Spreading the truth: How truth commissions address human rights abuses in the world society

Abstract

Spanish

French

This research examines why truth commissions have proliferated worldwide and become a standard component of the transitional justice repertoire, in spite of a lack of evidence that the institution is viable or beneficial in diverse contexts. Drawing on world society theory, the article argues that rationalized myths about the value of truth telling have driven the diffusion of truth commissions. Data from 34 founding charters reveal that a commission’s objectives do not necessarily correspond with the precipitating conflict or political transition, but are highly shaped by three external channels of influence: the United Nations, international consultants, and regional proximity. By identifying distinct actors that have developed and promoted different rationalized myths, the article refines world society theory’s tendency to present routine uninhabited diffusion of a single institutional model. Instead, truth commissions provide evidence of the uneven spread of a multifarious global institution.

Keywords

Globalization human rights transitional justice truth commissions world society theory

In the last 30 years, diverse post-conflict states around the world have held truth commissions to address a range of human rights violations. Truth commissions are temporary, autonomous, and victim-centered commissions of inquiry authorized by a government or intergovernmental body to investigate a pattern of severe violence in the state over a period of time (Hayner, 2011). Since their inception in 1974, ‘truth’ has increasingly been portrayed as a panacea for the challenges confronting post-conflict societies, and states have employed truth commissions to deal with an array of human rights abuses, varying in their setting, scope, and timing. Truth-seeking initiatives are now viewed as universal aspects of peacebuilding, and nearly every state emerging from authoritarian rule or civil war considers establishing a truth commission (Hayner, 2011; Shaw, 2007).

One would expect the proliferation of truth commissions (see Figures 1 and 2) to be based on evidence of the institution’s effectiveness, and commission objectives to be tailored to the needs of a given post-conflict society. However, empirical data demonstrate this has not been the case. Instead, many claims about the beneficial effects of truth commissions are unsubstantiated, and commission objectives do not necessarily reflect the conflict being addressed (Mendeloff, 2004). This article presents an alternative explanation for why truth commissions have emerged as a global paradigm for addressing crimes committed in vastly disparate contexts, by showing the way in which external factors influence a given commission’s objectives.

Figure 1.

Increase in the establishment of a global truth commission model over time.

Figure 2.

The global spread of truth commissions.

Drawing from insights in world society theory (WST), I demonstrate how the global prominence of truth commissions has been driven by rationalized myths. Rationalized myths are socially constructed cultural logics legitimated by actors in the global environment to guide the practices, policies, and operations of state institutions, independent of their actual efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). I argue that truth commissions have increasingly relied on rationalized myths about the value of truth telling, despite inconclusive evidence of their effectiveness. While many truth commissions have successfully documented particular crimes, uncovered missing persons, and investigated human rights abuses, the ability of commissions to promote peace and heal divided communities is far from certain. Yet, proponents of truth commissions contend that these institutions can do more for society at large than is logically feasible (Mendeloff, 2004). As a consequence, unrealistic expectations are one of the biggest issues confronting truth commissions, and unfulfilled assumptions have had severe consequences for survivors of human rights abuses (Hayner, 2011). This research examines how these expectations emerged, and why they became a foundational aspect of truth commissions.

World society theory and its limitations

World society theory (WST) offers a useful lens for understanding why, as some have argued (Reiter et al., 2012), a growing number of states have employed a global truth commission model to address a heterogeneous range of human rights violations, despite vast differences in resources and traditions. WST conceptualizes states as social enactors of global models rather than autonomous actors pursuing efficient and calculated interests (Drori, 2008). According to WST, states restructure their policies based on rationalized myths in the world society instead of pursuing strategies deliberately tailored to their particular needs. While rationalized myths are not necessarily false, they may not always be the most effective way to pursue an organizational task within different contexts. Instead, WST describes three types of influences – regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive – that lead states to adopt global models (Scott, 2008). Regulative influences establish formal rules that are enforced through external rewards or sanctions to shape state behavior. Normative influences transpire through networks of experts that convince states to adopt practices that serve their internal interests. Lastly, cultural-cognitive influences occur via shared conceptions of social reality that guide what is ‘thinkable’ in a given cultural context (Cole, 2012). When states adopt a global model they create a positive feedback loop, perpetuating the idea that the rationalized myths actually work and further diffusing the model (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

