Abstract
Reviewed by: Suzanne Doyle, University of East Anglia, UK
From 1977 to 1987 the controversy about the deployment of a new generation of nuclear-warhead missile delivery systems near dominated East–West relations. As the two sides confronted one another, anxieties arose over the consequences for bipolar stability. The crisis visually demonstrated the end of détente, but its eventual resolution with the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the eradication of an entire class of nuclear weapons, arguably marked a ‘new’ détente. Indeed, the Euromissile Crisis was the last key confrontation of the Cold War. Despite this historical importance, there are still many questions over the origins of the crisis and its impact, if any, on East–West relations and bipolar stability. The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War is the first substantial scholarly work in many years to address these questions, and through the authors’ utilization of a wide array of newly declassified materials and careful analysis, the edited volume brings us fresh insights into the Euromissile affair and its place within the evolution of the Cold War.
The volume is divided into four parts. In the first, David Holloway provides an excellent general overview of the crisis, which sets the background for the more specific analysis of the later chapters. The second part then focuses on the Soviet perspective, through chapters that analyse the rationale that led to: the Soviet deployment of the SS-20; the reaction of Soviet intelligence to the 1983 ‘war scare’; Mikhail Gorbachev’s thinking on the interlinking between the crisis and his attempts to reform Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet system; the Warsaw Pact’s views on deployment of SS-20 s and their US equivalents. The third part of the volume then turns to the Western perspective through chapters that examine the ways in which relations between the United States and its European allies shaped the eventual deployment decision, as well as a number of case studies on the role of individual European governments. Taken together, the eight chapters in the third part illustrate the complexities of transatlantic decision-making during this era, and moves scholarly analysis beyond disagreements over which country was the most influential in the December 1979 dual-track decision – a debate that often dominates the literature on the subject. The final part of the book explores public debate about the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This section includes analysis of Western public opinion data, the reactions of Polish intellectuals and dissidents, the response of the German peace movement in the East and West, the divisions that the crisis created within Western European socialist parties, and the impact of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues on the eventual political resolution of the crisis. This final section is the most methodologically innovative of the book as it eludes the traditional disciplinary separation between diplomatic approaches and social ones. The resultant work provides crucial insights on the interplay between the decision-making process and the emergence of a diverse public protest movement.
The volume’s analysis significantly deepens our historical understanding of the crisis and moves scholarly debate forward. Much of the debate throughout the crisis and in its immediate aftermath was highly partisan. In contrast, the book’s contributors utilize newly available documentary evidence to analyse the Euromissile affair from a wide range of perspectives. As such the book makes an important and innovative contribution to the expanding literature on this era. Indeed, given the volume’s impressive breadth and scholarly contribution, it is frustrating that there has been such a lengthy passage of time between the book’s conception and its eventual publication. The volume is the outcome of a conference held in Rome in December 2009. This delay means that not only has the literature on the crisis been without this seminal work for too long, but also that the archival analysis of many of the chapters is not as up-to-date as it could have been.
Notwithstanding this small shortcoming, The Euromissile Crisis is an extremely important addition to the canon of literature on the crisis and the end of the Cold War. The volume significantly deepens understanding of the origins and consequences, both political and social, of the Euromissile affair. Moreover, the book successfully places these events within the broader context of the Cold War and the evolution of the international system. As such, this book is essential reading for anyone interested in the diplomatic and social politics of the Cold War during this period.