Legitimacy of authoritarian law: Legal compliance in China

Abstract

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Very few studies of legal compliance have been conducted outside the context of liberal democracies. This study tests and expands theoretical expectations regarding legitimacy and its effect on legal compliance in the context of China, a society under authoritarian rule where clashing cultural discourses coexist. In addition, it examines different types of laws, highlighting the importance of social relations regulated by and cultural elements supporting various laws. Using linear regressions with data from an original representative social survey of 556 individuals in Chengdu, China, the author finds that (1) the perceived legitimacy of law, (2) expectations concerning compliance with law, and, most importantly, (3) the association between law’s legitimacy and expected compliance all vary according to the type of social relationship targeted by the legal regulation (familial, state-oriented, or economic). The article shows how China’s cultural, political, and historical environments contribute to the patterns identified in this analysis.

Keywords

China legal compliance legitimacy

This study focuses on why people obey the law in urban China. It enriches sociological research on legal compliance by expanding the scope of research to a non-Western society and complicating presumptions about legal culture(s). I propose a new framework that considers the range of social relationships regulated by law. By differentiating categories of law particularly meaningful in the Chinese context – those regulating family relations, state/society relations, and commercial relations – this study demonstrates that the connection between legal compliance and legitimacy is conditioned by the cultural and social locations of specific laws. I find different levels of perceived legitimacy across categories of laws, expanding on legal compliance approaches that treat law as a homogeneous phenomenon or focus on a single category of law. My analyses also reveal that Chinese people’s willingness to obey the law is associated with their recognition of the social values embedded in the law, rather than the law’s ability to punish. In sum, this study shows how both the social relationships regulated by the law and the cultural values supporting the law play a role in people’s expressed willingness to obey or defy.

Contextualizing legal compliance

In his classic analysis of political domination, Weber (1978) emphasizes the importance of legitimacy in sustaining stable power relations. Mainstream legal compliance studies, mostly conducted by psychologists and within advanced industrial nations, largely confirmed that the legitimacy of law and/or legal institutions contributes to citizens’ willingness to abide by legal rules (for a review, see Tyler, 2006b). This body of literature usually conceptualizes legitimacy as ‘the right to rule and the recognition by the ruled of that right’ (Jackson et al., 2012: 1051). However, this somewhat vague definition does not specify the source of the recognized ability to rule and does not rule out possible factors such as coercion. More nuanced work thus has highlighted the normative aspect of power as the foundation of legitimate rule, arguing collectively shared values imbued in legal rules and institutions compel citizens to follow their dictate, regardless of whether these values are consistent with individuals’ personal beliefs (Tyler, 2006a). In particular, these studies show people obey the law when they perceive it as procedurally fair (Tyler, 2006a; Tyler and Huo, 2002).

Yet, other socio-legal research suggests the normative power of law might have a broader basis. For example, Scheingold (1974: 78–79) maintains the willingness of US citizens to use the law arose from ‘a myth of rights [that] exercises a compelling influence . . . and provides shared ideals for the great majority.’ US citizens thus participate in a shared legal discourse, collectively reinforcing and contributing to the construction of law’s supremacy in regulating social relations. The legitimacy of this legal discourse and its consequent power over human behaviors are not likely based on one set of moral codes or a singular institution but rather a network of interweaving, and sometimes contradicting, cultural schemas (Ewick and Silbey, 1998).

Additionally, even though Weber long ago established links between the rise of a capitalist economy and a formal legal rationality in Western Europe (Trubek, 1972), he also cautioned against the tendency to generalize this observation to other cultural contexts such as China (Weber, 1968).¹ Recent research on legal compliance examines the effect of legitimacy in various realms (Papachristos et al., 2012; Tyler et al., 2007), at particular historical moments (Ryo, 2006), in specific contexts (Tyler, 2000), and for different types of laws (Ryo, 2006; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). This research indicates the symbolic power of law is mediated and conditioned by other institutional structures (Tyler et al., 2007), personal factors (Murphy and Tyler, 2008), and interpersonal networks (Papachristos et al., 2012). Therefore, it is important to understand the specific historical and cultural context when exploring the relationship between law’s legitimacy and legal compliance. In China, where legal compliance research is largely absent, it is thus wise not to assume what exact values are embedded in the law. Therefore, in this article, I define the legitimacy of law broadly as law’s perceived ability to embody core social values. While fluid enough to allow historical and cultural specificity, this conceptualization is also instrumental in understanding China’s authoritarian social control as it illustrates how institutional legitimacy manifests at the individual level. Institutional legitimacy, ‘the fundamental social processes wherein the actions of an institution are socially constructed as desirable and just’ (Roscigno et al., 2015: 18), is often times shaped by narratives manufactured by elite actors to maintain their power and privileges. Scholars have documented the expansive ideological campaigns by the Chinese government to (re)produce the institutional legitimacy of its regime (Zhao, 1998). But do such state campaigns translate to conforming behaviors? Using a socio-legal approach, this study addresses this inquiry.