WST notes that it is often impossible for states to actualize global models because externally imposed models tend to contain elements that conflict with local practices and needs (Meyer et al., 1997). The decoupling of structure and activity becomes increasingly prevalent amongst later adopters of an institutional innovation. While early adopters incorporate an innovation based on internal factors, once a model is taken up in the world society it acquires a ‘taken for granted’ status, such that later adopters incorporate a model because of societal legitimacy, irrespective of need (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In consequence, states formally conform to a global model as external ‘window dressing’ that differs from internal practices, which are perceived as more effective (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

While previous WST studies have offered important insights into the diffusion of international human rights policies (see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Koo and Ramirez, 2009), there are several limitations to this theoretical framework. Scholars have critiqued WST for not paying enough attention to how global models emerge or diffuse, nor sufficiently considering how interactive relations shape the transnational transmission process (Go, 2012). WST studies tend to presume diffusion is static and uncontested, neglecting to consider the ways in which conflicts and struggles cause norms to develop and change, or to account adequately for the effects of power and interests (Koenig and Dierkes, 2011; VanAntwerpen, 2009). Additionally, WST studies have failed to address inequality within the social structure of the world society itself, and implicitly assumed that international organizations are increasingly forming a single world society rather than regional societies or other assemblages (Beckfield, 2008).

Considering these concerns, I argue that an analysis of the history and content of the three channels of influence – regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive – can refine WST to reveal the multifaceted, uneven, and changing spread of a global model with multiple variations. In contrast to the profusion of quantitative WST studies, I use qualitative methods to trace how global norms emerged, establish specific actors responsible for promoting certain models, and identify key historical and contextual circumstances that shaped the creation and diffusion of rationalized myths.

Truth commission data and analysis

In order to analyze the diffusion of this institution, I needed to create an original database of all truth commissions between 1974 and 2009. Previous cross-national comparisons have relied on disparate databases that produce conflicting results (Brahm, 2009). To address this problem, I began my study with a list of 104 possible truth commissions compiled from more than 10 databases created by other researchers. I found that only 39 of these commissions overlapped between databases, and could be labeled a ‘truth commission’ according to the standards of the leading truth commission scholars, Priscilla Hayner (2011) and Mark Freeman (2006). Accordingly my definition is as follows:

A truth commission is a temporary ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up and authorized by a government or intergovernmental body to investigate a pattern of severe violence that took place in the state over a period of time. It engages directly and broadly with the affected population to gather information on their experiences, and is established with the intention of concluding with a final report.

I used this definition to systematically delineate which institutions I included in my study (listed in Appendix 1) and collect commission objectives. Detailed justifications for why institutions were excluded from the database are available upon request: some were too event-specific, others were permanent institutions, and several were unofficial.¹

To compile truth commission objectives, I acquired and analyzed the mandates of each commission’s founding charter. Many commission charters were publicly available either through the United States Institute of Peace’s Truth Commissions Digital Collection or the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation’s database, Justice in Perspective. I had 11 of these charters translated (seven charters were in Spanish, three charters in French, and one charter in Serbian). Out of the 39 commissions in my database, I was unable to acquire five charters, which poses a limitation for my findings.² In two cases (Grenada and Nigeria) I analyzed the objectives listed in the establishing mandate published in the commission’s report. I used these charters to identify rationalized myths for establishing a truth commission, and coded which objectives were listed. This coding frame can be provided to interested scholars. For every objective I coded in the database, I included a short explanation of my decision, as an extra check for reliability.

In the second phase of my research I focused on the two main objectives of the global model: (1) truth commissions promote reconciliation, and (2) truth commissions present the complete truth. International guidelines for best practices have presented these rationales as the most important goals for a commission. Moreover, truth commissions are interchangeably referred to as truth and reconciliation commissions, and the words ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ are in most commission titles (Daly, 2008). I used these as my dependent variables, and tested which precipitating factors influenced the objectives a truth commission pursued.

