Mirrored Neutralities: Spain and Argentina in World War I

For two decades, and in step with the transnational and global turn, studies on the First World War have notably broadened their horizons of analysis. As John Horne argued years ago, for many reasons, from the imperial and ‘pre-national’ forms that dominated a significant part of the world to the ‘totalization’ of conflict, understanding conflict required ‘a sense of different national trajectories that only a comparative sensibility can measure just as it calls for a willingness to look in transnational terms at the processes at work’. ¹ With the centenary, the publication of The Cambridge History of the First World War showed that this transnational interpretation of the war had become dominant. ² Simultaneously, various works have recently highlighted the global character of the war. ³

The experience of neutral countries, however, was neglected for a long time and at the same time narrow, national points of view, dominated the historiographies produced in these territories. However, as various works have recently shown, despite the fact that their states were neutral, European, Latin American, and Spanish societies expressed various processes of mobilization and multiple internal and external tensions derived from the conflict. ⁴ It was expressed both in the Netherlands, which suffered the severe strains the conflict put on everyday life, and Scandinavia, where Danish and Norwegian societies experienced hard ideological and social tensions besides an apparent consensus around the official position. ⁵ Other countries that ended up entering the war also show similar elements. This is the case of Italy, which was divided between those who supported neutrality and those who wanted the intervention. In many senses, the Italian case had many elements in common with Spain and Argentina. ⁶ In general, all neutral countries were subjected to negotiation processes in the face of military and commercial pressure and tried to maximize the benefits of their situation on the international scene. ⁷ In this framework, the debate on the nation – that is, the dispute regarding the ideological groundings of national identity and its projections in the future – had a fundamental importance in articulating the discourses of political transformation. ⁸

Within this framework, it is pertinent to relate various aspects that link two neutral countries, Spain and Argentina, with what happened in the belligerent countries. ⁹ The ties between the two countries, of course, were based on the close cultural and political relations forged between the two countries since the nineteenth century. ¹⁰ This situation was combined with an important demographic presence of the European immigrant communities in Argentina, about 30 per cent of whose population were immigrants in 1914 (in Buenos Aires it was 49 per cent). It is worth remembering that Spain had a significant demographic presence in Latin America: almost 3.3 million Spaniards emigrated to America between 1882 and 1930 and just over 1.5 million went to Argentina. ¹¹

Taking into account all these elements, this article proposes an interpretation of the Argentine and Spanish neutralities from a simultaneously comparative and transnational perspective with the aim of analyzing the intricate relationship between ‘national interests and transnational concerns’. ¹² To do this, I propose to study the evolution of war through three concepts – neutrality, peace, and the nation – that were expressed at the local and transnational level through people, political projects and discourses on neutrality, peace, and the belligerent countries as well as the neutral ones. As will be shown, these concepts were central in the constitution of the Allied-rupturist and Germanophile-neutralist sectors that divided Spanish and Argentine societies throughout the war. As had happened in the belligerent countries, ‘Ideas were reworked in national and local contexts, but their legitimacy rested on transnational contexts’. ¹³

Facing the Outbreak of the War

During the negotiations of July 1914, Spain was ignored by the Entente countries. Its limited army, which then had some 75,000 men stationed in North Africa, could help France and England little in a war that was presumed to be short term. ¹⁴ South America had experienced strong tensions a few months earlier after the United States military occupied the Port of Veracruz, against which Argentina, Brazil, and Chile had proposed a negotiation that resulted in the signing of the ABC treaty. ¹⁵

When war was declared, all Latin American governments declared themselves neutral. Spain did the same. Between 1 and 7 August, various official documents were published that delimited the government's position. ¹⁶ The intensity with which the first news from the battle fronts was received was evident: the streets of Barcelona were ‘full of people’. ¹⁷ As in Buenos Aires, crowds gathered in the newsrooms of the main newspapers waiting for the latest news. ¹⁸ In these first spontaneous demonstrations, in which the melody of the Marseillaise was insistently heard, the first moments of tension had occurred, staging the division between the supporters of ‘one side and the other’. ¹⁹ A few weeks later, to cope with these tensions, Eduardo Dato's government prohibited all political meetings where Spain's position in the war was debated and tried to counter the idea that neutrality was related to idleness or inertia. ²⁰

The reactions to the outbreak of the conflict in Argentina were similar. On 2 August, the headquarters of the newspaper La Prensa, one of the most important in the country, sounded its siren to report that war had broken out. In a few hours, the streets of the city centre were filled with people crowded in front of the blackboards of the main newspapers. ²¹ The same night that the proclamation of neutrality was announced, hundreds of people gathered on Avenida de Mayo, cutting off the traffic while singing La Marseillaise, God Save the Queen and the Das Deustchlandlied. The demonstration ended with a violent police intervention in front of the French consulate. ²² Of course, European events were closely followed by immigrant communities from belligerent countries, which made up around 16.5 per cent of the Argentine population and in Buenos Aires reached around 28 per cent of its inhabitants. ²³ As had occurred in Spain, the tensions caused by the war led the government of the city of Buenos Aires to issue various decrees that prohibited ‘in theatres, cinemas and other events the representation of any work and the exhibition of tapes or views that because of their language, actions or arguments may provoke … demonstrations of any kind, in favour or against foreign nations’. ²⁴