I further extend the research on legal compliance and attend to the complexity of law by devising a systematic analysis to differentiate legal provisions regulating different social relations, namely family, state/society, and economic relations. Legal rules are sociologically meaningful only to the extent they are relevant to people’s social lives. This connection between the legal and the social happens through the definition, construction, and regulation of social relations by legal rules and the corresponding cultural interpretation of legal provisions (Conley and O’Barr, 1990). Thus, legal compliance research must understand the significance of the social relations regulated by law in their local cultural contexts.

Engaging the law in China

Contemporary China provides an ideal setting to investigate the relationship between the legitimacy of law and legal compliance. China’s long-standing emphasis on ‘education (jiaohua)’ over penalty in maintaining legal orders suggests values should play a central role in guiding law-related behaviors (Liang, 1991). At the same time, an abundance of research points to the omnipresence of political power over legal institutions in post-Second World War China (Peerenboom, 2009), casting doubt on the legitimacy of its legal system and attributing legal compliance mainly to political oppression. However, little research has been conducted to empirically test either speculation. The few previous studies on legal compliance of marginalized urban residents in China indicate non-compliance with certain legal rules resulted from disbelief in law’s legitimacy (Xin, 2005). This study tests if perception in law’s legitimacy shapes compliance among the general urban population and across different laws.

Legal compliance in China is likely shaped by the profound transformations in contemporary China. Recent economic, social, and legal reforms in China bring conflicting intellectual traditions into contact (Logan, 2008). While the government has actively engaged in a ‘modernization’ project with the legal system since the late 1970s, contradictory cultural and political legacies from the imperialist period, the nationalist period, and the Maoist period continue to shape the legal landscapes and law-related behaviors (Landry, 2011; Michelson, 2007; Minzner, 2011). During four decades of legal reforms, China has produced more than 200 new laws at the national level, including a new Constitution. These laws, many the result of international pressure (Vermeer and d’Hooghe, 2002), challenge legal philosophies that once dominated China. This contested process of institutional change provides a unique opportunity to highlight the conflicting legal cultures that stem from and lead to varying attitudes and behaviors toward the law (Fu and Cullen, 2011; Peerenboom, 2002).

The coexistent legal ideas in China assume different fundamental values, prioritize different social institutions, and are likely pertinent to different concrete legal provisions. Variation in legal ideas is likely accompanied by variation in legitimacy of and compliance with different laws based on varying social values and governing different social relationships. Therefore, I systematically examine how the relationship between perceived legitimacy of law and legal compliance varies based on the social relations regulated by the law. I focus on three types of social relations – those among family members, those formed in economic transactions, and those between state and the citizens – each of which corresponds to contemporary China’s most influential intellectual traditions. I elaborate the relationships between China’s various cultural traditions and different social relations and my research expectations in the next section.

Given the authoritarian context of China, I consider an alternative explanation for legal compliance which focuses on how law deters crime through punishment. Influenced by the law and economics tradition (Becker, 1968), the rationalist school in criminology argues the effectiveness of law is based primarily on its ability to inflict loss on the person who defies its authority. An individual’s decision to be law-abiding results from an instrumental cost-benefit analysis. Compliance is likely when rational actors’ estimation of the cost of law-breaking outweighs its expected benefit: the more certain and severe the punishment, the less likely legal non-compliance (Gibbs, 1986). Recent empirical research in this area finds perceived certainty of punishment to be the most consistent factor for law’s deterrence effect (Maxwell and Gray, 2000). This article investigates how the legitimacy and deterrence effect of law work in distinctive ways in three aspects of social life to encourage legal compliance.

Hypotheses

Family relationships

As a kinship-based society, imperial China placed paramount importance on the institution of the family and mutual support among family members as the basis and core of social and legal order (Ebrey and Watson, 1986). Even though the political turmoil and economic reforms in recent Chinese history have modified the specific structure of contemporary Chinese families (Quach and Anderson, 2008), the value of family ties as the foundation of social life has never been seriously challenged. Even under the socialist regime, family life remains closely tied to Confucian ideals where education is emphasized over punishment as socialization tools. I therefore expect a positive relationship between people’s perceptions of legitimacy and compliance regarding family laws. Meanwhile, the intimate nature of family relationships makes them unlikely subjects of formal social control. Thus, I do not expect a statistically significant relationship between perceptions of punishment and compliance.

