017: 131). According to the author, this principle could also be applied in Indonesia to solve the problem of religious intolerance in order to bring benefit to the nation.

The question remains, whether a contact has existed between Calvin and the Dutch neo-Calvinist and Indonesia—the largest Muslim-populated country in the world. The answer is yes. History records that since 1602 the Netherlands had colonialized Indonesia for 350 years. And since 1623, Reformed Christianity, which is based on Calvin's theology, was introduced to Indonesia (Steenbrink, 2008: 99–100). The essential role of Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta in preparing for Indonesia's independence and the birth of Pancasila could not be separated from the education and thought formation they received from the Dutch. Sukarno even quoted Kuyper in support of his argument when he described the ruthlessness of the Dutch colonial government in his speech, “Indonesia Menggugat” (Sukarno, 1956: 13). Eric Louw notes that the importance of Kuyperian pluralism for Indonesia lies in how it participated in the formation of Pancasila so that religious pluralism was established and the idea of majoritarianism thus excluded (Louw, 2004: 210).

Before discussing principled pluralism, the author would like to touch on the secularism approach which is often considered to be the solution to religious violence. As religious radicalism appears mainly due to a fusion taking place between religion and the state, its solution then is to draw an absolute separation between religion and the state, which secularism upholds. However, viewed from the perspective of post-secularism, secularism could not be the right solution to religious radicalism. On the other hand, while post-secularism has played a significant role as a way for religions to enter into public life, it has not discussed comprehensively how religion should function in it. It is principled pluralism that the author would offer to provide for the understanding of religion's place in post-secularism society and how it should function in it, in order to solve religious intolerance. In the final discussion, the author will relate principled pluralism to Pancasila, Indonesia's national ideology (the five principles of Pancasila include the following: The Principle of One Lordship; A Just and Civilized Humanity; The Unity of Indonesia; The Principle of Peoplehood Guarded by the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation; and Social Justice for all Indonesian citizens), in the Indonesian context.

The secularism approach

Religious violence and intolerance have created a frightening impression of religion. The extremists’ use of religious symbols and language has brought a bad reputation to religion since it is considered to be a source of problem. For some, religious violence could have been prevented if religion were limited to the private sphere, as secular countries that embrace secularism have done.

The terms “secular state” and “secularism” are used in this context in the sense of ideal type. While varieties of secularism exist in secular states, the one discussed here is that inherited by the French Revolution. Before the revolution, religion (the church) and the state were very closely related. But after the revolution, the state removed religion from the public sphere, as the example of the statue of the Goddess of Reason being built in the Cathedral of Notre Dame showed. It was intended to indicate that religion (Christianity) was no longer allowed to get involved in the public sphere since its position had been replaced by Reason and Liberty (Jemadu, 2023).

This kind of secularism could be called radical secularism or secular intolerance or laicism, which Jonathan Fox defines as “a type of ideology that specifically declares that not only is the state forbidden to support any religion, but also restricts the presence of religion in the public sphere.” It has to be distinguished from neutralism, in which the government must be “neutral toward all religions…it must treat all of them equally, playing no favorites” (Fox, 2018: 172–173). Alfred Stepan distinguishes between democratic secularism and authoritarian secularism. In the democratic secularism model, the state exercises control over religion at a low level, whereas in authoritarian secularism, the state exercises control over religion at a high level (Stepan, 2011: 119). In this context, France is often viewed as a secular state of the laicism kind and closer to democratic secularism.

In short, the secular state that the author discusses here is the laicism secular state that sees secularism as an ideology in the form of democratic secularism as well as authoritarian secularism. Only civic virtue, derived from philosophical and secular foundations, is allowed to be used in the public sphere. As Longstaff maintains, “a secular state will afford a safe and respectful place for people of all faiths—and of none. Indeed, it is only a secular state that can offer a coherent response to the problem of extremism, especially the kind grounded in religious belief” (Longstaff, 2022).

A secular state embracing secularism would restrain religious freedom with the purpose of preventing religious radicalism. Leaders of secular states think that radicalism and religious extremism would take the opportunity to develop themselves in an atmosphere of religious freedom. Therefore, by restraining religious freedom in the public sphere, one would only be able to express one's religion in the private sphere. In short, “secularization as privatization” does not allow religion to get involved in any organization of the community, including in state affairs (Casanova, 1994: 35–39).

