Tall tales make fast friends: Exaggerating when retelling previous experiences fosters relational closeness

Abstract

This research explores the possibility that exaggerating in order to entertain the listener while sharing previous experiences can increase interpersonal closeness in new relationships. It is hypothesized that adding exaggerations about previous experiences will increase the quality of the story, which will lead to increased interpersonal closeness, and that even listeners who are provided with the actual facts will show this effect. Three studies with 592 total participants investigated the impact of exaggerating when sharing a story about a previous experience on feelings of closeness to the storyteller. In Study 1, participants read scenarios of a person telling a story about a previous experience. Results indicate a preference for exaggerated stories and a concomitant feeling of closeness to the storyteller. In Study 2, participants retold the events of a video to another participant who was a stranger. Participants instructed to give an entertaining recalling used more exaggerations, and listeners felt closer to them. In Study 3, participants watched a video of a confederate retelling events accurately or with clear exaggerations. Participants reported feeling closer to the confederate when exaggerations were included, even when they knew the facts the storyteller was retelling. Discussion centers on reasons why being entertaining was more beneficial in creating relationship closeness than being honest.

Keywords

Deception exaggerations interpersonal closeness narratives relationship formation self-disclosure

The movie Big Fish (Cohen, Jinks, Zanuck, & Burton, 2003) centers on the extraordinary stories Edward Bloom likes to share with others. He tells of meeting a giant who helped save his life, coming face-to-face with a witch who predicts the future and even how time actually stopped when he saw the love of his life for the first time. Over time, it is revealed that these stories are exaggerations built upon real events that occurred in Edward’s life. Edward’s son Will is mystified and annoyed by the degree to which everyone else in Edward’s life finds these exaggerations endearing. The present research examines whether exaggerated retellings of life experiences are—as Will believed—harmful to relationships because they are lies or—as Edward’s friends believed—beneficial to relationships because telling a good story increases interpersonal closeness.

Edward knowingly and intentionally misled his friends and family into believing the events in his life occurred in a way that never happened. In the previous literature, lying has been defined as “intentionally [trying] to mislead someone” (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996, p. 981). Edward’s actions fit into this definition because he intentionally told others about true events that occurred, but in an untrue fashion. The matter is complicated, though, because Edward’s intention was not to harm others, but to entertain them. Everyone must know someone like Edward whose stories deviate from the truth by virtue of exaggerations designed to entertain listeners. Determining whether exaggerating for the purpose of entertainment makes the lies not just acceptable, but actually relationship promoting, is the goal of the present research.

We term truth deviations used by Edward EEEs, abbreviated for entertaining exaggerations of experiences. The present research investigates the effects of EEEs in stories of individual events upon the relationship between the listener and the storyteller. This issue is ripe for investigation, as no research of which we are aware has specifically investigated the effects of EEEs on new relationships. Moreover, opposite hypotheses about their effects might be drawn from two distinct literatures, one on the impressions made by those who lie and the other on the nature and functions of storytelling.

The research literature on reactions to lies suggests that EEEs would have a chilling effect on relationships. The deception literature in psychology is primarily focused on the accurate detection of deception rather than its acceptability (e.g., Aamodt & Custer, 2006). The small literature on acceptability of deception reveals that, in general, the act of lying is seen as morally wrong, even by 4-year-olds (Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997; Bussey, 1999). Moreover, people who utter deceptions are generally evaluated negatively, and lying usually negatively impacts relationship quality (DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004; Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006). Listeners approach interactions with others with a truth default (Levine, 2014); they expect to hear the truth and are bothered by deception.

Most of these studies on deception acceptability are experiments in which participants are presented with scenarios of a character telling a particular type of lie, with measures assessing acceptability or impressions of the lie teller taken afterward. A few studies are experiments in which participants interact with a live confederate in the laboratory. Thus, these experiments investigate impressions of fictional others or strangers, so that the nature and closeness of the relationship between the listener and the storyteller are held constant. The results show that those who lie make a poor impression, especially (although not exclusively) if their lies are self-serving, hurtful, or unexpected (Rycyna, Champion, & Kelly, 2009) or if the liar has no offsetting positive characteristics (Kuhn, Johnson, & Miller, 2013). Thus, even though EEEs are not intended to hurt or manipulate others, they could be considered a type of lie and therefore could impair feelings of closeness between the listener and the storyteller.

It is important to note that this prior literature on reactions to lies has not studied EEEs specifically. Nevertheless, it seems feasible that EEEs might create interpersonal distance between a storyteller and a listener, at least when the EEEs are known to be untruths. People tend to react with anger upon learning that a narrative presented as nonfiction contains misleading information (Green, 2011). Therefore, EEEs may be viewed as unacceptable deviations from the truth particularly when the facts upon which the story is based are known to the listener. The storyteller’s intent is to mislead the listener, even if this intent is explained by the larger goal to tell a better story.

The literature on storytelling and narrative suggests, in contrast, that EEEs could potentially facilitate relationships. To understand why that might be the case, it is necessary to clarify how people listen to stories told by others. When people listen to others, they do so using what Bruner (1986) refers to as a narrative mode, in contrast to a logico-scientific mode. Listeners in narrative mode are not as concerned with details, facts, and logical arguments as they are with ordering the sequence of events and assigning intention to characters in the story.

