Urban regeneration companies and their institutional setting: Prevailing instabilities within the West Midlands,England

Abstract

Urban regeneration companies were adopted by the UK government during the 2000s as a property-orientated economic development initiative. Compared to earlier urban development corporations, urban regeneration companies lacked dedicated funding and depended upon the planning and regeneration capabilities of partner agencies. Evaluative perspectives on urban regeneration companies have often been favourable, though the depth and breadth of analysis has been limited, particularly beyond three core city pilots. Outstanding institutionalist questions remain about the diverse settings within which urban regeneration companies operated and their relationship with local authorities. Drawing on interviews this paper investigates the reasons for and operation of three West Midlands-based urban regeneration companies, all within the de-industrialising Black Country sub-region. Rather than early support for government steering towards partnership working, attention is drawn to evidence of pragmatism, resistance and compromise. The potential for local institutional dynamics to influence the stability of regeneration initiatives is then acknowledged as illustrated by officer level tensions associated with existing projects, experiential learning and ground level outcomes. Compared to prevailing urban regeneration company perspectives, the Black Country urban regeneration companies lost momentum prior to national austerity. Future questions remain about appropriate forms of regeneration within smaller settlements with problematic industrial legacies and the capacity of local authorities to advance collaborative forms of regeneration.

Keywords

area-based initiatives Black Country institutional tensions urban regeneration companies

Urban regeneration companies (URCs) were introduced in the United Kingdom from 1999 to encourage property-based forms of economic development. In terms of urban policy history, URCs emerged shortly after the cessation of the property-orientated urban development corporations (UDCs) that had been adopted by the national Conservative government (1979–1997). Operating at arms-length from local authorities, URCs were governed by public and private sector interests and employed regeneration professionals. Underpinning the adoption of a new regeneration approach were continuing patterns of uneven development, including spatial selectively by developers and investors (DETR, 2000), and electoral support for the Labour party from northern and Midland urban areas at the 1997 national elections. The incoming Labour government responded by appointing an urban task force to examine the needs of urban areas (UTF, 1999). In response to the recommendation that URCs be established, three core city pilots were introduced: Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. Following favourable early reviews (ODPM, 2004; Parkinson and Robson, 2000), the wider roll-out of URCs was supported (DETR, 2000). By 2007, 21 additional locations across England, Northern Ireland and Wales had experienced URCs – a separate policy stream emerged within Scotland. Similar to previous area-based regeneration initiatives (ABIs), URCs focused on designated areas within local authorities, though somewhat differently lacked dedicated national funding and gave greater attention to town/city centres (Jones et al., 2003). In some instances URCs were cross boundary entities that focused on sites within different local authority areas.¹

Despite representing a corner stone of the Labour government’s urban renaissance agenda, URCs have attracted limited research attention (Lord, 2009), particularly beyond the core city pilots. Prevailing commentary has often been favourable, with commentators pointing to good or amicable partnership arrangements (Jones and Evans, 2013; Parkinson and Robson, 2000; Tallon, 2010). Government documents have acknowledged that URCs attracted significant levels of private sector investment (DCLG, 2008). Academic descriptions have pointed to the involvement of URCs in substantial gateway, retail and waterfront projects (Couch and Cocks, 2011; Couch et al., 2011; Jones and Evans, 2013). Symbolic of their effectiveness, a number of URCs were transformed into city or economic development companies (EDCs) during the mid- to late 2000s (e.g. Liverpool, Sheffield). The change reflected the realisation of initial property-orientated objectives, plus national Labour government support for a new style of regeneration agency with a broader economic development remit (Couch et al., 2011; DCLG, 2007; Lord, 2009). With the onset of the international financial crisis during the late 2000s, public sector budget cuts were forthcoming and a national Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government emerged after the May 2010 elections. Public sector restructuring and deeper budget cuts followed. As funding for URC administration diminished, URCs were either wound up or ceased to function as they had. Based on the above summary, an epitaph for URCs might read that they were relatively successful and that they operated effectively during their existence. Such conclusions would, however, be drawn on a limited breadth of examples, and the local tensions commonly associated with national regeneration initiatives would be substantially under investigated and/or downplayed (e.g. Coaffee, 2004, 2005; Wallace, 2007).

The paper that follows is divided into two key sections. The first section acknowledges over three decades of centrally formulated ABIs in England and that within this timeline URCs were an initiative that lacked substantial forms of autonomy or funding. Looking beyond URCs as an example of central government ‘steering’ (Jessop, 2004), the importance of investigating the geographical and institutional context within which regeneration initiatives are embedded is acknowledged (Healey, 2006; Lowndes and Wilson, 2003). Particular institutional dimensions impinging upon the likely effectiveness of such initiatives are how and why they emerged locally and the nature of the relationship between ground level officers. To further interpret local contextual situations, the paper draws on interview material to investigate three Black Country URCs, the only URCs to be created in the West Midlands region. In common with other comparative reviews of ABIs the paper brings to the fore areas of diversity and commonality across local authority settings (e.g. Deas et al., 2000; Imrie and Thomas, 1993). Rather than revealing an underlying commitment to strengthened partnership working, the paper identifies contrasting instances of URCs being imposed, pragmatically adopted and accepted as a secondary option. Furthermore, instead of evidence of a growing commitment towards partnership working, the principal dynamic was growing tension between ground level officers, including tensions relating to existing projects, growing officer confidence and URC achievements. In contrast with prevailing perspectives there was evidence of URCs being less successful within the context of smaller de-industrialising settlements and having experienced declining momentum prior to their eventual cessation. For reasons including the desire for local authority control, central government arms-length regeneration agencies may face instability ahead of anticipated lifespans. Contextual conclusions follow about regeneration needs and requirements.