Hypothesis 1: As perceived legitimacy of family laws increases, so does the likelihood of compliance with these laws.

The study focuses on two specific legal provisions among numerous family laws in China. These are laws providing that (1) parents are responsible for raising their underage children and (2) adult children are responsible for supporting their aging parents. These two laws are chosen because filial piety and parental love are the most essential and consistent features of discourses surrounding Chinese families (Yue and Ng, 1999).

State–citizen relationships

Distinct from family ties are state–citizen relationships. As widely agreed among China scholars, China is neither democratic nor liberal. It is thus in the regulation of civil society where one might expect to find the most drastic divergence from earlier legal compliance research, which has been conducted almost exclusively in liberal democracies (Lubman, 1999). In post-Mao China, the socialist state continues to have a strong grip over political power and limits the development of civil society (Zhao, 2000). Studies on the Chinese legal system have documented the influence of political factors in a variety of legal domains (Peerenboom, 2009). With strong domination of the executive over the judicial branch of government, individuals face serious consequences for disobeying laws aimed at maintaining the political power of the state (e.g., Buckley, 2017). After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party lost its ideological appeal among some of the younger generations, weakening its legitimate claim to political power (Zhao, 2000). Consequently, legal compliance to laws that strengthen the state’s political power is likely to be garnered through the threat of punishment rather than shared norms. I thus propose:

Hypothesis 2: As perceived likelihood of punishment for violating administrative laws² increases, so does the likelihood of compliance with these laws.

The two specific provisions representing administrative laws are (1) family planning laws and (2) laws restricting individuals’ ability to participate in political groups and demonstrations. These laws are chosen because they characterize the unique relationship between the Chinese government and its citizenry.

In China, reproduction has not been an issue of individual (women’s) rights but instead is regulated to meet the needs of the collective (Lee and Feng, 2001). In particular, the Chinese government implemented controversial family planning policies that made reproduction the business of the state (Savage, 1988). Since then, the number of children per family is defined first and foremost as an issue related to population control (Tribe, 1992). This state intervention into private lives has invited mixed domestic and international reactions and many use it to exemplify the oppressive nature of the Chinese state. China’s family planning laws thus provide a good example of its regulation of the state–citizen relationship.

The Chinese state also regulates freedom of association and demonstration among citizens, repressing demonstrations with force and taking protesters into custody, often without fair trials and proper procedure (e.g., Kaiman, 2013). Laws that limit the freedom of association and demonstration thus constitute another example of how the Chinese state attempts to regulate its citizenry.

Economy-related relationships

Many have argued legal reform in China is mostly driven by economic reform with the main objective of regulating the market to ensure healthy and sustainable economic growth (Chen, 1996; Lubman, 1999; Potter, 2004). Since China models its economy-related legal system after Western economies (Vermeer and d’Hooghe, 2002), laws are likely to encourage conformity in a similar manner in China’s markets as they do in Western market-driven economies. The emphasis on rationality in the realm of economics makes it likely that individuals base their judgment for law-breaking on a cost-benefit calculation and thus refrain from violation when the risk of punishment is high (Simpson and Koper, 1992). In addition, economic growth contributes to normative compliance because citizens may become committed to norms and concepts that are essential to the stability and expansion of free markets. Thus, it is plausible that both threat of punishment and legitimacy of law drive legal compliance in the economic realm. Therefore, I propose:

Hypothesis 3a: As perceived likelihood of punishment for violating economy-related laws increases, so does the likelihood of compliance with these laws.

Hypothesis 3b: As perceived legitimacy of economic laws increases, so does the likelihood of compliance with these laws.

As examples of laws in the economic realm, I focus on intellectual property rights laws and theft laws – specifically laws that regulate downloading unauthorized materials and knowingly purchasing stolen property.

Data and method

I focus on one major city, Chengdu, the capital of the Sichuan province. This city represents some of the most important characteristics of China’s urban and social development. Its inland location means it is not as heavily influenced by globalization as other mega cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, allowing it to maintain the unique characteristics of Chinese culture. Yet, its strategic importance in the economic development of western China calls for ‘modernization.’ Thus, ongoing reforms produce colliding cultural discourses in this city, allowing observation of diverse coexisting, sometimes contradicting, legal ideas and behaviors. Such variation crystallizes how legal behaviors may be associated with legal ideas.

I implemented in-house surveys with 556 individuals randomly sampled from all Chengdu urban residents. The surveys were conducted face-to-face where the interviewers read the survey questions to respondents and filled out the questionnaire with answers provided by respondents. To my best knowledge, this survey is the first in China to specifically focus on legal compliance.

