Vox in Spain: Similarities and differences with the far-right family

Introduction

Vox is not a recent newcomer in Spanish politics. Founded in December 2013 by former leaders and members of Spain’s primary center–right party, the Partido Popular, it counts its current leader, Santiago Abascal, among its founding members. Although the party has been politically active for over a decade, it only began to significantly influence Spanish politics in 2019. Since then, Vox has become a prominent actor, not only within Spain but also in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, in the broader European context.

Vox presents a somewhat unique case within the European far-right landscape. While its electoral strength within Spain is waning, its international standing continues to solidify. This duality – domestic decline paired with international ascendancy – renders Vox an intriguing and complex subject for study.

Domestically, Vox remains far from achieving its objective of overtaking its primary rival on the right, the Partido Popular (PP). Its electoral weakness contrasts sharply with the success of other radical right-wing populist parties across Europe – such as the French National Rally and the Dutch Freedom Party – which have surpassed their Christian Democratic counterparts and become the dominant forces on the right in their respective countries. Similar trends are evident in Italy and even in Flanders, Belgium. Across much of Europe, the far right has either eclipsed or seriously challenged the political dominance of center–right parties. In this respect, Vox diverges from the broader European trend, although it still manages to exert ideological influence over the PP.

However, on the international stage, Santiago Abascal’s party demonstrates considerable influence and maintains an impressive network of contacts. Vox’s international agenda spans actors from not only the Latin American conservative right but also the European radical right and the US Republican Party. The party has positioned itself as a central figure in understanding the ties between the European far right and the radical right across the Americas. On the global stage, Vox has carved out a role as a vital bridge or nexus between various right-wing actors.

This role was prominently displayed in May 2024, during a rally organized by Vox in Spain, which brought together global far-right leaders such as Marine Le Pen (France), Javier Milei (Argentina), José Antonio Kast (Chile), André Ventura (Portugal), Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland), Giorgia Meloni (Italy), and Viktor Orbán (Hungary). Vox’s bridging role is further reflected in its creation of the ‘Madrid Forum’, ¹ an alliance of conservative parties and organizations from Europe, Latin America, and the United States. In addition, this role as a meeting point for right-wing parties from across continents has been institutionalized through the permanent structure of the Madrid Forum and its regular global and regional summits.

The primary objective of this article is to conduct an in-depth analysis of Vox as both a political and strategic actor within the broader context of the Western far right. In this regard, the article seeks to examine the similarities and differences between Vox and other members of the family of so-called Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs; Mudde, 2007). Specifically, this analysis aims to identify the ideological and strategic factors that both align Vox with and distinguish it from other parties within this political spectrum. Furthermore, the study explores the extent to which strategic considerations impact the ideological orientation of the party.

The article is structured as follows. The first section examines the history of Vox, highlighting the elements it shares with other parties in its ideological sphere and determining the most suitable label to define the party. The second section analyzes Vox’s position within Spain, paying particular attention to its electoral trajectory and the rise of new competitors on the far-right political landscape. The third section explores the central concept coined by Vox – the ‘Iberosphere’ – which the party employs to solidify its international standing as a bridge between right-wing movements in the Americas and Europe. Finally, the fourth section delves into one of the theoretical implications of the Iberosphere, ‘ethnic Hispanism’, and its influence in shaping Vox’s ideological agenda within the broader Western far-right spectrum.

Methodologically, this article is structured around four key pillars. First, it examines the results of Vox in the most recent Spanish elections. Second, it provides a qualitative analysis of eight speeches delivered by the party’s leader between 2018 and 2024. Third, it draws upon five in-depth interviews with individuals involved in Vox’s strategic and communications teams, as well as members of its primary think tank, the Dissenso Foundation. Finally, the article analyzes discussions from the second summer university organized by ISSEP, an institution closely aligned with the party, focusing on concepts like the ‘Iberosphere’, ‘Hispanicity’, and the ‘Spanish Empire’.

