The roots of division,activism,and civil society in Nigeria

Colonialism and schismatic foundations

Nigeria is considered a regional power in West Africa. Its economy is largely dependent on oil and it is the most populous black nation with an estimated population of over 200 million. Nigeria’s contemporary structure can be traced to the Victorian British Empire, and Bourne rightly notes: ‘Without the British there would never have been Nigeria’ (p. 4). The geographical space of Nigeria accommodated a collection of feudal states, semi-feudal states, semi-republican societies, and stateless societies (Kew, pp. 73–76, 159), who, though they interacted with one another and other societies outside the present Nigerian geographical structure, were independent and/or semi-independent of one another and did not share an identity or culture. They were a collection of different and distinct nations. Nigeria is a product of European power struggles and the negotiations that took place at Otto von Bismarck’s Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 (Bourne, p. 7; Kew, p. 75). Aside from the Colony of Lagos, which came under British rule in 1861, the British conquered and/or surreptitiously secured protectorate agreements with the different nationalities that make up Nigeria between 1893 and 1906. The ‘protected’ territories were differently governed as the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria (Bourne, pp. 8–12; Kew, p. 76).

Southern Nigeria was more economically advanced than the North. Lord Fredrick Lugard (an advocate of British supremacy [Bourne, p. 8]), governor of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, lobbied the British government for a merger of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria for economic and administrative convenience. According to Bourne:

The nub of the case for merger, which Lugard put to Harcourt over a period of five months’ persuasion in 1913, was about balancing the books. In 1912, Southern Nigeria had a revenue of £2.25M and its government was running a surplus. Northern Nigeria, with a possibly larger population and greater geographical extent, had only £500,000 of local revenue, which included a grant of £70,000 from customs income in the south. Lugard did not argue that there would be enormous economies in the administration to follow. Nor, as will be seen, was he arguing to do away with the separate administrations and rather different colonial approaches to north and south. It was essentially about making an unsatisfactory finance add up. (p. 12)

Indeed, Lugard’s primary strategy was to advance the colonial economic agenda by creating a uniform economy under a single administration to offset the deficit of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria while increasing the British economic hold on the two territories. Lugard’s proposal brought about the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (Bourne, p. 4; Kew, p. 76). Despite the amalgamation, Lugard promoted different administrative and political policies for the two regions. The Colony of Lagos was administered with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, whereas the colonial government had a unique approach to the Northern Protectorate by insulating it from the modern influences that were mostly encouraged in the South. Christian missionaries were prohibited and modern education was restricted in the predominantly Muslim North (Bourne, p. 26; Kew, p. 76; Agozino, p. 127). The North and the South were not intended to be culturally and ethnically fused into a nation. This set the tone for the enduring division in amalgamated Nigeria.

Soon after the amalgamation, the young country was dragged into the largely European First World War. Nigerian soldiers fought on the frontline. Most of the soldiers were Hausa from Northern Nigeria and a few were Yoruba from Southern Nigeria. The language of command in the colonial army in this early period was Hausa; and educated natives were prevented from enlisting because they were ‘politically unsound’ (Bourne, p. 16). This somewhat explains why most of the recruits were of Northern extraction. A growing population of Southern Nigerians had some form of modern education, unlike their Northern counterparts. Literacy and education could generate anti-European war consciousness, which could negatively affect control of the troops. Indeed, they were politically unsound, and the fewer Southerners in the Colonial Army the better.

The end of the First World War in 1918 and return of native soldiers who had been exposed to the ideals of freedom and liberty signaled the beginning of the nationalist movement. The educated elite partnered the veterans, who called for the inclusion of the literate and educated in governance processes and independence. Little had been achieved in this respect by the time the Second World War began in 1939. Again, Great Britain used human and natural resources from the colonies to prosecute the war. Nazi Germany was an enemy to be conquered and natives were ‘conscientised’ to support the British cause (Bourne, pp. 57–58, 62–63). Bourne further notes that Nigerian children were singing: ‘Hitler that is throwing the world into confusion/Push him with a shovel into the grave’ (p. 60). This is similar to a 1940s primary pupils’ song, which says ‘Ijoba Geesi wa, ko ni ye, ko ni ye, Ijoba Geesi wa, ko ni ye titi lai, Lai lain i Ijoba Geesi wa. Awon Ogun Itila, won gbo gun ti wa, awa yoo si segun’ (The British government is ours, it shall not fall, it shall reign forever. The forces of Hitler have waged war against us, we shall conquer). Most of the Nigerian public, young and old, were on the side of the British; and of course, the general opinion was that German overlordship would be worse (Bourne, p. 60). The end of the war in 1945 crystalized nationalist movements in the colonies; in Nigeria, it was championed by notable individuals such as Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, and Nnamdi Azikiwe (Bourne, pp. 64–65).

Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe teamed up in the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) whereas Awolowo led the Action Group (AG; Bourne, p. 65; Kew, p. 77; Agozino, pp. 61–62). The NCNC and AG were Southern Nigeria groups. Whereas the North remained undivided under one political administration, Southern Nigeria was divided into West and East that were dominated by Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups respectively (Bourne, p. 53). The North was not enthusiastic about independence or self-governance, fearing that it would be dominated by the South; hence whereas the West and East were self-governing by 1957, the North did not become self-governing until 1959 (Bourne, p. 79; Agozino, pp. 61, 106). Azikiwe’s NCNC had an early influence on the politics of Western Nigeria whereas Awolowo’s AG could barely penetrate the East. Leaning on ethnic sentiments, Awolowo appealed to the Yoruba to politically displace Azikiwe from Lagos and Western Nigeria. Obafemi Awolowo became the premier of Western Nigeria, whereas Nnamdi Azikiwe, who did not wish to become the leader of the opposition, relocated to Eastern Nigeria to become the premier. In the North, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) clinched power in 1959 under the leadership of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Hence, at the eve of independence, the regional governments of Nigeria were led by innately ethnic parties. Of the entire trio, only the NCNC had a fair participation of people from ethnicities other than those of Eastern Nigeria. The AG was predominantly Yoruba and had its base in the West whereas the NPC was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani and had its base in the North. Nigeria was set for schismatic ethnicism in national politics at independence. In preparation for independence in 1960, there were parliamentary elections in 1959. The NPC won 142 seats, the NCNC had 87, and the AG won 73 (Bourne, p. 90). Azikiwe’s NCNC would not work with its southern counterpart, Awolowo’s AG, who had played the ethnic card to displace it in the West in 1957. The NCNC’s coalition with the NPC produced a federal government in 1960 led by Sir Tafawa Balewa as prime minister. Azikiwe assumed the position of titular governor-general (later president in 1963 when Nigeria became a republic) whereas Awolowo assumed the role of the leader of the opposition (Bourne, p. 91; Agozino, p. 62).