It is interesting that Casanova defines the ideology of secularism as “political theories that presuppose that religion is either an irrational force or a nonrational form of discourse that should be banished from the democratic public sphere” (Casanova, 2011: 67). Secularism supporters view religion as an irrational metaphysical matter. This means that with the development of science and technology in modernization that deifies reason, secular leaders believe that religion would become more and more diminished and irrelevant to modern society (Habermas, 2008a: 17). Thus “secularization as religious decline” and secularization as privatization will cause religion to continue declining in the modern world until it vanishes at last (Casanova, 1994: 25–35).

Post-secularism: a critique of secularism

However, secularism's prediction that in the modern world, religion would become an artifact has not been proved. Since the end of the Cold War, religion—instead of diminishing—has become one of the most significant powers in social-political life (Juergensmeyer, 1994). Casanova notes that at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, traditional religious movements have appeared, beginning with political Islam and Catholic Liberation Theology that persuaded their followers to withdraw from the private sphere and enter into public life, which Casanova calls the “deprivatization of religion” (Casanova, 1994: 5)

In line with Casanova, Jürgen Habermas also started by doubting the actions and relevance of religion in the modern world that defies reason, but his position changed after seeing the development of modernity itself, in which religion has returned to become a public issue (Habermas, 2008a: 18–19). The privatization and decrease of religion's role had, in fact, not obliterated religion, and once again religion functions in the public sphere. While Casanova calls this condition a “deprivatization of religion,” Habermas uses the term “post-secular society” (Habermas, 2008a: 19).

From the perspective of post-secularism, the thesis of privatization and the decline of religion do not hold, not only because of its lack of empirical proof but also because of its theoretical inconsistency. As I have explained above, secularism's view of the function of religion in the public sphere was founded on a negative assumption about religion. Religious violence and intolerance, although displaying the destructive side of religion, are not the only truth about religion. In many cases, religion has also shown its constructive side—numerous positive contributions to society could be credited to religion. As Casanova maintains, during the 1980s, religious activists had played significant roles in movements that fought for liberation, justice, and democracy around the world (Casanova, 1994: 3).

Tracing the history of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, R. Scott Appleby in his book, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, points out that religion is more ambivalent than it is dangerous. He maintains that religion's ambivalence lies in the fact that every religious tradition contains seeds of violence as well as of peace. Both the extremists and the peacemakers are militant as well as radical. They serve the holy and are rooted in the basic truths of religious tradition (Appleby, 2000: 11). Appleby's study has shown that the revitalization of “pubic religion” tends to bring peace more than to instigate violence. For Appleby, whether religion becomes a source of conflict or a source of peace depends largely on its leadership in forming the development of tradition that provides energy to the religious community (Appleby, 2000: 305–307). From the perspective of post-secularism, the error of secularism lies in its conviction that religion should be prohibited to reveal its positive contribution.

Another inconsistency of the secularism theory, according to post-secularism, is its restraint or curtailment of religion. Pushing religion into the private sphere does not prevent religious radicalism; conversely, it escalates religious violence. Religion is a fundamental part of every human being; restraining it will accordingly create a reaction—and a strong one at that in the form of “backlash” (Juergensmeyer, 1994: 4) often accompanied by “revenge” (Kepel, 1994). It is therefore unsurprising that if someone, particularly from a religious minority group, feels that his religious freedom is being restrained, he would become unsatisfied, and when his dissatisfaction escalates into frustration, it would end up in violence (Saiya, 2021: 105–115).

Consequently, in order for religious radicalism to be solved, post-secularism suggests that a new paradigm should be found regarding the relation between religion and the state beyond separation or fusion. I have previously mentioned that secularization's thesis regarding the decline of religion and its separation from the state has not been held, not only because of its lack of empirical proof but also its inconsistency in theory. In this case, only one alternative is left of the modernization theory whose validity could be tested, namely, “secularization as differentiation.” Within the discourse of post-secularism, this type of secularization is valid for religions that function in the public sphere. Through the process of differentiation, distinctions are made within the societal spheres, in which religion no longer becomes the only one that defines all reality, so that the secular aspect can find its proper place (Casanova, 1994: 15). Hollenbach is right in stating that the term differentiation has to be understood as “distinction” and not as separation that results in strict isolation (Hollenbach, 2002: 118).

