The Failure of the French Tripartite Experiment in May 1947

I. The French Political Crisis and the Mounting Isolation of the PCF

With more than five million votes and 150 seats after the Constituent Assembly election on 24 October 1945, the PCF emerged as France’s largest party in the immediate post-Second World War period. ⁷ In the words of the Secretary General of the PCF, Maurice Thorez, ‘The people paid tribute to the clear-sightedness and the patriotism of the Communists … They made us the first party of the country’. ⁸ This development was mainly the result of the crucial role played by the Communists within the Resistance during the period of German occupation. In May 1941, they established their own resistance movement: the National Front. The severe anti-Communist repression undertaken by Vichy and the Germans no doubt strengthened their resolve. According to Claudine Cardon-Hamet, the Gestapo considered the French Communist resisters as mortal enemies. ⁹ Tens of thousands of them were either shot or sent to German concentration camps. The PCF thus had some justification in describing itself as the parti des fusillés. Moreover, the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 provided further impetus to the Communist resistance, as it put an end to the dilemma posed by the signature of the Russo-German Pact on 23 August 1939 that had torn the Communists between ‘their duty to their country and their loyalty to their ideology’. ¹⁰ Due to their training in revolutionary tactics, they proved to be the only substantial body in France adequately prepared for underground action. ¹¹ Through psychological warfare, guerrilla action, strikes, sabotage, escape operations, and intelligence gathering, they undermined the Germans’ confidence, slowed down the Nazi war machine, helped to discredit the Vichy regime, and restored hope for the return of a legitimate republican government. ¹²

Despite the threat of a common enemy, numerous tensions remained within the Resistance. The Communists and the other internal resistance groups disagreed in particular about the strategy to be employed against the Germans. Most resistance groups supported what David Stafford calls the ‘detonator concept’, a strategy of limiting action until the critical moment of the Allied landings, when the intervention of the Resistance might make the difference between success and failure. ¹³ The Communists, however, equated such a strategy with attentisme and complained that it meant a slow death for France. Their relations with the external resistance, led by General Charles de Gaulle from London, were also tense. They were determined to liberate France before the arrival of de Gaulle and the Allied troops. They therefore called the people of Paris to arms on 18 August 1944, while General Leclerc’s Second Armoured Division was still 200 kilometres away from the capital. De Gaulle was by no means alone in perceiving the Communists’ organization of the insurrection as an aggressive attempt to conquer power through the liberation of Paris.

These war-time tensions within the Resistance no doubt contributed to the political instability of the early post-war years. De Gaulle’s provisional government, headed by a tripartite coalition composed of the PCF, the SFIO, and the MRP, seemed bound to collapse, not least because leaders of the three parties had so often proved unable and unwilling to coordinate their actions within the Resistance during the war. On 21 January 1946, de Gaulle resigned. He did not reappear on the French political scene until 14 April 1947, when he founded the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF). ¹⁴ A new tripartite government was formed under Félix Gouin, but without de Gaulle’s leadership, the parties found it increasingly difficult to reconcile their conflicting ideologies and legitimate aspirations. France seemed to be in a state of political sclerosis. The inability of the parliamentarians to define and pursue a coherent policy was one of the many symptoms of the disease. Amid the paralysis, Communists grew increasingly tense. With 53 per cent of the respondents voting no, the rejection of the constitutional draft in the referendum on 5 May 1946 marked the first major disappointment of the PCF. As the Communist Vice-President of the National Assembly, Jacques Duclos, complained, ‘We could have exited this provisional state more than a month ago … Unfortunately, we voted no’. ¹⁵

The PCF’s mounting sense of isolation within the tripartite coalition emerged as one of the central features of this period of political instability. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the parti des fusillés had hoped to gain control of the state through the ballot-box, especially after the Assembly election of October 1945 had given the Left, in the form of a PCF–SFIO alliance, a majority for the first time in history. However, various developments put an end to its optimism. The PCF grew particularly suspicious of the MRP’s intentions and began to suspect an anti-Communist conspiracy in the making. On 19 January 1947, Marcel Cachin, a Communist deputy, expressed fears that ‘they want to throw us into the opposition’ and that the MRP’s policy is to make things worse’. ¹⁶ Similarly, on 17 February 1947, the Political Bureau noted nervously that the government’s wage policy was intended to undermine the PCF and could lead to a ‘more right wing oriented governmental formula’. ¹⁷ Communist leaders also questioned the value of their alliance with the Socialists. Although in December 1946, the SFIO promised to give its votes to Thorez in his candidacy for the Premiership, 25 Socialists failed to do so. ¹⁸ Hence, despite a PCF-SFIO majority in the two Houses and the support of several Radicals and Nationalists, Thorez obtained only 259 votes, 51 votes below the constitutional majority required for the investiture. ¹⁹ He later complained that this betrayal represented ‘a retraction of the November 10th ballot’ and a ‘first attempt to exclude us from the government’. ²⁰ The Communists were furious. To them, France had become a top-down democracy. ²¹ According to the democratic rule, they argued, not only should the PCF, as the largest political party in France, have the Premiership and the Presidency of the National Assembly, but it should also be in charge of at least one of the three vital ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence). Yet it was not until 23 January 1947 that a Communist, François Billoux, was appointed National Defence Minister. And even then, he was given little room to manoeuvre, for Paul Ramadier, the SFIO Premier, made sure that each of the three subordinate Ministries (War, Air, Navy) were headed by a minister from a different party. ²² As Jacques Duclos complained in his memoirs, ‘workers, they’re good to produce, they’re good to fight, they’re good to pay, they’re good to be killed, but they’re not as good as other citizens are to govern’. ²³