Vox and the European radical right

There are three key questions regarding Vox’s relationship with the European radical right. The first concerns the acceptability of parties ideologically aligned with the PRRP family in countries such as Spain and Portugal, given their recent history of long-standing right-wing military dictatorships. The second focuses on the ideological nature of Vox, with scholars divided between those who perceive it as merely a split from the PP and those who argue it shares significant ideological commonalities with far-right formations such as the French National Rally, the Polish Law and Justice Party, or the Dutch Freedom Party. The third question, informed by comparative studies and monographs, explores which party or parties are most ideologically aligned with Vox, whether in Europe or within the Latin American context.

Regarding the first question, it was long assumed that Spain and Portugal were inhospitable to the rise of radical right-wing populist parties. This view, which persisted until 2019, was supported by the argument that the proximity of the Salazar and Franco dictatorships made it difficult for radical right formations to take root in the Iberian Peninsula (Marchi, 2012; Rodríguez Jiménez, 2012). Scholars applying this thesis extended it to Portugal as well, arguing that both countries, having recently experienced long right-wing military regimes, lacked the conditions for the emergence of a radical populist right comparable to that seen in other parts of Europe (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015). Notably, this view was also shared by many of the radical populist right parties themselves, which regarded Spain and Portugal as ‘immature’ environments for the development of political movements akin to their own (Fernández-Vázquez, 2019).

The second question – closely tied to the first – centers on whether Vox should be seen as ideologically similar to the European radical populist right, or if it represents a neo-conservative offshoot of the PP. Early academic work on Vox, particularly before 2019, emphasized its ideological distinctiveness, characterizing it as a party focused primarily on issues like sexual and reproductive rights, the Basque conflict, and historical memory (López-Diéguez, 2019; Monedero, 2019; Sáez, 2019; Urbán, 2019). These scholars argued that Vox functioned more as a pressure group within the Spanish right, driven by a neo-conservative agenda, rather than as part of a broader European radical right trend. Furthermore, some argue that Vox’s initial electoral success was not tied to economic factors, as in other European cases, but rather to a nationalist response to the Catalan independence movement (Barrio et al., 2021; Vampa, 2020).

However, this view has shifted since 2019. More recent contributions almost unanimously categorize Vox as ideologically aligned with the radical populist right, emphasizing the similarities between its political platform and that of its European counterparts (Ferreira, 2019; Polo-Artal, 2023; Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2024). Studies have underscored the nativist nationalism promoted by Vox, which echoes the nativist discourse prevalent in other far-right parties across Europe. Scholars have also noted Vox’s embrace of authoritarian ‘law and order’ rhetoric, a hallmark of radical right parties (Marcos-Marne et al., 2024). In addition, a number of studies have investigated Vox’s political communication strategy, analyzing its populist style (Aladro Vico and Requeijo, 2020; Franzé and Fernández-Vázquez, 2021).

The third question focuses on which parties, either in Europe or Latin America, most closely resemble Vox in ideological terms. Comparative studies and monographs have examined Vox alongside parties such as Chega in Portugal (Adorf, 2021; Ramos Antón and Baptista, 2022), Brothers of Italy (Berti et al., 2024; Forti, 2022), Alternative for Germany (Gould, 2019), and Law and Justice in Poland (Martín et al., 2022). These studies consistently find a high degree of ideological overlap between Vox and these parties. In the Latin American context, Vox’s platform has been compared with that of Brazil’s Social Liberal Party, founded by Jair Bolsonaro (Tortti Galán, 2023), as well as to different strands of the Colombian radical right (Botero and Jaimes Prada, 2023). More recently, scholars have drawn parallels between Vox and Argentina’s Freedom Party, led by Javier Milei (Forti, 2024; Gamboa and Troyano, 2021; Stefanoni, 2024).

