The importance of political context: Motives to participate in a protest before and after the labor reform in Spain

Abstract

Spanish

French

The objective of this study is to ascertain how political context and participants’ union membership affect the motivation to participate in a protest. The study compares participants of two demonstrations in Spain on different dates, organized by the same trade unions, with the same objectives (opposition to a new labor law). The design of the study compares political context (demonstrating before or after the labor reform) and union membership (unionist/non-unionist). This provides an excellent frame of analysis as to how these factors affect the variables that motivate participation in a protest: anger, efficacy, identity, satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions. The results confirm that political context mainly affects the variables identity and efficacy, whereas the union membership factor influences trust in political institutions, identity and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, analysis shows how the interaction between political context and union membership affects feelings of anger, trust and satisfaction with democracy.

Keywords

Collective action motives for participation political context Spain unionism

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of people who claim to have participated in demonstrations (Dalton et al., 2009). The results of the European Social Survey (ESS, in Jiménez, 2011) show that Spain has the highest percentage of demonstration attendance among the 16 countries that have participated in the four rounds of the ESS. The frequency of demonstrations and their ability to impact the sociopolitical agenda justifies the interest in analyzing the reasons for demonstrating.

Many studies have focused on the characteristics of participants and the reasons associated with their participation in these acts, providing a substantial body of knowledge on why some participate and others do not. However, this has created too homogeneous an image of the participants. The reasons for participating in a particular demonstration are not the same for all participants. Recent studies have explored how different demonstrator profiles may involve changes in the reasons to participate within the same demonstration (Saunders et al., 2012); similarly, individuals’ reasons can change according to the social and political context of the demonstration (in this study, the passage of a new labor law). This means that the reasons for participating are connected with the political context of mobilization (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009).

Because motivations for participating are not always the same, it is necessary to study the interaction between political context and participant profile in order to explain and to better understand the reasons for participation. To do so, more studies need to establish comparisons between participants in different types of demonstrations (Klandermans and Smith, 2002). These comparisons could demonstrate different types of motivation that exist among the participants, and whether these types of motivations are related to the political context of a given protest.

People react to context differently. As Lewin pointed out, behavior is a function of the person and his or her environment (Lewin, 1936). The interaction between political context and participant profile is vital because the political context is not an objective or independent entity. Rather, each person brings to the situation a number of experiences and cognitive schemas that influence how the situation is defined and interpreted (Duncan, 1976). As such, context is socially constructed, so different interpretations are possible. Social movement organizations (SMOs) play a key role in this work, generating meaning and providing the frames for collective action (Gamson, 1992). In this sense, involvement with an organization (membership) can influence how the situation is perceived. It may be important to know how a given political context and organization membership interact, creating motivations for participation. The study of this interaction can help us to better understand the dynamics of protest.

To test if the political context in which protest occurs produces changes in the participants’ motivations, we compare two demonstrations organized by the same organizations, with the same demands, and attended by similar participants. Significantly, between the events of both demonstrations, the political context changed due to the passage of a critically relevant labor reform.

We also attempt to identify two clear profiles among the protesters: those belonging to the unions that organized the demonstrations (unionist), and those who are not part of the organization (non-unionists). As McAdam (1986) has noted, there is often no clear demarcation in membership in a movement or SMO. People may consider themselves members of a movement without ever officially ‘signing up’. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, in this study we will use the term ‘unionist’ to refer to those subjects who are members of the unions responsible for the demonstration. The unionists are expected to demonstrate their reasons for participating in the protest more intensely than non-unionists.

Thus, we can effectively ascertain whether this change in political context, before or after the law is passed, and whether being a member of the union or not produces changes in the motivations for these protesters to participate.

To understand the change of political context, we give a detailed explanation of the events leading to, during, and after the demonstrations.