First, I examined rational explanations to see whether a commission’s objectives were tailored to the state’s needs. I analyzed this by collecting information on propensities – the type of conflict and the type of transition – from commission reports and secondary sources. To examine the type of conflict, I coded whether commissions addressed civil wars or authoritarian regimes. To examine the type of transition, I coded whether each commission was initiated in a peace agreement, by a ruler (president or king), or through a government party. I then compared these propensities with commission objectives to see if there was a systematic relationship.

Next, I considered WST as an alternative explanation for why commissions pursue particular objectives, and analyzed regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive influences. I examined regulative influences by accessing reports from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ website and examining publicly available records on UN Peacekeeping Operations from 1948 to 2012.³ To analyze normative influences, I collected ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice) research studies, policy briefs, and rules for best practices alongside a list of commissions officially advised by the ICTJ.⁴ I examined cultural-cognitive influences by comparing the two regions with the most truth commissions with trends in commission objectives. Lastly, historical research on each of these channels of influence allowed me to examine how a truth commission model emerged in the world society.

The spread of rationalized myths

Early truth commissions did not carry the same expectations and assumptions about truth that later commissions developed as part of a global model. Initial truth commissions were framed as investigations into the past and their charters did not provide further justification. For example, Bolivia’s 1982 National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances (Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparecidos) had the succinct objective ‘to analyze, investigate and determine the status of missing persons in the national territory’ (Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2012: 1). At the time, the term ‘truth commission’ did not exist and there were few institutional references. The name first appeared during the 1990 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación) in Chile and gained international attention during South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 (Hayner, 2011).

While initial truth commissions had few institutional models to build from, later truth commissions were guided by the expertise of global consultants, international principles, and previous experiences.⁵ These influences spread commissions by promoting rationalized myths about the benefits of truth telling. Specifically, my data reveal that truth commissions have increasingly been established based on the following four rationalized myths: (1) truth telling will lead to reconciliation, (2) knowing how human rights violations occurred will prevent future violence, (3) establishing the truth is a form of justice, and (4) truth commissions can produce a complete and objective account of the truth. These four myths emerged from my data through an inductive process and parallel several of the goals often identified in truth commission literature (Daly, 2008).

As Figure 3 demonstrates, before 2001 many commissions did not pursue any of the four main objectives. However after 2001, when the ICTJ was established, every commission pursued one or more objective. For example, Kenya’s 2009 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission lists four pages of activities that should be pursued in order to ‘promote peace, justice, national unity, healing, and reconciliation among the people of Kenya’ (Government of Kenya, 2008: 9–12).⁶ This highlights a growing reliance on rationalized myths to justify the establishment of truth commissions.

Figure 3.

Changes in truth commission objectives over time.

Increased dependence on rationalized myths indicates that the decoupling of structure and activity becomes commonplace (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). While early commissions pursued concrete goals tailored to their particular context, the objectives of later commissions are loosely coupled to the on-the-ground conditions and germane to a wide range of circumstances. States addressing disparate conflicts are able to employ the same rationalized myths because their transcendent and universal character makes them applicable to a diverse array of circumstances without substantiation (Meyer, 2010). Thus truth commissions pursue the polysemic concept of reconciliation, which is subject to multiple interpretations (Rosoux, 2009). For some, the key element of reconciliation is the re-establishment of friendship, while others argue it requires going through a psychological process of transformation (Rosoux, 2009). There is also the question of reconciliation with what or whom? Sometimes reconciliation is attempted between individuals, while other times reconciliation involves a nation coming to terms with its past.

Regardless of how the concept is defined, it is unclear that truth telling at a commission will lead to reconciliation. Instead, case studies demonstrate that truth telling can have a contrary effect. For example, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) had a strong ideological commitment to the narrative that truth promotes reconciliation (Wilson, 2001). As the TRC’s charter states, ‘The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past’ (Office of the President, 1995: 4). While these aims highly resonated with some individuals, others who testified at the TRC were re-traumatized and further polarized by the process. In certain cases, victims desired vengeance after discovering ‘the truth’ about what happened, and a sense of reconciliation was not a consistent outcome (Wilson, 2001). A follow-up study of 3727 participants found that while there was a reciprocal relationship between truth and reconciliation for white South Africans, there was no relationship between the two concepts for black South Africans (Gibson, 2004). The research explains, ‘everyone is certain that “reconciliation” has failed, or at least not lived up to the expectations of most South Africans’ (Gibson, 2004: 202). In spite of these findings, my data show that truth commissions after South Africa increasingly included reconciliation as an objective in their founding charters.

