Lifestyle and close relationship trends among young adults in Poland

Leaving home

In some countries, leaving home is considered a developmental milestone during late adolescence/early adulthood. The transition often occurs through employment, college, or marriage. Through any of these venues, young adults move out of their parents’ homes and into their own homes. However, this choice was often dependent upon access to economic resources (e.g., well-paying job and low college costs) that made such choices viable. Under current economic conditions in Poland, it can be difficult for young adults to find work that allows them to be financially independent. Although well-paying jobs can exist in the economy, such salaries are not common in entry-level positions (even for college graduates). Thus, young adults face difficult challenges in (a) gaining independence from their parents and (b) starting their own families.

In light of these challenges, the leaving home process has been delayed for many young Polish adults. Among European Union (EU) countries, Poland has one of the highest age rates for adult children living at home. The mean age for leaving home is 28.5 years for women and 30 years for men (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011). As living at home has become elongated, attitudinal changes have also been noted. According to Oles (2011), there are young people who are not willing to ‘leave the nest’, even if they have family support to undertake the common developmental tasks of early adulthood (e.g., higher education, career initiation, and marriage). Rather, they are actively choosing the coziness of living with their parents (e.g., enjoying a comfortable life and avoiding the responsibilities of adulthood). In Poland, this attitude has become more common and is known (colloquially) as ‘domestication’.

This trend (toward elongated years living at home) is also consistent with research on life values. In prior generations in Poland, the value of marriage, family, and personal happiness was seen as inseparable—one could not be happy without family (including marriage) and family was the source of happiness. However, these values have become more distinct for the more recent generations of young adults. More specifically, research has shown that adults value personal happiness more than (a) marriage and (b) family (Adamski, 1982; Boguszewski, 2008a; Kwak, 2005; Plopa, 2010; Slany, 2006). Young adults still see happy marriage as desirable, but they also seek fulfillment/happiness through other life venues. For example, they want work/employment to be the (a) source of personal satisfaction and (b) guarantee of an acceptable quality of life (Blazek, Kazmierczak, Lewandowska-Walter, & Michalska, 2010). In addition, Polish psychologists stress that love is the most important motive for being in a relationship and getting married (Plopa, 2004; Rostowski & Rostowska, 2005; Rys, 2000). Thus, young adults might be less motivated to marry for other reasons (e.g., compliance with parental expectations/hopes). If young adults do not leave home until they marry and love is a precondition to marriage, then the search for love can extend the number of years that they live at home.

Intimate relationships

In reference to relational values, the majority of young adults express some support for marriage. In a 2005 survey, less than 10% were involved in informal (e.g., dating and temporary) relationships, and 85% planned to marry during early (aged 19–26 years) adulthood (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011). Marriage is not valued primarily as a means to fulfill societal functions (e.g., community stability). Rather, marital relationships are valued as a means to fulfill psychological needs and expectations. For example, marriage serves to provide respect, sensitivity, forgiveness, sexual fidelity, and emotional faithfulness (Plopa, 2010; Rostowski, 2009; Rostowski & Rostowska, 2005; Szlendak, 2010).

Yet, a wedding does not guarantee that partners will find the fulfillment that they seek. Thus, young Polish adults demonstrate more open attitudes toward diverse relational structures. People are willing to engage in interpersonal connections as a means to explore the fit with potential partners. Some participate in living apart together relationships (LATs). LATs occur when partners have a shared emotional bond, but do not share a household (Slany, 2006). Rather, they live separately (each partner in a different household).

Cohabitation (a shared household between romantic partners) is not viewed as a permanent or ideal relational structure (Vennum, Lindstrom, Monk, & Adams, 2013). Only 10% of Polish adolescents and 5% of young (aged 20–26 years) adults view cohabitation as acceptable (Janicka, 2009, 2010; Slany, 2006; Szlendak, 2010). The lack of acceptance might reflect the transitory nature of these relationships. According to Janicka (2006), cohabitation is characterized by lower security, lower personal satisfaction, and higher risk of relationship termination. Some couples might use cohabitation as a trial marriage or premarital planning phase (e.g., cohabiting while seeking/waiting for sufficient financial stability). Yet, relatively few Polish young adults choose cohabitation as a long-term structure.