Dependent variable

Likelihood of compliance with the law

Legal compliance is measured with the following question:

Imagine a person just like you. Given the conditions and opportunities, how likely do you think (s)he will do the following things?

Respondents were then given a list of behaviors that violate various Chinese laws and were asked to give a score of 1 to 5 to indicate the expected likelihood of a person like her/himself engaging in each behavior. The larger the number, the higher the likelihood of violating the law.³

The hypothetical approach was chosen with the research context in mind. When individuals fear the repercussions of violating a law, they are unlikely to report their own illegal behaviors or potential for such behaviors truthfully. In the current project, there are reasons for such fear as the survey was conducted in communities where researchers cannot access residential registration without permission from the local government. At times, researchers could only get access to buildings in the presence of local officials. Although the interviewers were thoroughly trained to maintain confidentiality of the survey data and respondent information, the respondents nonetheless might suspect the possibility of their responses being leaked to the authorities. Such fear would likely discourage the respondents from being truthful in reporting their own illegal behaviors. The use of hypotheticals was adopted to protect the respondents and to capture a wider range of possible variation in (non)compliance behaviors.

The six behaviors included in the survey constitute violations of the three larger categories of laws discussed in previous sections. Appendix A gives a full list of the six behaviors in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Except for violations of the family-planning policy that would constitute only civil violation, all behaviors could result in either civil or criminal sanctions. The circumstances and severity of violations were not described in detail but left to the respondent’s own judgment.

For the statistical analyses, I constructed four compliance scores, one for each type of law and one for all laws combined. Specifically, I averaged the two measurements within each legal category to get the law-specific non-compliance score. I then reversed this non-compliance score so that higher numbers are associated with higher expectation of legal compliance. As a result, there are three compliance scores ranging from 1 to 5: 1 meaning a respondent suggested a 100% chance of non-compliance and 5 meaning they suggested complete compliance. Finally, I averaged these three compliance scores to obtain the overall compliance score, also ranging between 1 and 5. Reliability tests for the internal consistency of the scales for the three types of laws returned Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from 0.712 to 0.8, suggesting the instruments are reliably measuring the same concepts (Travakol and Dennick, 2011). I conducted ordinary least-square (OLS) regression analyses for each type of law and all laws combined.

Independent variable

Perceived legitimacy of law indicator

A key explanatory variable is the perceived legitimacy of the law, captured with the question: ‘How much do you think each of the following behaviors violates our core social values?’ The same six behaviors used to measure legal compliance were presented to the respondents. Respondents were then asked to assign a score of 1 to 4 to each behavior. Larger scores indicate greater agreement that the behavior violated social norms, suggesting a higher level of perceived legitimacy of the law restricting the behavior.⁴ The question wording emphasized the social aspect of law’s legitimacy instead of the respondent’s personal value judgment. The survey interviewers were trained to clarify ‘core social values’ as meaning ‘values that you think the larger society holds as important, not necessarily your own values.’

As previously discussed, this research does not focus on procedural justice as the source of law’s legitimacy for a few reasons. Formal legal procedures are not widely respected in China, even within the judiciary (Fu and Cullen, 2011). Lay Chinese people hardly make clear distinctions between formal and substantive aspects of the law (Michelson and Read, 2011). In China, no known research has been conducted to establish which legal doctrines are legitimate, i.e., ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate within [the] socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574). This study thus leaves the specific values embedded in various laws open to be defined by the respondents. The focus of my analyses is whether people’s perception of the normative power of the law drives their tendency to comply, regardless of the specific norms implied.

Likelihood of punishment

As previously discussed, in the context of an authoritarian regime, punishment also plays an important role in social control, particularly for laws that protect the interest of the state. The perceived likelihood of punishment for non-compliance is thus an additional key explanatory variable.

Consistent with the outcome variable, the respondents were asked how likely they think a person like him/herself would be punished under the law for engaging in each behavior being studied. The question asked, ‘Imagine a person just like you. Had (s)he done the following things, how likely do you think (s)he would be punished under the law?’⁵ Similar to the non-compliance question, the respondents were asked to assign a score of 1 to 5 to the likelihood of punishment as the result of each violation with the larger scores indicating a higher likelihood of punishment.⁶

Following the recoding strategies for the outcome variable, I created a legitimacy score and a punishment score for each type of law by averaging the measurements within that category (without reverse coding). I then calculated the overall legitimacy and punishment scores by averaging across the three type of laws.