According to post-secularism, secularization in this sense causes neither a decline in religion's role nor a privatization of religion. Religion's decline, says Casanova, is a historical choice. Religion will experience a decline if it opposes modern differentiation (Casanova, 1994: 15). We know that Western Europe had experienced a religious decline often known as the post-Christian era (Vahanian, 2009). It was caused by a characteristic that churches controlled by the state have, namely, opposing differentiation in political and secular areas. “It was the caesaropapist embrace of throne and altar under absolutism,” Casanova maintains, “that perhaps more than anything else determined the decline of church religion in [Western] Europe” (Casanova, 1994: 29).

In contrast to Western Europe, the United States did not experience a post-Christian era. Religion even reappeared at the denominational level (Habermas, 2008a: 18). What distinguishes American Protestantism from Western Europe, says Casanova, is that the United States has never had “an absolutist state and its ecclesiastical counterpart, a caesaropapist state church” (Casanova, 1994: 29). This fact shows that as long as religion accepts the differentiation process, it could survive as an influential power in the modern world.

The acknowledgment that post-secularism gives to the existence and influence of religion in the public sphere is limited to religion's function and use in modern society. Post-secularism, according to Habermas, refers to the behavior of people who were originally secular but later experienced “a change in consciousness” (Habermas, 2008a: 20) and accepted new thoughts regarding religion. It is the wish of Habermas that a modern state, in creating people's solidarity and strengthening their social involvement, would use not only morality and political philosophy as its source but would also be open to accepting the perspectives of religious traditions (Habermas, 2008a: 21). Habermas agrees with Hegel's thesis that world religions have their own rational history. It would therefore be irrational for the secular party to reject the richness that religious traditions could have contributed (Habermas, 2008b: 111). In short, within a post-secularist society, both the secular and the religious, each owns the same communication rights, in which each could learn from the other in a spirit of mutualism—“a complementary learning process” (Habermas, 2008b: 122–123, 130).

Conceptually, although post-secularism seems to have left secularism, it does not mean that post-secularism returns to religiosity. In reality, post-secularism is still inclined to secularism. It is therefore unsurprising that it still uses doubt and caution when involving religion in social-political life. Habermas distinguishes the informal public sphere (outside of parliament) from the formal one (the political system). In the informal public sphere, religions are allowed to express their thoughts in their unique religious language. Here, all citizens could learn from each other about the richness of different religious traditions (Habermas, 2008b). However, in the formal public sphere like the parliament, only public reason applies. So for Habermas, in the formal public sphere religion needs to interpret the content of religious contributions into the secular idiom in order “to make them accessible to all” (Reder and Schmidt, 2010: 7). Through “generally accessible language,” says Habermas, the religious contribution “can enter into the deliberations of political institutions that make legally binding decisions” (Habermas, 2013: 371). In other words, Habermas limits the contribution of religion in the formal public sphere; Hardiman explains that “the intention is not to have a dialogue about exclusive religious doctrine, but to grasp the inclusive rational content of religious faith that is in touch with the problem of social justice in universal humanity” (Hardiman, 2009: 159).

It is true that the presence of post-secularism has reduced the tension caused by secularist groups that often negate religion. However, has the solution that post-secularism provides brought into reality the religious unity in the thought of modern society? In other words, has post-secularism acknowledged the public sphere as an inherent and inseparable part of religion? In making its contribution, has religion played a maximum role that includes the whole reality of its religiosity?

Principled pluralism

Long before the appearance of post-secularism that averts the thought of secularism, Kuyper had already faced the challenge of secularism and came up with principled pluralism to avoid it. It was the challenge of the atheistic French Revolution that Kuyper faced. Kuyper was grateful for the French Revolution because it overthrew the Bourbon dynasty and destroyed the conspiracy between Roman Catholics’ spiritual and political authority, thus creating political freedom (Kuyper, 1987: 109). According to Kuyper, the Roman Catholic spiritual and political conspiracy, often called “ecclesiasticism,” along with its theocracy system could not be justified since it claims sovereignty over all spheres of life. In other words, the church pretends to be God, with the result that its government, according to Kuyper, will end up “in tyranny and the corruption of [the] people” (Kuyper, 2015: 35).