The institutional underpinning of central government initiatives in England

Conceptualising past ABIs

By the mid-2010s there had been 35 years of state-formulated ABIs in England designed to respond to economic growth requirements, uneven patterns of development and concentrated areas of deprivation. Over this timeframe an array of partnership structures were created, with the latter incorporating various combinations of public, private and community interests (Booth, 2005; Henderson, 2012). One of the most heavily scrutinised ABIs was the downward introduction of 13 UDCs in England and Wales by the national Conservative government (1979–1997) from the early 1980s. UDCs were private sector-led partnerships appointed by and answerable to the national government. Notwithstanding inter-area variation, including in terms of councillor representation, community involvement and local authority engagement (Deas et al., 2000; Imrie and Thomas, 1993), UDCs principally focused on leveraging private sector investment to redevelop derelict industrial land (Shaw and Robinson, 1998). In terms of achieving their narrow remit UDCs were relatively effective (Dabinett et al., 2001; Deas et al., 2000). The ability of UDCs to stimulate physical change reflected their financial resources and extensive powers, including land assembly and development control. Criticism was nevertheless pervasive where UDCs marginalised local authorities, unfairly acquired property, contributed to retail decentralisation and failed to address neighbourhood deprivation.

During the 1990s, building on the willingness of some local authorities to engage with UDCs, national initiatives gave renewed importance to local government (Atkinson, 1999; Hastings, 1996). Councils were thus recognised as being key partners in the realisation of more integrated and holistic forms of regeneration. ABIs that captured this sentiment included City Challenge (early to mid-1990s) and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB; mid-1990s to mid-2000s); both had dedicated funding streams over periods lasting up to 5–7 years. In both cases local authorities needed to engage in competitive bidding and demonstrate commitment towards working with local actors (e.g. Atkinson, 1999; Hastings, 1996). Grant chasing behaviours were adopted to satisfy national government requirements including an appeasing rhetoric of partnership working and economic possibility (Wilks-Heeg, 1996). After winning the 1997 national election, rather than supporting arguments for increased mainstream funding (Amin, 2005; Perrons and Skyers, 2003), the Labour government introduced several new area-based partnerships, including the 10 year New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme (e.g. Lawless, 2012) and URCs. In a break from the recent past, applications for NDC funding (approximately £50 m) were invited from the most disadvantaged areas.

The characteristics and underpinning of URCs

During the 2000s regeneration approaches also underwent a notable change when the national Labour government (1997–2010) created URCs (DETR, 2000). Compared to UDCs, which were arm’s length from the central government, URCs were designed to operate at arm’s length from local government. Also in contrast with UDCs, URCs lacked dedicated funding and were not allocated powers relating to planning, compulsory purchase and land ownership (Greenhalgh and Gudgeon, 2004; Greenhalgh and Shaw, 2003). One similarity between the initiatives was the anticipated life span of 10–15 years. The cost of URC administration, including officer salaries, was met equally by local government and regional development agencies (RDAs, 1999–2010), with English Partnerships (or the Homes and Communities Agency from 2007) – the national brownfield development agency – also a funding partner in most situations. From a governance perspective, URCs were overseen by public–private sector board structures, with the opportunity also existing to incorporate other interests (e.g. the community, voluntary or education sectors). From an operational perspective, URC actions were shaped by their board chairman (a business person), their chief executive and a small number of officers.

Whilst multi-stakeholder partnerships had been created to implement abovementioned competitively available ABIs, the principal focus was often how to utilise the available funding stream. The intensity of collaboration and levels of creativity were therefore subject to inbuilt limitations (Coaffee, 2004), as symbolised by the collapse of state-necessitated partnership structures after funding ceased (Shaw and Robinson, 1998). Where regeneration partnerships were forged in the absence of funding, such as URC partnerships, alternative policy perspectives assumed that stronger more collaborative relationships could be created (Catney, 2009). In bringing different interests together it was anticipated that mutual understandings of urban problems could be developed, and that the knowledge, skills, capabilities and resources of different stakeholders could be better integrated. Beyond the boardroom, URC officers were to play an active role in facilitating change by attracting developers and investors, including through future place-based visioning and the marketing of opportunities. URC officers would also draw upon partner agency powers and resources to address development hurdles, including those relating to land constraints, land ownership and planning permission. With stronger levels of partnership working, private sector engagement and a shared future vision, government funds could in turn be directed downwardly with greater confidence, particularly through RDAs. In terms of the emphasis given to unfunded, state-legitimised partnerships, similarities can be seen in terms of local strategic partnerships (2000–2010) and more recent (public–private) local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) created by the national Coalition government (2010–) (Henderson, 2014; Pugalis and Townsend, 2013; Shaw and Robinson, 2012).

The expansion and evolution of URCs

An early review of the three core city pilots indicated that the URC experiment held ‘considerable promise’ as a vehicle for enhancing public–private sector linkages, strategic planning, policy coordination and large-scale regeneration (Parkinson and Robson, 2000: 13). Reservations were nevertheless identified including the need for the central government to consider whether dedicated resources were necessary to strengthen the perceived power of URCs, to support match funding, to secure a degree of independence and to avoid URCs becoming bogged down in fund-raising. Parkinson and Robson (2000: 44) concluded that a ‘key test will come when they attempt to deliver their ambitious and expensive Masterplans’. Similar reservations were raised elsewhere. Greenhalgh and Shaw (2003: 175) commented that: ‘URCs are the only policy tool that is dedicated almost exclusively to the delivery of physical regeneration, but they risk being emasculated as they have no dedicated funding and no powers or resources of their own’. Substantial time and resources might therefore be consumed applying for funding, detailed development proposals might be created for un-owned (or unlikely to be owned) sites and attention might focus on less suitable land owned by regeneration partners (Greenhalgh and Gudgeon, 2004).

Such reservations noted, strong support was forthcoming from the national government. Following the review conducted by Parkinson and Robson (2000), the then Minister for Local Government and the Regions commented that: ‘these pilot urban regeneration companies are already doing well in providing their areas with the focus and co-ordination they need’ (LGC, 2000). As a result, the 2000 Urban White Paper indicated that the number of URCs would be increased to 15 (DETR, 2000). By the time that a policy stock take was completed in mid-2004, 18 had been created (see Table 1). The review concluded that URCs ‘were effective organisations for delivering focused physical development’ (ODPM, 2004: 8). For the Minister for Regeneration, URCs were a ‘fantastic tool’, which were helping to create a new focus, boost regeneration, encourage investment, stimulate environmental improvement and breathe new life into neglected areas (LGC, 2004). As reinforced by Table 1, the government decided against arbitrary limits (e.g. one or two in every region (see Parkinson and Robson, 2000)), arguing in favour of the ‘relative simplicity and cost effectiveness’ of URCs, the success and flexibility of the model, and the need for regional determination (ODPM, 2004: 7).

Table 1.

