Abstract
Reviewed by: Sylvia L. Hilton, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Wayne H. Bowen’s book is a welcome contribution to our understanding of the North American civil war, mid-nineteenth century transatlantic diplomacy, and Spanish–US relations during that period. Bowen argues that Spain should be included in any consideration of the diplomatic context of the war. Spain’s Caribbean colonies, long-standing transatlantic connections, and obvious interest in reclaiming some of her old colonial and diplomatic clout meant that all major actors would have taken into account the possibility of a Spanish intervention, because at mid-century Spain was enjoying a period of political stability and economic growth which translated into significant military and naval capabilities. In the end Spain did not have any definitive impact on the course or the outcome of the war, but that hindsight should not detract from the historiographical importance of tracing the development of relations between Spain, the Union and the Confederacy during the five years of war, because diplomatic contexts are as much about coetaneous perceptions, hopes and fears as about actual commitments and actions.
After losing most of its once vast overseas empire during the revolutionary era, Spain had become a second-rate power, but by mid-century Queen Isabel II’s government was bent on rebuilding the country’s international prestige. The outbreak of the American civil war seemed to be a golden opportunity to renew Spanish influence in the Americas, and diverse military operations reflect that assessment. Between 1861 and 1865 Spain tried to consolidate its re-annexation of Santo Domingo, and in 1861–62 participated in a joint Hispano-Anglo-French punitive expedition against Mexico, seeking to pressure that government into paying its international creditors, although Spanish forces did withdraw after only a few months in view of Napoleon III’s neo-colonialist intentions. Finally, the (First) War of the Pacific pitted Spain against Peru and Chile from 1864 to 1871. There was no doubt, then, that Spain was willing and able to deploy military and naval forces if such action was thought to be in the Spanish interest.
It is a well-known fact that the relations between Spain and the United States had long been strained, if not openly hostile. Spaniards were deeply suspicious of democratic republicanism as well as American territorial expansionism and attitudes toward Spanish America. Spain’s governing elite, like those of most European powers, saw their own interest in a prolonged American civil war that would weaken both sides. Alternatively, if the Confederacy prevailed, two republics would be weaker than a united nation. So, when the Confederate government sought diplomatic recognition and aid in Europe, they were disappointed. Nonetheless, Bowen maintains that this result was not a foregone conclusion and that, among the powers, the most likely source of aid to the South was Spain. He argues that Cuban, Puerto Rican and Southern plantation owners had a common interest in slavery, and cites, encouraging comments by some Spanish newspapers, and some social, political and military leaders, including members of the government such as prime minister O’Donnell and Queen Isabel II herself. Spokesmen on both sides opined that the Confederacy and Spain were natural allies, but that argument was weakened by the fact that Spaniards were well aware that the biggest American threat to Spain’s Caribbean possessions originated in the South.
Spain, as a relatively weak power enmeshed in a complex system of diplomatic relations, needed the support of at least one other major power in any action, in addition to carefully weighing cost and risks. In 1861, then, it was abundantly clear that Spain’s response to Confederate overtures would depend on the policies adopted in Britain and France. They all declared neutrality in the North American conflict, but gave belligerent rights to the South. Spain did, however, show her sympathy for the southerners by pressing for joint European diplomatic initiatives in favour of mediation to secure an armistice and Union recognition of Confederate independence. In addition, Confederate blockade runners and warships found some safety and aid in Cuban and Puerto Rican ports. More active support of the Confederacy on Spain’s part was unthinkable, because the ventures in Santo Domingo, Mexico and the Pacific were clearly overtaxing Spain’s military and naval resources, while Union forces gradually became more menacing. Bowen concludes that, in any case, a more aggressive Spanish involvement in the civil war would probably not have made much difference to the actual result.
Spain and the American Civil War is based on both primary and secondary sources, is well written and fills a significant historiographical gap, updating James W. Cortada’s pioneering Spain and the American Civil War: Relations at Mid-Century, 1855–1868 (1980), hitherto the main work of reference. Spain has attracted little attention in the few studies that cover the diplomatic context of the war simply because Britain and France were stronger actors. Some of the few Spanish historians who have approached the subject are missing in Bowen’s book: the small but useful contributions by Joaquín Oltra Pons on General Prim’s visit to the USA in 1862 (1971) and by Francisco Ruiz Fernández on the coverage of the civil war in a Malaga newspaper (1987–88). Overall, Bowen tells a convincing story, although if he had dug a little deeper into Spanish public opinion he would have uncovered strong support for the Union among liberal republicans and other groups. Such quibbles aside, this book should be in every university library and will be necessary reading for any serious student of the larger international framework of the American civil war.