In summary, there is now broad academic consensus that Vox should be regarded as the ‘Spanish expression’ of a wider political family that spans both Europe and the Americas. While certain aspects of its foundation and electoral rise may be unique to Spain – particularly the party’s initial response to the Catalan crisis – Vox is now understood as part of an international movement. This movement, organized around parliamentary groups in Brussels and regular international forums, shares a common ideological foundation and targets the same political adversaries across the globe. Within this context, Vox can be identified as a key player in a global political and ideological trend, connected not only to Europe’s radical right but also to its Latin American counterparts.

Vox’s electoral evolution

Vox’s electoral trajectory has not followed a linear path. Founded in December 2013 under the leadership of Santiago Abascal, the party did not achieve political representation until late 2018. Since then, its journey has been marked by significant contrasts. At the national level, Vox reached its electoral peak in the November 2019 general elections. However, this success was followed by a gradual decline, first confirmed in the July 2023 elections and later corroborated by successive polls conducted by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research (CIS).

Initially, Vox’s electoral performance was lackluster. The party participated in the general elections of 2015 and 2016, achieving extremely poor results. Nevertheless, its fortunes began to shift dramatically following the escalation of the Catalan independence crisis and the illegal referendum held on 1 October 2017. ² In the April 2019 general election, Vox made a significant breakthrough, securing 10% of the vote, which translated into 24 seats in the Spanish Parliament, positioning it as the fifth-largest political force. This electoral success marked a turning point for the party. Even so, the April election results led to a fragmented parliament, with no party able to form a stable government. As a result, new elections were called in November 2019.

The November elections were held in a political environment highly favorable to the radical right. Voter dissatisfaction with the repeated elections and the perceived lack of leadership among the major parties created an opening for Vox (Simon, 2022). Seen as a ‘new’ force untainted by the shortcomings of more established parties, Vox capitalized on this discontent (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020). The timing of the elections also coincided with the Spanish Supreme Court’s sentencing of Catalan independence leaders, sparking widespread protests and unrest across Catalonia. Vox seized upon this volatile political climate, securing 15% of the vote and becoming the third largest party in Parliament with 52 seats, more than doubling its representation in just 7 months.

Despite this extraordinary result, Vox’s electoral momentum has since waned. In the July 2023 general election, the party’s support fell to 12%, resulting in a significant loss of parliamentary representation, as it retained only 34 seats. Furthermore, subsequent polls suggest that Vox’s decline is likely to continue, with projections indicating support in the range of 9–11% of the vote (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

Vote for Vox in the Spanish general election 2015–2023. ³

Several factors contribute to this electoral decline. First, there is an evident sense of discouragement and strategic confusion within the party following the 2023 election results. Vox had expected an opposition victory and hoped to negotiate a coalition government with the Popular Party (PP), a scenario supported by pre-election polls (Vall-Prat and Rondon, 2024). As one member of Vox’s communications team noted, ‘We did not foresee such a negative outcome. While we knew we could lose some representation, we were convinced that this would be offset by entering the government and possibly securing key ministries’ (A. Ávila, Personal communication, 10 May 2024).

Second, Vox faces a growing challenge in surpassing the PP. Given the current electoral landscape, it seems unlikely that Vox will overtake its center–right rival in the future. This situation contrasts with the political dynamics in other European countries, where radical right parties such as the French National Rally, Brothers of Italy, and the Dutch Freedom Party have either surpassed or posed serious challenges to their Christian Democratic counterparts. In comparison, Vox remains one of the weaker radical populist right parties in Europe from an electoral point of view (see Figure 2). ⁴

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Figure 2.

Far-right election results. ⁵

Third, Vox is encountering new competitors on the far-right fringes of Spanish politics. One such competitor is ‘Aliança Catalana’, a regional party challenging Vox’s dominance of the anti-immigration discourse in Catalonia. Another is the electoral platform ‘Se Acabó La Fiesta’ (SALF), founded by a former Vox-affiliated journalist. SALF has gained traction, securing 4.5% of the vote and three seats in the European Parliament. Vox is particularly concerned by SALF’s appeal to young male voters, a demographic they both target. A member of Vox’s communications team noted, ‘SALF’s advantage lies in its ability to avoid taking a stance on every issue. This lack of ideological rigidity can be an asset in debates on topics like abortion or euthanasia’ (D. Alda, personal communication, 13 May 2024).

