Abstract
Reviewed by: Olena Palko, University of East Anglia, UK
In his prize-winning book, Per Anders Rudling discusses the emergence and evolution of modern Belarusian nationalism from its origins in late imperial Russia to the early 1930s. This book, according to the author, is ‘a study of the invention of Belarus’ (3), which came about as a product of committed nationalist intellectuals, rather than from popular opinion. In the same manner, Belarus as a nation-state is considered an invented tradition or artificial construct enhanced and affirmed by different rival actors of Realpolitik, who in their power struggle had used the aspirations of those national intellectuals to gain hegemony in the region. The approach undertaken by the author places Belarusian nationalism in a regional context, which necessarily requires engagement with the vast bibliography on German and Russian imperialism, Polish nationalism and early Soviet nationalities policies.
Rudling discusses the rise and fall of Belorussian nationalism in eight chronologically organized chapters covering the period between 1906 and 1931. The first chapter, ‘Imagining Belarus’, provides a broad theoretical background to the study of Belarusian nationalism. The origins of this intellectual trend, discussed in the second chapter, are traced back to the nineteenth century, when the idea of local territory-based transnational kraiova ideology was shaped against the reactionary praxis of assimilation (sliianie) of the tsarist imperial government. Chapter 3 examines the turbulent period of 1917–1920, during which two competing foundation myths of Belarusian statehood were created. The author argues that Belarusian nationalism of the period was not only initiated but also instrumentalized by foreign actors (Germany, Poland, Soviet Russia), each of which used local intellectuals and their sentiment in order to weaken its rival. This short revolutionary period is of the greatest importance for the study: the declaration of the Belarusian People’s Republic in March 1918, although both short-lived and unknown outside the capital, impelled the Bolshevik leaders, according to the author, to establish a Belarusian Soviet Republic in January 1919.
The main focus of the book is, however, placed on the developments of the 1920s, when the Belarusian lands became divided between the Soviets and Poland by virtue of the Treaty of Riga of 1921. The examination of the nationalities policy in Soviet Belarus (Chapter 4) and the Second Polish Republic (Chapter 5) is of the foremost significance. Although the main focus of the book is on Belarusian nationalism, Rudling makes a major contribution to Sovietology. The 1920s Bolshevik nationalities policy has merited a number of studies, yet Rudling’s research is perhaps the first comprehensive account in Western historiography of the implementation of the Soviet national project in Belarus. Notably, the author separates two interlinked national policies with distinctive goals: linguistic Belarusization, accompanied by Yiddishization and Polonization, aimed at forced de-Russification of the population; and korenizatsia, or indigenization, aimed at ‘rooting’ Soviet rule in the republic. In the sixth chapter, Rudling examines how the enforced promotion of the Belarusian language by mere bureaucratic means, along with the enlargement of the republic’s territory eastwards in 1924 and 1926, stirred up opposition among the republic’s national minorities and Belarusians, who did not acquire an essential self-identification. The so-called War Scare of 1927, discussed in Chapter 8, revealed the weakness of public support for the Soviet regime as it was used by Moscow to initiate the process of suppression of Belarusian nationalism in Soviet Belarus.
It is of note that Rudling puts the implementation of the Soviet nationalities policies into the context of the Soviet foreign policy of the time. The author seconds what Terry Martin called ‘the Piedmont principle’: the intentional promotion of local irredentism in the Soviet western borderlands as a major factor in undermining Poland. Yet, Rudling in Chapter 7 draws the readers’ attention to the Polish understanding of ‘the Piedmont principle’ and its implementation in the Second Polish Republic. The success of Belarusization compelled the Polish leadership to change – albeit for a short time – their treatment of national minorities and forced them to introduce a new eastern policy ‘Prometheanism’ in order to weaken the appeal of Soviet socialism. Yet, as proven in the book, the period of an affirmative attitude towards national aspiration, which in turn had never enjoyed a significant popular following, was seen by both sides only as a tactical manoeuvre, dismissed resolutely once local nationalism became a liability for those governments’ foreign goals.
Overall, Rudling’s book is of significant importance. Belarus is one of the most under-researched countries in Eastern Europe. This scholarly work helps to understand how different and sometimes conflicting ideas of ‘Belarusianness’ were created and the influence they have had on shaping the identity of modern Belarus. In addition, Rudling’s study proves the benefit of the regional approach to the history of imperial and later Soviet borderlands. The author’s expertise in Ukrainian history of the period evidently enriched his scholarship on Belarus. More importantly, the present study advocates the necessity of closing the gap between East European studies and Sovietology; the convergence of which allows, as proven by this volume, a more complex and deep understanding of the processes in the Soviet border republics during the interwar period.