Abstract
By just reading the title of this book, one question strikes our mind: Need we ponder over Gaddafi anymore after his overthrow during the Arab Spring? Like a favorite old tune, the thought or mention of Libya and Gaddafi may flow endlessly in our minds. But this book is different from the banal and often saturated tales about the enigmatic former leader of Libya, Colonel Gaddafi. This volume moves beyond the all-too-familiar Libyan narrative. Through empirical research the author exposes readers to the opaque world of Libyan politics; the disconnect/apathy between the regime and citizens, and how this gave way to alienated citizenry leading to the regime scrambling for legitimacy. She brings to bear the apparent contradictions inherent in the ‘the people’s authority,’ which was Gaddafi’s façade of having given power to the people. Like its title suggests, the book focuses on how political alienation is linked to the question of legitimacy. This book is extraordinarily prescient about what was to befall the regime during the Arab Spring in 2011. This book is arguably the first of its kind on Libya.
It was the author’s PhD dissertation in 2001 which crystallized into this book in 2008. She uses a clear and accessible style and empirical findings to support her conclusions. With amazing determination, she was able to elicit 887 responses out of a targeted sample of 1100 respondents. Although this fell short of the targeted number, it is significant considering the difficulties involved in getting people to answer questionnaires in such an autocratic regime, as well as the traditional barriers impeding her in a society where women are expected to be wives rather than individuals seeking further education.
The book is of undoubted value, and it steps into the remarkable scenery of the regime’s effort to deploy various forms of authority to consolidate power. The regime deployed charismatic, ideological, eudemonic, rational-legal, and even foreign policy to seek legitimacy at various stages, but in reality the regime hung on to revolutionary legitimacy throughout its 41 years of rule.
With the introduction of The Green Book and People’s Democracy in 1977, all the traditional tools of democracy were abolished; the regime banned political parties and representative democracy. The new system of governance rested on two pillars of revolutionary authority and political (people’s) authority. The revolutionary authority was headed by Gaddafi, the Revolutionary Liaison Committee, and the Revolutionary Committee (RC). On the other hand, the political authority was based on the Basic Popular Congress (BPC), the Popular Committees, the General People’s Congress, the General Popular Committee, and Colonel Gaddafi. In essence, Gaddafi had a stranglehold on both pillars of power.
All these structures could not translate into the kind of citizen participation that would lead to legitimacy. Rather it deepened the gulf between the regime and it citizens. In a short review, it is rarely possible to allude to all the interesting and salient issues raised in this book, but some of the more striking are discussed below.
Based on the findings, political alienation, which the author describes as the conscious rejection of the whole political system, was the prevailing condition in Libyan society. This was the result of continuing authoritarianism and the marginalization of citizens and institutions of political participation. Coupled with these was the destructive censoring of opinions.
Furthermore, fading participation in institutions like the BPC was due to other reasons rather than the desire to take part in the political process: people participated under duress. What escalated this alienation was that the BPC was only symbolic and decisions that were considered and carried out had already been decided by the regime. In essence, the BPC was a charade and a token gesture of incorporating Libyans into decision making.
In addition, it was revealed that the RC suppressed dissenting voices which derailed the regime’s attempt to mobilize support. Motives for joining the RC were more personal than ideological or political. The benefits and supports offered the RC members called into question the faithfulness and authenticity to the members (the regime’s most reliable allies). Indeed, there was mounting evidence of alienation among members of the RC. It is ironic that these individuals could still act in accordance with the wishes of the regime.
Moreover, the study highlights the common attitude of suspicion towards the regime’s organizations and activities. People merely took part in supportive actions to ward off the stigma of being labeled reactionary by the RC (i.e., some sort of spy agents for the regime).
Also, in a rentier state such as Libya, the regime’s attempt to galvanize support based upon the distributive nature of the state failed, but instead generated disaffection with the political system. This, Werfalli argues, was because the quality of service was not good enough. Indeed, the political support bought in exchange for socioeconomic welfare and acquiescence to the regime’s activities during the early decades of Gaddafi’s rule waned. This, together with the regime’s cunning, duplicitous, and corrupt nature, challenged the regime’s legitimacy. As such, the regime was unable to steer a sinking ship back on course.
Proponents of change constituted the most alienated group. These were dominated by the younger generation, who felt handicapped because they could not obtain the changes they desired. Having been born after the revolution, and having grown up with experience of ‘people’s authority,’ they were the most disconnected, and they called for a revolution instead of reforms. This critical mass of individuals sought other means to bring about desired change including violence because they lacked legitimate means to bring about change. As solace for the deepening cleavage between the state and citizens, most of them sought refuge in Salafism, although some joined underground Islamic movements. On the other hand those who preferred reform to revolution feared total change, since it might result in undesirable outcomes.
In general, citizens’ frustrations at effecting change led to silent withdrawal from self-identification, and interest in, attention to, and participation in politics. Giving a public opinion about the regime could lead to reprisals. Thus, individuals who attended the BPC were unwilling to contribute.
The author offers insights into the use of international relations as a weapon of legitimacy. The decision to pay compensation to the families of the Lockerbie bombing victims and the renouncing of weapons of mass destruction were ploys for eliciting support at the international level at the expense of local reform.
The regime’s last attempt at legitimacy was embodied in Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam. He presented himself as the avatar of hope by advocating that Libya move from autocratic rule to constitutional democracy as part of its modernization process. However, he was viewed with suspicion. The younger Gaddafi’s quest for reform was seen as a way of seeking public support that would ultimately justify his succession to his father.
The author’s research is a novelty in the sense that almost all notable studies of legitimacy in the Arab world have focused on system-level theoretical analysis, but this book focuses on micro-level analysis at the grassroots level. On the other hand, what could raise controversy and therefore might need defense is why the survey was concentrated in Benghazi, an area perceived to represent massive opposition to the regime instead of balancing it with responses from areas known to be populated by regime sympathizers. A plausible explanation was, perhaps, because of the fear of the author’s cover being ‘blown’ to the authorities. Whatever the explanation, a sample from both sides might have been fair. Also, the author admits that the study could have considered different scales of alienation. However, these are minor reservations about an extraordinary book.
The book’s potential readership should encompass political scientists, sociologists, historians, those interested in Arabic studies, and advocates of ‘authentic’ democracy and good governance. Political Alienation in Libya is certainly a book worth reading, and it is recommended by the elegant, eloquent style through which the author unravels the level of alienation – and demolishes the myth of ‘people’s authority’ – under Gaddafi’s regime.
Werfalli concludes that ‘the ideology and the politics of the Libyan regime is progressively failing to meet the criteria for legitimacy’ (p. 162). The longevity and stability of the regime, despite the level of political discontent uncovered by the survey, support the hypothesis that, for a long time, ‘undemocratic regimes can survive with or without the support of the majority of their citizens by increased use of force’ (p. 158).