In response to these domestic challenges, Vox has increasingly focused its efforts on the international stage. The party has shown considerable innovation in forming alliances and developing new concepts. Currently, Vox’s significance lies more in its international positioning, where it has emerged as a strategic actor, rather than in its domestic electoral prospects. By positioning itself as a key player in the ‘cultural battle’ being waged by the radical right across the Western world, Vox is solidifying its role as a strategic link between different right-wing movements.

Iberosphere as a strategic asset

The term ‘Iberosphere’ is a neologism created by Vox, modeled after the concept of the ‘Anglo-sphere’. The Spanish party introduced this term in late 2019, and since then, it has been used to describe a geographical sphere of influence that Vox strategically targets. This sphere includes Spain, Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Portugal.

Spain was the dominant colonial power in the Americas from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. During the sixteenth century, the Spanish Empire consolidated its control over virtually all of Central and South America – excluding Brazil – the entire region of present-day Mexico, and much of North America’s west coast. Spanish colonial rule persisted until the early nineteenth century, when large parts of the former empire – modern-day Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, among others – declared independence after defeating the Spanish forces.

Historically, Vox associates the concept of the ‘Iberosphere’ with the former Spanish Empire, emphasizing its ‘cultural and civilizational heritage’. In Vox’s discourse, the term ‘Iberosphere’ is used interchangeably with ‘Hispanidad’ and ‘Hispanic Empire’. This linguistic fluidity aims to modernize imperial terminology and symbolically rehabilitate Spain’s colonial history by removing negative connotations. In this context, Vox uses the term ‘Iberosphere’ as a ‘conceptual weapon’ against critics of Spain’s history, particularly those who propagate the ‘Black Legend’ (González, 2024), a critical narrative that emphasizes the violence of the Spanish conquest and colonial domination in the Americas. To counter this narrative, Vox promotes cultural materials that offer a ‘more favorable interpretation of Spain’s imperial legacy and its role in the Americas’ (Orella, 2024).

For example, Vox has publicly supported documentaries such as España, la primera globalización and Hispanoamérica: canto de vida y esperanza, both directed by José Luis López Linares. The party has also promoted the book Imperiofobia by Elvira Roca Barea on its social media platforms and has encouraged Spanish filmmakers to create films or series about Admiral Blas de Lezo, one of the most renowned military figures of the Spanish Empire. ⁶

Theoretically, the concept of the ‘Iberosphere’ draws from the writings of Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno (1999), particularly his book España frente a Europa (Spain Versus Europe). Bueno (1999) argues that the ‘Iberosphere’ is both a geographical and symbolic space representing Spain’s ‘greatest creation’ –the ‘fruit of Hispanidad’ (p. 378) – and a vocational mission: a ‘historical duty’ and the embodiment of the ‘Hispanic ideal’ (Bueno, 1999: 380). Accordingly, the ‘Iberosphere’ also serves as a caution against two potential risks for Spain: the federalist vision of the European Union and the country’s possible opening to Africa and the Maghreb. In opposition to these temptations, the Iberosphere project seeks to reorient Spain’s influence back toward the Atlantic, focusing either on the United States or Latin America.

From a strategic perspective, the Iberosphere is described by Eduardo Fernández Luiña, Director of Studies at Vox’s Disenso Foundation, as an ‘area of economic, cultural, and political influence’ (E. Fernández-Luiña, personal communication, 11 March 2022), both for Spain as a country and for Vox as a political party. It is worth noting that Spain is the third-largest investor in Latin America after the United States and China. According to Fernández Luiña, the Iberosphere project calls for greater ‘economic coordination for a market of more than 800 million inhabitants’, increased emphasis on the cultural bonds that unite these countries, and stronger ‘political cooperation’ to defend ‘democracy, the rule of law, and individual freedoms’ across the region. In this sense, the Iberosphere serves as a conceptual framework to be used strategically in the political, economic, and cultural arenas.

