David Stahel,Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East

Reviewed by: Stephen G Fritz, East Tennessee State University, USA

The German assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941 was a colossal endeavour, so much so that any historian attempting to chronicle it of necessity has to pick a main point of emphasis. In his earlier work on Operation Barbarossa, to which Kiev 1941 is a follow-up, David Stahel detailed the activities of Army Group Centre in its drive toward Moscow. His conclusion (rather revisionist to Anglo-American readers, but one that mirrored the assessment of German historians) was that the Wehrmacht’s triumph at Smolensk in late July was more apparent than real. Savage Soviet resistance combined with the limits of the German logistics system meant that Blitzkrieg had been replaced by positional warfare, which put Germany at a grave disadvantage. The late autumn drive on Moscow thus not only had little chance of success, but the turning point of the war had already come and gone at Smolensk. In addition to leaving himself open to charges of materialist determinism (the Germans lost simply because they had insufficient resources), Stahel seemed to also ignore in his earlier work the gigantic encirclement battle at Kiev that evidently jump-started the stalled Blitzkrieg campaign and gave the attack on Moscow a chance at success.

In some respects, Kiev 1941 is thus a response to his critics, with a further marshalling of his original arguments designed to show that the Ukrainian operation, although spectacular, altered nothing. His evidence is persuasive and his conclusions sound. The battle of Kiev has, indeed, been neglected, but in devoting only two of his 10 chapters to the actual fighting, Stahel has not entirely rectified this omission. The key to his argument, though, lies precisely in the importance of the larger context. Here, Stahel is on solid ground when he argues that the fierce Soviet resistance in July and August, which resulted in heavy German losses, presented German leaders with a dilemma, especially when combined with the lack of replacements, the logistical shortcomings of the Wehrmacht and the poor roads and unpredictable weather of Russia. Having failed to achieve the quick knockout blow upon which their success was predicated, neither Hitler nor the Army High Command had a clear idea on how to proceed.

This led to the paralysing command disagreements of August which, far from being an example of Hitler’s petty interference, laid bare fundamental disagreements. While Halder at the OKH favoured a thrust on Moscow, Hitler had his eyes set on the economic resources of the Ukraine. Who was right? As Stahel notes, it is not self-evident that Hitler possessed the weaker arguments: the failure of Blitzkrieg meant the likelihood of the eastern war continuing into 1942, which increased the importance of the Ukraine for the German war economy, while even OKH planners conceded the dangers posed to Army Group Centre from its overextended southern flank. Finally, Stahel rightly emphasizes what should have been obvious at the time: the German supply and transportation systems were so overburdened that, even had Hitler given the green light for an advance on Moscow, the necessary materiel to support such an advance could not have been guaranteed.

As for the actual fighting at Kiev, Stahel corrects a number of popular misapprehensions, most significantly in noting the hard fighting that slowed German operations to a crawl, as well as the fact that the encirclement was enabled as much by Stalin’s ineptitude as German skill. The Wehrmacht certainly enjoyed superiority in operational technique, training and leadership, but in neither quality of equipment nor fighting ability did they outshine the Soviets. Despite the eventual scale of the victory, most Germans who experienced the savage combat in the Kiev pocket were left more with a sense of foreboding than triumph. In the summer and autumn of 1941 the Germans were winning themselves to death, unable to convert operational triumphs, won at an appalling cost they could not sustain, into a strategic victory. Still, success at Kiev produced jubilation at Führer Headquarters and in Germany, as ultimate victory seemed possible.

The triumph at Kiev, however, could not alter the stark material equation facing the Germans: while their strength ebbed even more, the Soviets showed yet again their powers of rejuvenation, while now also receiving the first shipments of what would be vital Anglo-American Lend-Lease aid. While Stahel perhaps too readily dismisses German prospects in the battle for Moscow (after all, the mid-October panic in the Soviet capital was quite real), his basic point is valid. In the absence of another monumental blunder on the part of Stalin the Wehrmacht lacked the strength and resources to seize Moscow. Despite German illusions, at the time and after the war, that superior will could simply overcome all obstacles, the reality was that German power was insufficient to accomplish the goals set for the Wehrmacht by Hitler. In bluntly reminding us of that reality, David Stahel has performed an important task.