URCs in England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Their commencement, lifetime and transformation (1999–2014).

Pilots 1999–2000	2001–May 2004		After May 2004
Liverpool Vision (EDC 2008, remained Liverpool Vision, though merged with Liverpool Land Development Company and Business Liverpool) New East Manchester (2011, became a subsidiary of Manchester City Council) Sheffield One (EDC 2007, Creative Sheffield)	Bradford Centre Regeneration (ceased 2010) Catalyst Corby (EDC 2006, merged with North Northants Together Partnership (Corby, East Northamptonshire, Kettering and Wellingborough) to create the North Northants Development Company CPR Regeneration (Camborne, Pool and Redruth) (EDC 2012, Cornwall Development Company) Derby Cityscape (ceased 2010) Gloucester Heritage (ceased 2013) Hull Citybuild (EDC 2008–2010, Hull Forward) Ilex URC (on-going) (Londonderry/Derry City)	Leicester Regeneration Company (EDC 2009, merged with county-wide Invest Leicestershire to create Prospect Leicestershire) Newport Unlimited (ceased 2013) RegenCo (Sandwell) (ceased 2009) Sunderland Arc (ceased 2011) Tees Valley Regeneration (EDC 2009, Tees Valley Unlimited, an LEP from late 2010) The New Swindon Company (EDC 2010, Forward Swindon) Walsall Regeneration Company (ceased 2010) West Lakes Renaissance (Barrow-in-Furness/West Cumbria) (ceased 2011)	Central Salford (ceased 2011) 1^st East (Lowestoft/ Great Yarmouth) (ceased 2011) Opportunity Peterborough (EDC 2010) ReBlackpool (EDC 2010, subsumed into the larger Blackpool, Fylde & Wyre EDC) Renaissance Southend (ceased 2010) Wolverhampton Development Company (ceased 2010)

Source: Compiled from desktop research, Tallon (2010) and HCA (undated).

By the mid to late 2000s policy attention started to gravitate away from the URC model for various reasons. First, policy concern started to emerge as to which urban regeneration model should follow where URCs had successfully achieved their initial property-orientated objectives. Second, concern surfaced that England’s urban areas continued to fall behind European equivalents in terms of wealth creation and investment (Parkinson et al., 2006). Third, policy reviews indicated that URCs might not be the most appropriate model in all locations (e.g. three new UDCs were created in support of Greater London’s housing needs during the 2000s (Greenhalgh and Gudgeon, 2004)); that difficulty was experienced coordinating what represented a plethora of local regeneration agencies (UTF, 2005) and that a ‘sub-regional or functional economic area approach’ could help to improve local authority coordination and expand economic development activity (DCLG, 2007: 6). In response to the above considerations, public policy attention shifted to city development companies (CDCs), or as eventually termed, EDCs. Stronger national attention was also directed to city-region and sub-regional approaches (Harrison, 2010; Rees and Lord, 2013), a trend which continued and evolved with the Coalition government’s introduction of sub-regional LEPs. In addition to expanding the geographical remit of URCs, EDCs provided the opportunity to focus on broader forms of economic development (e.g. tourism, promotion, enterprise, inward investment). Lord (2009: 86) identified a ‘clamour to participate in the latest institutional experiment’. Early examples included the core city pilots of Liverpool and Sheffield, plus Hull, where St Stephens Shopping Centre had opened in 2007 (DCLG, 2008). In the case of Liverpool, Couch and Cocks (2011: 289) pointed to a ‘more holistic approach to economic development in the city’. In view of the international financial crisis, national austerity measures and the removal of the regional tier of government, the actual growth of EDCs was subdued. By 2014, one URC existed, 12 URCs had closed, one URC had been re-established as a local authority subsidiary and nine EDCs were operating (eight evolving from previously URCs, plus Regenerate Pennine Lancashire) (see Table 1).²

Institutional perspectives on URCs

Despite evidence of urban areas experiencing physical change where URCs were present (Couch and Cocks, 2011; Couch et al., 2011; Jones and Evans, 2013), there has been limited detailed research into URCs or EDCs, their operation and their contribution (Lord, 2009). In addition to the complex and dynamic nature of state spatial and scalar policy during the 2000s (Coulson, 2005), this is likely to reflect favourable reviews (ODPM, 2004; Parkinson and Robson, 2000) and the inability of less autonomous URCs to force through controversial projects. As noted above criticism was also directed towards URC capabilities (see also UTF, 2005). Where academic perspectives have been forthcoming, there has been a strong tendency for URCs to be viewed positively, because, relative to UDCs, local authorities were more heavily involved in the establishment, (administrative) funding and oversight of URCs. Jones and Evans (2013: 24) thus indicate that URCs: ‘have been a somewhat less controversial vehicle for coordination at a local level’. Yet beyond generic conclusions, outstanding questions remain about the institutional environments within which URCs operated.

From a national perspective, ABIs are open to different interpretations. They can be interpreted as part of the state’s attempt to build legitimacy (e.g. through political rhetoric), national recognition of the complexity of local problems and the need for local input, or as a centralist attempt to steer sub-national actors in desired ways (e.g. through metagovernance (Jessop, 2004)). More specific comments about the steering associated with URCs can also be made. On the one hand, URCs can be viewed as an attempt by the state to roll out what are considered effective partnership structures – e.g. public–private partnership working to rebuild inner city Manchester following bomb damage in 1996 (Couch and Cocks, 2011; Parkinson and Robson, 2000). On the other hand, URCs can be interpreted as a centralist critique of local authority actions and as a mechanism to shift decision-making power beyond the walls of local government (Catney, 2009). Looking beyond national level interpretations, institutionalist perspectives acknowledge that new policy directions are always introduced into existing settings. Given variability across such settings, whether geographical, institutional or otherwise, there remains considerable uncertainty as to how new policy directions are locally interpreted, adopted and implemented (Healey, 2006; Lowndes and Wilson, 2003). Top-down and bottom-up institutional influences therefore interact in place, with higher levels of government determining how much local diversity will be tolerated and local authorities contingently deciding how much commitment will be given (Lowndes, 2009).