That is, the historical truth (or close hewing to the actual facts) of a narrative may be less relevant in a typical interpersonal context; instead, it is the narrative truth (or the storyteller’s interpretation of the events) that matters (Fisher, 1987; Spence, 1982). Furthermore, it has been argued that stories about previous events are shared as narrations that are designed to symbolize the meaning of the events from the storyteller’s perspective, creating a more persuasive and meaningful mode of communication by illustrating what matters and why it matters to the storyteller (Bochner, Ellis, & Tillman-Healy, 1997; Fisher, 1987). In these narrations, the honesty of the storyteller’s interpretation matters more than sticking closely with the facts.

Therefore, by this logic, listeners may react positively to stories that deviate from the actual facts (by way of EEEs) if the EEEs help illustrate the meaning and significance of the events as interpreted by the storyteller (Bochner et al., 1997; Fisher, 1987). That is, narration is viewed as a social, interpersonal act of meaning-making instead of a description of the exact events that occurred (Bruner, 1990). Listeners may therefore feel closer to the storyteller because he or she has succeeded in bringing order and personal meaning to the experience told to the listener by using EEEs.

It is also important to note that narratives about one’s own life experiences are special, because they are an integral component of identity (McAdams, 2013; McAdams & McLean, 2013). Such narratives can be developed in collaborative dialogue with others (Pasupathi, 2006) and may be shared with others after being formed (McLean, 2005). Hence, making a good story out of one’s own experience may be seen as revelatory of one’s identity and thereby perceived as an act of self-disclosure by the listener. Self-disclosure usually increases feelings of closeness and liking between conversation partners (Beike, Brandon, & Cole, 2016; Collins & Miller, 1994). Both the meaning-making and the identity-sharing processes ought to lead to greater feelings of closeness and intimacy between the teller of a good story and the listener.

Consistent with this view, qualitative research suggests that listeners seem to find stories that deviate from historical truth appropriate, as long as those stories exhibit tellability (containing noteworthy yet not overly disclosing information), coherence, explications via intentions, and clear temporal sequencing (Bruner, 1991; Norrick, 2007). The narrative goodness of a story is theorized to enhance the relationship between the storyteller and the listener (Baron & Bluck, 2011; Donahue & Green, 2016). In short, transforming the events into a meaningful and cohesive story may be the more important factor than strict accuracy when listening to others’ stories of experiences.

Most of the studies on narration and storytelling are qualitative in nature. Individual dialogues or narratives are presented and annotated, such that the narrative itself is the unit of analysis, rather than its measured effect on the listener. For example, Pasupathi (2006) presented a dialogue in which one speaker is discussing with his friend an experience with a girl who expressed interest in dating him. Pasupathi noted qualities of the dialogue, in this case, times when the speaker is directly quoting words that were spoken and explicitly describing details of the experience. She inferred the function of these portions of the narrative from various theories of meaning-making and identity. Similarly, Norrick (2007) used Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) theory of narrative form to annotate a conversation, labeling elements such as orientation, evaluation, and resolution. Unlike the literature on deception acceptability, no direct measures of perceptions of the storyteller or of the story were taken from the participants in either study; the narratives were analyzed by the researchers.

Another difference between the deception acceptability literature and the narrative literature is that, in the latter, there has been much literature investigating stories when the storyteller has an existing relationship with the listener, such as between romantic partners (Buehlman, Gottman, & Katz, 1992; Holmberg, Orbuch, & Veroff, 2004; Veroff, Sutherland, Chadiha, & Ortega, 1993) and between family members (Koenig Kellas, 2005). Few studies have focused on new or developing relationships among relative strangers (Koenig Kellas, Trees, Schrodt, LeClair-Underberg, & Willer, 2010). Thus, the effect of specific qualities of the narrative on a new or developing relationship, which is the goal of the present research, is not the subject of investigation in most research on narratives. Finally, the listener rarely has access to the historical truth being communicated in the story and instead must rely on the storyteller to communicate the facts as he or she sees fit. Thus, EEEs or even full-blown manipulative and deceptive lies may enter the narrative unbeknownst to the listener. And, like the deception acceptability literature, the specific category of EEEs has not been analyzed in this literature.

In short, the deception literature suggests that people expect historical truth in communication, whereas the narrative literature suggests that people expect stories to have narrative truth in that narrations are constructed to highlight the personal meaning of the events as experienced by the storyteller. Often historical and narrative truths overlap virtually perfectly, but in the case of EEEs, there is a distinction. The details of historical truth may be sacrificed for a story with greater entertainment appeal. Thus, EEEs are a good test case for determining which matters more in a burgeoning relationship: conforming to the norm of conveying historical truth by sticking to the facts or conforming to the norm of conveying narrative truth by telling a good story. In order to test these two factors, it is essential that the listener be presented with both historical and narrative versions of the events so that he or she has the opportunity to detect where the truth has been stretched or embellished. We refer to the literal description of what happened as the “actual facts” of the to-be-described event.