After the first Battle of the Marne and the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, a heated controversy began to develop, as one of the more moderate Spanish military newspapers had recognized. ²⁵ In Spain, the Court and the aristocracy led by María Cristina, daughter of Archduchess Isabel Francisca of Austria, stood out among those who supported Germany and the Central Powers. Her sympathy was overshadowed by the role assumed by King Alfonso XIII, the ‘most allied of the monarchists’. ²⁶ The Army also supported Germany. ²⁷ Except for Catalonia, the high hierarchy of the Catholic Church was another pillar of Germanophile support. These sectors were joined by the Carlist and Maurist conservative movements. ²⁸ Against them, in the wide range that was favourable to the Allies, the Socialists, the reformists and numerous republican groups stood out for interpreting the conflict as a dispute between German autocracy and the French and English democracies.

In Argentina, the debate on the war was used to attack the conservative administration of Victorino de la Plaza. His government declared neutrality on 5 August and maintained it until the end of his presidency. The defence of the official position was quickly supported by a wide sector of the press, from La Nación to La Razón, passing through Última Hora and El Nacional. ²⁹ Despite the fact that the tone of the most relevant ones was impartial, publications such as Crítica showed their preference for the Allies and their cartoons were published in the French Le Matin. Also standing out as favouring the Allies were El Diario, which was clearly the most Francophile in Argentina, La Mañana and Caras y Caretas, among others. ³⁰ Despite the fact that there were some publications in German favourable to the Central Empires – such as Argentinisches Tageblatt ­– the Argentinean Germanic front had their most important voice in the newspaper La Unión. ³¹ Its connections with the Spanish Germanophiles – and in particular with traditionalism – were evident from the beginning of the war. ³² While the Argentine pro-Allied supporters began to be the majority in literary and artistic circles, the supporters of the Central Empires prevailed in the areas of Law, Medicine, the Army, Sciences and the Catholic Church. ³³ Although conservative intellectuals stood out among the Germanophiles, most of them favoured the Allies. Among the partisan sectors of France and England were mainly the traditional conservative sectors of the elites, most of the radicals opposed to Yrigoyen, as well as the socialists and part of the anarchists. ³⁴

Despite the fact that an important part of historiography has argued about the existence of a ‘neutralist consensus’ until 1917 – the formula has been mainly used by Tato and Compagnon for the Argentine case, but it is applicable for part of Spanish historiography – it seems clear that during the first months of the war, Argentine and Spanish societies experienced a division of opinions that, as we have pointed out, led to conflicts and incidents. ³⁵ In this process, built through an interaction between what was happening in Europe and Latin America, the debates on the defence of peace and neutrality were fundamental.

Neutrality and Peace

Although it has had a historiographical development that extends to the present, the debate on the responsibilities of war began with the conflict. In this framework, the struggle for the ‘truth’ became one of the axes on which the belligerent states projected their propaganda on both their own territories and on neutral countries as well. ³⁶ Being not responsible for the outbreak of the war was one of the main points of this propaganda and this was also a key element in internal debates of neutral societies. The argument of carrying out a ‘defensive’ war became fundamental and was linked to a second aspect that was equally central: the appeal to the struggle for peace. Humanitarianism, peace and defensive warfare were articulated transnationally in a space that did not exclude neutral countries. ³⁷

The arguments for the defensive war were crucial to support the leading positions of intellectuals and political groups in Spain and Argentina. In this context, the question of responsibilities was at the centre of discussions in the first months of the conflict. ³⁸ The sectors in Argentina in favour of the Allies denounced ‘an ardent campaign’ by the Germans that aimed to demonstrate the ‘justice of their cause’ and to gain ‘the sympathies of neutral countries’. ³⁹ Similar arguments were made in Spain, where Rafael Altamira defended the Allies based on German guilt and Alejandro Lerroux claimed that France represented ‘the policy of pacifism’ and had limited itself to responding to German attacks. ⁴⁰

These debates had been triggered after German troops entered into Belgium on 4 August. In a relatively short period, which lasted until 21 October 1914, close to 6500 executions were registered and a new intervention model was revealed that included robberies, looting, fires, rapes, deportations and the destruction of buildings considered part of the historical and cultural heritage. ⁴¹ The intense discussion on responsibilities was based on the positions that neutral countries had taken on what had happened in Belgium, as illustrated by the case of Sweden. ⁴²