Similarly, later truth commissions have relied on the idea of an essential ‘truth’ despite the fact that what constitutes truth varies according to the respondent and context. As one scholar describes, truth ‘is so commonly used that it seems to be a transparent notion, clear to all who are involved or interested in redressing past abuses, but “truth”, like “justice” and “reconciliation” is an elusive concept that defies rigid definitions’ (Parlevliet, 1998: 142). In contentious post-conflict environments, the ‘truth’ is typically fraught with sharply conflicting and political versions of the past (Chapman and Ball, 2001). Multiple, incompatible, and subjective memories of violence suggest that it is impossible for testimony from a truth commission to provide a single and accurate account of past human rights abuses (Daly, 2008).

Still many truth commissions pursue the ‘complete truth.’ For example in El Salvador a truth commission was established by the UN to address social unrest in the state which ‘urgently require[d] that the complete truth be made known’ (United Nations, 1993: 1). However, the commission was criticized for failing to report on violence implicating the United States or addressing the operations of death squads (Hayner, 2011). In Liberia, the TRC’s mandate explained that the investigation would assess the antecedents and circumstances of gross human rights violations in order to create a ‘clear picture of the past … [and] address falsehoods and misconceptions about the nation’s past socioeconomic and political development’ (National Transitional Legislative Assembly, 2005: 5). However, an Amnesty International (2008) report described the Liberian TRC as ‘a fragmented truth,’ noting that the cases chosen for public hearings were not representative, and provided a politically motivated narrative about past violence. Thus claims that a truth commission can present the ‘complete truth’ about human rights violations obscure the selective and limited nature of the historical documents and testimony collected.

While these examples highlight problematic assumptions about the benefits of truth telling, there can still be great value in setting up a truth commission. For example Argentina’s commission report was published in a shortened version, Nunca Mas, which sold more than 500,000 copies by 2007, becoming Argentina’s best-selling book ever. This report exposed secret detention centers, disappearances, and forms of torture that had been denied during the military dictatorship. And while the Argentinean military initially had amnesty, by 2009, 1400 people had been charged with war crimes from the dirty war (Hayner, 2011). However, as the next section further highlights, the promotion and proliferation of truth commissions have not been based on rational, feasible, and measurable outcomes, but rather driven by rationalized myths about the inherent value of truth telling. Post-conflict states increasingly establish truth commissions because they have great legitimating value both to external powers and internal interest groups as an accepted way to address human rights abuses (Hafner-Burton et al., 2008). In consequence, later truth commissions conform to their institutional environments rather than specific technical demands. As states rely on rationalized myths to justify the establishment of commissions, decoupling becomes endemic.

Propensities

Type of conflict

Rationally, one would expect that the objectives in a truth commission’s charter reflect the conflict that triggered its formation. To examine this, I compared commissions addressing crimes committed by authoritarian regimes with commissions addressing civil wars. Authoritative regimes are extremely secretive, and truth commissions can serve as a tool to expose their covert and repressive actions. Logically, commissions set up to address this type of regime transitions would emphasize the desire to ascertain the ‘complete truth’ about previous crimes. In contrast, commissions that are set up to deal with a civil war would seek reconciliation, in order to create peace between formerly warring parties that now need to peacefully coexist. These expectations are based on the perceived needs of each conflict.

However based on my analysis, commissions addressing both civil wars and authoritarian regimes have pursued each of the four objectives at a relatively even rate (see Figure 4). This finding indicates that the type of conflict being addressed does not dictate which objective a commission pursues.

Figure 4.

Prevalence of each objective based on the type of conflict.