When the actual facts are unknown to the listener, only the narrative and not the historical truth of the story can be detected. Therefore, listeners are predicted to feel closer interpersonally to a storyteller who uses EEEs than one who does not use EEEs. EEEs make a better story (Marsh & Tversky, 2004; Ulatowska, Olness, Samson, Keebler, & Goins, 2004), which implies greater effort to engage in meaning-making with the listener, resulting in a feeling of greater closeness.

When the actual facts are presented before the storyteller’s version, however, the divergence of EEEs from the historical truth can be readily detected. In this case, predictions about the effects of EEEs on feelings of closeness to the storyteller diverge, based on the two literatures reviewed earlier. The results of research on acceptability of deception lead to the prediction that when the actual facts are given, listeners will feel less close to a storyteller who uses EEEs than one who does not. The violation of the truth default and the general disregard for liars would lead to a feeling of interpersonal distance. The results of research on narratives in relationships, on the other hand, lead to the prediction that even when the actual facts are given, listeners will feel closer to a storyteller who uses EEEs than one who does not. Once a story begins, listeners use a narrative rather than a logico-scientific mode. EEEs would not be viewed as lies or inaccuracies, but rather as a natural by-product of forming a good narrative. Therefore, a storyteller using EEEs would be viewed as better fulfilling the norms of good narrative and meaning-making, as well as a form of self-disclosure to the listener, thereby producing greater feelings of relational closeness.

We tested these predictions in three studies. To maximize internal validity, we designed the studies along the lines of the experimental psychology deception detection rather than the narrative storytelling literature. Study 1 tested with scenarios whether participants who imagined hearing an exaggerated (compared to an accurate and to a falsehood-filled) version of a story would find the story more enjoyable and would imagine feeling closer to the storyteller afterward and whether this effect would reverse when the actual facts were given before the story. Study 2 tested with pairs of participants whether a participant instructed to tell an entertaining (compared to an accurate) story would use more exaggerations, produce a more enjoyable story, and create more interpersonal closeness between the self and the listener. Study 3 tested with a videotaped storyteller whether participants who viewed an exaggerated (compared to an accurate) retelling of a story would find the story more enjoyable and would feel closer to the storyteller afterward and whether this effect would reverse when the actual facts were shown before the story.

Based on our interpretation of the literature described above, we had four specific hypotheses for the current research:

H1: We hypothesized that listeners would find stories containing EEEs to be of higher quality than stories without EEEs. H1 was tested in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3.

H2: We hypothesized that listeners would report feeling closer to storytellers who incorporated EEEs into their stories than those who did not. H2 was tested in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3.

H3: We hypothesized that knowing the actual facts would not impact the listeners’ perception of story quality or reported feelings of closeness. H3 was tested in Study 1 and Study 3.

H4: We hypothesized that the results would present a pattern demonstrating that EEEs increase story quality, which in turn increases feelings of relational closeness. H4 was tested in Study 2 and Study 3.

Study 1

Participants read a scenario about a person giving an honest retelling, an exaggerated retelling, or an outlandish lie-filled retelling of a previous experience. Half of these participants were presented with the “actual” facts of the experience before reading the retelling so that they could readily determine the degree of exaggeration. Participants rated how much they enjoyed the story and how close they felt to the storyteller.

The design of Study 1 allowed H1, H2, and H3 to be investigated. It was predicted that participants reading the exaggerated version of the retelling would rate the story as more enjoyable and would report feeling closer to the storyteller compared to the other two conditions. This was predicted regardless of whether the actual facts were first presented to the participant or not. H4 could not be investigated in this research design as participants were not asked to report the number of EEEs they perceived in the story.

Method

Participants

Participants were 179 University of Arkansas undergraduates who received partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Twelve participants were excluded from analysis because they admitted not reading the scenario. Of those who remained, participants were primarily female (73.2%) and Caucasian (86.9%). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 60 years (M = 19.61, SD = 3.47). In all three studies, sample size was determined by setting the time of data collection to one semester and then running as many participants as possible in that time frame.

Materials and procedure

This online study employed a 2 (Facts [known, unknown]) × 3 (Story [truth, exaggeration, lie]) between-participant design. Half of the participants were first presented with a third person objective account of a series of events that happened to a character named Pat, including being bothered by hungry ducks, having a car breakdown, and witnessing an argument. Next, all participants read Pat’s retelling of the events to friends. Pat’s gender was matched to participants’ gender to reduce error variance due to gender biases (Pontari & Schlenker, 2006).¹ Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the three versions of Pat’s retelling: a truthful account of the events (“The steering wheel began to shake and the car made a horrible noise. I turned on my warning lights and pulled over safely to the side of the road.”), an exaggerated account of the events (“The steering wheel began to shake and the car made a horrible noise. My car swerved on the road and I lost control.”), or an outlandish account of the events, containing outright lies (“A small dog ran out into the road and I had to quickly swerve and slam on the brakes to avoid hitting the pup. I crashed into another car that was parked on the side of the road.”).²

After indicating if they read the story, all participants were asked to imagine they were among the group of friends with whom Pat shared the events as they answered the questions. The questionnaire included a manipulation check of story type (accuracy), consisting of the item “The events that Pat told his/her friends were close to the real-life events that occurred.” The questionnaire also included a story quality scale including the Perceived Quality Index scale, “To what extent was this story memorable?” (Baron & Bluck, 2011) plus the items “I enjoyed Pat’s recalling of the events” and “Overall I liked the way Pat recalled the events” (8 items; α = .88). Responses were reported on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) scale.