However, contrary to Communist perceptions, most French leaders were willing to cooperate with them. ²⁴ On the domestic front, the Socialists recognized the importance of the working class and aimed for ‘the organic unity of the proletariat’. ²⁵ They nevertheless argued that at a time when reconstruction must come first, certain Communist demands could not be satisfied. As the veteran SFIO leader Léon Blum put it, the standard of living of the workers should be improved, but only ‘to the extreme limit of what is presently possible in the French economy’. ²⁶ MRP leaders also showed support for the Communists. As Maurice Schumann remarked, ‘since the Resistance, Bidault had done everything to continue the collaboration with the Communists’. ²⁷ On the international front, most French leaders refused to accept Winston Churchill’s metaphor of an Iron Curtain. ²⁸ None was obdurately anti-Communist in principle. Although left-wing historians such as Roger Linet tend to associate the PCF’s isolation in 1947 with the emergence of the Cold War in French politics, nearly all leading politicians, including Vincent Auriol, the President of the Republic, opposed the formation of two antagonistic blocs. ²⁹ Symbolically, Ramadier was one of the few deputies who voted against the expulsion of the Communists from Parliament in 1939. As Patrick Facon observes, the SFIO Premier did not nourish any entrenched anti-Communist feeling, repeatedly emphasized the need for concessions, and gave the utmost priority to ministerial solidarity. ³⁰

Regrettably, the increasing radicalism of the PCF left the MRP and SFIO leaders little choice but to distance themselves from their Communist counterparts. In 1947, it seemed that the latter could not conceive of cooperation other than as the outcome of conquest. ³¹ They appeared unable to engage in constructive discussions and were unwilling to make compromises. When they were dissatisfied, their central organ, l’Humanité, adopted hostile rhetoric: ‘Against the plot of the exploiter’, ³² ‘Premiums for production! Subsistence minimum! Coal of the Ruhr! Peace in Vietnam! Unity against the reaction!’ ³³ When they disagreed with the government’s policies, they called for strikes or demonstrations, as in January 1947 in Les Halles. ³⁴ And whenever they believed that their voices were being ignored, they walked out of cabinet meetings, such as on 16 April 1947 when they protested against the arrest of six Malagasy parliamentarians, or left their Assembly benches, such as during the debate on the government’s policy in Indochina on 19 March 1947. The SFIO and the MRP, though initially inclined to cooperate with the PCF, came to believe that the latter understood nothing but force. This idea continues to permeate French politics today. As the former President François Mitterrand concluded about his alliance with the Communists in the 1980s, ‘we cannot become friends with people when it is evident that they seek our ruin above all else’. ³⁵ Ironically, in 1947, it was the Communists’ perceived isolation that led them to take a harder stance, and it was their growing inflexibility and hostility that led the MRP and the SFIO to slowly detach themselves from the PCF.

II. The Cold War in France and the Reassessment of PCF Strategy

The emergence of the Cold War in 1947 further complicated the French political equation. The war confronted two diametrically opposed ideologies. ³⁶ Whereas communism aims to overthrow ‘bourgeois democracy’ and capitalism, the nature of capitalism brings it to combat anything that seeks to surpass or eliminate it. ³⁷ On 12 March 1947, the American President, Harry Truman, vowed to ‘support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’, that is, to fight any form of Communist coercion or subversion. ³⁸ He also asked Congress for 400 million dollars, to provide assistance to the non-Communist side in the Greek Civil War and to give aid to neighbouring Turkey, where the Soviets were trying to gain control of the Dardanelles. The Moscow Conference in April 1947 confirmed the disintegration of the World War II Grand Alliance, as it showed the great powers’ inability to agree on the future of Germany. ³⁹ A psychosis had taken hold of the world, by which the West tended to label as communist everything it did not consider suitable, and conversely for the East with capitalism. The Americans soon gave substance to the Soviets’ greatest suspicions, with the launching of the Marshall Plan on 5 June 1947. Four months later, the Soviet Union responded with the establishment of the Cominform. The Cold War had begun to spread throughout the European continent and beyond, as demonstrated by the parallel eviction of Communist ministers in Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Chile, Italy, Austria and France in 1947, and the eviction of non-Communist ministers in countries under Soviet control. ⁴⁰

It did not take long before Cold War tensions emerged at the forefront of the French political scene. The ideological orientation of the French government had become a matter of great concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union. On 22 February 1947, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, complained that with four Communist ministers in the French government, one-third of the electorate voting for the PCF, and France facing extreme economic instability, ‘the Russians could open the trap door whenever they would choose to do so’. ⁴¹ The United States, however, had few reasons to be anxious. It seemed indeed that in 1947, French policies could be dictated by nothing other than the desideratum of reconstruction. And to that end, American aid was indispensable. France was in a sore financial state: its debt had reached 2.3 billion dollars at the end of 1946, the ambitious Plan Monnet of January 1947 lacked a source of financing, the deflation plan had failed due to a lack of food supplies, and all French industries suffered from a dearth of raw materials. ⁴² France appeared in no position to refuse the ‘life jacket that it was being handed’, however detrimental it might be to the PCF. ⁴³ The French signature of an agreement on the exportation of German coal with the British and the Americans on 21 April 1947 at the Moscow Conference seemed finally to place France in the Western bloc.

