Comment

When viewed à longue durée, the Belle Époque can be seen as part of the general increase in empathy that – if one adopts Pieter Spierenburg’s approach – served to diminish the importance of physical violence. ¹ It was also associated with a reduction in homicides across Europe (with the exception of Italy), ² with a more calculated use of violence as a proactive strategy ³ and with the bourgeois rejection of public displays of violence except for specific institutions and rituals. ⁴ In some countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, historians even talk of the domestication of violence during the Belle Époque. ⁵

The articles included in this special issue relativize such an irenic perspective on the Belle Époque and show that the epithet ‘Belle’ did not exclude the existence of violent acts and conflicts. In choosing the issue of strikebreaking, Matteo Millan draws attention to the structural situation in which the right to work and the right to strike came into conflict and provoked ‘low-intensity episodes of violence’. Such episodes have significance for political peace and social cohesion in the four countries that were chosen for investigation in this special issue: the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. The project does not follow transnational history, although such connections are not ignored. Contacts among capital or big landowners in the various countries were not very well developed, with the exception of the British shipping industry, which formed international organizations to oppose the international trade union association of seamen and dockers. Another aspect of transnational history concerns the relocation of strike-breakers, who were sometimes hired abroad or in peripheral regions. Instead, the project mainly takes the more demanding comparative approach to identify the similarities and differences between the four countries. These particular societies were chosen as they highlight the differences between those that were in the process of state building, such as Italy and Austria-Hungary, and those that had completed the process of modern state building, such as the United Kingdom and Germany. ⁶ The Nordic societies, in which the practices of arbitration and conciliation were (and still are) highly developed, may also have been represented. ⁷ It may also have been useful to consider industries in addition to this comparison of nation states (the fact that Austria was an empire is of no particular significance here). Indeed, the fascinating study of the British shipping industry demands a similar analysis of the Italian and German ports. Was the British case unique or did Genoa and Hamburg react to strikes by seamen and dockers with similar structures and strategies?

Strikebreaking was also a struggle for space. Workers defended their workspace by picketing the entrances to the enterprises where they were employed, while strike-breakers rejected this limitation of space. Claire Morelon found detailed sources of information on Austria-Hungary, from which she was able to reconstruct the places of encounter. Strike-breakers that had arrived by train were attacked by striking workers when travelling from the railway station to their place of work or when they were in pubs. In the United Kingdom, one of the Shipping Federation’s strengths was their ownership of three ships that they could use to bring in – behind the backs of the strikers – replacement workers for the docks and ships. These examples reveal the extent to which the articles heed what Trutz von Trotha advocated, namely that studies of violence should concentrate on ‘microhistorical’ reconstructions of the relationships between actors, victims and bystanders, ⁸ although bystanders have often been ignored in published studies.

Strikebreaking was one element of the various strategies aimed at imposing discipline on workers. Even without citing Michel Foucault, the articles consider the different forms these strategies took. Blacklists were a common means of excluding militant workers from enterprises, while foremen, white-collar workers or those in senior positions controlled the workers, excluding those deemed resistant and rebellious. Lockouts were a frequent tactic to avoid confrontations between workers and strike-breakers, especially in the Ruhr region. ‘Free unions’ organized by entrepreneurs and by the Catholic Church made efforts to attract docile workers and use them as strike-breakers. In order to better resist strikes, entrepreneurs formed national and local organizations to defend themselves and protect their interests. It was in the United Kingdom that such organizations had the greatest success and importance – Saluppo calls the Shipping Federation ‘the most aggressive anti-union force in the United Kingdom’ – and strikebreaking was subcontracted to ‘Free Labour Unions’. In Germany, the Zechenwehren in the Ruhr area tried to prevent and counter labour conflicts. The capital-owners’ strength lay in having recourse to a variety of responses to strikes and social unrest. It might prove useful to carefully consider the occasions on which each of these strategies was preferred and why, and how they were combined.

Strikebreaking illustrates the different forms of labour control within a nation’s industries, which varied according to sector: it occurred more frequently in sectors that did not require special knowledge on the part of the workforce and less frequently in those where highly specialized workers were necessary. Does this imply that strikebreaking was absent from the highly developed, modern industrial sectors? The modernist tendency to retain workers by offering good working conditions and/or by providing social benefits, such as housing or sickness insurance, may be contrasted with a more traditional vision that stresses control of workers, pressure and discipline. However, strikebreaking does not follow this broad distinction between modern and traditional industries, since it was also used by modern capitalist enterprises. The highly-developed Krupp company used Zechenwehren and employed five private policemen. Caruso argues that the coalmines and the iron and steel industries, which were the forerunners of German capitalism, responded aggressively to strikes. In France, Schneider, the director of a well-known armament company, supported the ‘yellow’ trade unions. In Italy, the SBTF, which had links to the Bank of Turin and also cultivated land, kept its workers in a ‘semi-enslaved’ condition. In addition, it is easy to agree with Matteo Millan when he writes in his introduction that capitalist rationality did not exclude the exploitation of workers and the use of strike-breakers.