Past institutional perspectives have highlighted the potential for ABIs to be resisted locally as an unwanted intrusion, pragmatically adopted as a source of funding, treated somewhat dismissively by local authorities or tightly controlled by paternalistic councils seeking to remain dominant actors (Coaffee, 2004, 2005; Robinson et al., 2005; Wallace, 2007; Wilks-Heeg, 1996). Comparable URC commentary has frequently focused on the core city pilots. Catney (2009: 62), for example, acknowledged councillor concern that URCs were: ‘forcing local authorities to share power, hence weakening them and hollowing out local democracy’ (i.e. pragmatic acceptance based on the absence of alternative funding opportunities). In the case of Manchester, Evans (2007) pointed to pragmatic support by Manchester City Council based on the council’s capacity to locally steer ABIs towards furthering its own regeneration plans. Couch and Cocks (2011), in contrast, indicated how Liverpool’s URC built upon growing evidence of partnership working between local regeneration interests, including a more ‘mature’ approach by the city council towards the central government and local partnership working (see also Cocks, 2009).

Beyond local political perspectives and commentary about boardroom relations, an additional institutional aspect shaping the local embeddedness of ABIs is the interaction between local officers. This dimension has particular relevance in the case of URCs given high levels dependence upon local authority powers. Rather than introduced into local authority areas void of anything historical or pre-existing, ABIs emerge within spaces consisting of local officers, plans, projects, programmes and targets (Hibbitt et al., 2001; Lawless, 2012; Purdie, 2001). Faced with the introduction of a new regeneration agency, council officers, in particular, may perceive that their efforts and achievements are being questioned and/or down-valued. Future ideas, should funding become available, and career prospects may also be considered threatened. Council officers are further likely to be concerned where responsibilities are lost or where ABI officers are perceived to be granted greater freedom and payment for undertaking similar jobs. In the case of URCs, regeneration practitioners were considered better able to mediate between public and private sector interests based on their independence and in-depth knowledge of both sectors. URC officers were therefore introduced over and above council employees. What can strengthen the likelihood of tension is the need for new regeneration agencies to justify their creation and continuing existence. Areas of local authority under-performance can therefore be identified and attempts made to take control of existing projects to build momentum. In doing so the past achievements of council officers can be overlooked, with new regeneration actors antagonistically viewed as stealing the kudos. Such disharmony can result in groundswells of scrutiny, protest and resistance (e.g. who is more or less ‘committed’ to place (Davies, 2004: 579)). Given the potential for new regeneration actors to create fragmentation as opposed to the integration they are often associated with (Raco et al., 2003), how such actors are embedded in place remains a critical consideration. The remainder of this paper reinforces this point by examining three URCs that were created within the West Midlands; all three were within the Black Country sub-region.

An evaluation of URCs in the Black Country sub-region of the West Midlands

The Black Country context

Based on technological advances, mineral wealth and the production of coal, iron and later steel, the Black Country emerged as the world’s first large-scale urban industrial landscape from the 1760s. By the late 19th century a new wave of industrialisation appeared centred on the manufacturing of a diverse array of transport technologies. Enormous land-based legacies extend from the Black Country’s urban industrial experiences (e.g. stability, contamination). De-industrialisation took hold during the 1970s and 1980s. Over a three decade period starting from the early 1970s, the number of manufacturing employees fell from 300,000 (50% of the workforce) to 100,000 (20% of the workforce) (BCC, 2006: B2.8). In parallel the national desire for greater economic efficiency within the local authority sector led to amalgamations. By 1974 the Black Country administrative area consisted of four urban boroughs: Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton (see Figure 1). Between 1981 and 2001, the Black Country represented a ‘shrinking’ sub-region with the population falling by 55,000 to register 1.08 million in 2001 (Dudley 305,000; Sandwell 285,000; Walsall 253,000; Wolverhampton 238,000) (Nomisweb, 2013). Despite some service sector counter-balancing (e.g. the working labour force fell by 100,000 between 1971 and 2001 to total approximately 500,000), levels of in-commuting were also rising, substantial levels of deprivation existed and further decline in manufacturing was predicted (BCC, 2006).

Figure 1.

The Black Country administrative area.

Alongside European funding and fluctuating interest in local economic development (Hall, 1995), national regeneration initiatives were introduced, including City Challenge (three), SRB (numerous) and NDC (three) programmes (Henderson, 2012). The most significant in terms of land transformation, but also the most controversial, was the Black Country Development Corporation (BCDC), which operated between 1987 and 1998. Despite such initiatives, levels of deprivation across the Black Country continued to deteriorate relative to other English local authorities.³ One additional response to socio-economic decline was the emergence of a sub-regional regeneration approach from 1999 (Henderson, 2014). In addition to reduced levels of sub-regional conflict, subsequent achievements included the creation of a sub-regional vision, a technical study and a joint planning approach (BCC, 2006; Dudley et al., 2011). Alongside sub-regional networking, three URCs were created. RegenCo was established in Sandwell in 2003, Walsall Regeneration Company (WRC) followed in 2004 and in late 2007, the Wolverhampton Development Company (WDC) commenced in Wolverhampton. A summary of key URC characteristics is presented in Table 2, including administrative funding (approx. £1 m), limited community representation, small operational teams, town/city centre orientations and substantial initial ambitions. As illustrated in Figure 1, the Black Country is contiguously joined with the regional city of Birmingham, such that the URCs could be conceptualised as advancing a multi-centric metropolitan form.

Table 2.

Summary of the Black Country URCs.

	RegenCo (Sandwell)	Walsall Regeneration Company	Wolverhampton Development Company
Time period	2003–2009	2004–2010	2007–2010
Operational funding	LA, RDA, EP/HCA	LA, RDA, EP/HCA	LA, RDA
Governance	Council (Council leader, CEO, Member for regeneration), RDA, EP/HCA, six business representatives	Three main political group leaders (Conservative, Labour, Liberal), RDA, EP/HCA, LSP, seven business representatives	Council (Council leader, CEO, Member for regeneration), RDA (2), HCA, four business representatives, university, NDC chairman
Operational team	Six	Five	Four
Area Designation	Town centre (West Bromwich), residential (Smethwick) and industrial (Hill Top)	Town centre, adjacent waterfront area, industrial areas (Darlaston, Green Lane, Leamore)	City centre, northern (Stafford Road, mixed-use) corridor
Early ambitions	‘ensure that Sandwell reclaims its economic position and plays its full part in the 21st century’, by ‘transform(ing) West Bromwich into a premier town centre’, attracting £1.9 b of investment and providing 20,000 jobs over 5–10 years	Creating ‘a vibrant 21st century Market town, with a thriving economy and an attractive physical environment’ by attracting £755 m in investment and providing 5500 new jobs over 10–15 years	Transform ‘Wolverhampton into one of the most successful urban centres of the 21st century’, by attracting £345 m of private sector investment and providing 30,000 new jobs by 2025

CEO: chief executive officer; EP: English Partnerships; HCA: Homes and Communities Agency; LA: local authority; LSP: local strategic partnership; NDC: New Deal for Communities; RDA: regional development agency.