On the other hand, Kuyper also saw that the real crime committed by the French Revolution was not its overthrowing the Bourbon dynasty, but its opposition of divine authority through its slogan, “ni Dieu ni maître” (no gods, no masters) (Heslam, 1998: 148). Thus, the civil liberty that the French Revolution achieved was, according to Kuyper, not true freedom, since it has to agree with the atheistic majority (Kuyper, 1987: 109). As the saying goes, “Escaping the tiger's mouth, falling into the crocodile's mouth,” the French Revolution did free French society from the trap of ecclesiasticism but then led it into the trap of secularism.

The presence of secular nations in Europe could be seen as an impact of the Protestant Reformation. By destroying the organic system of the Middle Ages monopolized by the church, the Protestant Reformation had freed the secular sphere from the control of religion; it had thus given religion's legitimation for the founding of modern secular states (Casanova, 1994: 21–22). However, in distinction with the freedom á la French Revolution, the freedom that principled pluralism offers is a freedom rooted in God who holds the highest sovereignty over every sphere of life (Kuyper, 1987: 79). In this way, freedom according to principled pluralism is “a liberty of conscience, which enables every man to serve God according to his own conviction and the dictates of his own heart” (Kuyper, 1987: 109).

While ecclesiasticism promotes a theocratic state, the atheistic French Revolution produces a secular state (Kuyper, 2015: 34–35, 58, 61). In similarity to other secularisms, the French Revolution wants the neutrality of the public sphere, namely, a public sphere free from religious values but promoting secular values based upon a certain philosophical position. For Kuyper, an “irreligious neutral standpoint” promoted by the French Revolution is completely unrealistic (Kuyper, 1987: 106). Following Calvin, Kuyper saw human life as “incurably religious” (Spykman, 1989: 81). Viewed from the perspective of principled pluralism, even secular values could be regarded as religious and not neutral. Kuyper explains, “however much they rage against dogmas, they are themselves the most stubborn dogmatics. A dogma, after all, is a proposition that you want others to accept on pain of being proven wrong” (Kuyper, 1998a: 115). This means that, as the neo-Calvinist Gordon Spykman puts it, “every societal issue is a human issue and every human issue is a religious issue,” with the implication that “[the] public affairs of society and the state are no less religious than the so-called private affairs of individual, church, home, and school life” (Spykman, 1989: 81). Principled pluralism's rejection of a neutral public sphere thus adds to the list of the inconsistencies of secularism, in theory.

Basically, principled pluralism has two important elements—sphere sovereignty and confessional pluralism. Focusing on the doctrine of God's sovereignty, Kuyper acknowledged that only God is sovereign as the source of all human authority (Kuyper, 1987: 90). For Kuyper, it is the sovereign God who created various institutions and granted each institution with a unique authority. This view is known as sphere sovereignty. Kuyper explains:

In a Calvinistic sense we understand hereby, that the family, business, science, art and so forth are all social spheres, which do not owe their existence to the state, and which do not derive the law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high authority within their own bosom; an authority which rules, by the grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the State does. (Kuyper, 1987: 90)

As an ordinance of God, every institution in society has its own authority and is not allowed to seize or dominate the authority of other institutions. Sphere sovereignty has been God's plan from the beginning and is therefore normative. Those institutions do not have ultimate sovereignty but sovereignty only to a limited degree, each in its own sphere (Kuyper, 2015: 29–41). According to Spykman, each field has its own identity, tasks, and specific rights given by God (Spykman, 1976: 167). In other words, the sovereignty that each institution has is God-given, dependent, inherited, delegated, and limited. Only God has ultimate sovereignty. God delegates His authority to humans in a concrete way in various institutions, for example, the authority of parents at home, the authority of sermons at church, the authority of teachers at school, and the authority of government in state administration for the sake of maintaining public justice (Spykman, 1989: 95).

Even though each institution has its own identity and responsibility, its independence is not absolute. It means that between institutions an interconnectivity exists. As Kuyper maintains, “[the] cogwheels of all these spheres engage each other and precisely through that interaction emerges the rich, multifaceted multiformity of human life” (Kuyper, 1998c: 467–468). In other words, these institutions have to work together to build “[a] wholesome community life.” Spykman calls this collaboration between institutions “a sphere universality” (Spykman, 1989: 80).

