Abstract
Reviewed by: Frederick C. Schneid, High Point University, High Point, NC, USA
Bruno Colson has created a compendium of Napoleon’s thoughts on the conduct of war. His intention was to construct a book that mirrored Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. Napoleon never produced a political or military testament like Frederick the Great, but he certainly spent much of his time in exile on St Helena dictating his thoughts on history and war. Since that time, various historians have tried to produce a corpus of Napoleon’s military maxims, drawing from various memoires and recollections of those in the imperial retinue. Colson examines the nature of these earlier works in his introduction, and then establishes that the intent of his book is to ‘identify as accurately as possible what Napoleon understood of war, and how he saw it’ (12).
Colson purposely divides Napoleon: On War into eight books: The Nature of War, The Theory of War, On Strategy in General, The Engagement, Military Forces, Defence, Attack, and War Plans, mirroring Clausewitz’s On War. Colson’s chapters within each book match those of the well-known Prussian military theorist. Indeed, within the respective chapters and the summary conclusions, Colson compares and contrasts the Prussian general’s arguments with Napoleon’s statements. This is an interesting intellectual exercise, and the amount of detailed research from numerous Napoleonic memoranda is impressive. Colson seeks out Napoleon’s statements found in the myriad of published correspondence and memoirs. Indeed, he matches the great French leader’s pronouncements with various campaigns that highlight a particular chapter. In many ways, Colson is reverse engineering Clausewitz in order to draw lessons directly from French Emperor, rather than from the Prussian’s interpretation of the Napoleonic Wars.
Clausewitz’s work has become ubiquitous and de rigueur in war colleges and military academies around the world. His words are often recited as if they are Biblical passages. All the same, Colson seeks to draw readers directly to the source. In doing so, he serves a dual purpose: to highlight Napoleon’s mastery of the art of war and to contextualize Clausewitz’s insightful analysis of war as it was in the early nineteenth century. Thus, Colson appears to want his study to be read in tandem with that of Clausewitz. Accepting this, the question is begged, exactly for whom was this book written? Napoleon: On War could certainly stand on its own in a course on military history, but the parallel structure to Clausewitz would imply that this work should be read by those who have studied, or are studying the great military theorist as well. Therefore, this book might be best used in a graduate course on military theory or at a military academy or war college.
While the concept, research and execution of this monograph is impressive, perhaps its greatest shortcoming lies in its translation. It is clunky. The translators and copy editors at Oxford University Press should have spent a bit more time smoothing the narrative. Indeed, a reader familiar with the French language in the original can visualize the complex sentences, and then attempt to translate them – in some cases verbatim – into English. This can create rather cumbersome sentences that lack clarity. With that criticism aside, Colson has produced a fine book for the Napoleonic historian or the student of military theory.