The following sections draw on interviews conducted within the Black Country between 2007 and 2012. Interviews were conducted as part of a detailed investigation of attitudes towards regeneration within the Black Country. Whilst alternative methodological approaches might have been considered (e.g. participant observation of actor dynamics), access to decision-making settings can be problematic, initiatives are layered over time and interviews represent a more effective method for collecting reflective thoughts. Reserved forms of engagement within open forums, may, however, be replaced with unbalanced perspectives within interview situations, especially after the cessation of regeneration agencies. It was therefore deemed important to interview widely, to carefully synthesis perspectives (e.g. temporal, initiative, interest group) and to engage in comparative research. In the current research, interviews were conducted with councillors (7), council officers (23), business sector organisations and representatives (12), regeneration professionals (19) and other multi-sectorial local and regional stakeholders (30). Interviewees were identified as holding strategic positions through desktop research, with snow balling techniques also deployed. Interviews lasted for between 1 and 2 hours and where permitted were recorded and transcribed for accuracy, detailed analysis and illustrative commentary. Topics of interest included prevailing regeneration challenges confronting individual local councils and the Black Country, and attitudes towards past and present regeneration initiatives. The remainder of this paper draws on this information, alongside written documentation, to describe the prevailing institutional terrain.

The rationale underpinning the Black Country URCs

The Black Country URCs reinforce the diverse institutional settings within which ABIs are introduced and the importance of examining centralist policy prescriptions in conjunction with local institutional perspectives. Rather than URCs receiving upfront institutional support as a desired pathway towards enhanced public–private partnership working, commentary pointed to the Black Country URCs emerging in different ways and for varying reasons. Sandwell supported a URC as a pragmatic pathway towards government funding; Walsall initially resisted a URC as an unwanted intrusion and Wolverhampton accepted a URC, despite desiring a CDC.

The Borough of Sandwell was created in 1974 as an artificial amalgam of historical industrial settlements. In subsequent decades, although consistently Labour party controlled, councillor infighting over financial resources was a common source of instability. To advance regeneration activity, the BCDC was therefore imposed downwardly, largely onto Sandwell. Antagonism followed. One beneficial outcome was that with councillor attention redirected, the Borough adopted a unifying six town approach and advanced West Bromwich as the principal centre.⁴ Planning ambitions for West Bromwich grew during the 1990s, with further emphasis derived from the perceived negative impact of Dudley’s Merry Hill (out-of-town-centre) retail complex and the decentralising influence of the BCDC. With BCDCs impact on deprivation levels limited and with investment in West Bromwich slow to commence, the context existed for a favourable institutional reaction to URCs. Yet instead of being supported as a desired alternative to local authority controlled forms of regeneration, the URC was viewed as a new (or the latest) vehicle for gaining access to public sector funding to help advance the council’s own plans. If an arm’s length URC provided the trust and security that regional and national government interests desired prior to the allocation of regeneration funds, then the council was willing to pragmatically tolerate a URC: ‘The big selling point was that they would be able to cut through the red tape and access funding from people like the RDA and what have you, and the HCA [Homes and Communities Agency]’ (Sandwell council officer, 2012).

In contrast to Sandwell borough’s attempt to build internal cohesion during the 1990s, Walsall borough experienced rising levels of instability. Partly stemming from geographical conditions, notably an amalgamation of industrial settlements, substantial green belt territory and access to the core city of Birmingham, the borough of Walsall has varied between Labour and Conservative party dominance, with the party’s themselves also fractional. During the mid-1990s support existed within a ruling Labour party faction for a more decentralised approach to governance, and thus a reduction in Walsall-based bureaucracy – a national backlash resulted to avoid Conservative party propaganda about socialist tendencies. Further instability surfaced when a Conservative-Liberal coalition assumed power in 2000 and leadership infighting within the Conservative party followed. Reports of administrative mismanagement, councillors mistreating officers and disengaged staff ensued, resulting in the national government placing the borough under ‘special measures’ (2002–2005). In addition to intense external scrutiny, a new chief executive was appointed and high level officers were dismissed. The Black Country therefore contributed to continuing national anxiety towards local government during the 2000s. In response the national government also deviated from the dominant URC account by imposing a URC onto a reluctant council:

John Prescott (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM), as it was, approached us (Walsall’s leading figures) and said that the only way he would introduce funding into the town was though a URC, he would not give funding via the council… It was probably 18 months in shadow form… There was probably 18 months of political infighting before we actually got ourselves formed. It was quite an interesting time, the politicians didn’t want this imposed thing from the outside. They didn’t want it to be led by a business person. (Walsall business representative, 2011)

To obtain the support of the eventual business chairperson, a centralist steer that councillor representation be limited to the council leader was amended to enable WRC to include representation from each of the three main political parties. This outcome, plus the URC’s commitment to engaging with the council, helped to create an island of stability, within a sea of scrutiny and restructuring. Post hoc URC support strengthened for reasons including the negative impact of national scrutiny on investor confidence, the potential for the URC to engage in more open conversations and ‘a realistic [or pragmatic] view in terms of the ability of the local authority at that point to play a leading role in regeneration’ (Walsall council officer, 2012).