The specific political context of mobilization

In 2004 the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) – a leftist party – became, democratically, the most popular political force in Spain. In the beginning it established a close relationship with the two most prominent state unions, the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), also left-wing. In the early years of this government, the relationship between the PSOE and the unions was one of mutual agreement and respect. Good rapport was maintained, even during the period in which the consequences of the economic crisis became clearer and when unemployment reached 20.06% (INE [National Institute of Statistics], 2010). But, as the economic situation continued to deteriorate, the government started to consider the need for labor market reforms, such as postponing retirement until the age of 67, facilitating dismissals, reducing wages, etc. This was a very sensitive subject for unions, who feared for the loss of workers’ rights. In 2010, the government raised the issue openly, and requested that the unions and the CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Employees) reach an agreement to reform the current labor market law so as to tackle the economic crisis. To accelerate negotiations, the government set a deadline after which, without agreement, the government would make a unilateral decision. The government, pressured by the European Union and the economic crisis, applied that pressure in turn to the unions, who had been previously negotiating cordially with the PSOE. The CCOO and UGT now felt they needed to demonstrate against the government, with whom they had enjoyed mutual understanding and shared objectives before.

The government’s proposal to change the law coincided with the 1st of May, Labor Day. The unions took advantage of the date (traditionally an opportunity for workers to show their solidarity) to express dissatisfaction with the political agenda and exert pressure on the ongoing reform negotiations taking place at the time. The statements of the leaders of the major trade unions and the slogans of the demonstration on that day clearly highlighted the central objective of the demonstration: to show their opposition to the government’s labor reform. The union leader of the CCOO, Fernández Toxo, commented before the 1st of May demonstration: ‘there is no labor reform that will create jobs if it does not also create economic activity’ (Bore, 2010a). Similarly, the demonstration slogan read: ‘For employment with rights and the guarantee of our pensions’ (El Mundo, 2010).

Despite criticism from the unions, minority parties and social agents, the government passed a labor reform in September 2010: a law facilitating dismissals and increasing the retirement age to 67. On 29 September, the unions called a strike and carried out a demonstration to oppose the new law. A particular slogan in opposition to the law declared its position: ‘Not in this way! Reformation of the law, now!’ The union leader of the UGT, Castor Mendez, commented after the strike: ‘After this strike the Government is between a rock and a hard place. … The Unions have made their claims in unison and the Government must not remain impassive and react’ (Manjón and Maicas, 2010). This event, therefore, took place after the controversial law had been passed. The participants in the second demonstration could not possibly have expected to reverse the passage of the law only a few days later, so the reasons for demonstrating had to be different and the goal of that action and its possible effectiveness would have to go beyond an immediate outcome.

This case provides us with an excellent comparative example to analyze the importance of the political context in the dynamics of mobilization. The actors remain the same (the PSOE government and the unions) but we have two distinct mobilizations: the first carried out as a warning against the government’s intention to pass an unpopular labor reform, and the second carried out after the government had passed the law. Obviously the first demonstration did not show exactly the same characteristics as the second, because it was also linked to the general demands related to 1 May. Traditionally, the 1st of May demonstration is considered to be a ritual march in which the labor unions affirm their identity and defend workers’ rights in general (Hobsbawn, 1984). However, a study carried out by Peterson et al. (2012) pointed out that this 1st of May event was special. They showed that this 1st of May demonstration in Spain, rather than being simply ritual, was more demanding in nature, as well as being a warning to the government. Logically, it can be asserted that the people who went to this demonstration for its ritual character would be still more motivated to do so because of their opposition to the labor reform. In the same way, those who had not felt drawn to taking part in a solely ritual demonstration might have been motivated to go by the added significance of the demonstration. A random sample of responses to the open question at the start of the survey asking, ‘Why are you participating in this protest event?’ confirms this assertion, with answers such as, ‘For the loss of workers’ rights that is causing the economic crisis’, ‘To vindicate the rights of workers’, or, ‘The crisis, full employment, social improvements’.

According to these arguments, both demonstrations did focus on a common goal: to defend the labor rights of workers against the cuts inspired by the economic crisis, but in a different political context. The first demonstration takes place in a context of ‘political normality’ as it is the celebration of the 1st of May, while the second takes place during a general strike. This is clear evidence that the unions organizing both demonstrations transitioned from warning a ‘friendly’ government to a total confrontation of that government.