The Communists were slow to digest the news. France’s prima facie alignment with the United States seemed to doom tripartism to a certain death. How could the PCF possibly participate in a government that had, to all appearances, joined the anti-Communist forces? The dilemma posed by the Nazi–Soviet pact resurfaced. Once again, the Communists had to choose between ‘their duty to their country and their loyalty to their ideology’. ⁴⁴ Although in April 1947, they were still unwilling to take a definitive stance, their immediate reactions denoted a clear preference for the latter option. While Duclos moaned about this ‘reversal of alliances’, ⁴⁵ Cachin complained that it marked ‘the abandonment of the reparations policy’. ⁴⁶ He added, ‘Bidault gave everything away’, in exchange for ‘a bit of coal’. ⁴⁷ With regret he concluded that France had become an American protectorate for 250 million dollars. ⁴⁸

While acknowledging the soundness of the Communist reading of the event, the question of whether France’s signature of the agreement on German coal in April 1947 necessarily implied a political alignment with the United States is still open to debate. On the one hand, authors such as Jacques Julliard and Wall suggest that the Moscow Conference marked a distinct change in the course of French foreign policy, as MRP Foreign Minister Georges Bidault made clear that America could rely on France. ⁴⁹ On the other hand, Auriol maintained the view that it was only after the launching of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, the creation of the Cominform in October 1947, and the widespread strikes and demonstrations in the summer and autumn of 1947 that the French government finally aligned with the Americans. ⁵⁰ Wall himself acknowledges that, at the time of the Moscow Conference, nobody ‘appeared to want the government to fall after all’. ⁵¹ American ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, indeed remarked on 29 April 1947 that there were no signs of an impending crisis and that the ‘political thermometer was cooling’. ⁵² In any case, whether or not the Moscow Conference amounted to a declaration of war against communism, what is important is that the French and Soviet Communists perceived it to be so. And by increasing the latter’s anxiety, the conference therefore opened the way for a thorough reassessment of the French and Soviet Communist goals and strategy.

Before examining the evolution of PCF strategy, which was significantly influenced by events in Indochina, it is necessary to consider Moscow’s plans and ambitions. A common view is that, until the expulsion of the PCF from the government in May 1947, the Soviets wanted the French Communists to maintain a moderate line so as to secure a continued role in the tripartite coalition. According to Jonathan Haslam, they strongly supported the idea of a French popular front, that is, a bourgeois, non-socialist but anti-fascist government. ⁵³ Their underlying assumption was that the more influential the PCF was, the more it could strengthen their position in the emerging Cold War. In contrast, a provocative attitude on part of the PCF could only worsen the relations between the two superpowers and lead to an aggressive American counter-offensive. As Jean-Pierre Rioux puts it, until May 1947 the Soviet motto was ‘yes to agitation, no to subversion’. ⁵⁴

Contrary to that view, this article argues that the Soviets in fact grew very dissatisfied with the PCF’s softness. As Zubok and Pleshakov recount about the Soviet policy line, by 1947, Moscow had lost all hope of cooperation with the West. ⁵⁵ With Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, and the deadlock at the Moscow Conference, it had indeed become increasingly apparent to Joseph Stalin that the war-time Grand Alliance was at an end. Symbolically, the Truman administration seemed to have ‘already decided to rebuild the Western zones of Germany without Stalin, and, if necessary, against his will’. ⁵⁶ Stalin therefore began to encourage all foreign Communists to adopt a more aggressive stance and ‘to work systematically toward unity of live national forces’ against American aid. ⁵⁷ Yet in the wake of the Moscow Conference, the PCF appeared to be weaker than the Kremlin had hoped. Marius Magnien, a journalist for l’Humanité, in an official report written during his stay in Moscow (10 April to 3 June 1947), recalls that Moscow had become unusually critical of the PCF. It began to raise doubts about the ‘soundness of PCF policy’. ⁵⁸ As Comrade Youri Joukov questioned Magnien in the Pravda office, ‘Isn’t there a risk that the PCF will shift too far to the right, as the danger posed by the reactionaries increases? Aren’t you making too many concessions, compromises?’ ⁵⁹ The Soviets were particularly outspoken about the equivocal attitude of the PCF on the question of Indochina. Comrade Viktorov reminded Magnien that on the latter issue, the PCF had not yet taken a firm position to counter-balance the acts of the reactionaries. In a reproachful tone he added, ‘We are concerned about whether the French people are against this war’. ⁶⁰ Moreover, in a second round of criticisms, the Soviets highlighted the PCF’s weakening hold over the French industrial workers. Demonstrations had become widespread between 10 February and May 1947. Slogans varied from ‘raise our pensions’, to ‘a job for each youth’, ‘food to eat’, ‘subsistence minimum’ and ‘negotiate with Vietnam’. ⁶¹ The Soviets blamed the PCF for having failed to assert its authority within the government, to the detriment of its electorate. As Joukov cautioned Magnien:

Isn’t there a danger that the PCF will lose its influence on the masses, who could think that the party is betraying them and that the leaders want to preserve their wallets, and that, because of the activity of the right wing and the fact that the PCF’s aims in the government have not been attained, the masses resign themselves to saying that the Communist members of government do nothing for the masses? ⁶²

Furthermore, the Soviets no longer wanted the French Communists to remain in the government. They believed that France had officially aligned with the Western bloc at the Moscow Conference and that the MRP and the SFIO would soon drive the PCF out of the coalition government. Hence, as Magnien reported, many, including Comrade Sorkine, began to raise the idea of the PCF returning to the opposition. As Comrade Efimore from the Central Committee asked Magnien on 24 April 1947, ‘Why stay in the government at all costs? What are your prospects in terms of influencing the entire government?’ ⁶⁴

However, while this article recognizes that the Soviets supported the idea of a more aggressive PCF, it does not support Philippe Robrieux’s view that the PCF was following Soviet orders when it provoked its own expulsion in March–May 1947. ⁶⁵ As Alain Ruscio suggests, it is highly unlikely that the ‘international Communist movement directly “ordered” a change of attitude of the PCF’ and that it was willing to lose governmental posts in a key Western European country. ⁶⁶ This article argues that, far from being Soviet puppets, the French Communists were following their own agenda. As Zubok and Pleshakov recount, until the Conference at Szklarska Poremba on 25 September 1947, Western European Communists were indeed ‘quite autonomous in charting their national ways toward a new democracy’. ⁶⁷ And in full awareness of Moscow’s implicit support, they began to question the relevance of a continued Communist presence in the government. The legitimacy of their interrogations was no doubt confirmed by the growing tensions over the Indochina issue.

III. The Indochina War and the Dilemma of the PCF

De Gaulle’s Brazzaville policy, enunciated on 30 January 1944, should have shaped the colonial world in the immediate post-war period. The policy aimed to satisfy both colonial aspirations and imperial interests through the development of a new basis for association. It sought to establish regional-level councils and territorial-level representative assemblies in which the overseas territories would have the right to representation. However, diverse domestic parameters put an end to the ideological consensus reached at Brazzaville. Firstly, de Gaulle’s resignation left a void in French politics at a critical moment, not least with the removal of the ‘ideological and institutional pillar’ of the Brazzaville policy. ⁶⁸ Secondly, the return to a centre-right majority after the Assembly election of June 1946 resulted in major ambiguities in the Constitution. Whereas Section VIII reflected the conservatives’ refusal to give anything near political autonomy, the Preamble reflected strong anti-colonial sentiments. ⁶⁹ In such an unstable and confused state of affairs, the French government’s talks with Ho Chi Minh, the newly self-proclaimed President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), could only progress at a very slow pace. The first and only serious breakthrough came on 6 March 1946, when Ho Chi Minh and Jean Sainteny, the French representative in Hanoi, signed an Accord which stipulated that the Vietnamese Republic would have its own government, parliament, army, and treasury, and would belong to the French Union. ⁷⁰

However, the frail tripartite government in Paris was unable to bring the Accord to a successful conclusion. This failure can be ascribed to both the metropolitan crisis and the policy of faits accomplis of the French colonial administration in Saigon. On the one hand, as suggested above, French leaders in 1946–47 were primarily preoccupied with domestic politics, the challenge of reconstruction, and the fears of a breakdown of tripartism. They were still shaken by de Gaulle’s resignation and the failure of the May 1946 referendum. As the former director of Le Monde, Jacques Fauvet, put it, ‘French politicians, having been drowning in a cascade of electoral consultations for the past year, have neither the time nor the will to deal with this distant and complicated conflict’. ⁷¹ On the other hand, Saigon’s policy of faits accomplis led to a dramatic escalation of the war. Not only did the Saigon hawks obstruct and distort all the communications between Hanoi and Paris; they also convened the Dalat Conference in May 1946, during which representatives of Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia discussed a proposal for a federation from which Vietnam would be excluded. ⁷² The following month, they went so far as to order the occupation of the Moi plateaux and to establish the phoney Republic of Cochinchina, without any mandate from Parliament. ⁷³ The High Commissioner to Indochina, Thierry d’Argenlieu, repeatedly claimed that there was no legitimate Vietnamese government with which to reach an understanding. Ironically, Ho Chi Minh could have said precisely the same of the French government: due to the failure of the May referendum, France was indeed in the middle of a ministerial reshuffle when Ho Chi Minh arrived in Fontainebleau in July 1946. While the negotiations in Paris stalled, the Saigon hawks raised the conflict in Indochina to critical heights. After 23 French soldiers were killed, General Valluy ordered the evacuation of the Vietnamese from the Chinese quarter of the town. Their refusal to do so resulted in the French bombardment of the Haiphong harbour on 23 November 1946, in which 6000 Vietnamese civilians were killed. ⁷⁴ Frustrated by the modus vivendi reached at the negotiating table in Fontainebleau and infuriated by the Haiphong incident, General Giap launched the Tonkin Vespers on 19 December 1946: at the stroke of 8 a.m., 30,000 Vietminh soldiers attacked the European quarters in Hanoi, following which Ho Chi Minh called for an all-out insurrection and went underground. The Indochina War had begun.