Like Walsall, Wolverhampton council has fluctuated in party control, though the Labour party has tended to dominate and the borough has not experienced equivalent levels of instability. Reasons include the dominance of Wolverhampton within borough boundaries, and the counterbalancing inclusion of Labour voting southern industrial settlements (e.g. Bilston) and wealthier western suburbs during 1966 boundary alterations. Perhaps in view of its historical significance as a market town with surrounding hinterland, its growth as an industrial town and its strategic importance within the Black Country, Wolverhampton was royally declared a (Millennium) city in 2001. The designation was viewed optimistically in terms of supporting the delivery of proposed flagship projects and in attracting further investment. By the mid-2000s, with city flagship progressing towards development phases (albeit slowly) and with internal dynamics constraining economic development activity, lead councillors gave their support to an ‘arms-length’ regeneration agency – an agency which could in part be justified through match funding. A city-wide development company was preferred because alongside the facilitation of new brownfield development projects, a CDC could provide a broader approach to local economic development. The external view differed, which led to the adoption of a URC. Whilst this could be interpreted as reflecting the need for development on the ground and a policy stepping stone (see Lord, 2009), for interviewees the designation provided evidence of a confused policy environment.

We wanted one of these urban (or city) development companies, which John Prescott had been talking about, but they couldn’t understand that, because they didn’t know what an urban development company was. It was coming out of DCLG (Department of Communities and Local Government), they identified them, but the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) as it was then and the RDA didn’t know what they were. They knew that there was a concept, but they said if you have a URC, and maybe if we ever find out what a development company is you can become one. (Wolverhampton council leader, 2009)

Arguably, further contributing to Wolverhampton’s support for a CDC was the sense that Wolverhampton’s status as the dominant Black Country centre was under threat and the desire to be sub-regionally distinctive. In addition to the challenge presented by the Merry Hill retail centre, WRC was promoting plans for Walsall town centre and attracting substantial attention. Notable achievements included attracting ‘Urban Splash’ in 2005, a development company with national acclaim for delivering brownfield site projects in England’s northern core cities. National interest followed, including from leading architects. By the end of 2007 Walsall had submitted the largest development application outside of the London Olympics for a new £400 m office-based (‘gigaport’) quarter centred on high speed broadband connections (WRC, 2007). Despite strengthening Black Country collaboration, historical place-based rivalries continued to be influential (Henderson, 2014).

Prevailing institutional instabilities and the Black Country URCs

Through a dynamic lens it was noticeable that interviewee commentary highlighted growing local authority anxiety towards URCs rather than strengthening support for new forms of partnership working (i.e. a path-shaping role for ABIs, e.g. Davies, 2004). Observed tensions centred upon existing projects, institutional learning and the scale of achievements. In the case of Sandwell, two major interview themes were the positioning of RegenCo relative to Sandwell Council and whether the URC was influential. In terms of the first theme, there were numerous indicators of the potential for and existence of strained inter-organisational relations. Despite RegenCo’s pragmatic adoption as a vehicle to advance the local authority’s existing regeneration ambitions, clear divisions existed between the two organisations. Common to all Black Country URCs, the chief executive was not a former council employee and council officers were not employed. RegenCo also set about establishing a distinctive identity, including through its website which described the URC as an ‘independent’ organisation with responsibilities for ‘driving forward’ rather than necessarily ‘delivering’ development. The extent to which RegenCo remained dependent on the local authority was obscure; an observation relevant to all three Black Country URC websites. At the same time, pre-existing council projects were included in RegenCo’s targets, as reflected in the scale of early ambitions (see Table 2), thus downplaying past council achievements: ‘They just jumped on the bandwagon of council owned sites that we were already bringing forward for development, and put signs up saying RegenCo are bringing this forward. There was a lot of tension’ (Sandwell council officer, 2011).

Compared to WDC and WRC, RegenCo had a (slightly) greater number of staff and was better positioned to act independently. Perhaps as a result, the URC sustained criticism for investing in compiling information and strategies, particularly when substantial documentation and detail existed within the local authority. Adding to the sense of disconnection were suggestions that some council officers were reluctant to engage, plus the perception that RegenCo tended to network with property and regeneration professionals beyond the borough – the latter being to the chagrin of local property industry interests. In 2007, a council scrutiny panel questioned the scale of impact and called for closer working between the URC and the council (Sandwell MBC, 2007). One response from RegenCo was to establish a series of 09:09:09 targets to be achieved by the 9th September 2009. Despite seeking to promote a stronger collective focus, the sense of disconnection remained.

Acting to further erode Sandwell council’s ‘pragmatic tolerance’ was the sense that limited government funding was being attracted, and that the funds that were being obtained could be accessed by better resourced in-house officers. The perception therefore grew that the URC was not actually bringing anything significant to help the local authority deliver its pre-existing growth strategy. Compounding the strengthening critique was uncertainty surrounding the contribution RegenCo was making to those developments that were proceeding (e.g. a new Sandwell College, a supermarket-led mixed-use scheme and a new office development). More disparaging commentary pointed to the URC causing unwanted confusion. Rather than lessening expectations to encourage development, the URC supported high-quality construction as a catalyst for successful places and future investment. RegenCo therefore focused attention beyond securing funding and investment towards taking a wider interest in place shaping, including engaging in discussions relating to a pre-existing supermarket-led project. Criticism followed from council officers because of the delay and unwanted intrusion, from the supermarket because of the ambiguity and from development professionals because URCs were not considered necessary to deliver supermarket schemes. Whilst on face value RegenCo ended following the council’s decision to terminate its contribution in August 2009, notably after regional and national government agencies had indicated that funding would be reduced or withdrawn, council officers were adamant that RegenCo’s opportunity to demonstrate a contribution had ceased:

These bodies act as an interface between us, council bureaucrats, and people like the RDA [Regional Development Agency] … the URC didn’t have any local authority people in it, it had people with previous private sector experience, so I think they had a useful role to play there. But they didn’t have any planning powers, CPOs [Compulsory Purchase Orders], they didn’t have any money that they held. Effectively the council was doing all of that behind the scenes. And I think eventually, bear in mind it was [jointly] costing £1m a year to run, people eventually said it is just too expensive, and it is not really achieving a great deal, and of course it wasn’t helped by the recession, that really did chop it off at its knees I suppose. … But I think there was a feeling that it did run its live, and certainly our members were … we had a leader on the board, the cabinet member for regeneration, as well as our chief executive, so we had a lot of involvement at a board level … just (of) the feeling that it wasn’t giving us any added value. (Sandwell council officer3, 2009)

As it transpired growing institutional tensions also helped to destabilise the WRC ahead of its abolition. In reflecting upon local authority–WRC relations three major tensions were notable. First, local authority concern was raised about the scale of ambition. Whilst all three URCs marketed their boroughs at international property exhibitions (e.g. MIPIM in Cannes), WRC was notably more publicity orientated as abovementioned achievements imply. Criticism was, however, forthcoming because of the way that the WRC was compiling a list of large-scale projects whose realisation would re-shape the town, but which lacked connection with place or property market realities. By 2012 a number of significant development proposals had not proceeded (e.g. Walsall gigaport, Waterfront North by Urban Splash) and a major public landmark positioned over the M6 motorway had been shelved. Regional property advisors added to the critique by indicating that an international design competition was not necessary to establish a conference venue capable of supporting Walsall’s needs. Council officers therefore indicated their support for a regeneration approach that were more sensitive to Walsall’s small town context: ‘In many ways they were a force for good in terms of stimulating us, but it kind of went beyond the realistic’ (Walsall council officer, 2012). Some developments nevertheless proceeded with support from the URC (e.g. Waterfront South residential development, new retail and supermarket stores) (WRC, 2007).