Granted independence as a nation, Nigeria remained ethnically fractionalized in the early independence period. Bourne rightly notes that ‘The trouble for Balewa and those trying to make a success of an independent Nigeria was that public expectations were excessive, the economy would have difficulty paying for them, and politics seemed the easiest way to make money. “Nigeria” was becoming a deadly combination of zero-sum game and roulette. The honeymoon joy of independence was the prologue to a deepening crisis’ (p. 95). Rumors of British manipulations of the 1959 elections to favor the Hausa-Fulani dominated North were rife in the West (Bourne, p. 91). Also, the NPC-led government of Tafawa Balewa sought to weaken Awolowo’s political base by supporting the latter’s erstwhile deputy, Chief Akintola, who replaced him as premier of the Western region (Bourne, p. 113). Awolowo was subsequently accused of plans to topple the federal government, and he was arrested for treason in 1962. He was tried and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in July 1964 (Bourne, pp. 101–102; Agozino, p. 62). Western Nigeria was plunged into turmoil. Ensuing violence popularly called wetie (light up with petrol bomb) claimed many lives and destroyed much property in the Western region (Onoja, 2009). There was palpable confusion in the country while the political class was ineptly corrupt. Bourne (p. 105) represents Balewa’s government thus: ‘Okotie-Eboh became notorious, like Kingsley Ozuomba Mbadiwe, Minister for Transport, as one of the “ten per centers”, the ministers who were collecting commissions on projects they approved.’ With palpable public disenchantment, Nigeria’s nascent First Republic lasted only till 1966. On 15 January 1966, Balewa’s government was toppled in a bloody coup led by Major Nzeogwu (Bourne, p. 115; Kew, p. 78). Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, Chief Akintola, Okotie Eboh, and other top politicians and senior Hausa and Yoruba military officers were killed. It is surprising that no Igbo politician or military officer suffered this fate. General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the Army chief (and an Igbo officer), foiled the coup and took over as military head of state. Ironsi abolished the Nigerian federal system in favor of a unitary system of government (Decree 34, 24 May 1966). His government did not prosecute Nzeogwu and other conspirators while he promoted 18 Igbo officers over their colleagues from other ethnicities and regions against the recommendation of the Supreme Military Council (Bourne, p. 117). The North was alarmed that the Southern domination it had feared in the pre-independence period had arrived through an Igbo coup. There were violent riots in Northern Nigeria, and numerous Igbo were killed. On 29 July 1966, the government of Ironsi was toppled in a coup led by young Northern military officers including Major Murtala Mohammed and Captain Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma. General Ironsi and many Igbo and Yoruba military officers were killed (Bourne, pp. 117–118; Kew, p. 78; Agozino, p. 63). Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon emerged as the new head of state. He immediately released Obafemi Awolowo and made him a senior member of his government. His actions were like an appeasement of the Yoruba. In the North, however, killings of Igbo continued. Hence, the military governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Emeka Ojukwu (an officer educated at Oxford University) appealed to Igbo to return to the East. On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu declared that the Eastern region had seceded from Nigeria to become the sovereign nation of Biafra. A civil war ensued after negotiations collapsed. The Yoruba-dominated West was allied with the Hausa-Fulani dominated North to ensure the Igbo-dominated East was brought back under the Federation of Nigeria. The civil war lasted till 15 January 1970; there were heavy casualties, especially among the Igbo. The majority of Igbo survivors emerged from the war economically, socially, and psychologically scarred (Bourne, pp. 119–128; Agozino, pp. 125–134). The postwar interpretation among the Igbo is that the Yoruba teamed up with the Hausa to scourge the Igbo in retaliation for the Igbo’s coalition with the Hausa in the immediate postcolonial period.

More than four decades after the end of the civil war and five decades after independence, Nigeria remains ethnically polarized. Since the end of the civil war, there has been a growing clamor for recognition and distinct representation among diverse ethnicities. Bourne notes:

The federal victory in the civil war did not put an end to the existential question about the Nigerian state – whether so many different peoples can live together amicably in one polity. But it recast it. It demonstrated that there are military, political and economic forces strong enough to counteract and defeat the centrifugal and fissiparous tendencies. It showed that there was not some southern unity, of Igbos, Yorubas and the ethnicities in the Delta, that could overthrow a perceived hegemony of the north. It showed that the north itself was not a single uniform bulldozer, but a mosaic of groups with different interests and different appreciation of Islam. And above all it showed that the minority tribes all over the country were committed to the survival of a reorganized federation, in which their voices could be heard. (p. 126)