The result of the Iberosphere project has been the creation of international forums, particularly the Madrid Forum, where a shared ideological vision is promoted and a common political strategy is outlined. This ideological framework operates on two levels of hostility. Regionally, it targets Latin American political parties and leaders associated with the São Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group, which Vox labels as ‘enemies of democracy, freedom, and Western values’. ⁷ This group of enemies includes the Brazilian Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of Cuba, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, and Bolivia’s MAS, all of which are part of the São Paulo Forum and have held significant political influence in the region in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Other targets include Mexico’s ruling Morena party and several former presidents aligned with the Puebla Group, including Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolivia), José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Spain), and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil).

The concept of the Iberosphere thus emerges as a political call to action for ‘patriots and democrats on both sides of the Atlantic’ ⁸ to unite against left-wing governments and progressive think tanks throughout the region. The Iberosphere serves two primary functions. First, it acts as Vox’s ‘introduction’ to the conservative sphere in Latin America. Second, it operates as an initiative, spearheaded from the metropolis, aimed at raising awareness and mobilizing the European radical right ‘in defense of freedoms in Ibero-America’. ⁹ In this capacity, it offers support and coordination to opposition groups and platforms in countries such as Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela. The key to the Madrid Forum lies not in the complete ideological uniformity of the participating groups, collectives, and political parties, but rather in their shared adversaries and overlapping strategic objectives.

The second level of hostility pertains to the increasingly multipolar nature of the global order, with China identified as the foremost geopolitical threat. In this context, the Iberosphere is positioned as ‘the response of nations with an Iberian heritage to the growing influence and power of Russia and, more critically, China’ (E. Fernández-Luiña, personal communication, 11 March 2022). As Luiña articulates, ‘In a world of blocs, the Iberosphere holds the potential to play a pivotal role alongside the Anglo-Saxon world and the broader Western bloc’. He further asserts, ‘In an increasingly chaotic world, the ability to establish a secure sphere in response to the rising influence of other superpowers is of paramount importance’. Thus, the Iberosphere embodies a coordinated effort by social, economic, and political actors – through forums and summits – to align with the ‘Atlanticist’ bloc in a complex and competitive multipolar world, particularly in regions where geopolitical competition with China is intensifying.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Iberosphere project gained significant momentum following Vox’s participation in the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in February 2020. During this visit, Vox leaders had the opportunity to engage with key figures from the US Republican Party, as well as with Luis Almagro, then-president of the Organization of American States. Although the term had been introduced in September 2019, its usage remained intermittent and hesitant until the CPAC event. ¹⁰ Since that critical juncture – and particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic – Vox has not only consistently employed the term but has also intensified efforts to consolidate and expand the project. These efforts include the establishment of the Madrid Forum and the organization of the so-called Iberosphere Summits. Significantly, since 2020, the number of Vox-led tours in Latin America has increased, paralleling the rise in participants at the Madrid Forum and signatories of the Madrid Charter.

Through the Iberosphere project, the Spanish radical right seeks to position itself as a bridge or communication hub among organizations that share both political opposition to the global left and a geopolitical alignment with the Atlanticist bloc. This central positioning situates Vox at the intersection of multiple channels of communication. First, Santiago Abascal’s party has emerged as a crucial intermediary between the burgeoning Latin American right and the US Republican Party. Second, Vox has become a nexus connecting the European radical right with its Latin American counterparts. ¹¹ In both instances, Vox’s role is to facilitate connections between diverse sectors of the Western radical right. In essence, through the Iberosphere project, Vox aspires to serve as the convener, bringing together groups that were previously distant from one another.