In the relation between church and state, both entities cannot be separated in an absolute sense because there are spheres of life, such as marriage, education, and the like, that are governed not only by the laws of the state but also by the laws of the church. And every individual is both a citizen of the state and of the church. More basically, from the theological perspective, as I have mentioned above, principled pluralism teaches that life is religious and human beings are basically religious beings. Supporting Aristotle's view of the individual as a social being (zoon politikon), Kuyper views human beings as naturally political beings (Kuyper, 1987: 97). Thus, every person is a religious being and at the same time a political being. The implication would be that the state and church are actually united in every individual. Kuyper describes this paradoxical relation between religion and state as “no separation between religion and state but only between state and church” (Kuyper, 2015: 354).

This is the differentiation theory á la Kuyper. As I have mentioned above, differentiation is for post-secularism the only alternative that would sustain the role and relevance of religion in modern society. However, long before the advent of differentiation, Kuyper had already come up with the concept of sphere sovereignty, which he first mentioned in 1870 in the weekly newspaper, De Heraut (Harinck, 2020: 265–284; Kuyper, 1998c: 461–490).

Aside from structural pluralism, the second part of principled pluralism is confessional pluralism. Spykman defines confessional pluralism as the right of different religious groups to get involved in public life through their institutions—schools, political parties, labor unions, worship places, and others—and to introduce their views (Spykman, 1989: 79). Unlike structural pluralism, confessional pluralism is not normative as it is not God's design from the beginning but the result of human fall. The parable of the wheat and the tares is one of the biblical texts used to support this concept (Kuyper, 2015: 68), in which the task of separating true faith from the untrue one is not carried out by the church or the state, but which Christ himself will accomplish it at His second coming (Kuyper, 1998b: 220).

As I have previously discussed, Kuyper sees human beings as religious creatures, homo religioso. For Kuyper, religion is not only inseparable from human life, but more than that it is “a holistic orientation of life,” as expressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff:

The Christian is called to bring his or her entire life into conformity to Christ. Devotion to God in Christ is to transform one's life, not merely serve as add-on to a shared human nature or a shared liberal democratic way of life. Shaping Kuyper's thought about politics, academia, etc., was this profoundly holistic understanding of the (proper) role of Christianity in particular, and of religion in general, within human life. (Wolterstorff, 1999: 197)

So, for Kuyper, one's thoughts about various aspects of life are inseparable from the religious thoughts he/she has. Thus Kuyper encourages every person from different religious backgrounds to freely and openly express his/her faith in the public sphere. In Kuyper's words, “whatever you may choose, whatever you are…you have to be it consistenly…in your entire world-and life-view” (Kuyper, 1987: 134).

In this context, Wolterstorff allows religion's contribution to the use of religious language not only at the informal level of the public sphere but also at the formal and official level (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997: 116–119). Habermas disagrees with Wolterstorff. For Habermas, if religion enters the formal public sphere with its religious concepts and language it is highly probable that adherents of the majority religion would take over political agendas and this could create repressions on minority groups (Habermas, 2008b: 133–134).

Responding to the debate between Habermas and Wolterstorff, it should be underlined first and foremost, as mentioned above, that religion is unified with human life, in which its expression is not limited to informal life outside of parliament but also within formal life in the political sphere. Wolterstorff gives the example of a judge's decision in court, which could side with the pressure from the masses or, conversely, against their demands. It is hoped that his decision would be in compliance with the claims of justice. It is also hoped that, whatever the judge decides, it would be in line with his conscience (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997: 117–119). Religion, Kuyper maintains, is closely related to one's conscience, and freedom of the conscience is “the primordial and inalienable right of all men” (Wolterstorff, 1999: 199).

Moreover, Kuyper asserts that any belief and religious concept has a mission to influence the public sphere. As Matthew Kaemingk explains:

According to Kuyper, all worldviews, religious and secular, ancient and modern, have a missional aspect to them by which they seek to go out and influence “the tendency and construction” of public life. Catholics hope to move the public square in a Catholic direction, socialists hope to move it in a socialist direction, democrats in a democratic direction, pragmatists in a pragmatic direction, and so on. None of these philosophies keeps its conviction private (Kaemingk, 2018: 112; Kuyper, 1987: 26).