Type of transition

The second propensity that should rationally be connected to a commission’s objectives is the type of transition. One would expect that truth commissions that are established as part of a peace agreement would emphasize reconciliation. There was evidence of this outcome, as seven out of eight countries that established a truth commission in a peace agreement explicitly included the word ‘reconciliation’ in their objectives. In this case, there is a logical association, as commissions set up during peace negotiations between warring factions saw reconciliation as a very real way to diminish tensions.

However, other transitions have a less systematic relationship. My results were inconsistent when I analyzed whether commissions set up by a new head of state would establish a truth commission to document the ‘complete truth’ about past crimes. One would expect that these commissions would be set up as a political tool to delegitimize previous regimes while boosting the authority of a new ruler. There is some evidence of leaders using truth commissions for this type of political manipulation. For example, Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission was nicknamed the ‘Nail Rawlings Commission’ because the National Democratic Party believed that the new president, John Kufuor, had established the commission solely to discredit the previous president Jerry Rawlings (Valji, 2006). However, commissions established by new rulers do not seek the ‘complete truth’ consistently in their founding charters. Instead, even in a case like Ghana, reconciliation is listed as the primary objective. Overall, this heuristic exercise indicates that the objectives a commission pursues do not necessarily reflect a state’s rational needs and interests, but rather are influenced by other factors.

Institutional influences

Since truth commissions’ objectives are not consistently associated with (a) the type of conflict or (b) the type of transition, this study considers an alternative to rational explanations. Drawing on WST, I argue that truth commission objectives are highly influenced by actors in the external environment. I examine how three channels of influence – regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive – have contributed to the proliferation of truth commissions by promoting rationalized myths in the world society. Adjudicating between these channels of influence, I show the historical development of truth commission objectives within each channel, to demonstrate that they focus on different priorities and influence different outcomes. Still, their impact is not mutually exclusive – over time different channels have interacted and reinforced one another (Scott, 2008).

Regulative influence: The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) provides a useful example of regulative influence due to its role in establishing a legal rationale for truth commissions. Regulative influence refers to the diffusion of policies through an authority that has the power to establish rules, survey implementation, and provide punishments or rewards for compliance (Scott, 2008). The UN can play a critical role influencing the establishment of a truth commission, in some cases facilitating negotiations, serving as a guarantor during the implementation of a peace process, and monitoring adherence to agreements (Armengol, 2013; Sriram, 2000). The UN Security Council also has the power to prompt legal interventions to address international crimes, by referring a situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation. While truth commission investigations do not strictly satisfy the complementarity test of the ICC, which is focused on whether a state is unwilling or unable to conduct domestic prosecutions, states may set up commissions to signal to the UN that they are taking legitimate steps to deal with human rights abuses.⁷

Truth commissions have increasingly come under the purview of the UN, as the UN has advised post-conflict states on how to set up a truth commission, acted as the primary organizer of commissions, and developed legal guidance for states wishing to establish a truth commission. In particular, the UN has promoted truth commissions as an important institution for securing the right to truth in post-conflict societies. This has led commissions to prioritize the ‘complete truth’ as a primary objective.

The principle of the right to truth was originally intended for relatives of missing persons who sought information on the disappeared, but has been used for a wider set of purposes over time. The right to truth was first incorporated as international human rights law in Article 32 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in 1949, and iterated in numerous resolutions, including Article 24 (2) of the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the 2009 Council Resolution 10/26 on forensic genetics and human rights. As this right has spread to regional multilateral systems (such as the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union), it has progressively been expanded to apply to information regarding any serious human rights violation. Today the right to truth entails the ‘whole’ and ‘complete’ truth as a means to ‘combat impunity’ and the ‘desire to know’ is often referred to as ‘a basic human need’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). Thus, while the right to truth was first devised for the families of missing persons, it now applies to all citizens of post-conflict states who seek knowledge of human rights violations (Naqvi, 2006). Both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have reiterated that the truth about crimes is fundamental for post-conflict transitions, and this right has been used as a legal basis for establishing truth commissions.