In the following section, we review past research on collective behavior, as well as briefly explain our dependent variables.

Theoretical perspectives in the study of collective action

In this study, we try to identify the different motives for participation before and after the labor reform, and whether they differ between unionists and non-unionists.

According to Gamson (1992), there are three basic frames that direct and legitimize collective action: injustice, efficacy and identity. These frames are socially constructed and culturally contextualized. As Vilas and Sabucedo (2012) pointed out, a significant part of the current investigation is inherited from this approach and, according to the literature, these three frames have received the most attention in the research about collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

First, we focus on the injustice frame. When people believe they are not being treated as they deserve, or that the situation is unfair, then they are compelled to change it (Gurr, 1970). However, it is true that the situation does not always have to be objectively unjust. It must be perceived subjectively as unfair (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996). Thus, the concept of relative deprivation emerges. This theory suggests that feelings of deprivation are developed based on the comparison of one’s situation with others’, so it is only when social comparisons result in a subjective sense of unfairness that action occurs.

Gamson (1992) stressed that the injustice frame had a cognitive component – grievances – and an emotional component – anger. This latter component has had a great impact on participation (Smith and Ortiz, 2002). Although the emotional component has, in the past, been controversial due to its ‘irrational’ nature, Lazarus (2000: 98) stipulates that the stimulation of an emotion really depends on the reason, and emotions follow clear rules. Furthermore, Lazarus refers to cognitive appraisal – that is to say, the way in which we evaluate an event determines how we react emotionally to it.

Along these lines, participants’ evaluation of an unjust situation determines how they react emotionally to it. Protest represents a means by which they can channel and express deep feelings of anger, arising from the assessment of the situation as an unjust one (Gurr, 1970). In fact, the leading models concerning collective action incorporate this emotion (Páez et al., 2013; Stürmer and Simon, 2009; van Stekelenburg et al., 2011).

Knowing that anger is an important reason for participation, it is expected that this feeling should be among the motives for participation in demonstrators of both protests. However, those feelings of anger should be more prominent in the second demonstration, given that the government had passed the reform anyway. Moreover, anger is expected to be more potent among the unionists. Being a member of an organization causes the injustice grievance component to be more available to memory. This is what Tversky and Kahneman (1981) define as accessibility heuristics. Information pertinent to their grievance will be more readily accessible to unionists, bringing about their evaluation and emotional reaction to an event more quickly and intensely.

The second frame proposed by Gamson, efficacy, is also a topic of great interest for studies on collective action. In response to LeBon (1995 [1895]) and his research on irrationality and protest, efficacy is given an instrumental position in collective action. According to Klandermans (1997), this perceived efficacy is a result of a cost–benefit calculation individuals make relative to their participation in collective action. A significant amount of work maintains this idea of short-term efficacy, and taking into account the studies by van Zomeren and Spears (2009) or van Stekelenburg et al. (2011), it can be confirmed that efficacy, in a collective action, is more closely defined by the immediate achievement of an objective. However, this idea of efficacy cannot explain many circumstances in which people protest, even knowing their protest will not achieve anything immediately.

It is because of this that Hornsey et al. (2006) suggest a long-term concept of efficacy as something altogether more inclusive; that efficacy should not only be measured as achieving the goal of a single demonstration, but rather the belief that, through a collective effort, the group will be capable of responding to relevant events, overcoming obstacles, uniting its members, weakening the political opposition, etc.

Defined as short-term, efficacy might only seem relevant to the first demonstration, in that participants are seeking an objective, achievable goal (to prevent the passage of the reform law). However, if we focus on the more inclusive concept proposed by Hornsey et al. (2006), efficacy should be relevant both before and after the law was passed.

We also expect to find significant differences between unionists and non-unionists, regarding variable efficacy. Unionists are expected to score higher in this variable, given that efficacy seems to be reinforced each time they participate in a demonstration (Saunders et al., 2012).

The third collective action model frame that Gamson suggested is the identity frame. According to van Zomeren et al. (2008), collective action requires a socially relevant identity, a sense of belonging to a group. The theory of social identity (Tajfel, 1981) links the individual to the social. It is part of the self-concept derived from belonging to a social group, along with the value and emotional significance that a person attributes to this association.