Control variables

Different social and demographic groups have different needs and opportunities for deviance and are thus likely to follow different patterns of legal compliance. I include a number of socioeconomic and demographic variables in the statistical models as controls. Age and gender have traditionally been included in the study of deviance, which indicates older individuals ‘age out’ of delinquency and women are socialized to be more compliant (for references and discussion, see Tittle et al., 2003). Educational level and monthly family expenditure are used as indicators of socioeconomic status, as they likely influence one’s exposure to various social norms. I used family expenditure rather than individual income for a number of reasons. First, the age range of the sample covers some high school and college students belonging to relatively advantaged social groups but who rely mostly on their family for financial support. Second, there is a large number of missing values of the income variable due to both its inapplicability to some groups and respondents’ reluctance to answer the question. Third, according to a number of experienced survey scholars in China, self-reported expenditure level is more reliable than self-reported income level as Chinese people tend to be reluctant to share their real incomes with strangers. Finally, under a single-party regime, it is reasonable to assume those who are more closely tied with the regime, i.e., members of the ruling party, are more likely to abide by the state-sanctioned legal rules. I thus also included Communist Party membership as a control variable.

Table 1 reports the distribution of the demographic variables. The sample of this study is comprised of a relatively representative group of individuals as the distributions of most demographic variables are comparable to recent census data for similar geographic regions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Therefore, by controlling for a number of demographic variables in the statistical analyses, the findings and conclusions based on this sample are meaningful indications of patterns among ordinary residents in Chengdu, a typical urban setting in contemporary China.

Table 1.

Distribution of demographic variables.

Variable	Statistics	N
Age (mean ± SD, median [range])	45.7 ± 15.4, 46, [18–79]	555
Gender (% women)	58.1%	556
Years of formal education (mean ± SD, median [range])	11.8 ± 3.8, 12, [0–22]	554
Political affiliation (% party member)	20.5%	556
Household monthly expense in RMB (mean ± SD, median [range])	3693.9 ± 3893.9, 3000, [300–50,000]	529

Results

Distribution of key variables

As indicated in Figure 1, most respondents report people like themselves to be rather law-abiding. For five of the six deviant behaviors, more than 70% of the respondents report it is inconceivable or unlikely that people like them would engage in such behaviors. Yet the various categories of laws generated different reactions. Most noticeably, more than 90% of respondents report it to be inconceivable or unlikely people like them would consider abandoning their responsibilities toward their family (Figure 1a and b). In contrast, people are much more likely to expect non-compliance with economic laws. Respectively 45% and 26% of respondents think people like them would have at least a 50/50 chance of either downloading unauthorized material or purchasing a stolen bike (Figure 1e and f). In between are people’s expectations of their equivalents defying the state’s authority (Figure 1c and d).

Figure 1.

Distribution of reported expectation of legal non-compliance by social relations regulated.

Figure 2 reports the distribution of the key independent variable, namely the perceived legitimacy of different types of laws. Family laws are by far the most legitimate legal rules – more than 90% of respondents consider disobeying either of the chosen legal provisions a violation of core social values (Figure 2a and b). Least legitimate appear to be laws that prohibit downloading pirated materials (Figure 2f). Only slightly more than half of the respondents think breaking such laws somewhat violates core social values. Theft laws, albeit in the same category, are perceived by more respondents to be legitimate than administrative laws, particularly family planning laws (Figure 2e, d, and c).

Figure 2.

Distribution of legitimacy of law by social relations regulated (How much does violation of the law also violate core social values?).

Figure 3 presents the distribution of the perceived likelihood of punishment under different laws. Economic laws are at the opposite end of the spectrum from the other laws. Respondents state people like them are not likely to be punished for violating private economic laws, particularly the piracy law. Almost 60% of respondents believe it is unlikely or impossible for people like them to be punished under the anti-piracy laws (Figure 3f) and about 40% think the same for theft laws. In contrast, most respondents think violating other laws is much more likely to evoke punishment. Nearly 80% think there is at least a 50/50 chance for people like them to be punished for violation under all the other laws, with the highest percentage (95%) of respondents thinking the laws that restrict freedom of assembly were likely to evoke punishment.

Figure 3.

Distribution of perceived likelihood of legal punishment for non-compliance by social relations regulated.

The aggregated ranks of perceived legitimacy and expected likelihood of punishment do not match exactly. Eighty percent of the respondents think theft laws are legitimate (Figure 2e) but only about 60% believe people like them were likely to be punished under the law for breaking these laws (Figure 3e).⁷ In comparison, fewer respondents perceive the family planning laws (70%, Figure 2d) to be legitimate than the number of them thinking people like them were likely to be punished for disobeying these laws (80%, Figure 3d).