Another generational shift is reflected in the willingness of Polish adults to terminate unsatisfying marriages. There is a growing acceptance of divorce as a means to solve marital and family conflicts (Janicka, 2009; Rostowski, 2009; Sikorska, 2009; Slany, 2006). The most commonly reported reasons for divorce are irreconcilable personality/character differences, unfaithfulness, abuse, and exaggerated individualism (which prevents adequate attention to partner’s needs). Indeed, the divorce rate among adults (aged 30–35 years) is increasing substantially (compared to prior decades). Given that Polish adults now wait until their late 20s or early 30s to wed, these divorces represent more dissolutions during the earliest phases of marriage. There is also some indication that the rate of second marriage is increasing (Beisert, 2000; Beisert, Liberska, & Matuszewska, 2001; Central Statistics Office, 2008).

Love, sexuality, and fertility

In Poland, the mean age of sexual initiation (e.g., intercourse) is nearly equal (women = 18.8 years and men = 18.7 years). Similar to relationship structures, there appears to be a lack of uniformity in young adults’ attitudes. For example, Boni and Szafraniec (2011) reported that 35% of men identified ‘love’ as very important to quality of life, yet only 26% of men identified ‘sex’ as a very important factor. A similar pattern emerged for women (42% love and 12% sex). This data might suggest sexual behaviors are relatively less important than emotional connections to others. However, there is also a clear trend toward multidirectional sexual activity among young adults. These adults utilize an enter-and-escape style, in which they might have brief relationships (which can include intercourse), but terminate the relationships before other traditional parameters (e.g., exclusive commitment and psychological intimacy) are enacted. In construction of sexual identity (erotic self), there is a tendency for individuals to focus more on their own needs than their partners’ needs (Biddulph, 2005; Sternberg & Weis, 2007; Wojciszke, 2009). Thus, love (and marriage) might be viewed as admirable or important but not necessarily a precursor to sexual behaviors among young adults. These Polish adults might not be inherently reckless in their sexual choices, but they are not postponing sexual intercourse until after they fall in love and wed.

Polish adults stress that starting a family (having children) is a serious matter. Children are included in the life plans of most individuals and less than 10% of young adults (19–26 years) do not intend to have children. A large family is not a preferred model, but having one (the only child plan) has little social acceptance. Thus, most adults might plan to have small families. Similar to romantic issues, there can be a gap between the plan and reality of family formation.

The fertility rate in Poland is now one of the lowest rates in Europe. The desired fertility rate is 2.5 (mean number of children per family) and a rate of at least 2.1 would be necessary to ensure an adequate population replacement. Demographically, replacement occurs when new children enter society (via birth) as other members exit society (via death). Thus, a replacement rate is essential for the long-term survival (across generations) of any country/culture. However, the replacement fertility rate was 1.39 (children per family) in 2000. Compared to prior generations of Polish families, this rate is substantially lower (Boguszewski, 2008b; Plopa, 2010; Sikorska, 2009; Slany, 2006).

Several factors have been identified as potential contributors to the low fertility rate. For example, contraceptives (to prevent pregnancy) are now widely available and affordable in Poland. Thus, young adults (in nonmarital or marital relationships) have the option to minimize the likelihood of pregnancy. As noted previously, it is not uncommon for Polish adults to delay leaving home and starting serious romantic relationships until their late 20s or early 30s. If adults plan to complete these steps before having children, then they might not attempt to become pregnant until their mid-late 30s. Under these conditions, it is not unexpected that some couples might have fertility problems. Approximately 14% of Polish couples cannot have children (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011). Being childless gives adults more opportunity for personal development but also increases the risk of social ostracism and feelings of emptiness in later life (Kalus, 2002; Slany & Szczepanik-Wiecha, 2003). The majority (73%) of Polish adults consider conception techniques (e.g., in vitro procedures) to be socially acceptable (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011). This acceptance might simply reflect the tolerance of greater diversity in romantic and parental pathways. Alternatively, the acceptance might reflect a resignation that (a) delayed marriages are going to create unintended consequences and (b) reproductive technology might be necessary to increase the likelihood of intergenerational survival.