From the perspective of social identity, group members in a disadvantageous situation will be more motivated to participate in collective strategies of social change (Stürmer and Simon, 2004) and will fight collectively against a common disadvantage (Simon et al., 1998). Feeling close to other individuals and sharing the same situations and experiences with them, creates a differentiated identity: ‘us’ against ‘them’ (Klandermans et al., 2004). This shared feeling can provoke the necessity to act jointly against the same problem (Sabucedo et al., 2010).

According to Stürmer and Simon (2004), people protest when they acquire a politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). This is when they assume that the adverse condition in which they find themselves is motivated by intergroup power conflict and when they identify themselves with the in-group. Furthermore, Simon and Klandermans (2001) link this politicized collective identity to the political context given that, according to these authors, the situation of different social groups cannot be understood separately from the social and political context in which these power relations exist (Sabucedo et al., 2010).

In this study we expect to confirm that identity is part of the motives which lead people to participate; in line with the theoretic approach, this sense of identification should be stronger among the unionists, although certainly not absent from non-unionists.

As noted before, the importance of the aforementioned frames must be associated with the specific context of the demonstration. In the study of protest dynamics we need to consider the political context, the meaning, the perception and interpretation that people have of the political environment in which they are embedded. If citizens have a channel through which they can express their demands, and can trust that the leaders will be sensitive to these demands, they will not need to demonstrate to achieve their objectives. However, without a conduit for their concerns, they can decide to participate in collective action to defend their rights.

We need to take into consideration these perceptions of the political context to understand the differences between participants. In this way, political trust and satisfaction with the way the system works form two interesting elements by which to analyze the level of willingness to participate in collective actions.

Political trust is one of the aspects that define the political culture of a country. In its broadest sense, it refers to citizens’ evaluation of political institutions (Montero et al., 2008); it is the belief that the institution will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way damaging to one’s interests or those of the country, but instead treat all citizens in an equal, just and correct manner. According to Newton and Norris (2000), trust in institutions is the main indicator of citizens’ basic feelings about the political system.

In our study we expect unionists to score higher in political trust, given that they are part of the system as union members, allowing them to place more trust in the system. Moreover, we expect these results to be higher before the reform was passed than after, because the government did not respond to demands made in the first demonstration.

Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is understood to be various perceptions that a specific political system has the capacity to solve problems considered to be especially important. Satisfaction fluctuates according to government policies, place in society, state of the economy and the demands by the main political institutions (Montero et al., 2008). Dalton et al. (2009) indicate that protest arises as a response to dissatisfaction and various studies in developed nations have found that political dissatisfaction is related to protest activities (Barnes et al., 1979).

As with trust, we expect that levels of satisfaction will produce different effects between unionist and non-unionists. Therefore, we expect that those who are unionists have higher levels of satisfaction with democracy, for reasons similar to having higher trust levels: being part of the system allows one to be more satisfied with democracy, given that it provides a channel to make certain demands. Additionally, results are expected to be higher before the reform was passed given that, in the second demonstration, the system had not met previous demands, and consequently, levels of satisfaction would have suffered a decrease.

If we base our ideas on the precepts above, the principal objectives of the investigation are as follows. First, we will examine whether there are differences between the different motives for participation before and after the labor reform. Although there are previous studies on differences between participants and non-participants (which measure, above all, the willingness to participate), and between demonstrations with the same objective in different countries (Walgrave and Rucht, 2010), we are not aware of any data comparing the same participants, called by the same organization, with the same objective, before and after the political context of the demand has changed. It is expected that the motives will have changed or suffered alterations in their intensity between both demonstrations.

Second, we will examine whether there are differences in the motives for participation between unionists and non-unionists. It is expected that, unionists will score higher in the motives that determine the participation in collective action.

Third, we will try to ascertain whether the interaction between this change in political context – before, or after the law is passed, and being member of the union or not – produces changes in the motivations for these protesters to participate. It is expected that there will be a significant change in the motives for participation among unionists especially, and that their perceptions of the political context will have been affected, given that they did not achieve their demands at the first demonstration.