The outbreak of the Indochina War confronted the PCF with a major dilemma: as a member of the tripartite coalition, it was required to support a national policy which ran counter to its action in favour of colonial peoples. The PCF’s ideology was based on the Marxist-Leninist principles of redistribution, freedom, equality, and national self-determination. It condemned colonialism because, as Karl Marx argued, it reflected a crisis of over-accumulation in the Western economies whereby the capitalists were driven to seek more fertile grounds (cheap labour, abundant resources) so as to expand the ‘basis for production of surplus value’. ⁷⁵ Colonialism was the internationalization of the capitalist mode of production that resulted in the exploitation of the colonies. The Indochina War also trapped the Communists between their strategic alliance with the MRP and the SFIO and their long-standing friendship with the Vietminh. Indeed, PCF-Vietminh relations went far beyond a common ideology. A sense of camaraderie and trust had grown during the course of the Second World War. As Raymond Aubrac, a French resistance hero and Communist compagnon de route, recounts:

They had made several thousands of workers come from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina … The camp was in the hands of all-powerful bosses. Mortality had reached intolerable levels … I got the workers to elect their delegates in a consultative committee, who would represent them before the leadership of the camp … We received a box of chocolate for the New Year, invitations for the Têt and, from time to time, for a Vietnamese dinner. ⁷⁶

In light of such historical, ideological and companionship ties between the French Communists and the Vietminh, the PCF’s decision in March 1947 to provide the Vietminh with unrestrained support came as no surprise. As Jean Gacon explained, the PCF could simply not accept ‘the plain and simple surrender to a policy that is contrary to its class solidarity and orientation’. ⁷⁸ It believed that a country that oppressed another could simply not be free, in addition to the fact that a war that cost 100 million francs a day could not be sustained. ⁷⁹ Throughout 1946 and 1947, l’Humanité condemned those who were ready to sacrifice ‘French interests because of their ambitions’, ⁸⁰ refused to recognize ‘the puppets of the phantom government in Cochinchina’, ⁸¹ and repeatedly argued that the Indochina War could only lead to ‘the ruin and disaster of two brotherly peoples’. ⁸² In the first semester of 1947, l’Humanité went so far as to put the Indochina War on its front page at least once every three days on average, as proof of its unbending criticism of French colonialism. ⁸³ Ruscio moreover explains that, to PCF leaders, supporting the Vietminh was justified not only because it was their preferred political alternative, but more importantly because it was the only sensible choice to make. ⁸⁴ To signal his vast discontent with the war, Billoux on 18 March 1947 provocatively refused to stand up at the Assembly in homage to the French soldiers who had died during the Indochina War. ⁸⁵ The next day, in response to a deputy’s offensive comments against the Vietnamese delegate Duong Bach Mai, Thorez and Billoux left the Assembly benches. The PCF’s message was clear: Vietnam had a government, whether it was officially recognized or not.

However, contrary to the Communist interpretation, both the SFIO and the MRP were initially inclined to negotiate a fair agreement with Ho Chi Minh. On the one hand, given the anti-colonial tradition of the SFIO, Blum’s personal friendship with Ho Chi Minh, and his liberal approach to the Indochina issue, the Socialist leader was perhaps the man who stood the best chance for peace with the Vietminh. ⁸⁶ As early as 10 December 1946 in Le Populaire, Blum called for ‘a genuine agreement, the basis of which would be independence’. ⁸⁷ The President of the Republic himself favoured peace, as made evident by his removal of Admiral d’Argenlieu from his post as High Commissioner on 1 March 1946. ⁸⁸ On the other hand, while remaining reluctant to grant full independence to Vietnam, the MRP was also inclined to cooperate with Ho Chi Minh and to open the way for an autonomous Vietnam within the French Union, as provided by the March Accord. The aim was to remain in line with the Déclaration gouvernementale of 24 March 1945: ‘The aim is not to carry out an imperial or colonial policy, but rather one of interpretation and exchange’. ⁸⁹ Bidault indeed proved willing to reach a compromise, as demonstrated by his attempt to convince General Valluy not to expand the French military presence. Although Frédéric Turpin depicts the MRP as staunchly pro-colonial (in part because many of its members had held posts in the overseas territories) and plainly averse to talks with Ho Chi Minh, ⁹⁰ even he acknowledges the possibility of a shift in MRP attitude vis-à-vis Ho Chi Minh:

even if the MRP militant [Bidault] could have had a positive view of Ho Chi Minh and his people prior to the Fontainebleau conference … the overt aggression of 19 December marked a change in the mentalities. The MRP took a clear stance in favour of a resolution by force. ⁹¹