Next participants were presented with a measure of closeness. Consistent with Beike, Brandon, and Cole (2016), this index comprised the items “How close do you feel towards Pat?”, “How likely would you be to use the term ‘we’ to characterize you and Pat?” (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997), “Relative to all your other relationships (both same and opposite sex), how would you characterize your relationship with Pat?”, “Relative to what you know about other people’s close relationships, how would you characterize your relationship with Pat?” (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989), and the Inclusion of Other in Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; 5 items; α = .73). Responses were reported on a 1 (not at all close) to 7 (extremely close) scale.³

Results and discussion

Manipulation check

A 2 (Facts [known, unknown]) × 3 (Story [truth, exaggeration, lie]) analysis of variance was conducted on the manipulation check measure. A main effect of story type, F(2, 161) = 45.57, p < .001, η_p ² = .36, and an interaction of fact and story, F(2, 161) = 7.41, p = .001, η_p ² = .08, were obtained. As predicted, and as illustrated in Table 1, all participants rated the truth story as closest to the real-life events that occurred, the lie story as the least close to the real-life events, and the exaggeration story falling in the middle. This pattern of results was more pronounced when participants first read the third person overview of the actual facts. The pattern suggests that all participants were aware of which story deviated most from the real-life events, but participants who were presented with the facts were even more aware of which story was most like the actual events that occurred.

Table 1.

Means and standard deviations by condition in Study 1.

	Facts condition
	Accuracy condition	Facts	No facts	Total
Manipulation check	Truth	5.73 (1.54)	4.29 (1.49)	4.95_a (1.66)
	Exaggeration	3.34 (1.76)	3.46 (1.61)	3.40_b (1.68)
	Lie	1.89 (1.37)	2.62 (1.47)	2.26_c (1.46)
Story quality	Truth	2.87 (.94)	3.06 (.80)	2.97_a (.87)
	Exaggeration	3.79 (.74)	3.59 (.85)	3.70_b (.79)
	Lie	4.00 (.65)	3.56 (.74)	3.77_b (.87)
Closeness index	Truth	3.11 (1.33)	2.90 (1.28)	3.00_a (1.29)
	Exaggeration	2.94 (1.28)	2.95 (1.25)	2.94_ab (1.25)
	Lie	2.34 (.96)	2.48 (1.32)	2.41_b (1.14)

Note. Means of each measure across conditions in the total column not sharing subscripts differ at p < .05 by post hoc pairwise comparison tests.

Story quality and closeness

As Table 1 illustrates, participants found the stories containing exaggerations and lies higher in quality than the truthful story, F(2, 156) = 17.52, p < .001, η_p ² = .18, and felt closest to Pat when Pat told the story containing exaggerations or told an accurate story, F(2, 161) = 3.91, p = .02, η_p ² = .05. No other significant results obtained (Fs < 2.32, ps > .10).

In line with H1, participants preferred stories that contained exaggerations to honest stories. Partially consistent with H2, participants felt equally close to the honest and exaggerating storyteller, but less close to the lying storyteller. In short, participants reported feeling equally close to a storyteller who told a historically accurate story as to a storyteller who told an EEE-filled story. Consistent with H3, the latter effect occurred even when participants had read the actual facts on which the story was based.

The pattern obtained indicates a potential optimal point or “Goldilocks zone” of exaggerating when sharing previous experiences with others. Strict honesty seems to impede story quality, whereas outright lying seems to impede interpersonal closeness. In other words, the size of an EEE may matter: Small exaggerations may be considered proper aspects of a good narrative, whereas large exaggerations begin to violate acceptable norms for narrative construction. It is possible that the results obtained in Study 1 were due to the unrealistic nature of a scenario study. We designed Study 2 to test H1 and H2 in a more ecologically valid manner and to test H4.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to determine whether participants would use exaggerations when prompted to be entertaining and whether those exaggerations would lead to increased story quality and increased feelings of closeness in a listener, in an actual dyadic interaction. Dyads were composed of strangers as participants who were instructed not to sign up with anyone they knew, and the data from participants who failed to do this were eliminated from analysis. We reasoned that it would be particularly interesting if EEEs increased interpersonal closeness among strangers since transgressions (such as lying) have been shown to be more easily forgiven in satisfying relationships (Schumann, 2012). Participants in Study 2 came to the lab in pairs. One participant watched a short video clip and then retold the events in that video to another participant in an accurate way, an entertaining way, or in any way the participant wanted (no instructions). As in Study 1, story quality and closeness were measured.

The design of Study 2 allowed H1, H2, and H4 to be tested. In line with H1 and H2, it was predicted that participants would rate the retelling as being higher in quality and report feeling closer to the story teller when the story teller had retold the event in an entertaining way (using EEEs). In line with H4, it was predicted that including more EEEs in a retelling would enhance story quality which in turn would enhance relational closeness.