Method

Participants

Unlike many other studies conducted on the dynamics of collective action, our samples are comprised of individuals who were selected at the time of participating in demonstrations. These, then, are real participants and not individuals declaring their intention to participate. Working with this type of sample has its advantages and disadvantages. The most important advantage is the guarantee these people are real participants in the protest. In this way, a social desirability bias is avoided, a problem occurring when intention instead of actual participation is measured (Conway and Ross, 1984). Similarly, we can avoid the possibility that a hypothetical situation evokes a response having nothing to do with what would happen in a real situation (Ajzen and Sexton, 1999). We must also ensure the highest possible representation of the sample and measuring instruments adapted to this situation. Different procedures developed in recent years for work on demonstrations have overcome these difficulties quite well (van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; van Stekelenburg et al., 2012).

The participants were selected from among the demonstrators in the actions convened by the CCOO and the UGT trade unions on 1 May and 29 September 2010. The first was held in Barcelona, and the second in Madrid. According to the figures provided by the media, the first demonstration on 1 May was attended by 7000 people (Bore, 2010b). Our sample consists of 180 participants, 67% male, 33% female, with a mean age of 52 (SD = 13.4). The demonstration in Madrid, which took place on 29 September, was attended by 95,000 people (El País, 2010). For the present study, the sample consists of 307 participants. 55.5% were male and 44.5% female, with a mean age of 42.76 (SD = 12.2).

What we wish to emphasize in this article is not locational context (Madrid vs. Barcelona), but the political context caused by the labor reform. What matters is that both demonstrations were called by the same organizations, and thus we expected participants to have a similar ideological profile. To confirm this, we compared the scores from both samples in a series of questions referring to this setting. As a result, we noted there were no significant differences in ideological self-placement, interest in politics, post-material values, or subjective perception of their membership to a social class. Therefore we can conclude that participants in both demonstrations had similar ideological characteristics.

Design

In this study, we propose a 2 × 2 factorial design: time of event (before vs. after the reform) and unionism (unionist vs. non-unionist).

Procedure

The data were collected during demonstrations. The selection was conducted using the sampling methodology recommended by van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) for collecting information at protests in the collaborative European research project ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’.¹ The aim of this sampling procedure is to ensure that each participant in the demonstration has, within the constraints of the size and shape of the demonstration, a broadly equivalent probability of being selected, thus guaranteeing the satisfactory representation of the sample (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012).

An interviewer approached the people selected according to the procedure established by van Aelst and Walgrave (2001). This interviewer, identified as a member of the university, explained the purpose of the investigation and requested the assistance of the protester. Only 2% of respondents in the first protest, and 8% in the second, refused to collaborate. Those who accepted were given a pre-stamped envelope which included the full questionnaire that participants should send by post. The percentage of returned questionnaires was 27.1% at the first demonstration and 34.2% at the second.

In order to control the non-response biases, one in five people also did a short face-to-face interview, which included sociodemographics, most of the important independent variables and the dependent variable. After the face-to-face interview was finished, the same protester was asked to fill out the survey-questionnaire at home, provided with a ‘personal login code’ similar to the code on the face-to-face survey, in order to connect both questionnaires. Therefore, survey questionnaires were always completed at home. Thus, provided proper sampling, face-to-face interviews serve to assess biases due to non-response and control the reliability of the data.

By comparing answers in the face-to-face interviews with identical questions from returned questionnaires, and by comparing the face-to-face interviews of those who returned their questionnaire with the interviews of those who did not, we can make fairly accurate estimates of the response bias. Comparing the responses from face-to-face interviews with questionnaires received by mail, we found no significant difference in sociodemographic and ideological variables, so we can conclude that the sample was representative of the people participating in the protest.

Measures

Participants responded to a standardized questionnaire, which included the following variables.

Independent variables

Time of demonstration

Before and after the labor reform. To verify that these two occurrences were perceived by the subjects as two different political contexts, we have taken into account the following criteria:

We considered in what point the negotiations took place between the government and unions regarding the labor law. At the first demonstration, the law was being negotiated, in the second the law had already been passed.

