Abstract
Niklas Luhmann is without doubt one of the most discussed sociologists of the present and the past century. A number of books have been dedicated to explaining – and applying – his theory on social systems. The book by Hans-George Moeller can be classified among those that seek to scrutinize Luhmannian thinking from the perspective of the theory itself. Its stated primary objective is to save, preserve and clarify Luhmann’s radicalism.
Moeller’s text is organized and easily understood by virtue of his fluid and elegant writing style. He begins to explore the radical theories in Chapter 3. Luhmann’s radical anti-humanist, anti-regional and constructivist concepts of society are explained as seldom before. Man and the theory of autopoietic social systems is the subject of much heated debate when it comes to Luhmann, mainly because of the anthropocentric view present in what the German sociologist terms ‘Old European’ thinking. The insight that the fourth insult to human vanity comes from the fact that it is impossible to steer society with political institutions or human rationality is brilliant. In much the same way as Copernicus demonstrated that the Earth was not the centre of the universe, Darwin proved that humankind was not the ‘crown of creation’ and Freud made it clear that the ego was insignificant in comparison to the unconscious (e.g. libido), Luhmann is absolutely radical in denying the central role of humans in social theory. The world has never been exclusively human, and society is not bound by the limitations of humankind. Only society produces communications and is capable of steering itself.
From this point onwards, the book is organized as a journey from philosophy to theory. Chapters 4–9 address a number of controversial or fundamental points in Luhmannian intellectual architecture. Chapter 4 discusses the influence of Hegel on the construction of Luhmann’s thinking. In fact, it is an analytical text, almost contradicting the German sociologist’s way of thinking, establishing the similarities and differences of both, suggesting Luhmann as Hegel’s grand successor. Both authors employ the word system as an essential element of their theories, though with different meanings. For Hegel, science is only science when systematized coherently, and truth is the only existing system, with philosophy as the most elevated level of cognition; for Luhmann, however, science is self-referential and the highest level of cognition is cognizance of cognition. And so Luhmannian radicalism re-emerges. He deconstructs the position of philosophy. His theory consists of a theory on systems and not merely, as Hegel would have it, a theory of a single system (philosophy). Cognition no longer lies in the spirit, and philosophy is separate from the social sciences. It is a contingency theory rather than a system of needs in the Hegelian sense.
Likewise, Chapter 5 abandons the analytical means of comparing the two authors and focuses on the radicalism that Moeller terms less useful. Luhmann, in his terms, solved the problem of Platonic mind–body dualism and the central role that the mind occupies in Cartesian thinking. Thus, a third element is added to the ontological dimension between material and existential existence: communication. Hence, there are physical, living and social (i.e. communicational) systems. There is no hierarchy between them and one comprises the system of the other in a continuous process of disturbance and irritation. Thus, the hierarchical nature that Plato attributes to the soul is abandoned, in lieu of a system consisting of observations of observations, with no privileged observer. Likewise, the ethical issue so important in Plato is replaced by an observation that does not postulate the moral or ethical superiority of the subject over the object. Luhmann, therefore, in contrast to the great thinkers of western civilization who, in one way or another, are still concerned with Greek philosophy, ceases to be a footnote in Platonic theory and proposes to analyse a complex world in which probabilities are, in truth, probable probabilities.
For Moeller, the less radical radicalism of Luhmannian theory is the theme of social evolution, which is addressed in Chapter 6. It is understood as a complex co-evolution among the relationships arising from system/environment interaction. As such, there is no centre (i.e. polycentrism as the norm) and what occurs are permanent feedbacks among a multiplicity of subsystems belonging to one system or another. This contradicts the creationist theories, based on a priori input. A co-evolutionary and self-sufficient ecosystem is not designed for any initial external act. There is also no plan, ideal, or objective to be achieved. Along the same line of thought, the theory of system evolution is not connected to enlightenment because it remains distant from the belief in the need for progress as order (Comte). Nor can it be classified as a suitable theory for understanding history as it occurs (Marx). Moreover, it is not to be confused with Darwin’s evolutionism because he believed that evolution is the history of progress, whereas Luhmann views it as an effect of the functional differentiation of social systems. Thus, evolution is contingent as opposed to necessary.
Viewed from another angle, the least criticized radicalism is that related to the Luhmannian concept of constructivism, discussed in Chapter 8. Moeller states that Luhmann’s rational and communicational constructivist vision is realistic (p. 87). In fact, it is so real it becomes too unreal to comprise a reality. This is because the construction of reality is different for each system due to the functional differentiations of social systems. Reality begins with the production of difference, and it is for this reason that Luhmann offers a theory of differentiation and not identification. His theory is an ontology of radical differentiation – an ontology of multiple realities – that are contingent and self-replicating of different realities that are connected to the entire moment, influencing each other. Hence, what is real depends solely on the observation of reality in a given system.
In regard to democracy, Luhmann’s radical question does not contrast with democracy, but points out the fact that democracy can be the death of itself. This means that the myth of social participation in elections is necessary for the continuous self-replication of the political system. Not everyone actually participates in elections. Nor do they all vote as they choose. And in some countries, such as the United States and Brazil, candidates with fewer votes are elected over those who received more. In fact, elections increasingly do not decide the future of society, but it is necessary to think this is true. The normality of elections periodically maintains the political systems, stabilizing it. Democracy is the most important condition for the continued existence of political systems that have achieved a certain evolution.
In the final pages of the book, Moeller states he is against the simplification and metaphors used to explain the thinking of the German sociologist because he feels they do not reflect that which they propose. Thus, Luhmannian radicalism leads to a place that is outside the comfort zone, but also does not ascribe to hope or fear. This is the modesty of the theory. It notes that no one and no observation possesses knowledge exclusively of its interoperability. Hence, the irony of the theory is also that meaning is produced based on internal distinctions of each social subsystem. As such, the scientific construction of knowledge is evident in a contingency of communications that are still meaningless. Hence, placing all of this within a scientific vision is ultimately meaningless. Irony, therefore, is an autological aspect of the theory. As such, a final prominent feature of the theory is tranquillity, given that Luhmann’s radicalism leads to a point at which the intellectual that adopts it is not radical in her or his views, even though the radicalism espoused presents her or him with, in the words of Moeller, a yoga mat for the analysis of society.
Finally, it is important to underscore that the merit of the book lies in its pursuit of a better understanding of the theory of the German sociologist in order to demonstrate that Luhmann’s radical theories, rather than a setback, are an evolution from Old European thinking and a breakthrough in relation to Enlightenment theories on the observation of society. The author performs this task with impressive finesse and systematizes non-linear thinking (Luhmann) in a demonstration of great erudition.