Method

Participants

Participants were 192 University of Arkansas undergraduates who received partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Two participants signed up for each session resulting in 96 dyads. Six dyads were excluded from analysis due to prior acquaintance. The remaining participants were primarily female (62.25%) and Caucasian (81%). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 46 years (M = 20.02, SD = 3.12).

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to act as a storyteller or listener. The storyteller watched a short video (Smith, 2010), while the listener waited in another room. The video depicts the events of an average day (i.e., waking up, eating breakfast, driving to work, and having a friend come over) from a first-person point of view.

Storytellers were randomly assigned to spend 3 min describing the video to the listener as accurately as possible, in an entertaining and amusing way, or any way they liked (see Dudukovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004). Next, participants were separated to fill out a questionnaire similar to that used in Study 1, with items referring to “the other participant” rather than “Pat” (story quality index: 8 items, α = .83; closeness index: 5 items, α = .71). In addition, listeners were asked to rate how entertaining they found the storyteller’s retelling, to rate how accurate they found the storyteller’s retelling, and to indicate the extent to which exaggerations were included in the retelling.

Two trained research assistants, blind to condition and working independently, coded each retelling for accuracy and entertainment value, on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all entertaining/accurate and 5 = extremely entertaining/accurate). These ratings served as manipulation checks. The two coders’ ratings were averaged together to form an entertaining coding index (α = .81) and accuracy coding index (α = .75).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks

As presented in Table 2, the listeners rated the storytellers’ retellings as most entertaining and as containing the most exaggerations in the entertaining condition, F(2, 87) = 3.23, p = .04, η_p ² = .069; F(2, 87) = 5.093, p = .008, η_p ² = .105. Listeners did not indicate any difference in accuracy, F(2, 87) = 2.05, p = .14, η_p ² = .045. As shown in Table 2, the coders rated the storytellers’ retellings as most entertaining in the entertaining condition, F(2, 86) = 9.12, p < .001, η_p ² = .18. Coders also rated the retellings as most accurate in the accurate condition, F(2, 86) = 3.01, p = .05, η_p ² = .07; however, this was only marginally significant when the accurate condition was compared to the entertaining condition (p = .07).

Table 2.

Means and standard deviations by retelling instruction condition in Study 2.

	Retelling condition
Measure	Entertaining	Accurate	Control
Entertaining (C)	3.21_a (.97)	2.42_b (.82)	2.31_b (.83)
Accuracy (C)	2.94_ab (.92)	3.35_a (.92)	2.81_b (.79)
Entertaining (L)	4.24_a (1.53)	3.25_b (1.78)	3.24_b (1.81)
Exaggerations (L)	2.31_a (1.58)	1.50_b (.88)	1.45_b (.91)
Accuracy (L)	5.31_a (1.29)	5.07_a (1.65)	4.53_a (1.67)
Quality (L)	3.64_a (.86)	3.14_b (.90)	3.22_ab (.88)
Closeness (L)	2.50_a (.72)	2.10_b (.57)	2.44_ab (.67)

Note. Means of each measure not sharing subscripts differ at p < .05 by post hoc pairwise comparison tests. L designates listener ratings. C designates coder ratings.

Therefore, as predicted, listeners perceived more exaggerations in the entertaining retelling condition. Yet they did not rate the entertaining retellings as less accurate. One possible explanation of this disparity is that the listeners were simply unable to determine the accuracy of the retelling, having never seen the video that was the basis for the retelling. A second and more tantalizing possibility is that listeners do not understand that a more entertaining story is almost necessarily less accurate. In support of this latter explanation, the overall correlation between listeners’ ratings of entertainingness and accuracy was r = .22 (p = .03).

Story quality and closeness

As presented in Table 2, listeners rated the entertaining retelling as higher in story quality compared to the accurate retelling (p = .03), with the no instruction condition falling in between the other two conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.70, p = .07, η_p ² = .06.

As presented in Table 2, listeners reported feeling closer to the storyteller in the entertaining condition compared to the accurate condition (p = .02), with the no instruction condition falling in between the other two conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.95, p = .06, η_p ² = .06.

Mediation analysis

As noted above, the entertaining manipulation led to more exaggerations and enhanced feelings of closeness to the storyteller. This suggests that storytellers used exaggerations to make the story more entertaining. Because story quality is associated with positive relationship outcomes (Donahue & Green, 2016), it was hypothesized that perceived story quality may mediate the relationship between exaggerations and closeness. Therefore, in line with H4, it was predicted that EEEs would enhance story quality, which would lead to increased feelings of closeness. To test this prediction, we conducted a multiple-step mediation model using bootstrapping procedures outlined by Hayes, Preacher, and Myers (2011; using the PROCESS macro for Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). This analysis showed that the confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect did not include 0 (95% CI [.02, .12]). The reverse mediation to determine whether exaggerations mediate the relation between story quality and ratings of closeness was not reliable (95% CI [−.01, .14]). These results support H4, EEEs increase story quality, which in turn increases feelings of closeness.