In this way, the involvement of citizens in the public sphere cannot be separated from the religious thoughts they have. However, when contributing their thoughts in the formal public sphere, every religious terminology, as Habermas insists, must be translated into public reason in order to be understood by all parties so as to prevent miscommunication and misleading. Yet, unlike Habermas, dialogues are not to be limited to “the inclusive rationality of religious faith” but should include “exclusive religious doctrine” as well. In the dialogue of public theology, as Max Stackhouse maintains, it is very important that one should, when contributing his/her religious thoughts, present the reality of his/her religiosity in a comprehensive manner. Thereby, in their dialogues citizens from diverse backgrounds and beliefs would have touched not only elements of reason and experience but also include Scripture and tradition, which comprise the exclusive source of of religious doctrine—these four elements of authority are known as “the ‘Quadrilateral’ Touchstones of Authority” (Stackhouse, 1987: 4–15).

Take for example Samuel Huntington's presentation in his book, The Third Wave, of the important contribution that Christianity—in this case Protestantism—has made to the field of democracy. While the first wave of democracy was dominated by Protestant states and the second wave by countries with a majority of Protestant population, the third wave happened in Catholic countries after the Second Vatican Council—countries that subscribed to a Charter of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) influenced by Protestant teaching (Huntington, 1991: 13–30, 72–85). Democracy has a very strong tradition in Protestantism since it is deeply influenced first of all by the doctrine of human depravity taught by Scripture (Genesis 3:1–24). Herman Bavinck describes human depravity as follows: “It [Sin] holds sway over the whole person, over mind and will, heart and conscience, soul and body, over all one's capacities and powers” (Bavinck, 2006: 119). Human sinfulness thus necessitates the limitation of government through democracy. Another thing that influences the tradition of democracy in Protestantism is human dignity that human beings still retain despite its damaged condition due to the fall of humanity into sin (Genesis 9:6). In this context, Reinhold Niebuhr has correctly observed that “[m]an's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (Niebuhr, 1944: xiii). As a consequence, religion's contribution must include those four elements of authority.

In conclusion, both structural pluralism and confessional pluralism—which are foundational to principled pluralism—are very much needed in a pluralistic society in order to create justice for all in the life of the family, politics, education, and religion.

Principled pluralism and Pancasila

Indonesia has indeed never experienced post-secularism like Western countries do. In Indonesia, religion has never returned because it has never been lost. During the era of the New Order, religion—Islam in particular—was marginalized to the private sphere, but after this regime fell, religion once again dominated social-political life. Nevertheless, Indonesia and Pancasila in particular had experienced the challenges posed by a religious state as well as the idea of secularism. History notes the Darul Islam (DI)/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (TII) revolt led by Kartosoewirjo with the purpose of establishing an Indonesian Islamic State (Formichi, 2010: 125–146). The revolt that started in 1949 could only be ended 13 years later. Indonesia had also experienced a communist rebellion that embraced secularism in Madiun in 1948 and later on the tragic event that took six generals of the Indonesian Army known as G30S PKI in 1965 (Crouch, 1973: 1–20). Thus, after the Indonesian independence in 1945, Pancasila had faced various tests to be replaced by other ideologies—whether religious doctrines or secularism ideas. This means that Indonesia had experienced post-secularism to a certain degree.

The tension between the religious state and the secular state had even happened in Indonesia prior to its independence. It happened between the Muslim group and the Nationalist group. When the Muslim group wanted Indonesia to become an Islamic state, the Nationalist group conversely wanted Indonesia to become a secular state. Both groups went through an intense debate at the meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) (Intan, 2006: 39). Amid this debate, Pancasila was born, which made Indonesia neither a religious state nor a secular state. Zainal Fikri said, “Indonesia's founding fathers had successfully married religion with secularism, resulting in a neither religious nor secular country” (Fikri, 2016). The fact that Pancasila was accepted by the Muslim group showed that they did not actually belong to a group that truly wanted Indonesia to become an Islamic state. Before having Pancasila as an alternative, only two options were possible: an Islamic state or a secular state. For the Muslim group, an Islamic state would be the better option. Likewise, the Nationalist group preferred a secular state to an Islamic state. The acceptance of Pancasila by both groups proved that Pancasila is the best ideology for the Indonesian nation.

