Abstract
Nihilistic Times: Thinking with Max Weber is a work that discusses what nihilism is and offers a possible means for overcoming it. Wendy Brown uses Nietzsche as the expert on nihilism and Max Weber as the thinker who offers a possible way to fight it. Brown references many of Nietzsche’s published and unpublished writings, but she focuses mainly on Weber’s two ‘Vocation’ lectures: ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ and ‘Politik als Beruf’; actually, she uses the translations ‘Science as Vocation’ and ‘Politics as Vocation’. This book is a revised and expanded version of the Tanner Lectures that she gave during November 2019. It is highly successful when read as a political work, but if read as a piece of scholarship, it is less successful. The book has four sections: ‘Introduction’, ‘Politics’, ‘Knowledge’, and ‘Afterword’.
In the ‘Introduction’, Brown explains that the focus of the Tanner Lectures is to discuss values, and it has a goal to bring together values and knowledge which the Enlightenment had separated. Brown emphasizes that merging them now is critical, given the plethora of problems confronting humanity. She notes that it may seem counterintuitive to invoke Max Weber because he not only embraced the distinction between facts and values; he also seemed complicit with ‘some of the most sinister forces contouring our present’. Furthermore, Brown insists ‘Weber was a dark thinker’ (p. 7) and certainly he had a reputation as being volcanic. But he was realistic and that provides Brown with the first of three reasons to ‘think’ with Weber. The second was his willingness to confront the crises of liberalism. The third one which animates these essays was ‘his deep confrontation with the intellectual and political predicaments of our nihilistic epoch’ (pp. 7–10). Brown does not mean that all values have vanished nor does she suggest Weber thought the world lacked all meaning. However, she does insist that the world lost much of the basis for values when science replaced religion. She also insists that Weber contended meaning was not discovered but was made and values lack a basis for decisions (p. 14). Brown contends that while one may not always agree with Weber, his ‘Vocation’ lectures provide a means for confronting nihilism in ‘our disturbed and disturbing world’ (pp. 14–16, 20).
‘Politics’ is probably the most important chapter and it is the longest in the book. Brown begins with Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism but moves to Weber’s appropriation of it. Brown suggests as much as Nietzsche influenced Weber, Tolstoy had even more influence (p. 30). Brown is at her best when she describes Weber’s concept of the genuine leader: attracted to power but not intoxicated by it, devoted to just and realistic causes, being far-sighted and restrained (pp. 34–35). Unfortunately, this is followed by an unsatisfactory account of charisma and questionable claims that Weber fuses ‘Nietzsche with Kant’ (p. 38). Brown insists that Weber has three ethics but he has the two ideal types: the ethic of responsibility and the ethics of conviction. Brown’s conclusion is mostly correct: Weber’s political leader possesses ‘seriousness, integrity, endurance, and responsible handling of power’, but not ‘in pursuit of a world-changing cause’ (p. 53). Weber criticized those who wanted to revolutionize the world as being naïve idealists; politics meant the battle to better the world by increments.
‘Knowledge’ is focused on ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ and although there is some justification for choosing ‘knowledge’ over ‘science’ it misses much of the breadth and nuance of the German concept of ‘Wissenschaft’. Brown recognizes this as she reminds her readers that ‘science’ refers to more than the natural sciences; it ‘refers to all systematic academic study’ (p. 63). But, Brown does not think that Weber is interested in detached study. Instead, ‘Weber is at war’ – not with ‘timeless stalwarts’ – but with the ‘political, epistemological, and existential conditions of his time’. (p. 67). The chapter is less about facts as it is about virtues and values. Brown admits not to be a Weber scholar, but insists ‘Weber knows better’, ‘Weber is aware’, ‘Weber affirms’, and ‘Weber builds’, and has a ‘desperation for meaning’ (pp. 77, 78, 80, 81, 87). Brown psychoanalyzes Weber: ‘Weber is fully alert to – and likely embodied with his own paralyzing depression – the tragic dimensions of these demands on the academician’ (p. 82). But Weber acknowledged that he was fortunate to become full professor at an early age and insisted that an academic life is often a matter of luck: a ‘Hazard’. She claims Weber prohibits ‘diagnosis, critique, and advocacy’ when that is what the scholar is supposed to do – just not ‘on the political side’ – which is what Brown endorses (p. 88).