Consistent with H1, listeners preferred the entertaining (but exaggerated) stories over stories that were more accurate and stuck closely to the facts. Additionally, storytellers included more exaggerations to create an entertaining story. Consistent with H2, participants indicated feeling closer to the storyteller in the entertaining condition compared to the accurate condition. Furthermore, consistent with H4, mediation analyses confirmed the predicted causal pathway in that EEEs increased story quality, which in turn enhanced interpersonal closeness.

The actual facts were not provided to the listeners in this study, so H3 could not be examined. Interestingly, despite not having access to the actual facts, listeners were aware of more exaggerations in the entertaining condition. Yet they did not rate stories containing EEEs as less accurate. It is possible that the exaggerations included by the storyteller were so natural and small that the listener did not perceive inaccuracy. This may have landed participants in the “Goldilocks zone” described in the discussion of Study 1. Perhaps an increase in closeness occurs only when the listener is unaware of a sacrifice in accuracy. If there are too many exaggerations for the story to be believable, then it is possible the social benefits of sharing a good story could be nullified. It is possible that people consider stories about previous experiences to be somewhere between fiction and nonfiction and, therefore, are accepting of small exaggerations that would be seen as a moral violation in a story that was presented as complete fact (Green & Donahue, 2011). This middle ground would allow participants to accept small exaggerations without deeming the story a complete lie, explaining why participants indicated more exaggerations without a dip in accuracy in the entertaining, EEE-filled stories.

Study 2 increased external validity by using a realistic setting in which the listener was unaware of the facts and the storyteller was free to choose how to make the story entertaining. However, some degree of control was sacrificed by allowing storytellers this freedom. Some storytellers were undoubtedly better than others at creating entertaining stories. It remains possible that the positive correlation between entertainingness and accuracy was due to the fact that the more entertaining storytellers within each condition happened to also be the more accurate ones. Study 3 controlled the content of the entertaining story and the accurate story, ensuring that all participants in each condition heard the same retelling and that the entertaining story was truly less accurate. In addition, in Study 3, we added the manipulation from Study 1 of whether listeners were aware of the actual facts or not.

Study 3

Study 3 combined the methodologies of Studies 1 and 2. Participants saw a video-recorded retelling of events witnessed by the storyteller, with half of the participants having first seen those actual events. The events to be retold were those in the video used in Study 2. The storyteller was the same person in both conditions and for all participants: a video-recorded confederate and a stranger to all participants (according to a self-report question). Half of participants saw a video of the confederate describing the events in an accurate manner, and the other half saw him describing the events in an exaggerated manner.

Study 3 allowed us to test all four hypotheses. Consistent with H1 and H2, it was predicted that participants would find the exaggerated story (containing EEEs) to be of higher quality and to report feeling closer to the storyteller after hearing the exaggerated story. Consistent with H3, it was predicted that H1 and H2 would be supported regardless of whether the participant had the actual facts from the recounted video or not. Consistent with H4, we predicted the same mediation pattern obtained in Study 2, with exaggerations causing an increase in story quality, which increases feelings of closeness.

Method

Participants

Participants were 221 University of Arkansas undergraduates who received partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were primarily female (68.3%) and Caucasian (79.2%). Ages ranged from 18 to 35 years (M = 19.64, SD = 3.47).

Materials and Procedure

This study employed a 2 (Video [watched, not watched]) × 2 (Retelling [truth, exaggeration]) between-participant design. Approximately half of participants were randomly assigned to watch the video before seeing its retelling, and the other half of participants listened to music for the same amount of time. Next, participants watched a video of a confederate retelling the events from the video. The confederate was trained, by watching exemplar retellings from Study 2, to recall the events in an exaggerated way or in a truthful way without exaggerations. To control for potential differences in nonverbal communication, the confederate was asked to use the same tone of voice in each video and to avoid hand motions. He practiced retelling both versions of the story using the same tone of voice and without hand motions multiple times before the videos were recorded. Both versions of the video were recorded at the same time and in the same location so that the confederate appeared as similar as possible in both videos. Lastly, participants filled out the same questionnaire used in Study 2, except “the other participant” was replaced with “the student in the video” (story quality index: 8 items, α = .88; closeness index: 5 items; α = .87). Fourteen research assistants, who had not worked on the project, rated the confederate’s exaggerated and truthful retelling prior to the experiment. The truthful video was rated as significantly more accurate (M = 6.07, SD = 1.14) than the exaggerated video (M = 4.93, SD = 1.14), F(1, 13) = 6.66, p = .02, η_p ² = .34. The exaggerated video was rated as significantly more entertaining (M = 6.79, SD = 0.43) and as containing significantly more exaggerations (M = 6.21, SD = 0.80) than the truthful video (M = 3.71, SD = 1.64; M = 1.85, SD = 1.46), F(1, 13) = 46.49, p < .001, η_p ² = .78; F(1, 13) = 88.11, p < .001, η_p ² = .87.

Results and discussion

Manipulation check

As shown in Table 3, participants rated the confederate’s retelling as most entertaining and as containing the most exaggerations in the exaggerated condition, F(1, 217) = 87.029, p < .001, η_p ² = .286; F(1, 217) = 89.659, p < .001, η_p ² = .292. However, participants rated the retellings as equal in accuracy, F(1, 216) = .680, p = .41.

Table 3.

Means and standard deviations by condition in Study 3.