The sectors favourable to the Allies based their rejection of the Central Empires on the basis of defending the sovereignty of neutral countries. In Spain, concern about what was happening in Belgium extended to all areas – from political to diplomatic – and territories. ⁴³ Pablo Iglesias, the leader of the Socialists, justified resistance to ‘German imperialism’ in the name of love for independence and the integrity of the homeland. ⁴⁴ Ramiro de Maeztu synthesized the war as a conflict between Belgium and Germany. ⁴⁵ The entire political spectrum of the Aliadophiles made similar arguments. In Argentina, proposals ran along similar lines. Francisco Barroetaveña published on 24 August a protest article in which he denounced the violation of international law by Germany. The progressive democrat affirmed that it had been a ‘most flagrant violation’ before which France emerged as ‘a centre of expansive and humanitarian civilization like no other’ while Belgium covered herself with ‘heroism and glory’. ⁴⁶ The idea of Belgium as a symbol of heroism and martyrdom was shared throughout the Argentine Allied sector, as was evident in the press and in intellectuals such as Leopoldo Lugones. ⁴⁷ Faced with these approaches, the sectors favourable to Germany presented radically opposite arguments. In November 1914, La Unión stated that ‘years before the war broke out, Belgium had ceased to be a neutral state, but a vassal of the Triple Entente, an enemy of Germany’. ⁴⁸ The arguments of the Spanish Germanophile sectors were very similar. ⁴⁹ Even leaders who assumed equidistant positions, such as the Catalanist Francesc Cambó, argued that the invasion had been the inevitable result of imperialist disputes. ⁵⁰

The hostilities escalated after the destruction of the Catholic University's library in Leuven on the night of 25 August 1914 and the bombing of Reims Cathedral on 19 September. Thereafter, representations of German ‘barbarism’ began to circulate more intensively than in previous weeks in publications of the pro-Allied sector around the world. ⁵¹ It was a transnational phenomenon in which important artists and intellectuals expressed their militancy through artistic works, manifestos, pamphlets, books, and new academic organizations like the French Committee d’Études et Documents sur la Guerre. ⁵² In accordance with these statements, journalists and intellectuals favourable to the Allies in Argentina denounced that the ‘Kaiser's soldiers’ mutilated children. ⁵³ In Spain, Miguel de Unamuno argued that what happened in Reims had revealed two ways of understanding the world – la Kultur y la Zivilisation – and flagged the danger that Germany would bring its brutality to the rest of Europe. ⁵⁴ The feminized projections of Belgium as ‘hero’ and ‘martyr’ were spread throughout the country through journals such as Madrid's España and Barcelona's Iberia. ⁵⁵

In this scenario, the murder of five Spanish merchants in Liege occupied by German troops between 20 and 21 August 1914 had a considerable impact on Spain and on Spanish communities in Argentina. ⁵⁶ A month later, a similar case shook Argentine politics. As an expression of its precarious diplomatic structure, it was common for Argentina to hire subjects and citizens of European countries for consular positions. Such was the case in the Belgian city of Dinant, where on the night of 22–23 September, Remy Himmer, ‘the most senior consular representative of Argentina’, was executed. ⁵⁷ The murder was interpreted as an attack on Argentine neutrality and sovereignty itself. ‘We cannot but feel our national dignity wounded’, said La Mañana and demanded a forceful protest from the government. ⁵⁸ The reports, published in La Nación, by the journalist Roberto Payró, resident in Belgium since 1909, were essential to expressing the aversion towards Germany from a considerable part of the Argentine population. His criticism caused German companies based in Argentina such as the German Transatlantic Bank to withdraw their advertisements from La Nación and contributed to sensitizing Argentine society to issues of humanitarian aid. ⁵⁹ Faced with these arguments, the Argentine Germanophile sectors argued that the execution did not represent an offence to Argentine sovereignty. ⁶⁰ National sovereignty and neutrality were at the centre of the debate.

This situation was escalated by the repercussions generated in both countries by the murder of the English nurse Edith Cavell after being condemned by a German court in an accelerated trial that the Spanish minister in Brussels, the Marquis of Villalobar, tried to avoid through numerous international efforts. ⁶¹ Accused of high treason for accommodating nearly 200 Belgian, French, and English soldiers in a Brussels hospital and helping them flee from occupied Belgium, she became an emblem of a defender of peace and another demonstration of German brutality that was expressed transnationally. This construction extended to both countries, as shown by the newspaper of Allied propaganda América-Latina, and in the Argentine and Spanish pro-Allied newspapers. ⁶² Towards the end of 1915, the links between the ‘heroism’ of the Belgian people, the defence of the Allied cause and pacifist and humanitarian discourses were articulated as a fundamental part of the Allied arguments in Spain and Argentina.