Economics, work, and gender

Although relational/family choices can be very personal events, these events do not occur in isolation. Rather, choices occur in the context of the broader social environment (e.g., Smock, 2004). Thus, relational/family choices can be facilitated or constrained by the social conditions in modern Poland. Scholars have identified economic, work, and gender issues that might be salient to trends in close relationships.

During the past 20 years, there has been a significant change in the political and social systems of Poland. After 1989, the political entity within Poland relinquished its role as a provider of jobs and social services. This created a fundamental change in the economic structure, which had been known during the latter half of the 20th century. Given the recency and dramatic nature of this change, it had a stronger impact on Polish families (than families in countries with open free market economies of longer duration). This economic change occurred simultaneously with periods of greater exposure/access to globalization, new ideologies, and more individualistic lifestyles. This exposure might be tempting to the generation of young adults and constitute a significant challenge to traditional forms of Polish family life (Boguszewski, 2008b; Plopa, 2010; Sikorska, 2009; Slany, 2006).

The new market economy offered models of a life that was more closely tied to consumerism. The purchase of items was presented as attractive and desirable. As attractiveness can be a precursor to intimate relationship formation, young adults might feel some pressure to engage in this economy to enhance the likelihood of relational success. For example, high consumerism might be judged as indicators of wealth and good taste, which might be the elements of (a) initial romantic attraction that enhance the possibility of (b) long-term relationship formation. Ironically, the same economic conditions might delay/inhibit success. In the absence of government support of job/service provision, young adults face the harsh realities and uncertainties that are typical of free market economies (Chybicka, Kosakowska, & Kazmierczak, 2006; Rostowski, 2009; Titkow, 2007). The job market limitations might make it difficult for young adults to save enough money to cover the costs of housing, marital life, and raising children. In addition, the work environment provides few incentives/supports to workers with children. In the absence of financial stability, adults might delay leaving home, marriage, and/or parenthood (Kalus, 2002; Maciarz, 2004; Sikorska, 2009; Slany, 2006; Slany & Szczepanik-Wiecha, 2003; Wojciechowska, 2002).

The political/economic system transformation did open opportunities for women to participate in the work world. In the traditional model of family life, women would stay at home and look after children, while men were employed outside the home (as breadwinners). If women had a desire for outside employment, then they would sacrifice their desires for the sake of their families and serve as primary caregivers. In modern Poland, women have higher expectations for involvement in the world of employment. They want to be well educated, more independent, and have access to professional career pathways. There is a growing acceptance of the recognition of women’s right in the context of income and promotion (Chybicka, Kosakowska & Kazmierczak, 2006; Rostowski, 2009; Titkow, 2007).

These potential gains in employment access can be tied to complications in parenthood options. If women engage in employed work with high demands, then they might postpone plans for parenthood until they have gained a degree of job and financial security. However, it is possible that there might be a greater risk of fertility problems as men and women age. In addition, it is possible that the stress of multiple roles (as worker, spouse/relationship partner, and parent) exacerbates fertility challenges. Some adults also seem to show less motivation to have children as they age (Chybicka, Kosakowska, & Kazmierczak, 2006; Titkow, 2007; Mui-Teng Quek et al., 2011).

Among young mothers in Poland, there appear to be employment variations tied to the level of educational achievement (Bidzan, 2012). Similar to prior generations, mothers with fewer years of formal education remain professionally inactive. Compared to women without children, these women can be seen as less appealing job candidates to prospective employers. Most employers do not provide day care services, so mothers who do not have viable day care options have a lower likelihood of finding jobs. These mothers have longer periods of unemployment between jobs, especially if they have more than one child. Economic challenges can also be difficult for divorced mothers. In the majority of divorces, children usually stay with their mothers and these single parent families face economic hardships (Plopa, 2004; Rydzewski, 1994). The main issue (for lower educated mothers) is not discrimination, but rather a cycle in which women’s skills become increasingly less marketable as they have less sustained employment in the modern society.