Results of regression analyses

The results of the multivariate statistical analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the OLS results for the category-specific relationships between expectations of compliance and either the perceived legitimacy or perceived likelihood of punishment. Table 3 contains full models with both the perceived legitimacy of law and estimated likelihood of punishment. Models 2A/3A through 2C/3C each involves one of the three sub-sets of laws discussed above. The dependent variables in these models are aggregated compliance scores of the two deviant behaviors within each category, namely family laws, administrative laws, and economic laws. Model 3D in Table 3 combines all three kinds of laws and measures the general relationships between the tendency of legal compliance and perceived legitimacy/likelihood of punishment.

Table 2.

Results of partial OLS regressions modeling the likelihood of non-compliance with different types of law.

Predictor	Model 2A:Family		Model 2B:State–citizen		Model 2C:Economic
	Coefficient.	Coefficient	Coefficient.	Coefficient	Coefficient.	Coefficient.
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Legitimacy of the law	0.252***		0.347***		0.424***
	(0.061)		(0.055)		(0.063)
Likelihood of legal punishment		0.057*		0.128***		0.285***
		(0.029)		(0.040)		(0.042)
Age in years	0.005*	0.005*	0.011***	0.014***	0.023***	0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Women	0.012	0.024	0.011	0.084	0.317***	0.347**
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Years of formal education	0.003	0.006	−0.005	−0.012	−0.0024	−0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Party membership	−0.052	−0.049	0.037	0.075	0.166	0.125
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Household monthly expenditure	0.006	0.006	0.005	−0.002	−0.008	−0.005
	(0.08)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)

N	525	525	525	526	524	525
R ²	0.042	0.018	0.141	0.094	0.279	0.281

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 3.

Results of full OLS regressions modeling the likelihood of compliance with different types of laws.

Predictor	Model 3A:Family	Model 3B:State–citizen	Model 3C:Economic	Model 3D: General
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Legitimacy of the law	0.236***	0.325***	0.294***	0.310***
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Likelihood of legal punishment	0.023	0.043	0.201***	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Age in years	0.005*	0.011***	0.022***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Women	0.014	0.024	0.336***	0.121*
	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.061)
Years of formal education	0.004	−0.005	−0.016	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Party membership	−0.051	0.036	0.145	0.049
	(0.077)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.077)
Household monthly expenditure	0.006	0.004	−0.004	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.008)

N	524	525	524	523
R ²	0.043	0.143	0.305	0.181

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Results in Table 2 show the perceived legitimacy and likelihood of punishment both exhibit significant positive association with the expectations of compliance for all types of laws. However, as indicated by the comparison between models in Table 2 and those in Table 3, the relationship between perceived likelihood of punishment and the expectation of compliance is attenuated when the effect of perceived legitimacy is taken into account. Diagnostics of multicollinearity show the tolerance of either main independent variable is above 0.7 across all types of laws, indicating no reason to suspect the change in the punishment variable’s significance level as a result of collinearity. Therefore, the significant effect of perceived punishment for some laws is spurious in most cases. The following analyses thus focus on the full models in Table 3.

When assessing the overall expectation concerning compliance with all types of laws (Model 3D), I found legitimacy but not the deterrence effect of the law to be significantly associated with people’s expectation of legal compliance by others like them. These patterns resemble findings in other social contexts (e.g., Tyler, 2006a). They are nonetheless slightly surprising in the Chinese context given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese government. But does this pattern hold up for all kinds of laws or does it vary with the types of social relationships regulated by the laws?

Turning to different categories of laws, expectations concerning legal compliance varied based on the type of regulation. Specifically, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, respondents’ expectation of how likely people like them will comply with family laws (Model 3A) corresponds to their evaluations of these laws’ legitimacy – the more they think a law is legitimate, the less likely they think people like them would disobey it. In contrast, the expectation of legal compliance in this area does not correspond with people’s estimation that a violation will be punished.

Hypothesis 3 is also confirmed. In the case of economic laws, both the perceived legitimacy of law and the likelihood of punishment are positively associated with expectations of legal compliance (Model 3C). Combined with the relatively low level of perceived legitimacy of these laws, this finding suggests when it comes to concrete materials gains and losses, rational calculation is as important as, if not more important than, the values embedded in the law in encouraging obedience.