Second, from the crisis situation that confronted Walsall borough in the early 2000s, a key institutional dynamic was that council officers grew in confidence. One contributing factor was the WRC’s desire to forge close links with the borough. Intentions included improving officer responses to development proposals by translating a sense of purpose and direction. The knowledge embedded in officers therefore increased, and as their confidence grew, questions were asked about whether the WRC was necessary. Third, as with RegenCo, critical questions were raised about who was responsible and who deserved the credit. Disputed examples included the refurbishment of Walsall (Manor) Hospital and a strategic land swap and development programme involving adjacent land parcels owned by Walsall Council, Walsall College and a supermarket. As council officers grew in confidence tensions intensified, and the substantial early achievements of the WRC started to be overshadowed: ‘The council thought that they could do things themselves. Certainly the leaders of the regeneration directorate thought that they could’ (WRC officer, 2009). With the URC under increasing scrutiny, when the chairperson left for personal reasons, the chief executive followed shortly afterwards in late 2009. Despite favourable external reviews (Parkinson, 2009), the WRC thus lost its key drivers and substantial influence prior to its termination in mid-2010.

In the end, the council decided that the URC had taken it as far as it could, and that the officers were now of a different calibre, and therefore could lead this. … So our URC was not really a victim of AWM [Advantage West Midlands, RDA funding cuts], in the end it probably killed off the last little bit. (Walsall business representative, 2011)

WDC was a third wave URC that emerged later than RegenCo and the WRC, and in parallel with the onset of the international financial crisis. Whilst the WDC’s role in facilitating development also lacked transparency (e.g. high-rise student accommodation, a northern gateway hotel), a full evaluation was hindered by its shorter 3-year existence. From a state of initial optimism about a fresh approach towards development, business sector participants grew in frustration.

So from having a vision at the start, which I thought was spot on, having an independent organisation that would do what the local authority had proven unable to do, fantastic. Now, because of the recession, because of the politics, it doesn’t have a hope in hell of achieving anything at all. The recession without the politics then maybe, the recession times the politics means forget it. (Wolverhampton business representative, 2009)

Reasons for such frustration included a political swing towards a Conservative-Liberal party coalition (2008–2010) shortly after the WDC was created, with budgetary cuts following, and resistance from council officers with city-wide regeneration responsibilities. Indeed WDC was slow to be adopted because of internal protests, in addition to regional deliberations. When the WDC was eventually advanced, key flagship regeneration projects which council officers had been progressing were omitted from its remit. The URC was therefore hamstrung as its success depended on the council delivering catalytic projects, yet part of the reason it existed was to increase the level of regeneration activity. With the change in council leadership, the opportunity emerged for key officer protagonists to further undermine the URC ahead of its eventual cessation:

… it is in the nature of partnership working that you have got an in-group and your out-group, if you are in the in-group then you are committed to it, and if you are in the ‘out-group’ you are more committed to undermining it. So that is a real issue, and that is inevitable, because just by the nature of things you have people who do things, and people who tell them what to do. (Wolverhampton lead councillor, 2012)

For business sector onlookers the case for an ‘arm’s length’ regeneration organisation in Wolverhampton was never clear, particularly because the URC distracted attention from prevailing practices within the council. For development interests a major concern was the intensity of planning scrutiny. Whilst the WDC was seen as presenting a fresh face to the development world, for onlookers this was a false hope because without changing rudimentary council processes momentum would remain stalled. That URCs were dependent on local authority officers acting behind the scenes reinforced this concern. With Wolverhampton regeneration approach narrowly centred on urban flagship projects, nor was there a broader sense of direction within the council. A difference therefore existed from Walsall where a growth-orientated vision evolved between WRC and council officers, even if tensions gradually increased. In Wolverhampton, a greater sense of fragmentation was apparent with council officers indicating that the WDC: ‘didn’t have much control in the authority’. Like WRC, broader commentary pointed to the adoption of overly ambitious plans, particularly with regard to what were described pejoratively as ‘mini-Manhattan’ office-based aspirations for the city centre. Unlike WRC’s promotion of high speed internet as a catalyst, there was little underpinning WDCs vision beyond waiting for major retail and train station developments to commence. In relation to both Wolverhampton and Walsall, property industry interviewees highlighted that underlying fundamentals prohibited the scale of growth being envisaged (e.g. skill levels). With private sector funding for retail development evaporating as the international financial crisis spread (Henderson, 2011), Wolverhampton city centre and the WDC experienced major setbacks prior to its eventual termination.

Discussion and conclusion

The paper has acknowledged national concern for economic and socio-economic conditions in the United Kingdom and the adoption of plethora of spatially targeted ABIs since the early 1980s. Whilst UDCs and URCs both represent property-orientated ABIs, in contrast to UDCs, URCs have received limited research attention (Lord, 2009). Mixed conclusions are also evident for reasons including different evaluative standpoints. Whereas some commentators have compared URCs to earlier initiatives, particularly UDCs, and reached favourable conclusions about levels of stakeholder involvement (Jones and Evans, 2013; Tallon, 2010), other commentators have evaluated URCs more independently raising concern about inclusivity relative to governance ideals (Booth, 2005; Ward, 2003). One notable limitation of current institutional perspectives into URCs has been the tendency to focus on the core city pilots (Catney, 2009; Couch and Cocks, 2011; Evans, 2007), their delivery of sizeable projects and the transition of Liverpool and Sheffield towards broader focused and spatially enlarged EDCs (e.g. Couch et al., 2011; Lord, 2009). Yet with such cities representing important regional centres with substantial population catchments, the effectiveness of URCs within other geographical situation has been overlooked, including smaller de-industrial settlements which could be considered subjugated by industrial legacies and more disconnected from middle class wealth. A second limitation has been inadequate attention to the manner in which URCs were embedded in place. It was noted that new initiatives are always introduced into locally contingent situations which are inhabited by existing actors (Healey, 2006; Lowndes, 2009; Lowndes and Wilson, 2003), that local authority attitudes towards past ABIs have varied considerably and that local attitudes towards URCs have been under-investigated. Recognising the limited breadth and depth of conclusions about URCs, the current paper investigated URCs based in the West Midlands; all three were located within the de-industrialising Black Country sub-region.