Peace and neutrality had become disputed grounds, as was observed in the numerous claims that the head of the German legation in Buenos Aires, Count Luxburg, had directed at Argentina's government since 1915. In one of them, delivered in June, he denounced that invitations to attend a conference by Emma Eydoux of the French Red Cross, who would speak ‘at length about the Kaiser's absurdities and his comic illusions’, had been found in the renowned Plaza Hotel in Buenos Aires. From his point of view, a violation of neutrality had occurred through the ‘abuse of the Red Cross, symbol of international humanity, with the purpose of agitating’. ⁶³ In all his communications, Luxburg highlighted the value of peace and respect for neutrality as fundamental elements. ⁶⁴

The second offensive of the German submarine war that took place between February and May 1916 increased the tensions in the relations between Spain and Germany. After sinking the French ferry Sussex, the Germans attacked several Spanish ships and this led Romanones, president of the government since December 1915, to threaten to sever diplomatic relations, as reported by Marco Avellaneda, head of the Argentine embassy. ⁶⁵ As was the case in Argentina, complaints from embassies and consulates of belligerent countries about the lack of respect for neutrality became common. Spain, as the diplomatic documentation sent from Switzerland in mid-1915 showed, was going through situations similar to those of all neutral countries: the social and diplomatic tension was intense. ⁶⁶ ‘Frequently there were incidents that provoked the denouncement of the vigilance and persistence of Prince Ratibor, German Ambassador’, affirmed the Argentine Ambassador in Madrid. ⁶⁷

In this process, the war had become a dispute for the nation. This was illustrated by a small book published in Madrid in mid-1916, which affirmed that a ‘civil war’ had broken out between Aliadophiles and Germanophiles. ⁶⁸ This perception coincided with those of Miguel de Unamuno, Luis Araquistáin, and Juan Guixé, who in the press of the Spanish community in Argentina had warned a year before about the existence of a ‘War between Francophiles and Germanophiles’. ⁶⁹ This dispute for the nation was based on the controversy around the multiple meanings of neutrality. Definitions of Spanishness and Argentinianness were part of the ideological tension derived from the war. It was a process that, as the cases of the Netherlands and Romania show, was far from being exclusively expressed in Argentina and Spain. ⁷⁰

Nationally and Internationally: Neutrality in Question

‘The Allies cannot continue the war without the help of the neutrals, and they will be fierce with them.’ This is how the Spanish Germanophile journalist Juan Pujol described the international scenario that seemed to open for Spain and all neutral countries at the end of 1916. ⁷¹ The war changed after the battles in Somme and Verdun and the offensive in Brusilov in Poland, while the German submarine campaign opened a new situation for neutral countries. Commercial and political pressure from the powers at war significantly grew. Months later, the intervention of new countries in the conflict – Greece, China and Brazil, among others – significantly affected the relations between the colonies and the mother countries. In this scenario, the Russian revolutionary process and the entry of the United States into the war ended up shaping a global war. ⁷²

On 7 April 1917, Frederic Stimson, the United States ambassador to Argentina, stated to Honorio Pueyrredón that his country was entering the war. Despite the fact that the Argentine Foreign Minister acknowledged ‘the justice of that resolution’ he maintained that his government was not willing to break relations with Germany. ⁷³ Simultaneously, the United States ambassador in Madrid, Frank L. Polk, tried to get Spain to follow and break diplomatic relations with Germany. Alfonso XIII repeatedly refused. His plan was to play a great role in future peace negotiations. ⁷⁴ At the same time, the first news about what was happening in Russia began to arrive. In Spain, the fall of the tsar was celebrated by the Allied sectors as a revolution against autocracy and the ‘German spirit’. ⁷⁵ The press in Argentina did the same. ⁷⁶ As was the case in Europe, in both countries the Russian process was interpreted as ‘an act of remobilization for war and, simultaneously, the act of a war-weary society desiring peace.’ ⁷⁷ Faced with this situation, the Germanophile sectors defended neutrality more strongly and criticized the policy of the United States. In Spain, Vicente Gay warned that Washington's imperialism posed a threat to the relations between Spain and its former colonies in America. ⁷⁸ The same arguments circulated in Argentina under the protection of German propaganda. ⁷⁹

This scenario of radicalization had been expressed in Madrid with the foundation of the Liga Antigermanófila a few weeks earlier. Its founding manifesto radically showed the will to delegitimize Germanophile propaganda as an expression of anti-Spain. Faced with this, the league defined itself as ‘Spanish’, ‘neutral’, and ‘humanitarian’. ⁸⁰ The development of this growing alliance occurred at the most complex moment for Romanones’ government, marked by the German naval offensive on merchant ships and the fiery campaign of conservative sectors against the intervention. This scenario was combined with an evident worsening of the economic and social situation that became clear during the first months of 1917. Therefore, La Gaceta published a decree on 29 March suspending the constitutional guarantees and introducing prior censorship of the country's press. The threat of a general strike justified the decree, but the defence of neutrality was its fundamental background. ⁸¹