Principled pluralism could function as a hermeneutical lens in reading Pancasila. Its application in Pancasila could be seen from the first principle, “The Principle of One Lordship,” which shows that Indonesia is not a religious state or theocracy. The term “Lordship” in the first principle points to the acknowledgment of religion in a broad sense. Initially, the term “God” was proposed to accommodate Muslim and Christian belief in a personal God. This proposal was rejected by I Gusti Ketut Pudja, a Hindu Balinese, who requested that “God” be changed into “Lord.” (Menoh, 2015: 161). A prefix and suffix were then added to form the noun “Ketuhanan” (Lordship), which means an idea about the divine and a belief in a supreme transcendence. As Simatupang notes:

So, the first principle in the Pancasila does not speak about God, but about a godhead; it speaks of the concept of the divine. Even people who do not believe in a personal God, as many Buddhists do not, can accept it. It is the belief in one supreme transcendence, a supreme and unitary Being. This may appear to be a very vague concept, but it is all embracing…. All of us, Christians and others, could accept it. (Simatupang, 1974: 317)

Consequently, through its first principle, Pancasila does not acknowledge the existence of an official religion. In other words, Kuyper's confessional pluralism is thus in line with the spirit of the first principle.

Besides revealing that Indonesia is not a religious state, the first principle, “The Principle of One Lordship,” indicates at the same time that Indonesia is not a secular state. This principle clearly expresses Indonesia's acknowledgment of God. This is in line with Kuyper's idea that emphasizes the sovereignty of God over everything, even over the state. For Kuyper, because a government is established by God and receives the divinely set task of ruling, it must obey God's transcendental norms. Thus a government, in its presence, must acknowledge its calling to serve God, with the major task of promoting justice and morality in society (Kuyper, 2015: 49). Therefore, viewed from the perspective of principled pluralism, the Principle of One Lordship displays the concept of God's sovereignty.

Thus in a Pancasila-based state—as viewed from the perspective of principled pluralism—although religious institutions are separated from the state, religion, and politics are inseparable entities, as Kuyper maintains above, “no separation between religion and state but only between state and church.” Indonesia is therefore neither a theocratic nor a secular state, but rather a religious state that acknowledges and obeys the sovereignty of God—in Kuyper's definition, “a nation not without God” (Kuyper, 2015: 60).

The first principle occupies a special place in Pancasila. As discussed above, the existence of the first principle reveals the concept of the sovereignty of God. Thus, its presence not only guarantees religious freedom, since the other principles could guarantee this freedom as well, for example, the second principle, “A Just and Civilized Humanity.” The main objective of the first principle is to encourage religions to function in social and political life in the public sphere.

With regard to religion's contribution to the formal public sphere, as previously discussed, it must bring all of its concepts of religiosity, which includes not only reason and experience but also Scripture and tradition. However, as Habermas contends, it is important for religion to translate its religious terminologies in order to avoid miscommunication and misleading. According to Darmaputera, the significance of the translation of religious concepts into public reason that is objective, inclusive, and general—or popularly known as “objectification”—lies in the fact that whether or not the concept is accepted, the reason is not because it originates from a certain religious tradition but because it is right or wrong, good or evil, according to objective norms (Darmaputera, 2001: 392). In other words, religion's contribution should not be oriented first of all toward religious symbols but rather toward the substance of religious values. On the other hand, Bahtiar Effendy reminds us that the translation of religious concepts should not compromise its uniqueness. In order to achieve this, Effendy states that the objectification process should become an internalization process rather than a secularization one. It means that the interpretation of internal values into objective categories should be accompanied by a determination to internalize and concretize them in order for them to be implemented in the life of the congregation (Effendy, 2000: 26–27).

What, then, is the holy mission of religion when it enters the public sphere, particularly in the Indonesian context? In his 1956 book, Indonesia in the Modern World, J. M. van der Kroef made an observation about Pancasila and came to the conclusion that Pancasila as a whole is inappropriate for the Indonesian nation. For van der Kroef, the five principles—in particular, the second to fifth—were Western products that were individualistic in nature and thus incompatible with the Indonesian society, which is largely communal. With regard to the second principle that speaks about humanity, van der Kroef predicted that in the future, the Indonesian society would be even less humane. As for the third principle regarding nationalism and unity, in the future Indonesia would see this spirit of nationalism fade and the nation divided. Similarly with the fourth and fifth principles regarding democracy and social justice, in the future Indonesia would become even less democratic and the social gap would be even wider (Kroef, 1956: 198–251). How far would van der Kroef's prediction come true, only time will tell.