Rather than the Black Country URCs building on pre-existing public–private partnerships or an underlying commitment to such networks (c.f. Cocks, 2009; Couch and Cocks, 2011), the comparative perspective brought to the fore a diversity of narratives centred on local authority leadership and control. Early political themes included resistance to a perceived central government imposition, criticism of business sector leadership and pragmatic support to access government funding to advance already adopted regeneration plans. There was also evidence of council leaders seeking to strengthen local regeneration functions within the context of short-term councillor priorities, requesting a broadly focused city-wide regeneration vehicle and receiving a property-orientated URC by default. Collectively, the results reinforce how new regeneration policies are never introduced onto a blank slate, as diverse and complex local political and regeneration situations exist. ABIs may therefore be associated with an unwanted attack on local competences and achievements. Nor does pragmatic support necessarily translate into collaborative approaches, though time may be allocated for new initiatives to show impact or funding. Underpowered and under-resourced URCs therefore faced a difficult proposition, a proposition made more challenging by deflated property markets and the complex demands placed upon funding bodies (e.g. leveraging pressures).

Looking beyond political resistance and pragmatism, an outstanding question remains whether central government ABIs are instrumental in re-shaping attitudes towards partnership working (Davies, 2004). Compared to narratives that suggested growing commitment to partnership working, the principal dynamic within the Black Country was strengthening instability. Whereas prevailing URC commentary points to amicable boardroom relations and the transition of effective URCs to broader regeneration companies, greater attention has been given to officer-level disharmony. Three key tensions related to existing projects, officer learning and the scale of achievement. To achieve and demonstrate impact, URCs were dependent upon pre-existing projects entering development phases and being of a quality that could attract future investment. Input from URC officers could, however, lead to criticism from council officers, as indeed did the re-badging of local authority projects as URC projects. A second tension emerged where regeneration ideas were less advanced and URCs endeavoured to both include and motivate local authority officers. As officers were up-skilled through experiential learning and became more confident, destabilising questions followed about who instigated or facilitated projects. Third, behind the scale of ambition that URCs used to attract private and public sector interest, destabilising questions were raised about what URCs were actually contributing, particularly when government funding and development activity were limited relative to bold ambitions. Compared to existing URC insights, the Black Country URCs lost momentum prior to funding cuts and institutional changes brought forward by the international financial crisis and national party political changes. Research into state-formulated regeneration initiatives must therefore extend beyond national policy dynamics, by acknowledging the potential for local instabilities and by recognising the practices adopted to manage such tensions.

By late 2010 all three Black Country URCs had ceased. Future questions nevertheless remain about the need for and design of property-based regeneration initiatives. Beyond reports of urban entrepreneurialism, partnership working and physical change in core English cities (e.g. Couch and Cocks, 2011; Couch et al., 2011), for smaller de-industrialising urban areas the question of how to encourage private sector investment remains. Unfunded and property-orientated URCs faced an enormous challenge, particularly where images of industrial decline, poor accessibility, low labour force skills and limited business sector support dominate. Place-based marketing by the Black Country URCs endeavoured to transcend path-constraining images, yet local realities constrained achievements. Compared to the logic of property-orientated URCs transitioning into broader regeneration agencies, an argument can thus be made for the early adoption of broad focused economic development partnerships. From this perspective, the transition towards LEPs in England has important merits within de-industrialising areas. Given the absence of LEP powers and resources, outstanding questions remain about the willingness of local authorities to collaborate with each other and the private sector, how sub-regional approaches are developed and how desired actions are translated to local authority officers (e.g. Henderson, 2014; Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010). As this research indicates where new agencies lack sufficient power and resources to assist the delivery of council priorities pragmatic forms of local authority support may quickly dwindle. Shifting from centralised steering towards local and sub-regional empowerment (and regional collaboration in the case of under-bounded LEPs) therefore remains a critical need and research interest (Shaw and Robinson, 2012). The threat of instability remains. As Pugalis and Townsend (2013: 208) indicate institutional legacies centred on ‘territorial disputes, political rivalries and partner suspicion’ may prove obstacles, the expectations placed upon voluntary business sector representatives may be too great and the tendency towards unpopular forms of centralist steering is likely to remain strong.

Finally, in view of the sub-regional strategic focus of LEPs, as well as abovementioned instabilities, continuing questions remain about the capacity of local authority officers to deliver incremental forms of property-based regeneration. With regeneration officers critical of URC achievements and lobbying for their cessation, they now face substantial onus to construct integrated regeneration perspectives that encourage diverse public and/or private actors to commit resources. This may of course be where the less overt and difficult to calculate contribution of URCs was downplayed (see Parkinson and Robson, 2000: 47), because their arm’s length economic remit could help to draw together disconnected local leaders where council leadership and support for external collaboration were lacking. Given the relegation of URCs to history books, it is apt that the final word should be left to a URC professional:

Unless you engage health and education and transport in those early conversations, and make it joined up, it isn’t going to happen. And the more you can demonstrate the interconnectedness of these things, then the more likely you are to get other people aligning their investment programmes with it. They shouldn’t be seen as separate, but that takes particular kinds of leadership to drive the connections and have those conversations with the strategic health authority or whatever. And in one sense that could be threatening to the Black Country local authorities, because they would see that they are losing control. But control over what. Because unless you are getting investment you are not controlling anything. (WRC officer, 2009)

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors and reviewers, plus the interviewees who devoted their time to this research. Responsibility for the final product remains with the author.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not for profit sectors.

Notes

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