On 6 April, a German submarine sank the Spanish steamer ‘San Fulgencio’, which was transporting coal from England to Barcelona. In response, Romanones contemplated the possibility of taking forceful action. The conservative and Germanophile sectors warned about what they identified as an ‘interventionist plot’. ⁸² The fall of the Russian monarchy inclined Alfonso XIII towards maintaining neutrality. ⁸³ In the spring of 1917 the crisis of the Restoration was a reality. Significantly, on 19 April, the same day the ‘Tom’, a Spanish steamer, was sunk, the Germans and the German embassy expressed their joy at Romanones’ loss of power. ⁸⁴

As was occurring among the Spanish republican sectors, a significant part of the Argentine Allies began to insistently question the role of Alfonso XIII: there was no point in continuing to argue for the defence of peace while neutrality was violated by German submarines. ⁸⁵ Faced with this situation Antonio Maura in a multitudinous meeting in Madrid argued that there were no reasons to break relations with Germany. ⁸⁶ The response of the left was expressed in another rally also in Madrid in May 1917. There, Álvaro de Albornoz argued that only the left defended a ‘dignified’ neutrality and truly fought ‘in the name of pacifism’ and democracy. The republican Roberto Castrovido made the same defence of pacifism: ‘We are the ones who are pacifists’. ⁸⁷ The fall of the royal houses in Greece and Russia opened a new scenario. The Aliadophiles had become the interventionists and the Germanophiles the neutralists. However, the arguments used continued to be articulated through disputes over peace, neutrality, and the nation. The increasingly radicalized tensions that were expressed in Argentina were structured on these elements.

The accession of Hipólito Yrigoyen to the Argentine presidency on 12 October 1916 was a watershed moment. With almost 46 per cent of the votes and a fragmented opposition, he became the first candidate to gain power after the electoral reform of 1912. A new political scenario opened where the conservative parties, which had dominated Argentine politics until then, were significantly affected. With Yrigoyen's coming to power, the Unión Cívica Radical, the ruling party, began a policy of rapprochement with the urban popular classes with the objective of integrating them into the system and setting them apart them from the influence of the Socialist Party. ⁸⁸

Yrigoyen had to face the challenges raised by the changes that had occurred internationally. On 4 April 1917, the Argentine flag ship, Monte Protegido, was sunk by the German Imperial Navy as it sailed off the Scilly Islands. This incident occurred when the debates about the entry of the United States into the war occupied the centre of political life. Against this background, on 7 April, Leopoldo Lugones published an important article in La Nación where he stated that neutrality was already ‘impossible’. ⁸⁹ When Luis Araquistáin read this article in Madrid he did not hesitate to establish a comparison between Spain and Argentina and published it in España. ⁹⁰

The declaration of war by the United States and the sinking of the Monte Protegido led more than 4,000 people to occupy the streets of downtown Buenos Aires. ⁹¹ A group of young people attacked the headquarters of La Unión and of Deutsche La Plata Zeitung, as well as German shops and entities. ⁹² As was occurring in other places – the case of John Meintz in the United States was emblematic ⁹³ – these were the first episodes of violent Germanophobia that were observed in Argentina. Throughout the country leagues and committees began to be created in favour of the Allies. ⁹⁴ The most important rally was organized on 22 April by the Frente Patriótico Popular, embryo of the Comité Nacional de la Juventud. Its objectives were centred on the ‘defence of national sovereignty’ against ‘the human rights violations carried out by Teutonic militarism’. As had happened with the Liga Antigermanófila in Spain, the Germanophile-neutralists were denounced as ‘anti-Argentine’. ⁹⁵ The speakers’ podium was full of Argentine flags and the audience shouted slogans such as ‘Down with neutrality!’, ‘We want war!’ or ‘Long live the homeland!’ ⁹⁶ There, Ricardo Rojas took the floor to affirm the arguments that were flooding the pages of Spanish Allied newspapers. Rupturing relations was the only true ‘pacifist’ option. The people had to prepare for war: failure to do so ‘would be unpatriotic’. ⁹⁷ The reply from the neutralists came two days later. On 24 April, the Liga Patriótica Pro Neutralidad – founded nine days earlier to defend independence and peace, according to its manifesto ⁹⁸ – organized a rally which had the same itinerary as that of their opponents. The slogans that were shouted seemed to clash with those that had been heard two days earlier: ‘Long live neutrality!’, ‘Long live the homeland!’ The same could be said of the posters that were displayed: ‘We want peace, order, work and greatness’, ‘We are not Germanophiles or Aliadophiles: we are Argentines’. ⁹⁹ Rupturists and neutralists claimed to act in the interests of the nation.