Secondly, the paralysis of the tripartite coalition gave a free rein to Argenlieu enabling him to reframe the crisis and portray the Indochina War as a Cold War battlefield. According to Marsot, the objective was to isolate the Vietminh, in order to deprive it of all credibility. ⁹⁷ This was facilitated by the significant information gap between Indochina-based officials and policy makers in Paris. ⁹⁸ In a letter addressed to Blum on 14 January 1946, Argenlieu attempted to convince Blum that the Vietminh was pushing France into a ‘dead end’, ⁹⁹ and that the French government should abandon all talks with Ho Chi Minh. ¹⁰⁰ At that stage, however, the Vietminh was not as grave a threat and even France’s allies were reluctant to assist in the war effort. ¹⁰¹ The Saigon consul Charles Reed complained that Argenlieu had ‘given undue emphasis’ to the communist menace, and the British indeed lacked any evidence of contact between Hanoi and Moscow. ¹⁰² As Mark Lawrence underlines, even the United States State Department asserted that, although the Vietminh contained ‘a strong communist element’, there was ‘little reason to believe that a large Communist mass movement exists at this time’. ¹⁰³ Had the French Communists been more conciliatory, had they realized that the MRP and the SFIO were prepared to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, it is possible that the three parties of the coalition could have better resisted the Saigon hawks. Blindfolded by their mounting feelings of isolation, the Communists proved unwilling to make any sort of concessions and hence antagonized MRP and SFIO leaders. As a result, the government failed to seize the window of opportunity offered by Ho Chi Minh, thereby frustrating his efforts to maintain a moderate stance. Unable to accept that their attitude might have hampered a resolution of the Indochinese issue and shifting the blame onto MRP and SFIO leaders, the Communists began questioning whether the Indochinese tragedy was not offering them the long-awaited opportunity to put an end to their political paralysis.

IV. May 1947 and the Eviction of the PCF from Government

A common view is that, until their eviction on 5 May 1947, the French Communists sought to seize power legally, that is, through democratic means. According to Van Dyke, they never regarded ‘their chance of winning through revolutionary action as great enough to justify the risk of destruction which would necessarily be involved’. ¹⁰⁴ They therefore supported a programme of reconstruction which all could accept and repeatedly advised the trade unionists to be more moderate in their demands. ¹⁰⁵ Nothing was to prevent them from capturing power, not even the Indochina issue. ¹⁰⁶ They also believed, as Ruscio explains, that their continued presence in the government would serve the purpose of ‘negative effectiveness’ and prevent the government from shifting rightward. ¹⁰⁷ It is suggested therefore that the news of their eviction in the Journal Officiel came as an unpleasant surprise. ¹⁰⁸

Could it be argued that the key factor behind their expulsion was therefore the emergence of anti-communist pressures? As Grosser argues, French politicians were compelled by the Americans to choose a side in the Cold War and to bear the consequences of that choice. ¹⁰⁹ The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 in particular gave the green light to purging the government of the Communist ministers. Yet, the thesis of an American-led conspiracy has been challenged by several authors. ¹¹⁰ According to Georgette Elgey, Ramadier’s decision to expel the Communists was not the result of an American ultimatum or order; it was a deliberate choice that simply happened to coincide with American wishes. ¹¹¹ Along the same lines, Wall suggests that Washington’s response to the political crisis of May 1947 was ‘improvised’ and that even Caffery was taken unawares. ¹¹² Nevertheless, while concurring with Elgey that the ‘myth of American orders should be laid to rest’, Wall does not deny the impact of anti-communist pressures. He emphasizes indeed the strong anti-communist sentiment that was growing amongst MRP and SFIO leaders. In his words:

French politicians hardly needed outside prodding to expel the Communists from the coalition. In 1947 anti-communism was developing in France with a fervor equal to if not greater than that in Washington, and French politicians intended to eliminate the Communists just as soon as they felt strong enough to do so. ¹¹³

On the other hand, they believed that a temporary eviction from the government might yield considerable advantages: it could help them recover the support of their electorate and pave the way for a larger Communist role in the government. In mid-1947, the popularity of the PCF was in sharp decline. The workers had become frustrated with the continuously deteriorating situation in France: not only did the country suffer from both a trade and a budget deficit, but its level of production had fallen by 10 per cent, the standard of living of French workers had decreased by more than 50 per cent compared to pre-war levels, and the bread ration had been brought down to an unsustainably low 250 g per person. Rumours spread that the PCF ‘does not give a hoot about production’. ¹¹⁸ PCF membership had fallen by seven per cent since December 1946. ¹¹⁹ In the face of an evident ‘risk of rupture’ with the working class, the Communists began to ponder on how to regain their past popularity. ¹²⁰ According to Annie Lacroix-Riz, they could simply not accept being ‘tied up and isolated from the masses’. ¹²¹ It therefore became imperative for them to dissociate themselves from the government, whose policies ‘regarding the French Union’ and that regarding ‘prices and salaries’ were widely criticized. ¹²²

By March 1947, the Communist leaders had redefined their immediate goals. Rather than strengthening their position in the government, they hoped to provoke their own eviction from the government and to rekindle their electorate’s support, so that sooner or later, they could return to the government, ‘stronger than ever’. ¹²³ As Cachin wrote about the Communist aims, ‘We need to push the government away, put the masses in motion’. ¹²⁴ It became clear that, as Auriol put it, ‘The PCF must temporarily go into the opposition so as to bring the bourgeois parties and the SFIO to take better account of the PCF’. ¹²⁵ Only then could the Communists finally ask Ramadier’s successor, possibly Bidault, to allocate them ‘one of the important ministries’. ¹²⁶ An emphasis therefore needs to be placed on the temporary nature of the eviction they sought. As Philippe Butin argues, they wanted a split from Ramadier’s government, but not from tripartism in general. ¹²⁷ They had no doubts whatsoever about the importance of the PCF for the renaissance of France. ¹²⁸ Even after they were dismissed from office, they continued to claim that the PCF was a government party and that they would soon make their return to the coalition. However, their hopes for a quick retour en force were dashed when Ramadier failed to call for a collective resignation of his cabinet. ¹²⁹ The coalition government was to remain in place, regardless of the removal of the Communists.