In contrast, mothers with more education have greater access to employment in a market-based economy. They have higher levels of employment, better incomes, and fewer children. The smaller family size might occur by choice or default (e.g., delayed parenthood). Despite their advantages, higher educated women have greater losses of comfort and time as they try to manage the duality of employment–family demands (Chybicka, Kosakowska, & Kazmierczak, 2006; Szlendak, 2010; Titkow, 2007). In the light of these economic issues, it is a significant challenge to address the (a) national fertility rate, (b) empowerment of all women who want to be engaged in employment, and (c) quality of life for couples/families (Kwak, 2005; Slany, 2006; Szlendak, 2010).

More generally, there has been a transition from a child focus (king child with parents model) to an adult focus (king pair with child model) in families. The needs of children are still considered important, but the needs of parents (as adult individuals) have gained more prominence (Boguszewski, 2008a; Maciarz, 2004; Sikorska, 2009; Slany & Szczepanik-Wiecha, 2003). Compared to prior generations, men and women are less likely to make certain sacrifices of personal desires/preferences. However, this increased focus on adult needs might have also contributed to more egalitarianism. There has been a shift toward more shared responsibilities (e.g., chores) between relational partners. The role of mother has been expanded to include employment and the role of father has been expanded to include activities that were traditionally considered women’s work (e.g., child care). A relatively new phenomenon is the readiness of males to take care of young children (Arcimowicz, 2003; Baran, 2001; Boguszewski, 2008a; Chybicka, Kosakowska, & Kazmierczak, 2006). Research has demonstrated the majority (59%) of adults accept this shared responsibility approach to marital/family relationships (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011).

Despite this shift toward more shared responsibilities, there is still a tendency toward strong mother–child bonds. Traditionally, the mother was considered the ‘emotional core’ of family life in Poland. For example, one-third of young people reported strong bonds with mothers and one-fourth reported strong bonds with fathers. Among those who reported weak parental bonds, the rate was nearly doubled for fathers (mothers = 16% and fathers = 29%). In addition, there were parental differences on specific interactional patterns (Boni & Szafraniec, 2011). Compared to mothers, fathers were less frequently identified as offering help (mothers = 75% and fathers = 51%), expressing love directly (85% and 61%, respectively), showing understanding (47% and 26%, respectively) and being more easily accessible for discussions (80% and 58%, respectively). Thus, it appears that some elements of the emotional core paradigm still exist in mother–child relationships. In future generations, it will be interesting to assess whether the emerging equality in mothers/fathers’ responsibilities contributes to more equivalent ratings (by children) of parental support/accessibility.

Concluding comments

In sum, this article has provided an overview of romantic and familial trends in modern Poland. The trends reflect changes in both attitudes (e.g., more focus on individual need fulfillment) and behaviors (e.g., earlier age of first intercourse, lower birth rate, and more divorces). Similar trends have been evident in a variety of regions (e.g., European Union and North America). Thus, some aspects of the relational patterns might simply reflect relational/family life in the context of current international economics (e.g., more employed parents and smaller families).

Yet, Poland does differ from some other European countries in its recency of individual freedom. For some decades of the 20th century, Polish individuals and families survived under the control of repressive governments (e.g., Nazism and Communism). One resource for sustainability was a strong attachment to traditional family (and religious) values. Since World War II, it has only been the current generation of young adults (who were born since the 1980s) who have known an entire lifetime in a free society. Thus, the broadening range of relational choices (e.g., leaving home at later ages, cohabitation, and divorce) might be one of many ways in which Polish adults enjoy their freedoms. Alternatively, young adults might perceive that they have fewer clear guidelines (for family life), so they explore more relational options as they endure the ambiguities of a major cultural shift. Continued research will reveal the evolving linkages between sociopolitical processes and psychological functioning of individuals, couples, and families in the 21st-century Poland.