The months of June and July were dominated by the sinking of two new Argentine ships, which led to a radicalization of the protests against the Germans and the Germanophile sectors. The neutralist sectors, in the face of this, affirmed that neutralism was ‘a whole explosion of virile nationalism and exclusive Argentine patriotism’. ¹⁰⁰ In this unstable context, Yrigoyen tried to strengthen neutrality internally and project himself as an arbitrator on the international stage, just as other neutral countries had tried since the beginning of the war and as Spain had done through the Pro Captives office promoted by Alfonso XIII. ¹⁰¹ However, the proposal by Argentina's president to hold a conference of neutral countries in Buenos Aires quickly failed. ¹⁰²

By the spring of 1917, the war had become a great revolutionary force. In a few months, numerous events took place: military riots in Italy, France and Russia; strikes in England, Italy and France; popular uprisings and the formation of workers’ councils in Germany; and workers’ and pacifist unrest in neutral countries like Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. ¹⁰³ Incubated during these months, tensions also erupted in Spain and Argentina in the second half of the year. Even though the roots of the crisis had local elements – in the Spanish case, they were related to the crisis of 1898 and the regeneracionismo – the defence of peace and the sovereignty of Spain and Argentina were at the base of what happened in the summer of 1917. In Spain, the triple crises – military, political, and social – that broke out in July were part of a more general process which caused the fall of the monarchy in Greece, the Sidonist revolution in Portugal and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia November. ¹⁰⁴ Faced with these events, as was the case in all neutral countries, the Germanophile press spread the rumour that social unrest was being financed with Allied resources. ¹⁰⁵

As had happened in Spain, the question of neutrality was the axis on which Argentina's process was articulated. The activity of German agents throughout the country became a real obsession for the rupturist sectors, who denounced the presence in Argentina of Franz von Papen, and the information about a German plan to invade the country. ¹⁰⁶ In this context, an incident took place that triggered a popular uprising. On 8 September, the Washington Chancellery released several telegrams sent from Buenos Aires to Berlin by Count Karl von Luxburg, German ambassador in Buenos Aires. La Prensa published them a day later. Two of the numerous telegrams sent stood out. The first, on 19 May, reported that the Argentine government would limit itself to dispatching ships only to Las Palmas and recommended that the Argentine steamers Orán and Guazón be allowed to pass or that, if not, ‘they should be sunk without leaving traces’. The second, on 3 July, in which the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Honorio Pueyrredón was described as a ‘notorious donkey,’ reported that the Argentine government would sever relations with Germany if it did not promise to respect their ships and asked, if necessary, to request the mediation of Spain. ¹⁰⁷ There was overall astonishment. The rupturist sectors clamoured for Yrigoyen to respond forcefully. ¹⁰⁸ On 12 September, the government decided to deliver diplomatic passports to Luxburg. A significant part of Argentine society understood this decision as breaking off relations and took to the streets. Again, the demonstrations included incidents and attacks on the headquarters of Germanophile newspapers, institutions, and businesses. ¹⁰⁹ When verifying that the rupture of relations had not occurred, the rupturist front changed its strategy and began to openly question the government. ¹¹⁰ The demonstrations increased and spread to neighbouring countries. ¹¹¹ For the rupturist sectors, neutrality was already ‘an ugly thing, contemptible, and anti-Argentine’. ¹¹² The appeal for peace continued to be a central argument. ¹¹³ While all this controversy was developing around the German telegrams, a general railway strike paralysed the country. The conservative rupturist sectors expressed in the Comité Nacional de la Juventud, together with The Times, denounced ‘the horde triggered by the agitators paid by German spy networks’. ¹¹⁴

Towards an Open Ending

The last months of the war were marked by the rise of the new projects represented by Wilson and Lenin. In Spain and Argentina, the sectors favourable to breaking off relations with Germany interpreted the Bolshevik triumph as an aberrational fact and favourable to Germany. Likewise, as happened throughout Europe and America, processes of political radicalization developed within the socialist parties, which subsequently resulted in the birth of the new communist parties. ¹¹⁵ These movements developed in parallel with the emergence of Woodrow Wilson as an international reference after the presentation of his Fourteen Points programme in the US Congress in early January 1918. Thereafter, what was known as ‘Wilsonism’ was an enthusiastic interpretation of his pragmatic programme promoted by liberal public opinion and the European and Latin American left, which did not include any general recognition of the principle of nationalities or the right of self-determination. ¹¹⁶ Partly thanks to the actions of American propaganda led by George Creel, a wave of enthusiasm was unleashed among the main liberal and left groups of most neutral countries. The seductive appeal of his approaches in Argentina and Spain was closely linked to his drive for peace and democracies. This was clearly expressed in reviews in such publications as Los Aliados and Iberia, both published in Spain, and in Nosotros and Caras y Caretas in Argentina.