Finally, the results concerning laws that regulate state–citizen relationships deserve particular attention. Disproving Hypothesis 2, likelihood of punishment and expectations of legal compliance with these laws are not related. Also, the link between the perceived legitimacy of the law and expectation of legal compliance is as strong as that for other kinds of laws (Model 3B). This finding is curious given popular assumptions about authoritarian regimes securing the political interest by deploying aggressive measures against their citizens (Svolik, 2012). Both legal rules within this category have attracted intensive media attention and invoked heated discussion on the oppressive nature of the Chinese state (Kaiman, 2013; Wong, 2012). However, it appears, in the minds of ordinary Chinese citizens, fear of oppression is not a salient deterrent keeping individuals from defying the state. Instead, it is their belief in the righteousness of governmental restrictions on civil liberty that constrains their (potential) behaviors, indicating the potential success of the Chinese state in instilling a discourse emphasizing the value of social order and harmony over individual liberty which resonates with long-standing cultural patterns (Hwang, 1987; Sandby-Thomas, 2010). However, a comparison between the perceived legitimacy of family laws and that of administrative laws suggests there might be more to the story. Even though perceived legitimacy is strongly linked with expressed likelihood to comply with both kinds of laws, their levels of legitimacy differ considerably. As discussed above, the vast majority (> 95%) of the respondents consider laws strengthening family bonds to be legitimate while considerably fewer of them (70–80%) think the same for laws sanctioning state power. Meanwhile, the number of people predicting compliance with family laws (> 90%) is much larger than that number for administrative laws (75–80%). This disparity suggests the association between legitimacy and compliance for administrative laws could be the product of corresponding distributions of these two variables over a wider range. In other words, while some Chinese people predict a high level of compliance with laws that restrict individual liberty, preferring social stability, others might predict a relatively low level of compliance with such laws, believing they are not legitimate.

Intrigued by this finding and its implication, I conducted statistical analyses for each of the two specific legal provisions under this category. Considering the ordinal nature of the dependent variables in this case, I utilized ordinal logistic regressions for this additional analysis. Table 4 presents the results of the additional statistical analyses. As it appears in Models 4A and 4B, Chinese citizens have approached the two kinds of laws differently. Specifically, the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the law and expectations concerning legal compliance is much stronger for family planning laws than for laws restricting public assembly. Meanwhile, the likelihood of punishment is significantly associated with expected legal compliance only for the latter.

Table 4.

Results of ordinal logistic regressions modeling the likelihood of non-compliance with specific state–citizen laws.

Predictor	Model 4A:Public assembly	Model 4B:Family planning
	Coefficient	Coefficient
	$(e^{β})$	$(e^{β})$
Legitimacy of the law	−0.507***	−.761***
	(0.602)	(0.467)
Likelihood of legal punishment	−0.186*	−0.056
	(0.831)	(0.946)
Age in years	−0.026***	−0.030***
	(0.975)	(0.971)
Female	−0.122	0.042
	(0.885)	(1.043)
Years of formal education	0.040	−0.016
	(1.041)	(0.984)
Party membership	−0.177	0.049
	(0.837)	(1.050)
Household monthly expenditure	−0.019	−0.003
	(0.981)	(0.997)
N	526	525

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

OLS model taken from Table 3.

Such findings highlight the importance of a relational understanding of legal compliance. In the case of family planning laws, the intended objective of the law (to regulate population growth) intersects with social relations in a much more private and intimate space, the family. As such, the law invokes different categories of social values that conflict and compete with one another. Family planning laws in China, in addition to constraining individual reproductive rights, put two important social institutions, the state and the family, at odds with each other. Given the significance of family in Chinese society (Ebrey and Watson, 1986), this finding may indicate that violations of family planning laws in China are motivated and justified more by the commitment to the family than by defiance against the state.

Meanwhile, both the legitimacy of law and expected punishment play an important role in expectations of compliance with laws restricting public assembly. This finding partially confirms Hypothesis 2 that Chinese citizens, living under an authoritarian regime, are sensitive to the cost of challenging the state. However, the significant role of the legitimacy of this law beyond punishment suggests coercion is not the only mechanism through which the Chinese government seeks obedience from the masses, even in the political realm. Yet, the moderate level of this law’s perceived legitimacy and the salient effect of punishment in constraining civil liberty suggest the authoritarian control of the ideological sphere is open to challenge and is shored up by coercive forces.

Finally, some intriguing patterns emerge out of the effects of the demographic and socioeconomic variables. Most notably, this study finds no variation in legal compliance based on socioeconomic status or political association. Given the pivotal role of social norms in legal compliance revealed in this article, this suggests the normative social control processes in China potentially work similarly across class lines. In addition, while the effect of age is largely consistent with previous literature, the effect of gender varies across different types of law. Women express lower likelihood than men to break economic laws but are as likely to disobey the other two types of laws as men are. More research is needed to unravel the processes through which different social groups are socialized and how these processes vary across social domains.

Discussion and conclusion

In China, all things considered, it is the social values embedded in the law, rather than law’s ability to punish, that are associated with legal compliance. The significance of a law’s legitimacy under an authoritarian regime challenges the common assumption that law is inextricably connected with democracy and liberalism (Hutchinson and Monahan, 1987). It explicates laws perceived to be legitimate are not necessarily just or fair in any transcendental sense nor do they always grow out of organic social consensus. In the context of contemporary China, the legal system is likely infused with state-sponsored ideologies, especially in the political realm. This research sheds light on the extent to which such ideologies translate into individual ideas and actions. As such, it adds to previous research in showing the necessity of investigating the mechanism through which an oppressive state apparatus functions smoothly without obvious use of brutal force, constraining the consciousness and behavior of ordinary people.