Given that the organizers are those who create the frames that justify and direct the action, we have checked the slogans and declarations made by the organizers. In the first demonstration the statements of the union leaders put the emphasis on the crisis ‘Against the social budgets. Workers shouldn’t pay for this crisis’, ‘For employment with rights and the guarantee of our pensions’; while in the second the slogans are much more confrontational: ‘The government must not remain impassive and must react’, ‘Reformation of the law, now!’.

These frames are internalized by participants and they reflect this perception in their claims. At the first demonstration the unions still had a good relationship with the government and the claims were against the crisis situation, e.g. ‘For the loss of workers’ rights that is causing the economic crisis’. While in the second there is a hostile reaction to the reform law and a severance of that relationship: ‘To avoid the labor reform proposed by the current government’, ‘Show our disagreement with the measures taken by the government to solve the crisis’.

The first demonstration takes place in a context of ‘political normality’ as it is the celebration of the 1st of May, while the second takes place during a general strike, one of the strongest political actions that unions have to exert pressure.

Organization membership (unionism)

Participants had to answer the following question: ‘Are you a member of any of the organizations staging this demonstration?’

Dependent variables

The questions were set out on a Likert scale with five possible answers ranging from 1 (nothing) to 5 (a lot).

Efficacy

This was measured by the following statements: ‘My participation can have an impact on public policy in this country’, ‘Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country’ and, ‘If citizens from different countries join forces, they can have a lot of impact on international politics’ (α = .75).

Anger

This was measured with the question: ‘To what extent do you feel anger when you consider the current economic crisis?’

Collective identity

This was measured with the following questions: ‘To what extent do you identify with the other people present at the demonstration?’ ‘To what extent do you identify with any organization staging the demonstration?’ (α = .62).

Political trust

Participants were given a list of institutions (national government, national parliament, political parties, judicial system and European Union) and were asked to indicate how much trust they had in them (α = .78).

Satisfaction with democracy

The participants had to answer the question: ‘In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?’, where 0 was not at all satisfied and 10 was very satisfied.

Results

A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out to discover the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. We used the time of the demonstration and union membership as independent variables; and efficacy, identity, anger, satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions as dependent variables. First, we present some data on the distribution of unionists vs. non-unionists across the two samples (Table 1).

Table 1.

Distribution of unionists and non-unionists in the samples.

	Before labor reform	After labor reform	Total
Unionists	127	127	254
Non-unionists	47	178	225
Total	174	305	479

The results of the MANOVA are shown in Table 2. Only the results of those variables showing significant differences between groups are displayed.

Table 2.

MANOVA results.

Factor	Dependent variables	Factors levels		M	SD	F	Sig.	η²
Demonstration time	Efficacy	Before		4.02	0.66	5.45_{(1, 455)}	.02*	.012
	Efficacy	After		4.14	0.62	5.45_{(1, 455)}	.02*	.012
	Identity	Before		4.08	0.075	7.17_{(1, 455)}	.008*	.016
	Identity	After		3.66	0.80	7.17_{(1, 455)}	.008*	.016
Unionism	Identity	Unionist		4.18	0.64	86.29_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.16
	Identity	Non-unionist		3.41	0.78	86.29_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.16
	Trust in institutions	Unionist		2.87	0.78	10.52_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.023
	Trust in institutions	Non-unionist		2.38	0.71	10.52_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.023
	Satisfaction with democracy	Unionist		4.73	2.38	15.058_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.032
	Satisfaction with democracy	Non-unionist		3.98	2.43	15.058_{(1, 455)}	.001**	.032
Time × Unionism	Anger	Before	Unionist	4.23	0.8	4.35_{(1, 455)}	.038*	.010
		Before	Non-unionist	4.42	0.6
		After	Unionist	4.40	0.9
		After	Non-unionist	4.20	0.9
	Trust in institutions	Before	Unionist	3.03	0.8	5.15_{(1, 455)}	.024*	.011
		Before	Non-unionist	2.39	0.8
		After	Unionist	2.69	0.6
		After	Non-unionist	2.39	0.7
	Satisfaction with democracy	Before	Unionist	4.97	2.3	4.39_{(1, 455)}	.037*	.010
		Before	Non-unionist	3.44	2.6
		After	Unionist	4.55	2.5
		After	Non-unionist	4.09	2.3

p < .01; * p < .05.