The international scene was combined with a process of political and social radicalization in Spain and Argentina. The attitude of Spain was summed up by the Argentine ambassador in Madrid: Germanophilia and Francophilia had become ‘political flags of the extreme right and extreme left respectively’. ¹¹⁷ The economic situation continued to worsen. Starting from a value of 100 for the 1914 global price index, in September 1918 it had climbed to 161.8 in the cities and 172.8 in the countryside. The cost of bread had increased 62.1 per cent; meat, 78.2 per cent; potatoes, 80 per cent; and eggs, 80 per cent. In the same period, wages had only risen 25.6 per cent for workers and 35.1 per cent for women workers. ¹¹⁸ In May, the situation became more pressing with the outbreak of the global flu epidemic, which in Spain had a mortality of more than 200,000 people. ¹¹⁹ Hunger and unemployment contributed to the radicalization of the population: 1918 was the year that registered the most worker mobilizations throughout the war period. ¹²⁰ The cycle of strikes in the Andalusian countryside was especially intense, where the influence of the revolution was strongly felt, and the leadership of the CNT grew. ¹²¹ The ghost of the Russian Revolution deeply worried the leaders of the dynastic parties, who were afraid of the potential consequences of breaking off relations with Germany. ¹²²

The instability experienced in Spain during these months was comparable to that experienced in Argentina, where social conflict and turmoil had also increased. Starting from a value of 100 for the 1914 global price index, in 1918 it had climbed to 169; the increase in food and clothing prices was especially significant. Despite having decreased compared to 1917, unemployment still stood at 20.8 per cent in 1918. By the end of November 1917, strikes had spread to various sectors. In March of the following year, tensions concentrated in the railway sector – dominated by British companies – where a strike took place that affected the meat supply to the Allies. In 1918, in Buenos Aires alone, 196 strikes were recorded, which included the participation of over 133,000 workers. ¹²³ From May onwards, as in Spain, the influenza epidemic also began to hit hard. ¹²⁴

The propaganda war became increasingly harsh, and the activity of the Committee on Public Information led by George Creel became especially relevant. ¹²⁵ In this framework, the tensions resulting from propaganda and spy networks showed multiple points of connection between Argentina and Spain. It was, of course, a very widespread phenomenon in neutral countries, among which Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands were particularly prominent. ¹²⁶ In this context, the idea that Germany intended to destabilize Spain and Argentina began to spread in rupturist media. ¹²⁷ In Argentina, the conservative rupturist sectors came to represent Yrigoyen and a ‘hairy Lenin’. ¹²⁸ In Spain, an especially pertinent incident took place, where a network formed by leaders of the CNT, the German Embassy and the political police of Barcelona was discovered, which resulted in the approval of an Espionage Law. ¹²⁹

At the beginning of October, the first news about Germany's request to the Allies for peace began to spread. In Buenos Aires, this led to spontaneous popular demonstrations. The link between peace and the ‘neutralist collapse’ became clear and the debate on the policy assumed by the government took on renewed intensity. ¹³⁰ For the neutralist sectors, the internal dispute was articulated as a struggle for the nation and its genealogy. Therefore, La Unión complained that in an act organized by the rupturist sectors in homage to France and the Battle of the Marne, a wreath of flowers had been placed at the foot of the statue of the hero of Argentine independence José de San Martín. ¹³¹ The rupturists were portrayed as ‘Europeanised Argentinians’ who did not care about ‘national sovereignty’. ¹³² They were ‘anti-patriotic’. ¹³³ Faced with these ideas, the rupturist sectors were of an opposing national genealogy, linked to an idealistic idea of the French Third Republic. ¹³⁴

These approaches showed notable similarities to what happened in Spain, where the questioning of Antonio Maura's government spread among the Allied sectors that continued blaming Germany for the start of the war and the issue of Belgium. ¹³⁵ In the last weeks of the war, the government, concerned about the question of neutrality, requested reports from all the provinces on social conflict. On 29 October 1918, the Civil Governor of Barcelona addressed a series of reports to the Minister of the Interior in which he proposed the prohibition of demonstrations and acts whose purpose was the ‘appointment of President Wilson citizen of Barcelona’. ¹³⁶ This coexisted with the threat of the Russian Revolution: comments about money that the Catalan trade unionists had received to ‘organize a movement similar to the sobie [sic] of Russia’ also continuously appeared. ¹³⁷