Beyond connecting China to other authoritarian societies, my results point to the importance of a culturally sensitive approach for dealing with law and politics. Even though the phenomenon of authoritarian rule through legitimacy is not entirely new, my findings necessitate the cultural sources of such legitimacy be treated carefully. The drastically different levels of perceived legitimacy among categories of laws warrant a rethinking of the theoretical concept of ‘legitimacy’ in socio-legal studies. Conventionally, studies on legal compliance tend to either treat ‘law’ as a homogeneous entity or focus on a single category of law without situating it in the larger legal system and social context. Such studies tend to assume a legal system legitimated through complementary values associated with individual rights (as in the case of rights discourse) and dignity (as in the case of procedural justice). The research reveals an internal tension within the concept ‘legitimacy of the law’ and a close connection to the local context. All laws considered in this analysis are parts of the same legal system and yet are perceived by Chinese people to possess varying degrees of legitimacy. By differentiating three categories of legal provisions and explicating their particular significance in Chinese society, this research demonstrates the connection between legal compliance and legitimacy is conditioned by cultural and social locations of the law. Both the social relationships regulated by the law and the cultural values supporting the law play a role in people’s expectations concerning obedience to or defiance of the law.

More importantly, my research points to the agency of individuals in resisting and reshaping structural constraints. Specifically, the relative low levels of legitimacy of and compliance to administrative laws (in comparison to family laws) suggest, even under an authoritarian regime extremely resourceful and efficient in repressing dissent, there is space in the political realm where people express doubts and potential for disobedience. This finding opens up space for future research on the material and ideological resources that enable resistance in contexts where assumptions about law based on Enlightenment philosophies do not always hold.

Finally, the analysis here demonstrates a moderate correlation between Chinese individuals’ perceived legitimacy of the law and their perceived likelihood of punishment under the law, regardless of the actual likelihood of such punishment. This finding echoes some previous research in Western societies (Sherman, 1993) and raises interesting question about the connection between people’s normative judgments and their instrumental decision-making.

Future research should also expand discussion on the complexity of legal ideas and behaviors raised here. The current project limited the respondents’ options in questions that might have otherwise generated more extensive and nuanced responses. The survey questionnaire reveals the complexity of China’s legal culture at the macro level by illuminating patterns among diverse legal ideas. Nevertheless, it likely masks the multifaceted and self-contradictory nature of both individual ideas and behaviors. Additional interview and ethnographic data thus are needed to investigate the micro meaning-making processes and power relationships that interact with macro patterns of legal ideas, behaviors, and cultures. In addition, these data would illuminate further the content of law’s legitimacy and the mechanisms through which it is disseminated and adopted by ordinary citizens – a point not addressed by the current study. Future research on the dissemination of law’s legitimacy would also shed light on the patterns across social and demographic groups identified in this research by looking at their access to different information sources.

A couple of limitations need to be noted. First, while any survey research assumes a certain level of risk for inaccuracy, attitudinal data collected in and about authoritarian regimes arguably are more likely to contain misinformation due to respondents’ fear of repercussion for being truthful. As described earlier, both the content and the process of this research have been designed carefully to minimize this possibility. Even so, one should interpret specific numbers with caution as one might for any research in a context where information does not freely flow. However, there is no reason to suspect the general patterns discovered are systematically biased. Second, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, I cannot make any definite causal inference. This does not undermine my fundamental argument that the legitimacy of law and its relationship to legal compliance are both contingent upon the nature of the social relations regulated, but future research should work to deepen and complicate this argument by collecting longitudinal data to tease out the causal direction.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix A.

A list of violations included in the survey questionnaire.

1. Downloading pirated copies of movies and songs

2. Knowingly purchasing a stolen bike

3. Having more children than allowed by the law

4. Public assembly without official permission

5. Parents not raising their underage children

6. Adult children not supporting their aging parents

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Elizabeth Boyle, Joachim Savelsberg, Anthony Jimenez, Kim Ebert, Maxine Thompson, and the anonymous reviewers whose feedback made this paper stronger.

Funding

The research for this article was supported by NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant Award #1203139 (Co-PI with Dr Elizabeth Heger Boyle).

ORCID iD

Wenjie Liao

Notes

Author biographies

Wenjie Liao is an assistant professor of sociology, Rochester Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on the interaction between legal institutions and their cultural contexts.

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