With regard to the variable time of demonstration, we can see in Table 2 that there are significant differences among participants in the variables identity (F _{[1, 455]} = 7.17; p = .008) and efficacy (F _[1,455] = 5.45; p = .02). This latter variable is higher among those participants who attended the post-labor reform demonstration.

In the case of the variable unionism, there are significant differences in identity (F _{[1, 455]} = 86.29; p = .001), trust in political institutions (F _{[1, 455]} = 10.52; p = .001) and satisfaction with democracy (F _{[1, 455]} = 15.06; p = .001). In each case, these results were higher among unionists.

We can see that there is interaction between variables, and the results are significant for anger (F _{[1, 455]} = 4.35; p = .04), trust (F _{[1, 455]} = 5.15; p = .02) and satisfaction with democracy (F _{[1, 455]} = 4.39; p = .04).

Figures 1 –3 show those dependent variables in which there is significant interaction.

Figure 1.

Anger.

Figure 2.

Trust in political institutions.

Figure 3.

Satisfaction with the democracy.

The unionists’ level of anger increases once the reform has been passed. However, the non-unionists show a decrease of these feelings once the reform has been passed (Figure 1).

In Figure 2 we can see that the interaction between time of the demonstration and membership is important in the case of unionists. Those who participated in the demonstration after the labor reform show a significantly lower level of trust than the participants on 1 May. In any case, trust among non-unionists is lower in both demonstrations.

In Figure 3 we see a curious effect. As in the case of trust, there are significant differences in satisfaction with democracy between unionists and non-unionists. Although this variable does not show significant differences before or after the reform, we do see that this causes notable interaction. As we can observe from the graph, unionists’ satisfaction decreases once the reform has been passed. However, at that time this increases slightly in non-unionists.

Discussion

In this study, we analyzed motivation for participation in organized protests called by the same organizations, with very similar goals, but held at different times. The objective was to compare and examine whether the time at which the protests were held (which corresponded with two different political contexts), or whether belonging to a union or not, changed the motives for participation.

First, we will discuss what happens to motives when the time of the demonstration is taken into account. The results indicate that there are significant differences before and after the labor reform. The figures for identity decrease notably after the reform has been passed. This could be as a result of the system failing to meet the demands made in the first demonstration. Seeing as the first protest did not achieve their objectives and their demands were left unmet, the participants suffered a blow to their identity. This was due to the fact that, although participating together (Simon et al., 1998), the expected results were not achieved. Moreover, the fact that the law was subsequently passed by the government may have been considered as a result of the weakness of the trade unions against the government. A great sector of the population has long been demanding tougher trade unions, taking a stronger stance against the deteriorating economic situation. Furthermore, the results indicate that there are significant differences before and after the passing of the reform, with regard to the variable efficacy, which, in this case, increases. This result in efficacy, understood as short-term (van Stekelenburg et al., 2011; van Zomeren and Spears, 2009) would be difficult to explain, given that the immediate objective was not achieved. Once the labor reform was passed, it would not make sense to protest against, and attempt to prevent, that which had already been done.

However, popular participation against ratified laws is nothing new – in recent history, there has been a great deal of organized collective action in which the principal goal was to change unpopular policies (e.g. the demonstrations against the Iraq war; Walgrave and Rucht, 2010).

A political action could be useful to demonstrate the anger and strength of the group, its commitment to certain policies and its willingness to continue fighting for them. This more inclusive and long-term concept of efficacy (Hornsey et al., 2006) is reflected in some of the slogans from the demonstration: ‘Their profits, our crisis. Another world is possible’, ‘For an active and democratic labor unionism’.