The day the negotiations began in Compiègne, demonstrations, rallies, and events multiplied throughout the main Argentine cities and towns. ¹³⁸ The Marseillaise was heard through many of the streets of Buenos Aires, whose shops – which had closed – were decorated with Allied flags. Similar scenes were repeated across the country. ¹³⁹ The triumph of the Allies, stated El Diario, seemed like ‘an Argentine victory’. ¹⁴⁰ The various columns of demonstrators that ran through the streets of Buenos Aires – the largest of them had close to 15,000 people – were led by the leaders of the Comité Nacional de la Juventud. The most repeated shouts were ‘Down with radical neutralism!’, ‘Resign bearded one!’, ‘Away with the Kaiser's servant!’ These demonstrations were interpreted as a plebiscite on the continuity of the government. ¹⁴¹ The communities of the victorious countries organized tributes to ‘those who fell in defence of freedom and democracy’, ‘in memory of the Argentine consul in Dinant’ and the ships sunk by Germany. ¹⁴² The main Spanish cities were also filled with celebrations that, in a way, tried to represent the differences between Spain and Europe, between the ‘liberating peace in the world’ and the ‘ominous peace in Spain’. ¹⁴³ Not only was peace largely celebrated, but the Allied victory was also understood as an impulse to advance in the radicalization of criticism of the government and the regime. In Madrid, in front of the Congress, clashes were observed between supporters of the king and those who repeatedly shouted in a ‘deafening’ tone ‘long live’ the Republic. ¹⁴⁴ As had happened in Argentina, the incidents multiplied in front of the editorial offices of Germanophile newspapers. ¹⁴⁵ Confrontations followed one another in the following days, this time carried out by Maurists and Carlists, who attacked diverse groups of republicans to the shout of ‘Die Republicans!’ and ‘Long live the King!’ A similar scenario was observed in Barcelona. ¹⁴⁶

Conclusions

In many ways, World War I did not end in November 1918. Fear of Bolshevism and the rise of fascism were central to shaping a cycle of revolutions and counterrevolutions that swept across Europe and the world until late 1923. ¹⁴⁷ Being a global phenomenon, the armistice did not close the processes opened in neutral countries either. ¹⁴⁸ Neutrality saved Spain and Argentina from the human and material hecatomb of war, but it did not isolate them from its profound impact. In both scenarios, the war and surrounding disputes such as neutrality, peace, and nation were essential. The hard confrontation between two opposing views on the principles on which a country should be sustained and the socio-economic upheaval of the times accelerated the crises of the liberal regimes.

Even though they were part of a cycle of crises and revolutions that assumed global characteristics, Spain and Argentina travelled similar paths. Their evolutions during the war were marked by both national contexts and a shared and disputed transnational space built on three elements: neutrality, peace, and nation. Analyzing both countries during the war clearly show that the international context was, in fact, the one that determined the legitimacy of their neutralities. ¹⁴⁹ Transnational, regional, and local contexts interacted in the evolution of neutral countries. Spain and Argentina were far from being exceptional and the impact of the war on them must be understood also as part of the ‘global war’.

The traces of the war in Argentina and Spain unfolded in the debates on the nation and its political projections. As Ricardo Rojas stated, the ‘new generation’ had understood that ‘international problems were national problems’ and that the ‘international rehabilitation work’ required ‘previous work on national culture’. ¹⁵⁰ As had happened throughout Europe, the post-war Spanish and Argentine revolutionary cycles opened the door to a period of intense social violence. In Spain, as in Europe, criticism of liberalism took centre stage in politics during the years before Primo de Rivera's coming to power in 1923. The evolution that followed in Argentina had many points in common, where the calls to react were also combined with a growing questioning of democracy and liberalism that was expressed in the labour movement and in the University. ¹⁵¹

After the war, a transnational phenomenon developed through which the criticism of liberalism and democracy became a central component in shaping renewed nationalist sentiments, among which violence was a consubstantial element. ¹⁵² In this framework, neutrality ceased to be a line of fracture. So, fracture passed through the defence or questioning of the heritage of the war, which was interpreted in the failure of the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson himself. Despite the fact that it continued to exist for some liberal and republican sectors, the identification between Aliadophiles and democratization vanished both in Spain and Argentina. Within this framework, transnational links between intellectuals such as Ramiro de Maeztu and Leopoldo Lugones were fundamental, and their evolutions show many points in common in their criticism of democracy and liberalism. In the post-war right-wing view, which focused on appeals to violence, authoritarianism and a renewed national discourse, was a place where Aliadophiles and Germanophiles had also met. This is shown, in the Argentine case, by the close relationship of Lugones, Manuel Carlés and Juan Carulla with José Felix Uriburu and Juan P. Ramos, who in 1932 created the Acción Nacionalista Argentina. This was also observed in Spain in the support of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship by Alidaophiles such as Maeztu, Germanophiles such as Vicente Gay and José María Salaverría, and neutralists such as Eugenio d’Ors. In this transnationally shared space, a renewed authoritarian Hispanism was articulated that, far from representing an antithesis of Lugones’ latinism and La Nueva República, had many points in common with it. In this sense, many aspects of the ideas developed by Germanophiles of both countries were adopted by new right-wing movements in both countries: anti-liberalism, claims of intellectual leading hierarchies, militarism, and a traditionalist nationalism were key elements. ¹⁵³