The influence of the UN’s emphasis on the right to truth is evidenced in my data. All eight states with a UN peacekeeping mission established commissions with the complete truth as a goal. Truth commissions with UN guidance have been more apt to include the complete truth as an objective than commissions that were not advised by the UN. Furthermore, while early commissions were less likely to pursue the complete truth, by the 1990s this objective was part of an accepted international norm. An overall trend shows that over time more countries refer to the need for a comprehensive truth when justifying their commissions.

Normative influence: The International Center for Transitional Justice

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is the foremost truth commission consulting organization and a prime example of normative influence. Normative influence refers to transnational actors less concerned with legal obligations, and more focused on expert sources of information about following norms and values. States conform to practices because of social obligation, and professional groups accredit state activities (Scott, 2008). The ICTJ’s influence comes from its professional reputation, relationships with other key actors in the post-conflict field (non-governmental organizations and private consultants), and system of certification.⁸ Previous studies have noted the ICTJ’s prominent role in the global spread of truth commissions (Sikkink, 2011; VanAntwerpen, 2009). In contrast to regulative influence, the ICTJ does not have political power to pressure states to comply, and instead has to convince states that these policies will benefit their internal interests and preferences. While the UN has emphasized the complete truth, the ICTJ has been instrumental in promoting truth commissions as a means to pursue reconciliation.

One reason the ICTJ emphasizes reconciliation is because the organization was founded to disseminate the South African experience (Bell, 2009). Alex Boraine (Vice Chair of South Africa’s TRC), Paul van Zyl (Executive Secretary of South Africa’s TRC), and Priscilla Hayner created the ICTJ in 2001. Through its work – consulting post-conflict states, sharing comparative experiences, publishing handbooks with best practices, and organizing conferences – the ICTJ has spread the objective of ‘reconciliation through truth’ as a successful lesson from South Africa’s TRC (VanAntwerpen, 2009). The results of these efforts are revealed in my data: while only 40% of commissions before the ICTJ’s establishment in 2001 include reconciliation as an objective, 78% of commissions after 2001 include this as an objective. Evidence of the ICTJ’s influence is bolstered by the fact that there was no critical difference in the type of conflicts being addressed before and after 2001: 36% of commissions until 2001 were established after a civil war, while 33% of commissions after 2001 were established after a civil war.

Instead, this trend is linked to commissions directly advised by the ICTJ, and extends beyond states the organization has a formal relationship with. Nine out of the 10 commissions advised by the ICTJ included reconciliation as an objective. After 2001, only six commissions were not officially advised by the ICTJ, yet four of those still had reconciliation as an objective. Further investigation of these cases reveals that the ICTJ was influential (albeit less directly) outside of its official capacity. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s 2004 commission was not included in the ICTJ’s official consulting list, but the ICTJ analyzed and reported on the commission’s activities, and reconciliation is listed as a goal in the founding charter.

The ICTJ has promoted reconciliation while recognizing that the term has multiple meanings. While the organization has acknowledged that many commissions interpret the word reconciliation in differing ways and the process may take a long time, ICTJ consultants have continued to encourage reconciliation at truth commissions (González and Varney, 2013). This could be due to imprinting, a concept first coined by Arthur L Stinchcombe (Scott, 2008). In this case, the founding context of an organization has a lasting impact on the organization’s subsequent history. Thus if an organization such as the ICTJ was established based on lessons from South Africa, this will continue to impact the organization’s trajectory despite environmental changes (Scott, 2008). Indeed, the ICTJ’s publications and website indicate that the organization’s consulting efforts continue to reflect its initial founding to promote reconciliation.

However, while ICTJ consulting was initially designed based on South Africa’s model, it is important to note that the organization’s approach differs in key ways. In particular, South Africa implemented a highly controversial amnesty exchange for perpetrators who testified that their acts were politically motivated. This conditional amnesty has not been a feature of ICTJ consulting or any subsequent truth commissions, and the ICTJ has cautioned against this type of amnesty (Quinn and Freeman, 2003). Thus while the ICTJ was heavily influenced by South Africa during its inception, the normative influence of this organization is separate from the diffusion of a South Africa model.