Finally, the Iberosphere project has a tactical objective: to ‘develop an agenda of contacts and international relations with conservative forces across Latin America’ (I. Sevilla, personal communication, 11 March 2022). Isidoro Sevilla, a member of Vox’s political communications team, emphasizes both the strategic importance of this initiative and the success in having ‘established a robust network of contacts even before [Vox] has assumed governmental power’. The overarching aim of the Spanish radical right is to surpass the PP in the domain of international relations, so that ‘conservative parties across both American hemispheres turn to Vox before they approach the PP’ (JM. Sayago, personal communication, 7 May 2022). In the short term, the goal of Santiago Abascal’s party is for figures like Javier Milei (Argentina), José Antonio Kast (Chile), Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), and María Corina Machado (Venezuela) to view Vox as their ‘principal ally’ and ‘reference party in Spain’ (I. Sevilla, personal communication, 11 March 2022). In this context, the Iberosphere project serves as a tactical maneuver designed to replace the traditional right-wing PP as the main actor in international relations with Spanish-speaking countries.

Hispanic nativism as a distinctive feature

Theoretical reflections on the concept of the Iberosphere introduce a second dimension in which Vox slightly diverges from the so-called PRRPs. Specifically, the concept of the Iberosphere, and its connection to the notions of Hispanidad and Empire, provides an opportunity to nuance Vox’s nativism. According to Cas Mudde (2007), nativism is defined as ‘an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group – the nation – and that “non-native” elements – both people and ideas – pose an existential threat to the nation-state’ (p. 22). Mudde further emphasizes that nativism is central to the ideology of PRRPs.

Initially Vox adopts a nativist stance, asserting that the Spanish nation belongs, by ius sanguinis, to a specific group: the native-born. Numerous speeches by Vox (2018) convey nativist messages, such as ‘In Spain, Spaniards come first’ and ‘Spain first’, which echo Donald Trump’s well-known slogan ‘America First’, as well as the promise that ‘Spaniards will always come first in Spain’. These nativist assertions are intertwined with a virulent anti-immigration discourse.

However, within the broader context of its generally negative discourse on immigration, Vox introduces a minor ‘exception clause’ linked to the concept of the Iberosphere. According to this clause, migrants from the countries that comprise what Vox refers to as Hispanidad would receive preferential treatment, allowing them to be ‘welcome’ in the former metropolis. The arguments in favor of this ‘exception clause’ and ‘preferential treatment’ are twofold. The first, of a pragmatic nature, asserts that while Spain continues to face a ‘pressing birth rate problem’, there exists an ‘opportunity in immigration from the sister countries of Ibero-America, with which it shares language, values, and culture’. ¹² Similarly, the document 100 Measures for a Vibrant Spain affirms that in matters of migration policy, priority will be given to ‘those nationalities that share linguistic and cultural ties with Spain’ (Vox, 2019: 6), further promising a plan to regulate and promote migration flows from the Ibero-American sphere (Vox, 2019: 24).

The second argument, political in nature, asserts that the inhabitants of the Iberosphere are historically and culturally linked to the native Spanish population and can thus be considered ‘brothers’ and, practically speaking, ‘compatriots’. In fact, Vox’s leader, Santiago Abascal, has readily employed the term ‘compatriots’ ¹³ to describe Mexican, Colombian, Venezuelan, and Argentine immigrants residing in Spain or the United States. According to Vox, the citizens of the Iberosphere form an integral extension of the native Spanish group, acting as a supportive ‘auxiliary belt’ surrounding the indigenous nucleus, both complementing and reinforcing it.

This logic of preferential treatment for citizens of the Iberosphere can be defined as ‘Hispanic nativism’ or ‘Hispanist ethnicism’. Within the broader context of the European radical right, the inclusion of these individuals into the Spanish national group represents a distinctive form of nativism. It constitutes an expanded form of nativism that continues to express hostility toward immigration from Africa and Asia – particularly against Muslims – while simultaneously opening the ethnic nation to citizens from former Spanish colonies. The logo of the pro-Vox media outlet La Gaceta de la Iberosfera visually encapsulates this concept (Figure 3).

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Figure 3.