		Video
	Type	Watched	Not watched	Total
Entertaining	Truth	2.71 (1.21)	2.85 (1.23)	2.78_a (1.22)
	Exaggeration	4.25 (.78)	4.02 (1.05)	4.14_b (.92)
	Total	3.50_x (1.27)	3.43_x (1.28)
Exaggerations	Truth	2.50 (1.45)	2.56 (1.59)	2.53_a (1.51)
	Exaggeration	4.57 (1.75)	4.62 (1.65)	4.56_b (1.70)
	Total	3.56_x (1.91)	3.59_x (1.92)
Accurate	Truth	3.92 (.80)	3.28 (1.30)	3.62_a (1.11)
	Exaggeration	4.03 (.58)	3.39 (1.09)	3.73_a (.92)
	Total	3.98_x (.69)	3.34_y (1.19)
Quality	Truth	2.59 (.79)	2.73 (.82)	2.66_a (.80)
	Exaggeration	3.85 (.55)	3.79 (.65)	3.82_b (.59)
	Total	3.24_x (.93)	3.27_x (.91)
Closeness	Truth	2.60 (1.07)	1.95 (.85)	2.28_a (1.02)
	Exaggeration	3.41 (1.08)	3.29 (1.29)	3.36_b (1.23)
	Total	3.02_x (1.15)	2.63_y (1.28)

Note. Means of each measure across conditions in the total column and row not sharing subscripts differ at p < .05 by post hoc pairwise comparison tests.

As presented in Table 3, participants who were assigned to watch the actual video first rated both the truthful and exaggerated retellings as more accurate than those who did not watch the video, F(1, 217) = 23.510, p < .001, η_p2 = .098. No significant interaction was found, F(1, 217) < 1, p = .99. As in Study 2, although participants were clearly aware of exaggerations, they did not rate the exaggerated video as less accurate. Even participants who were assigned to watch the video that was being retold did not notice a difference in accuracy between the two conditions. This supports the possibility, suggested in Study 2, that participants were unaware that a more entertaining story almost necessarily is less accurate. Once again, the correlation between participants’ ratings of entertainingness and accuracy was significant and positive (r = .19, p = .003).

Story quality and closeness

As presented in Table 3, participants’ rating of story quality was higher for the exaggerated retelling than the accurate retelling, F(1, 216) = 148.39 p < .001, η_p ² = .407. No other significant results were obtained, all Fs < 1.14, ps > .29.

As shown in Table 3, participants felt significantly closer to the confederate after watching the exaggerated retelling than the accurate retelling, F(1, 215) = 53.96, p < .001, η_p ² = .20. Participants also felt significantly closer to the confederate after watching the original video than those not having watched the original video, F(1, 215) = 6.77, p = .01, η_p ² = .03. However, no significant interaction obtained, F(1, 215) = 3.29, p = .07, η_p ² = .02.

Mediation analyses

Exaggerations were again positively related to reported feelings of closeness. To test whether story quality mediates the effect of reported closeness, a bootstrapping analysis based on 5,000 bootstraps was performed (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). This analysis showed that the CI for the indirect effect did not include 0 (95% CI [.07, .17.]) and therefore that the mediating effect was significant. The reverse mediation analysis testing whether exaggerations mediate the relation between story quality and ratings of closeness was not reliable (95% CI [−.02, .15]) and, therefore, mediation effect was not significant. As in Study 2, these results support H4; EEEs increase story quality, which in turn increases feelings of closeness.

In line with H1 and H2, participants rated the exaggerated story (containing EEEs) as higher in quality and reported feeling closer to the storyteller who had used EEEs. Additionally, in line with H3, H1 and H2 were supported whether the listener was made aware of the actual fact or was not made aware of the actual facts. In line with H4, mediation analysis again revealed that story quality mediates the relationship between exaggerations and closeness. Participants heard exaggerations, exaggerations increased participants’ perceived story quality, and participants therefore felt closer to the better storyteller. The results of Study 3 therefore provide further support that EEEs may increase relational closeness even when historical truth is known.

General discussion

Three experiments tested the following hypotheses: H1: EEEs would make better stories; H2: listeners would feel closer to storytellers who used EEEs; H3: being aware of the actual facts would not impact the previous two effects; and finally, H4: EEEs would cause an increase in perceived story quality, which would create greater feelings of closeness. The results generally supported all four hypotheses. Consistent with theories about the importance of narratives in social interactions (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Koenig Kellas, 2015), participants enjoyed tall tales and felt closer to storytellers who used exaggerations, even when those participants knew that these stories were a stretch of the truth.

However, more was not better where EEEs were concerned. Study 1 participants did not feel close to storytellers who used extreme exaggerations, particularly when those listeners knew the actual facts of the event before reading the storyteller’s version. In one of the few prior studies investigating impressions of liars, liking ratings were negatively correlated with the number of lies told during the first meeting even though the lies were not pointed out to the listener (Tyler et al., 2006). The present studies suggest that liars are only viewed negatively if the lies are outrageous and unbelievable, as in the extreme lie condition in Study 1. If the lies are small and can be viewed as EEEs, as in the stories retold in Studies 2 and 3, the listener actually experiences an enhanced connection to the storyteller. In both Study 2 and Study 3, mediation analyses support the hypothesis that EEEs increase story quality, which increases feelings of closeness. In summary, the present research may resolve the conflict between the experimental social psychological and qualitative narrative literatures in the following ways. People do seem to perceive EEEs as (small) falsehoods. Yet due to the superior narrative produced when EEEs are included, listeners feel more intimately connected to the storyteller.