While the impact of the ICTJ offers useful insight into how normative influences have spread truth commissions, it does not provide evidence of routine top-down diffusion of a single institutional model (Sikkink, 2011). Truth commissions could have been established after conflicts in the Global North, such as authoritarian rule in Spain, however core ideas about what commissions can achieve developed in the Global South. Northern intellectuals and organizations only began to debate the logic of this alternative transitional justice mechanism after the institution had been implemented and adapted in various Latin American and African countries (VanAntwerpen, 2009). Locating reconciliation in commission consulting materials and founding charters demonstrates the ways in which the spread of truth commissions emerged through a bottom-up process.

Cultural-cognitive influence: Region

The spread of truth commissions in particular regions, sometimes referred to as a ‘contagion effect,’ is a key indication of cultural-cognitive influence. Cultural-cognitive influences on state practices occur through cognitive paradigms and cultural frames, rather than regulative incentives or normative commitments. Cultural-cognitive influence leads states to adopt structures and activities based on a perception of shared beliefs, schemas, and assumptions (Scott, 2008). Other scholars refer to this as ‘acculturation,’ emphasizing that numerous empirical studies have shown how mimicry occurs amongst states that perceive themselves as similar (Goodman and Jinks, 2013). Indeed, truth commissions have largely been established in Africa and Latin America, while other conflicts have been addressed with criminal trials, amnesties, or lustration processes (such as the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, or human rights abuses by the Communist regime in Eastern Europe), suggesting that countries’ shared cultural contexts have shaped the spread of this global transitional justice model.

In order to consider cultural-cognitive influence on truth commissions, I examined whether states in the same regions implemented similar commission objectives. I found that while reconciliation has been a prevalent objective for commissions in Africa, it has not been as important in Latin American commissions: 69% of African truth commissions aimed to achieve reconciliation, while only 36% of Latin American truth commissions included reconciliation as an objective. This difference becomes even more striking when the time period and region are considered together. After South Africa’s TRC, every truth commission in Africa (except Mauritius) had reconciliation as an objective, while none of the African commissions before South Africa’s TRC had reconciliation as an objective.⁹ In contrast, following South Africa’s TRC, only 40% of commissions in Latin America had reconciliation as an objective. This suggests that South Africa’s TRC had a more pronounced impact on other African commissions than Latin American commissions. For example, previous research has shown that Sierra Leone sought to replicate aspects of South Africa’s model when designing its commission in early 2000 (Lamin, 2003). Furthermore, when neighboring Liberia set up a commission in 2005, it lifted and pasted sections on reconciliation from Sierra Leone’s charter verbatim.¹⁰ In contrast, truth commissions established in Ecuador (1996) and Panama (2001) solely referred to prior Latin American experiences (Freeman, 2006: 24–25). Thus countries within the same region tend to look to each other as examples for designing their approach.

This divergence between African and Latin American commissions cannot be attributed to differences in the type of conflict. While it is true that most Latin American commissions have addressed authoritarian regimes, in Africa, there has been an equal percentage of commissions addressing authoritarian regimes as those addressing civil wars (46% respectively). In consequence, regional mimesis appears to offer a more convincing explanation for why commissions pursue particular objectives.

The regional spread of truth commission objectives again challenges the notion of top-down diffusion from a single world society. In this case, transitional justice norms diffuse horizontally –ideas are more easily spread within Africa, than, for example, between Germany and Sierra Leone (Sikkink, 2011). As a result, certain variations of the model have been more prominent in different regions. These findings offer a preliminary indication of how perceptions of cultural similarities can lead states to mimic one another, facilitating the spread of a rationalized myth.

Conclusion

Drawing on my analysis of an original database of truth commissions’ founding charters, I demonstrate that a state’s type of conflict and type of transition cannot account for the spread of truth commissions or the objectives a given commission pursues. Instead, I employ world society theory (WST) to explain how transnational advocates have diffused truth commissions by drawing on rationalized myths about the value of truth telling.