In the ‘Afterword’ Brown makes more perplexing claims: for Weber ‘knowledge is drained of passion’ and his notion of the intellectual life is one of a ‘soul-killing Protestant discipline’ (p. 90). Yet, Weber insisted that the long hours working at the desk must be accompanied by passion – Plato’s ‘mania’ – and, as with all things worth doing, it must be done with ‘passion’. Brown claims Weber draws a ‘dark line between facts and values’ and he does; but his complaint is not against ‘those who openly advance them’ but is directed against those who embed their personal beliefs in scholarly pronouncements. His opposition is not between universities and politics but between the lecture hall and the streets; one cannot argue in the former but one can, and should in the latter (pp. 61, 93, 98). Brown concludes with the plea to subsume education under values because that offers the promise of overcoming nihilism (p. 109).
This book is difficult to assess. On one hand, it has a number of flaws. These range from some minor ones such as referring to the Ludwig Maximillian Universität as the University of Munich; using outdated and misleading translations instead of new and correct ones; and the claim that ‘Science as Vocation’ is built upon Weber’s ‘earlier essays on method’ (pp. 5, 65). This is true regarding the ‘Objectivity’ essay of 1904, but it is not likely true regarding the other dozen essays on method. There are some jarring quotations and translations: Weber talked about ‘inconvenient’ facts when he insisted that they were ‘uncomfortable’ facts (p. 71). There is the non-word ‘Weltanschauungs’ made plural with an ‘s’ instead of ‘Weltanschauungen’ and then the misguided attempt to translate the singular as ‘philosophy of life’ (pp. 62, 132). But the book also is plagued by some major problems. Here are four in increasing order of importance: (1) overlooking of the three ‘virtues’ of the scholar and the lack of understanding of the three political ‘virtues’. The key notion of ‘passion’ is minimized when Weber insisted on its critical importance. (2) There is no discussion of Weber’s critique of the various ‘ways’ to ‘true Being’, ‘true art’, ‘true nature’, ‘true God’, and to ‘true happiness’ and his explanation on how these ‘ways’ are false and misleading. (3) There are many pages devoted to charisma, but there is nothing there about its religious origins nor much about the power that the charismatic leader has. There is no discussion of how a leader gains charismatic power nor how the person can lose it. Brown insists that the charismatic leader is not the same as a demagogue but nowhere does Weber make that claim. (4) Perhaps the most disturbing is the blurring together of politics and science, the melting together of facts and values, and the sacrifice of correctness for morality. Brown admits to not being a ‘Weber scholar’ and it shows. Weber would likely applaud Brown for her zeal in confronting nihilism. But there is little doubt that he would criticize her for confronting it in the lecture hall. He insisted that political discussions need to be held in the streets where issues can be openly and publicly debated. Brown discards Weber’s insistence that it is imperative to make it clear when one shifts from facts to values; from being a professor to being a leader. Brown has passion and knowledge and she is to be commended to invoke Weber in her fight against nihilism. If one seeks enlightenment in the political struggle, then the book is highly recommended. But if one wants to understand Weber’s thinking, then Nihilistic Times will disappoint. The stark choice is between facts or values; there can be no compromise. Either one chooses to be a teacher and remain within the realm of knowledge or one moves to the political arena where persuasion is paramount. Brown forces the reader to choose: Weber’s side or her side. Brown asks us to join her in the personal fight against the forces of nihilism, but as a scholar who recognizes the need to keep universal truths separate from individual values, I must side with Max Weber.