Nigeria remains a state of multiple nations fused together in an inconvenient ethnically based schismatic union (Bourne, pp. 33–38, 53), because ‘Fissiparous tendencies have existed throughout the Nigerian century and [they] are unlikely to disappear’ (Bourne, p. 265). Since before independence, and throughout the First, Second, and Third republics, fissiparous tendencies have influenced party formation, election contests and their outcomes as well as cross-ethnic collaborations in the quest for political power. Successful political parties are largely built on the ethnic dimensions of the early independence period. During the Second Republic, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which won presidential elections in 1979 and 1983, was built on the foundation of the NPC. Obafemi Awolowo’s Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was built on the substructures of the AG, and Nnamdi Azikiwe’s Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) was built on the base of the NCNC. In the 1979 general elections, ‘the UPN won Yoruba states, the NPP in the Igbo east, and the NPC . . . [controlled] seven states and [won] seats everywhere except in Lagos and Ogun, two Yoruba states’ (Bourne, p. 144). Again, at the commencement of the Third Republic in 1999, Alliance for Democracy (AD) emerged as a successor to the AG and UPN and dominated all six Yoruba southwestern states, whereas the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which won the presidential election and 23 gubernatorial seats in Northern, southeastern and South/Southern Nigeria, drew its support from erstwhile members of the NPC and NPN and the Igbo. A third party, the All People’s Party (APP), partly drew its membership from the defunct NPC and NPN, attracted members from Northerners in the progressive movement, and won seven states in Northern Nigeria. The PDP appeared to be a national party because of its presence across the nation, and by the 2003 general elections, the PDP displaced opposition parties in most of their strongholds (Bourne, p. 204; Kew, p. 319). The PDP achieved the feat through support provided by Hausa, and of course, the Igbo and other ethnicities within the defunct Eastern region. The PDP remained in power until it was ousted by the APC, an alliance of disgruntled Northern PDP members, opposition parties with roots in the North, predominantly Hausa-Fulani, and the predominantly Yoruba Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN, successor party to the AD and APP). Once again, through an ethnically based alliance, the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani gained power. Present political wrangling within the APC and different parts of the government shows that the APC is a troubled coalition. Coalition and mergers are only constructed to gain political power, not necessarily to fuse the nation into one. Schismatic ethnicism remains and it has implications for activism and civil society in Nigeria, as the next section shows.

Reactive activism and civil society

Modern activism and civil society started in Nigeria at the end of the First World War. Activism was largely in reaction to colonial rule whereas civil society activities were focused on pressuring the colonial government to address workers and natives’ welfare and prepare Nigeria for independence (Bourne, pp. 45, 64–65; Kew, pp. 161–162). Two principal figures involved in activism during the colonial period were Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo. Azikiwe was a notable activist who utilized his journalistic skills to critique the colonial government and raise consciousness about the rights of natives and the need for political independence. Born in Northern Nigeria and schooled in Lagos, Azikiwe could speak Nigeria’s three main languages: Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba. He stowed away on a ship to the Gold Coast and then the United States where he attended Howard University, Lincoln University, and Columbia University, graduating with a master’s degree at the age of 29 (Bourne, p. 44). Azikiwe’s socialization in Nigeria and the United States molded him into an activist with global concerns about anti-racism, anti-colonialism, and freedom for Africa and the black race in general (Bourne, pp. 45–46; Agozino, pp. 28–38). Nnamdi Azikiwe moved to Ghana and established a newspaper, African Morning Post, in 1934. His write-ups were critical of the Gold Coast colonial government. Azikiwe was prosecuted for seditious libel in 1936, but later released on ‘a technicality . . . [that] he was not actually editing the paper that day’ (Bourne, p. 45). He subsequently moved to Nigeria and established the West African Pilot in November 1937.

Obafemi Awolowo was born in Ijebu Remo. After his father died when he was 11 he dropped out of school and followed his mother back to her parents’ home. Awolowo was engaged in business in Abeokuta until he was able to return to school at the Wesleyan School in Imo, an Igbo town. From Imo, he moved to Wesley College, Ibadan, in Western Nigeria for a four-year teacher training course in 1927. Awolowo was averse to the subservient attitude of African teachers to their European colleagues. Between 1932 and 1934, Awolowo was a clerk at Wesley College, Ibadan, after which he worked briefly as a trainee journalist at the Nigerian Daily Times. Awolowo subsequently engaged in the transport and cocoa business where he did well, and organized protests against the European merchants who were attempting to maintain a monopoly over rail transport and the cocoa trade (Bourne, p. 47). He earned a bachelor’s degree in commerce as an external student from the University of London in the 1930s, and later studied law full time at the University; he earned a law degree and was admitted the Inner Temple Bar in 1946. While in London, Awolowo established the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa) as a platform for Yoruba students and migrants in England (Kew, pp. 164–166).