Although our data do not speak in detail to issues of process, several possible mechanisms could explain the positive relationships among the use of EEEs, quality of story, and feelings of closeness. One set of possible mechanisms is cognitive. Specifically, the fact that EEEs make stories more engaging may allow the listener to be more absorbed into the story. Getting lost in a story is a unique cognitive process referred to as transportation into the narrative world (Green & Brock, 2000). Transportation can explain the popularity of media (e.g., books and television shows) because it enables people to feel a deeper connection to the characters (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004). Perhaps participants in our studies were more transported into the storyteller’s narrative world when the storyteller exaggerated the facts. Consequently, they felt more connected to him or her.

Another cognitive mechanism involves processing fluency. People unknowingly prefer stimuli that have been presented frequently or in a manner that makes them readily perceived (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). People admit to lying and exaggerating frequently when retelling their life events to others (Marsh & Tversky, 2004). Therefore, when people hear retellings of life experiences, they may implicitly expect to hear EEEs. Storytellers who conform to these expectations produce stories that are easier to process and therefore deemed better, all through a misattribution process of which the listener is unaware.

A second set of mechanisms involves relationship properties. The fact that EEEs create better stories may enhance the feeling of co-construction of reality between the listener and the storyteller (Bruner, 1990; Koenig Kellas, 2005), thereby creating a bond of mutual understanding. In addition, the use of EEEs may arouse an appreciation in the listener of the effort the storyteller has put into creating an interesting story. People value effort and like those who put forth effort on their behalf (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004; Tjosvold, Johnson, & Johnson, 1981). Therefore, listeners may feel closer to the teller of a good story because they recognize the effort required to produce it. Also, because narratives are seen as revelatory of one’s personality, the listener may experience the story told with EEEs as more self-disclosing and thereby feel closer to him or her (McLean & Thorne, 2006). These various potential cognitive and relationship mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and further research is required to determine which if any of them operated in the storytelling context investigated in these studies.

Before drawing a general conclusion that EEEs, because they lead to better narratives, are a more powerful determinant of relational closeness than is a strict adherence to truth, it is important to consider some of the limitations of the present research. One possible limitation is that the specific EEEs produced in our narratives and by our participants in these experiments may simply have been far more entertaining than those ordinarily encountered in everyday life, overwhelming any role of truth expectancy violation. Anecdotally speaking, however, this explanation seems unlikely, as very few EEEs were uproariously funny or particularly startling. They were simply mild sharpenings of the degree or extent of the event’s subaspects (e.g., “he spilled cereal all over the place” versus “he spilled four pieces of cereal”).

Another limitation of the present research is that it assessed only everyday social storytelling among two strangers. Our data only speak to an interaction involving one storyteller and one listener. The process is likely much more complicated when events occurred to more than just the storyteller. In such cases, EEEs may be viewed more negatively and perhaps even as a betrayal of the shared experience (Koenig Kellas, 2015; Koenig Kellas, Willer, & Kranstuber, 2010). Furthermore, there are undoubtedly other situations in which conforming to truth expectancy would be much more important, such as in a court of law or a scientific presentation, with the logico-scientific rather than the narrative mode dominating thoughts (Bruner, 1986). In such situations, storytellers who violate the truth by including EEEs may find themselves creating distance between themselves and the listeners to a much greater extent than storytellers who used EEEs in our studies. Imagine, for example, if in this article we had described the results of the present studies by saying that storytellers who stuck to the truth “made listeners want to get far, far away from those weirdos.” That story of our results is perhaps more entertaining than the story we have told, but we suspect its exaggerated quality violates our present roles as scientific reporters and therefore would not make readers feel especially close to us.

Conclusion

EEEs may be one form of lying that actually increases the social benefits of disclosing previous experiences with others. People are more entertained by, and feel closer to, storytellers who include exaggerations in their stories. In other words, people enjoy violations of the usual social norm against lying, in the case of EEEs. These exaggerations are a type of deceptive storytelling that can be an effective tool in burgeoning social relationships. As Edward Bloom from the movie Big Fish (Cohen et al., 2003) suggested, perhaps the best way to make new friends is to transform the events of one’s life into tall tales.

Supplementary material

Supplemental Material, Tall_Tales_Supplementary_materials_(Exaggerated_story) - Tall tales make fast friends: Exaggerating when retelling previous experiences fosters relational closeness

Supplemental Material, Tall_Tales_Supplementary_materials_(Exaggerated_story) for Tall tales make fast friends: Exaggerating when retelling previous experiences fosters relational closeness by Holly E. Cole and Denise R. Beike in Journal of Social and Personal Relationships

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Open research statement

This research was not pre-registered. The data and materials used in the research are available upon request by emailing hcole@wesleyancollege.edu.

Supplementary material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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