Abstract
Reviewed by: Perica Hadži-Jovančić, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, UK
Bakić’s book on British security challenges in the Danube region after the First World War is a welcome addition to an otherwise scant bibliography on British foreign policy in this part of Europe in the period before the Munich Conference. The author’s motivation was to fill that void by an analysis of various mutually dependent regional aspects, which interlinked to form a diverse political landscape. The book belongs to a conventional genre of diplomatic monograph and describes in detail British observations, assessments and reactions to the political developments in this permanently turbulent area, which geographically roughly corresponded to the territory of the former Austro-Hungary.
As Bakić observes, the official British policy, used to a traditional pre-1914 context, found it hard to function in the new role of arbiter in this political space, which was largely unknown, fragmented into many smaller states, permeated with rampant nationalism and burdened with territorial disputes in all corners. Eventually, the British neither did well in this role nor did they manage to significantly contribute to stability in the region. The Foreign Office and its diplomatic staff in the region’s capitals found it hard to understand the gravity of the call that nationalism had in the everyday political life of these countries. This makeshift foreign policy from the British resulted in the formation by Whitehall in the 1920s of the political opinions with respect to the countries of the region which would dominate British perceptions later in the 1930s. Bakić successfully follows the evolution of political attitudes towards the Little Entente and the misgivings the Foreign Office had about French influence. These two developments went hand in hand; by the mid-1920s, the opinion of the Foreign Office, largely unfounded, was that France and the Little Entente had already forged a firm unity in foreign policy. In the British opinion, such developments created an atmosphere of mistrust and were correspondingly conducive to adventurism in foreign policy, rather than to preserving peace. At the same time, the Foreign Office was sympathetic towards Hungary and Italy; both were seen as stable, conservative states and their foreign policies as simply defensive against the menacing and provocative actions of France and the Little Entente. These inherited notions continued into the 1930s and, partly as a result, clear political viewpoints on many important issues were rarely formulated in the Foreign Office after 1933. Some of the political initiatives of the Foreign Office discussed in the book have up till now received little scholarly attention, such as a debate in London about the extension of the Locarno principles to South-Eastern Europe in 1925. Another important issue which Bakić brings to the fore is the importance which the Foreign Office attached to the maintenance of Austrian independence from Germany after 1933. This caused the British to become embroiled in complicated political designs for bringing France, Italy and the Little Entente to the table; a task which exceeded London’s willingness to fully commit itself to the cause.
Yet, it remains unclear why Bakić decided to finish his analysis with the German march into the Rhineland. His own explanation does not suffice: ‘… the German occupation of the remilitarized Rhineland zone fundamentally transformed the situation … Germany’s position vis-à-vis the smaller Danubian countries was greatly strengthened …’ (4). This is true for the relations between Germany and South-Eastern Europe, but the object of this book is to focus on British security concerns. If Bakić implies that British policies after March 1936 changed in the light of German actions, then it is certainly not the case. More appropriate events to end on would have been either the Anschluss or the Munich Conference. As it is, the analysis is left somewhat incomplete and this book lacks one, unwritten chapter. It is also not exactly clear what British interests in the region were, apart from preserving the peace, particularly before 1933, and how they clashed with the interests of successor states. The author is aware that the most important policy makers rarely considered direct British involvement east of the Rhine. Central Europe and the Balkans were of interest, as the book demonstrates, but low on the priority list and London rarely contemplated anything more than promoting peace and regional understanding without its direct involvement. Bakić is justly critical of this approach, but the wider context of British European and Imperial policy is absent from the analysis. Finally, Bakić misses the opportunity to address the problem of the changing British attitudes towards the question of border revisions and territorial settlement in the Danube region, another under-researched topic in current historiography and deserving of a sub-chapter in this book.
Nevertheless, this is an important book, grounded in excellent archival research, which opens many interesting questions about British foreign policy in Central and South-Eastern Europe in the interwar period. As such, it should stimulate further research of the topic.