Both Azikiwe and Awolowo, along with other activists and members of the educated elite, were part of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). The NYM, as a civil society organization, was actively involved in politics, winning three elected seats in the Lagos council in 1938 (Bourne, p. 48). Though popular in the South, the NYM could not penetrate the North due to resistance from feudal emirs propped up by colonial officials. The NYM also experienced an internal crisis leading to its break along ethnic lines in 1941 (Bourne, p. 49). Most Igbo and other ethnicities in Eastern Nigeria went with Azikiwe to join the NCNC whereas most Yoruba followed Awolowo to form the Action Group. A third civil society organization, the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN), an amalgamation of trade unions representing diverse sectors of the Nigerian colonial economy, was established in December 1942 (Kew, p. 164). The TUCN was not immune to the debilitating schismatic ethnicism that had divided the NYM. Kew notes ‘the growing Yoruba–Igbo political rivalry between Yoruba leaders of Egbe Omo Oduduwa (later Action group) and the increasingly Igbo-led NCNC also began to influence the trade unions . . . ideological and ethnic differences between unionists combined to disastrous effect when radical TUCN leaders affiliated it with the NCNC in 1948. When conservative leaders shortly thereafter managed to pass a resolution dissociating TUCN from the NCNC, radical leaders bolted and formed a rival Nigerian National Federation of Labour’ (p. 165). Nigerian civil society is not entirely free of ethnicism and ideological differences. In 1975, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) emerged as the successor umbrella labor organization. Its ideology initially tended to the left, and it was proscribed by the military government of General Gowon. Finally, the military government of General Obasanjo recognized the NLC in 1978 (Kew, p. 167). Over the years, the NLC (along with other labor unions not affiliated to the NLC) has been influenced by government and powerful politicians. Internal politics of the NLC are not immune to ethnicism and the North–South divide and its leaders have been able to utilize embedded confusion to their advantage (Kew, p. 173). Non-labor civil society is also most influenced by ethnic considerations or operates within ethnic geographies and/or the influences of founders and is largely clannish (Kew, pp. 247–250). Such nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become popular since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, providing alleviation in areas where government has withdrawn and/or agitating for human rights and democracy (Kew, pp. 221–233). Of the numerous NGOs, the most successful are those that are internally democratized and who de-emphasize ethnicism in management, such as the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Women in Nigeria (WIN), Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), National Council of Women Societies (NCWS), and Campaign for Democracy (CD; Kew, pp. 245–261). Despite the progress made by these democratic civil society organizations, Kew (p. 263) submits that:

. . . Nigeria does not currently enjoy the sort of integrated, symbiotic state–civil society relationship that most healthy democracies feature. Rather, Nigeria’s two public spheres are still largely bifurcated and at frequent odds with one another. Political society continues largely to be Nigeria’s famous ‘political class’ raised on the prebendal style of politics of the past, with greater interest in using the state for personal wealth accumulation than as a medium to govern and improve the lives of their constituents. Civil society, for its part, having lost the unifying theme of resistance to the military, has broken into the myriad of special interests that its growing numbers represent.

Nigeria remains divided, due to roots founded on colonial ethnic schism. Thus, Agozino notes that Nwankwo calls for African revolutionary originality ‘for the decolonization of the African mind’ (p. 45); for Nigeria, Nwankwo also recommends the principle of ‘cimilicy’ in governance, which entails ‘the integration of three elements of Nigerian society – the military, civilians, and democratic politicians to make them work seamlessly for the good of the country’ (p. 59). Nwankwo’s cimilicy is a form of diarchy. There is no empirical evidence that ‘cimilical governance’ will be immune to bifurcating ethnicism. As long as Nigeria remains a country of diverse ethnicities, agitating for recognition and control for prebendal reasons, the country will remain a state of ‘contending nations’ rather than a state of a single overarching nationality that advances the good of all.

Conclusion

The works of Bourne, Kew, and Agozino provide critical insight into the informal structure of Nigeria, which is predicated on schismatic ethnicism. Ethnic considerations determine political, social, and economic policies, with mutual suspicions of attempts at domination by ethnic groups across the country’s Northern and Southern divides. Activism and civil society are not immune either, because they are largely constructed with blends of ethnicism. These three authors have traced the roots of ethnic divisions to colonialism; that Nigeria is unable to fuse into a single nation is an indication of failed political systems predicated on patronage and prebendal exploitation in the guise of ethnic protectionism.