Despite Moscow’s clear support for such a manoeuvre, and for reasons that remain unclear, the French Communists did not inform the Soviets of their plan until they were expelled. As Magnien explained, ‘I had the fear that people in high places would form an inaccurate opinion of the real situation in France, of the policy of our party, and that the doubt arises as to the forces available in France’. ¹³⁰ It is likely that they preferred to wait until their strategy had yielded tangible outputs. After having been blamed for their softness, they wanted to avoid the opposite accusation of being too provocative. They therefore needed evidence of a legitimate pretext and of a renewed PCF popularity to justify their defiance of the government. They were relieved to see that, by May 1947, Moscow had finally understood and given its support to their strategy and aims for a temporary return to the opposition. As Magnien recounted about the reaction of the Soviets after the eviction of the PCF from the tripartite government, ‘From then on, the comrades had a better understanding of the policy of our party and their opinions changed’. ¹³¹

The Indochina War presented the ideal pretext for the French Communists to provoke the government and to carry out their plans for a return to opposition. In December 1946, they had identified the outbreak of the Indochina War as a threat. Not only could it jeopardize the survival of their Vietminh comrades, but it also posed a direct challenge to their action in favour of colonial peoples. By 1947, however, their perceptions had shifted. The Indochina War had become a strategic opportunity. It indeed brought about a legitimate and popular reason to oppose the government from which they felt increasingly alienated: anti-colonialism. The war offered them the long-awaited opportunity to play with the limits of ministerial solidarity and to test how far they could go in their demands.

The Communists were fully aware that their opposition to the government’s policy in Indochina would lead to their expulsion from the government. French leaders had expressly warned them that, should they challenge such a policy, the whole government would stand against them. ¹³² As Blum explained during the vote for the military credits for Indochina, ‘if the Communists voted against, they would in so doing be throwing themselves out of the government’. ¹³³ The pact of ministerial solidarity, which had tied the Communists to the tripartite coalition since September 1944, was indeed founded on the idea that, as Auriol put it, ‘we cannot be a part of the government and fight it from the inside’. ¹³⁴ In the hope of preventing the Cold War from invading French politics, Auriol had implored the Communists to be more conciliatory:

I urge you … : you have courage, you have proved it. But isn’t real courage to never lie to yourself? If you persist … you will reduce French politics to the fundamental opposition between communism and anti-communism, which is what we have done everything to avoid. ¹³⁵

The tactic employed was insightful. In case of success, they would appear as conciliatory, yet not sufficiently to remain in the government, and they would emerge as martyrs in the face of a government willing to squander France’s scarce resources on a war of colonization. But the PCF’s ploy failed and the onset of the ministerial crisis was delayed. On 23 March 1947, a majority of 28 votes to 26 called for the eviction of the Communists from the government. However, due to the weak majority and the absence of two ministers during the vote, the PCF was allowed to remain in the government. ¹³⁸ Despite the failure of their tactic, the Communists were nonetheless satisfied by the significant gains they had made. As the Political Bureau claimed on 24 March 1947, the manoeuvre had succeeded in strengthening the support of ‘the working masses’ for the PCF and spread ‘disarray and division’ among the other parties. ¹³⁹

The ministerial crisis that was averted in any case returned to the forefront of French politics in May 1947. Having failed to provoke their eviction from the government on 19 March 1947, the Communists decided to renew their attempt and seize the second opportunity presented to them by the workers’ strike at the Renault plant at Boulogne-Billancourt on 25 April 1947. Although this article concurs with Dorothy Pickles’ view that the PCF was not the ‘clandestine conductor’ of the strike, ¹⁴⁰ it suggests that the strike, if not Communist-led, was at least Communist-sustained. The Communists did not initiate the strike, going so far as to depict the strike leaders as ‘Hitlero-Trostkyites in the pay of de Gaulle’, although they did take an active part from the moment they understood that ‘the strikers meant business’. ¹⁴¹ On 30 April 1947, they began to voice their discontent about the government’s ‘refusal to fairly readjust the salaries of the workers’. ¹⁴² Had they known that the strikes would gain such momentum, they would certainly have taken ‘the lead in the claims’, as Cachin wrote. ¹⁴³ Their emphatic support for the trade unions culminated with their refusal to endorse the government’s policy of freezing wages on 1 May 1947. And whereas in the vote of March only Communist deputies abstained, on 4 May 1947 both Communist deputies and ministers unanimously voted against Ramadier’s motion of confidence on the government’s wage policy. This dealt the fatal blow to tripartism. As the French Premier complained in April 1947, ‘two threats of crisis in one week, that is enough!’ ¹⁴⁴ Predictably, the Communists welcomed the decree that revoked their ministers on 5 May 1947 with both relief and enthusiasm. As Gacon recounts, they had the ‘impression of regaining a “freedom of action”, an improved cohesion, a greater faithfulness to principles’. ¹⁴⁵