Iberosphere magazine logo. ¹⁴

There are no equivalents to ‘Hispanic nativism’ within other formations of the so-called PRRPs, including those in countries with significant colonial histories, such as France, the United Kingdom, or Belgium. Surprisingly, no forms of ‘expanded nativism’ have emerged in the case geographically and culturally closest to Spain and the concept of the Iberosphere: Portugal. To date, no indications of this broader form of nativism have been observed within Chega, Portugal’s principal radical right party.

Moreover, ‘Hispanic nativism’ serves an additional function for Vox. Spanish-speaking citizens of the Iberosphere are seen as potential agents of ‘Hispanicisation’ or ‘Spanishisation’ in metropolitan areas where, in addition to co-official languages, separatist tensions exist, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country. As one member of Vox’s communications team acknowledges: ‘The citizens of the Iberosphere who reside in Barcelona, Bilbao, or Tarragona are, in principle, unlikely to feel compelled to learn a language other than Spanish, and even less inclined to support secessionist projects’ (A. Ávila, personal communication, 5 May 2024). This presumed resistance of Iberosphere citizens to Catalan and Basque nationalism could, in the medium term, benefit the unity of Spain, but more importantly, it could contribute to ‘the cohesion and vitality of the various Hispanic cultures’ (I. Sevilla, personal communication, 11 March 2022). Consequently, this form of expanded nativism would function both as a check on centrifugal forces and as a means of reinforcing the cohesion of the native core.

Conclusion

From a programmatic perspective, Vox embodies the key characteristics attributed by Cas Mudde to the family of PRRPs. There is broad academic consensus that the party, led by Santiago Abascal, promotes a particularly strong and uncompromising form of nativist Spanish nationalism. Similarly, there is near-unanimous agreement that the authoritarian aspects of Vox’s political platform justify its classification as a ‘law and order’ party. Although several scholars have demonstrated the populist nature of Vox’s rhetoric, it is somewhat less pronounced compared with other PRRPs. Furthermore, recent comparative studies underscore the convergences between Vox and other far-right political formations in Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia.

Vox’s involvement in the European Parliament – initially as a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, and later as part of the ‘Patriots for Europe’ (EP) group – further consolidates its broader ideological alignment. The same applies to the party’s participation in various summits and forums organized by this political family.

However, Vox’s current political significance does not lie within Spain. Domestically, the Spanish radical right faces electoral stagnation and strategic disorientation. Indeed, it is one of the least electorally successful members of the European populist radical right. The party, led by Santiago Abascal, has been thwarted in its efforts to enter government and is now contending with the rise of new right-wing competitors within Spain’s political spectrum.

Conversely, Vox’s political and strategic influence at the international level is growing. Through the concept and project of the Iberosphere, Vox has successfully positioned itself as a key player in two different streams of political relationships. First, Vox has become a nexus between the new Latin American right and the US Republican Party. Second, through the ‘Madrid Forum’ and the so-called ‘Iberosphere Summits’, the Spanish party has assumed a pivotal role between the new Latin American right and the older European radical right parties.

The strategic success of the Iberosphere project has led Vox to reassess its initial approach to nativism. In particular, the Spanish party has revised key elements of its nativist framework by extending the boundaries of the native group to encompass individuals from the Iberosphere. This expanded iteration of nativism, referred to as ‘Hispanic nativism’, represents a distinctive phenomenon within the broader spectrum of PRRPs.

Vox’s strategic trajectory also presents a compelling case for scholarly analysis. After facing setbacks in domestic politics, the party has embarked on an ambitious and expansive international agenda. This strategy has provided Vox with greater international visibility, serving as a counterbalance to its declining electoral momentum in Spain and the tactical challenges it faces domestically. As a result, Vox exemplifies a unique case in which a European radical right party strategically pivots toward the international stage to mitigate domestic weaknesses. Whether this focus on global outreach and the Iberosphere will enable Vox to solidify its position as a central player in Spanish politics remains an open question.