First, I argue that four rationalized myths have driven the spread of truth commissions. These myths are that truth commissions: (1) lead to reconciliation, (2) prevent future violence, (3) provide justice, and (4) present the complete truth. I demonstrate that commissions have increasingly pursued various combinations of these objectives over time. This insight refines WST by showing that global institutional models can be heterogeneous, rather than uniform, and can change through history. Second, I present an in-depth analysis of the two myths most central to the model: reconciliation and the complete truth. Tracing the origins of these rationalized myths in the major international forces advising commissions, the United Nations (UN) and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), I show that which myth(s) a commission adopts depends on the institutional influence. Commissions advised by the UN are more likely to seek the complete truth, while commissions advised by the ICTJ are more likely to emphasize reconciliation. I also find that the region influences which objectives a commission pursues; commissions in Africa are more closely linked to South Africa’s model of reconciliation, while commissions in the Americas tend to imitate Argentina’s model of the complete truth. This discussion refines WST by demonstrating agency within the diffusion of truth commissions and identifying the role of specific actors. In particular, these findings show how the interactions of actors with different interests and considerations shape the creation and diffusion of rationalized myths. In contrast to WST studies that present a relatively flat and universal diffusion of rationalized myths, I describe the multifaceted and uneven spread of a global truth commission model.

The increasing prevalence of rationalized myths in truth commission charters indicates that later commissions become highly decoupled from their stated objectives. However, further research is needed to examine when, how, and why decoupling occurs during a commission’s actual activities. This study has focused on the conditions in which truth commissions are established, and subsequent work should analyze how these commissions unfold.

Still, research on truth commission objectives is important because for many involved in these institutions the initial goals serve as a criterion for the ‘success’ of a commission. Whether a commission pursues reconciliation or the complete truth may seem like nuances in discourse to the outside observer, however these assumptions can have very real consequences for participants who share their testimonies at a public hearing. The approach a truth commission takes can affect both how their story is told as well ashow the commission and community receive it. As truth commissions are increasingly established in post-conflict states, it is crucial for scholars and practitioners to continue critically evaluating the forces that shape the objectives of this new institution.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix 1.

List of truth commissions in the database.

Start date	Country	Name of commission
1974	Uganda	Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda since the 25th of January, 1971
1982	Bolivia	National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances
1983	Zimbabwe	Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry
1983	Argentina	National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons
1985	Uruguay	Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and its Causes
1986	Uganda	Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights
1986	Philippines	Presidential Committee on Human Rights
1990	Nepal	Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period
1990	Chile	National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
1991	Chad	Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories
1992	Germany	Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany
1992	El Salvador	Commission on the Truth for El Salvador
1994	Sri Lanka	Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons
1995	Haiti	National Truth and Justice Commission
1995	South Africa	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
1996	Ecuador	Truth and Justice Commission
1997	Guatemala	Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer
1999	Nigeria	Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission
2000	Uruguay	Peace Commission
2000	South Korea	Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths
2001	Grenada	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2001	Panama	Panama Truth Commission
2001	Peru	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2001	Serbia and Montenegro	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2002	East Timor	Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation
2002	Sierra Leone	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2002	Ghana	National Reconciliation Commission
2003	Chile	National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture
2004	Democratic Republic of Congo	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2004	Paraguay	Truth and Justice Commission
2004	Morocco	Equity and Reconciliation Commission
2005	South Korea	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2006	Liberia	Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia
2007	Ecuador	Truth Commission to Impede Impunity
2009	Mauritius	Truth and Justice Commission
2009	Solomon Islands	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2009	Togo	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
2009	Canada	Truth and Reconciliation Canada
2009	Kenya	Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Edward Walker, Andreas Wimmer, Abigail Saguy, William Roy, Susan Watkins, Marie Berry, Amy Zhou, Tom Hannan, Tara McKay, Noah Grand, Phi Su, Lina Stepick, Chris Rea, Patricia Bromley, and Dashiell Dunkell for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I also appreciate feedback from members of the 2013 UCLA CPOWG, participants in the 2015 Stanford PACS Junior Scholars Forum, and the anonymous International Sociology reviewers. I received valuable assistance translating commission charters from Josette Nauenberg, Michael Nauenberg, and Gordan Todorovic.

Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-1144087. Any opinion, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Notes

Author biography

Saskia Nauenberg is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. Her research focuses on transitional justice, human rights, globalization, institutional theory, and the politics of memory. She is currently conducting fieldwork on Colombia’s peace talks.

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