The existence of the first principle—“The Principle of One Lordship”—that refers to the sovereignty of God should be seen not only as first in order but also as a guide to the other four. The position of this first principle provides a transcendent touch to subsequent principles so that nothing purely secular exists in Indonesia. In this aspect, one could detect a similarity with the idea of principled pluralism that sees all of life as religious. As a theological foundation, the first principle could provide ethical and religious guidance to the other four. Take, for example, the second principle about humanity: When entering into the public sphere, religion brings along the concept of human rights based on religious thought. Muslims, for example, would argue that human rights exist within every human being as God's caliph. Christians, likewise, would base human rights on the fact that human beings bear the image and likeness of God. Human rights, then, are not gifted by certain groups or political parties or even the state; it has a transcendent dimension in the universal sovereignty of God. The same thing applies to the other principles. In the third principle about unity, religion would bear the theme of nationalism in a religious nuance. In the fourth principle concerning deliberation and representation, religion would present a concept of “theo-democracy.” Religion would likewise carry the issue of social justice with religious values when getting in touch with the fifth principle. It is our hope that van der Kroef's prediction will not come true. But have we, as religious citizens, carried out our tasks and responsibilities?

The public role of religion has to be carried out in cooperation and dialogue among the religious groups in order to create the common good, known in Islam as mashlahah ‘ammah. For this purpose, every religious group is required to be aware of the interdependency between religions by presenting the golden rule (Luke 6:31, “And as you wish that others would do to you, do so to them”), of which many religions have various versions of it (Hick, 1995: 39–40). The application of the golden rule would end up in a relation of mutual care. In this situation, religions that are inactive must be encouraged to give their contribution because as religious interdependency signifies, the absence of one religion's contribution would influence the genuine civil consensus to be agreed upon by all participants. Richard Mouw and Sander Griffioen assert that every religion is thus required to have goodwill to bring benefit to the nation by having a spirit of cooperation, fair-mindedness, and tolerance (Mouw and Griffioen, 1993: 75).

The common good produced should reflect bonum honestum (true goodness). In order to achieve this, the common good must grow out of honest and open dialogues instead of the majority's opinion or a meeting point of popular argumentation. It means that the common good must be the result of a consensus, a “unifying” of the partial goods of each religion. But despite its being a unity of partial goods, the common good must still keep a pluralistic nature (Murray, 1988: 105). In other words, the common good must reflect the spirit of Pancasila, namely, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. The common good can be different from, but not in conflict with, the beliefs of each religious group. Besides, the common good must also be able to guarantee minority rights, which is an important requirement in creating democracy.

Conclusion

Religious violence and radicalism in Indonesia are clearly anomalies and could not be considered representative of religion. It is hoped that religious freedom could be fully implemented in Indonesia because Pancasila, in the context of sphere sovereignty, guarantees it in order that confessional pluralism could be realized. The founding fathers’ decision that Indonesia should not become a secular state must have liberated religion from the bondage of having to exist only in its private sphere; on the other hand, preventing Indonesia from becoming a religious state must have required a respectable place for religion. Especially as this is supported by principled pluralism's argument that religion has to present itself not only in the informal public sphere but also in the formal one.

All of this is connected with the mission that religions carry out to bring peace as its positive contribution. Even though religions, in themselves, embody a potential paradox—breeding violence on the one hand and reconciliation on the other—the revitalization of public religion could erase religions’ negative role in order to subsequently maximize their positive role. Thus, a hegemony of religions is an absurdity, and does not have roots in this country. On the contrary, it is necessary to develop public religion in order that it could provide a space where the public role of religions could be acknowledged and improved. In this way, religions could become a liberating force and create a democratic socio-political life. Interestingly, Paul Marshall once spoke of a contrast between Noah's ark and a lifeboat. Religion, says Marshall, should not function as a small and limited lifeboat that could save a mere handful of people. Religion, he asserts, should become like a huge ark that saves not only human beings but the whole creation (Marshall and Gilbert, 1998: 30-31).