Strikebreaking requires strike-breakers. However, it was difficult to use them in industrial sectors which needed qualified workers. The Fiat company in Italy did not have strike-breakers, while in the Ruhr, the Zechenwehren rarely mobilized large numbers of replacement workers but instead relied on members of staff. When large numbers of workers were needed to replace strikers in Austria-Hungary, companies contacted replacement agents, while in Britain they turned to national organizations. Replacements came either from the less-developed agricultural regions, as in Austria-Hungary and Italy, or from among the unemployed populations of bigger cities, as during the Parisian slumps. As the work was for a limited period only and required geographical mobility, it was not highly attractive. The Zechenwehren were an exception, since they were not conceived of as replacement workers but rather as a kind of private police force that could be deployed during strikes and that maintained order, as Caruso convincingly shows. Their function was often similar to that of foremen. Replacement workers were also recruited from abroad. In Cardiff, Chinese workers were employed on the docks, while in Hull workers came from Sweden and the Netherlands. Czech workers were employed as replacements in the Austrian mining and metal industries, while the ‘desperate people’ of the Veneto, known as crumiri, were brought in as strike-breakers in the Po Valley. In Austria-Hungary, in particular, local populations reacted negatively to the incoming workers and attempted to discredit them. When there were strikes in the public service industries, such as the gas and electricity suppliers, and the tramways and railways, the government often replaced the strikers with soldiers. In the Italian countryside soldiers were also used to bring in the harvest. This use of the military was legitimized by national interest, even though the military commanders were reluctant to intervene.

Strikebreaking was part of the public debate on legitimate forms of action. All the articles refer to the tension between the right to work and the right to strike that was at the core of the conflicts and that was used to support arguments for both striking and strikebreaking. They show that capital-owners frequently asserted the defensive nature of their position with regards to the trade unions, which they claimed were disrupting public peace and the country’s economic wealth. Strikers and trade unionists refuted this argument and contested the entrepreneurs’ strikebreaking initiatives. This debate is part of the historical context and its analysis should be central to any further research on this subject. Following Reinhard Koselleck’s approach, the terminology used is important in this context: it arises from structural or conflictual situations, but its effects were also felt within the broader social context. Studies of the language used in the debate could help to situate the ideological positions in a broader context and in their relationships with established political positions, and could show the implications of vocabulary choices. Is the discourse trying to isolate the workers, delegitimize them by means of nationalist arguments or even criminalize them?

Strikebreaking throws into relief the relationships between capital-owners, unions and the state. The articles stress the importance of these relationships, and one of the strengths of this special issue is the detailed analyses they offer. At the legislative level, the history of the establishment of the right to strike and the introduction of working contracts and arbitration and conciliation measures is presented in detail for all four countries. Below this level, judgement on rights by higher courts of justice are discussed, as are some important rulings on specific court cases. We see that the state acted when requested to intervene in violent conflicts and when its monopoly on physical violence was challenged by armed strike-breakers. The Zechenwehren were closely supervised by the Prussian state, which was reluctant to relinquish its monopoly, and even when it did the administration remained involved in the organization and deployment of armed groups. This seems to be specific to Prussia, since the other countries’ tolerance of private armament and private police depended on political conjunctures and the local or regional political conditions. The Prussian state’s involvement was not, however, effective when it came to the local police, who depended on local dignitaries and were also often paid by them. As a result of this dependence, in Italy and Austria-Hungary the police intervened during strikes, mostly in favour of the entrepreneurs. Open or covert privatization of the police had taken place in all four countries, albeit with regional or local differences. Sometimes, as in western Austria-Hungary, the regional prefects did not intervene in favour of the strike-breakers, although it was common practice in the east of the country. When state repression by means of the police or gendarmerie was not successful, the army was called in. This was the case in Germany during major strikes, but it was mainly the case in Italy and Austria-Hungary. The soldiers not only took over from the workers, they also intimidated and put pressure on the strikers. Sometimes they were armed and shot at the strikers. There were more victims of this type of violence in Austria-Hungary than in France or Germany. In Italy, whether or not the repression was brutal depended on the local administration; for example, in Berra and the southern part of the country the prefects did not protect the blacklegs, but they did in Molinella.

In all good studies, some important questions are answered, while others remain open. This is also the case in this special issue. The articles have one other factor in common, although it is not analysed to a great extent, and that is emotion. The fear and threat, hate and expectation, insecurity and panic that arose in each country are mentioned and are referred to in explaining the entrepreneurs’ politics and the state authorities’ reactions. Emotions are not only provoked as a means of politics to legitimate the use of violence against strike-breakers but they are also a widespread phenomenon of modern life and entertained by the mass media. They do not play a central role in the argumentation, and yet they could help deepen our understanding of the period. Future research could involve emotional-historical approaches without difficulty and look at the links between capital owners and media as well as the importance of media campaigns aimed at marginalizing and vilifying strike-breakers. ⁹

This special issue shows that historical research should return to the area of labour, which has been neglected during the last fifteen years or so. It draws attention to the minor forms of violence, aside from criminal behaviour, attacks and insurrection, which often had significant effects on the lives of ordinary people. It also shows the actions and reactions of state administrations under pressure from capital-owners or large landowners, and the ways in which they tried to calm relations between workers and entrepreneurs. These various perspectives highlight the ambiguities of the Belle Époque, and might even form a basis for studying the more violent evolution of society after the First World War.