Abstract
Olaf van Nimwegen, The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688, Boydell: Woodbridge, 2010; xxii + 577 pp., 62 illus.; 9781843835752, £75.00 (hbk)
Reviewed by: Jeremy Black, University of Exeter, UK
This welcome translation of a book first published in Dutch in 2006, provides both a valuable account of Dutch military history in a crucial period, and a work that contributes to the discussion of military change in Europe, and, specifically, the concept of a military revolution. The former account introduces the valuable idea that the Dutch had a strategic culture between 1635 and 1648. Nimwegen suggests that Frederik Hendrik understood the need for French support but did not appreciate the extent to which France and the Dutch had clashing interests. Nimwegen also argues that the Dutch could not have decided the Eighty Years’ War by military means. He explains this with reference to weapons technology, fortifications, engineering and logistical factors, but argues that the root cause of failure was the nature of relations between the state and the armed forces. I would be inclined to put more weight on the politics of the struggle, notably the views of the southern population. The failure of the Franco-Dutch invasion of 1635 owed much to logistical problems, but the subsequent failure to capture Antwerp, Bruges or Dunkirk was primarily caused by the large gap between the paper strength of the Dutch army (over 80,000 men) and its effective size of about 60,000 men. Political considerations (growing distrust of France) but even more so financial difficulties and prevailing attitudes about army–state relations made the Dutch regents loath to bridge this gap.
Nimwegen then turns to provide a very important study of the post-war years. Dutch deficiencies were highlighted by French improvements, providing a parlous situation that William III had to work hard to improve. Again, a crisis in strategy is discerned, such that William’s reform of the army in 1672–24 could not deliver the desired results. Nevertheless, his army reforms resulted in a spectacular decrease in the difference between paper and real unit strengths. Spanish weaknesses, alternative Austrian commitments and Dutch logistical problems prevented William from defeating Louis in the Spanish Netherlands, but the Dutch military reforms in themselves were a resounding success.
As far as a military revolution is concerned, Nimwegen links the tactical ideas and changes introduced from the 1590s and 1600s, which have been so ably discussed by Geoffrey Parker, with what he terms a revolution in military organization in the second half of the seventeenth century. Claiming that the 1650s and 1660s saw the establishment of the first modern battle fleets, Nimwegen argues that the changes that were achieved in the domains of army organization and growth during the 1660s and 1670s were even more spectacular. He suggests that the basis for this was a fundamental shift in relations between state and army as mercenaries were replaced by professional soldiers in the service of the government.
Possibly the social parameters of this change need rethinking as the relationship between governments and the aristocrats who raised and commanded troops scarcely conformed to subsequent bureaucratic notions. Indeed, David Parrott is due to publish a book arguing for the continuation of earlier elements of contractualism. The global perspective also requires discussion, a task I have attempted in my Beyond the Military Revolution. War in the Seventeenth-Century World (2011), while the contingent political nature of military organization emerges clearly from Jan Glete’s Swedish Naval Administration 1521–1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities (2010). These works indicate the current dynamism of the subject. As the Dutch contribution to European military developments from 1621 has attracted insufficient attention, Nimwegen’s book is much to be welcomed.