The main reason why historians have given little weight to the argument that the Communists might have premeditatedly provoked their own return to the opposition is that the PCF leaders have consistently denied this. Both Thorez and Billoux were quick to declare that the Communist ministers were driven out of the government on the orders of the American capitalists. ¹⁴⁶ The PCF would surely have lost credibility and legitimacy had the people discovered the proactive role it played in its eviction from the government. It therefore put a great deal of effort into presenting its departure as an expulsion rather than a resignation. As Thorez keenly emphasized on 4 May 1947, ‘we will not enter into the opposition, we will not resign’. ¹⁴⁷ Moreover, the Communists wanted their expulsion to appear unwarranted. Hence on 28 August 1947, the Political Bureau gave the party members the express order to declare that ‘the exclusion of Communist ministers, the defenders of national independence, was imposed from outside’. ¹⁴⁸ By 5 May 1947, the French Communists finally achieved what they had set out to accomplish: they appeared as the victims of an American-led conspiracy, they could now adopt positions that were more in line with their ideology and with their electorate’s demands, and they could take the time to prepare the grounds on which they hoped to return to power. However, contrary to the brief withdrawal they had envisaged, they remained outside government for decades to come.

V. Conclusion

Contrary to the views that portray the PCF as the victim of external pressures, the foregoing account demonstrates that the eviction of the Communist ministers from the French government on 5 May 1947 resulted from their own provocative actions, which aimed at a temporary withdrawal from the tripartite coalition. Having failed to secure key ministerial and Assembly posts, they complained about their growing isolation and powerlessness within the coalition. As close allies of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the Cold War at the forefront of French politics confronted them with the same dilemma they had faced on 23 August 1939, when the Russo-German pact was signed: they were asked to choose between ‘their duty to their country and their loyalty to their ideology’. ¹⁴⁹ In March 1947, they opted for the latter alternative. Although they had hoped in the early post-war years to conquer power through the ballot-box, they concluded that they could no longer reap benefits from French democracy. In the words of Thorez, ‘as soon as Communists are involved, the rules no longer apply’. ¹⁵⁰ Bidault’s alignment of France with the United States at the Moscow Conference had convinced them of an inevitable force at work by which the government would soon be purged of all Soviet-influenced elements. ¹⁵¹ With the implicit consent and support of Moscow, they decided to adopt a highly confrontational attitude towards non-Communist ministers, deliberately provoking their own exclusion from the coalition government. They hoped that a temporary return to the opposition would allow them to revive the workers’ support for the party and pave the way for a larger Communist role in the government. They believed indeed that they were indispensable to the reconstruction and renaissance of France and that, soon enough, they would be called upon to form a new government.

The outbreak of the Indochina War on 19 December 1946, while threatening the survival of their Vietminh comrades, also presented the Communists with the valid and popular pretext of anti-colonialism to express their open defiance of the French government. In the face of repeated demands for national reconstruction, few wished to squander France’s treasury on a war of colonial re-conquest. Communist deputies thus sought to test the limits of ministerial solidarity while preserving the PCF’s credibility and popularity when they abstained on 18–19 March 1947 in the votes of confidence and for the military appropriations for Indochina. But their tactic failed and the long-awaited ministerial crisis was deferred.

The government’s freezing of wages in March 1947 nevertheless offered them a precious second opportunity to defy the government, which they eagerly seized. Not only did they give their full support to the trade unionists’ claims, but they also went so far as to vote against Ramadier’s motion of confidence on the government’s wage policy on 4 May 1947. The following day, they were ousted from the government. Therefore, it was not Cold War tensions, direct orders from Moscow, nor a mere ‘dispute over domestic policy’ ¹⁵² that caused the rupture of tripartism; it was a dispute caused by the French Communists over domestic policy which led to their eviction.

Despite their initial outburst of relief and fervour, it was not long before they realized the consequences of their action. Not only had they frustrated any hopes for an early settlement to the Indochina War, but they had also renounced the opportunity to take part in the leadership and reconstruction of the country in these crucial post-war years. The Americans had long been worried about the ideological orientation of the French government. However, it may be argued that it was not until the launching of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 and the establishment of the Cominform that they explicitly began to put pressure on the French leaders. In May 1947, the latter were under no particular pressure to sacrifice their ties with the PCF in order to obtain American help for reconstruction. According to recent accounts, the eviction of the PCF even came as a surprise to Washington. ¹⁵³ It may be argued, therefore, that had the PCF shown more patience and been more conciliatory, the tripartite government might have upheld a united front and the MRP and SFIO leaders might have steered a middle-course in the Cold War.

To the great detriment of tripartism, a point of no-return was reached from the moment the Communists began to obstruct the government’s policies. Deeply influenced by a dialectical view of the world, in times of crisis, as Mitterrand put it, ‘the Communists understand nothing else but force’. ¹⁵⁴ Their forceful tactics, however, failed to secure their quick retour en force to the government. Their temporary return to the opposition was to last more than 30 years. Indeed, it was not until 23 June 1981 that the Socialists, led by the French Premier Pierre Mauroy, finally turned their back on old quarrels and invited the Communists to join the government, for the sake of the ‘Unity of the Left Wing’. ¹⁵⁵