Second, with regard to unionists and non-unionists, as was expected, those who formed part of the system, by being members of the organization who called the demonstration, scored notably higher results in the identity, trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy variables. Participating in the system as a trade union member allows one to have more trust in the system and be more satisfied with it. Furthermore, being a unionist allows one to actively demonstrate this politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans, 2001) and fight together against an asymmetric power relationship.

Third, we wanted to examine whether an interaction existed between union membership and time of the demonstration, and how this affected the motives to participate. This interaction is significant for three dependent variables: anger, trust in institutions and satisfaction with democracy.

Thus, although anger did not show a significant result before or after the demonstration, or between unionists nor non-unionists, it is relevant when we take both criteria into account. The unionists’ levels of anger increase once the reform has been passed; however, non-unionists show a reduction of these feelings once the law has been passed. This could be due to unionists experiencing some bitterness at having been let down by a system they trusted and believed in, because they perceived it to be just and incapable of damaging their interests (Newton and Norris, 2000). Furthermore, union members are always more aware of the hardship of the economic situation (by talking with peers, union reports, more selective perception to economic news, etc.).

Interaction between time of demonstration and unionism is also significant for the variable trust in institutions. Unionists’ results reduced notably between both demonstrations, while non-unionists’ results remained almost unchanged. That is, trust does not change notably among non-unionists, either before or after the reform is passed, given that trust in non-unionists was already notably low.

As regards satisfaction with democracy, there is significant interaction, much the same as with trust. Unionists feel let down by the system, ergo their satisfaction with it is reduced. In the second demonstration, both unionists and non-unionists show similar satisfaction levels.

The results are consistent with the expected adverse change in the political context. As Lewin would say, people react to the context (Lewin, 1936). The unionists’ perceptions are socially constructed and shared within the group; they shape the cognitions and worldviews of members, allowing them to face the changes of their political context. In consequence they change their perception about the situation. For the unionists, having protested against the law, and in light of the system failing to live up to their expectations (Montero et al., 2008), they demonstrably lost faith in the system, and this compelled them to act for a different reason.

To conclude, it is important to recognize certain limitations of our study. Our sample, defined by real participants in each demonstration, forces us to adapt sampling procedures and measurement scales for this particular mode of data collection. Without a doubt, these strategies may not be as ‘strong’ as other, more traditional ones, especially with regard to the sample selection and the scales used. However, in our opinion, the procedures used to overcome these methodological weaknesses provide a certain guarantee allowing us to compare real participants in collective actions.

As we have expressed in the work, this is not a laboratory experiment in which the independent variables are manipulated and the internal validity of the research is guaranteed. Given the kind of issue we address, and the criticism that has been made of the subjects in laboratory experiments, we have chosen to analyze a real situation. By definition, we have no effective control over other variables that may be influencing the data in these circumstances. What we need to ensure is that the independent variable is a real phenomenon and that it could be influencing, with reasonable probability, the dependent variables. We believe that these assumptions are confirmed by our study.

Despite this, we should be cautious with the importance we give to these results. The real value of these findings will become apparent when comparing with other studies – those using both the same design models and different ones – in order to try to overcome mentioned and unforeseen limitations. This will allow us to make stronger conclusions in future.

The data obtained here did not contradict existing studies and are useful to better comprehend concepts such as efficacy. The results obtained in this study allow us, therefore, to conclude that the question now is not which variables influence participation, but which types of motives are stimulated in each mobilization context, when taking into account that not all participants are the same. It emphasizes the demand to define different participant profiles, and it also highlights the necessity to link motives to participate with the political context of a given demonstration.

Footnotes

Funding

We acknowledge the financial support of the ESF Eurocores collaborative research project ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (), research grant EUI2008-03812 of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. The first author also has a grant within the FPU program of the Ministry of Education and Science (reference AP2010-5126).

Notes

Author biographies

Cristina Gómez-Román is a PhD candidate in Social Psychology at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain). She is working in the collaborative research project ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (). Her research interests are political protest and the motives behind participation.

José-Manuel Sabucedo is Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain) and editor of the Revista de Psicología Social/International Journal of Social Psychology. His main research topics are: political psychology, political violence and political protest.

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