Delivering strategic economic development in a time of urban austerity: European Union structural funds and the English city regions

Abstract

Supranational funding such as that from the European Union has become a key ingredient of the economic development of many major cities. Set across comparatively short time frames, these schemes are constantly evaluated and realigned to reflect current priorities, becoming increasingly competitive as cities deploy every strategy available to mitigate the effects of urban austerity. In the United Kingdom, European Union funding is currently allocated through a multi-level structure involving the state, subregional structures and cities, all conforming to supranational (i.e. European Union) guidelines. Considering this, this paper explores the extent to which funds such as the European Regional Development Fund can be effectively drawn down to focus upon issues deemed to be locally important. The paper achieves this through a case study of policy making in Liverpool, United Kingdom which, having successfully used Objective One funding to support an economic recovery in the 1990–00s, is now fully engaged with European Regional Development Fund agendas. In doing so, the paper explores how successful European Regional Development Fund-funded schemes are developed, drawing out the experiences of key stakeholders working at each level of the funding process. This allows for a reflection on the effects of Britain’s decision to leave the European Union and, moreover, makes a series of policy recommendations as to how future funding strategies might be improved.

Keywords

Brexit centre–local city regions European funding Liverpool

Introduction

Although urban development in the UK is heavily influenced by the centralised nature of UK governance (Vigar, 2013), for many years, central government funding has not been the only arena through which cities can drive their developmental ambitions. Supranational funding, i.e. sitting above the nation state, now forms a significant part of the investment strategies of many major cities (Duchacek, 1990; Meegan, 2003, O’Brien et al., 2015; Sykes and Lord, 2011; Williams, 1996). Perhaps the best example of this activity is that of the European Union (EU) which, as a means of fostering greater socio-economic and territorial cohesion, aims to ‘reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various regions’ (European Parliament, 2016) and fosters these goals through the use of European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) and, most notably, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Yet, the EU does not act in isolation in administering this process (Jones, 2015), with member states and their sub-national structures playing a substantial role in the funding process.

In the UK this process is currently overseen by the Westminster Government, with funding notionally administered through city region-focused organisations known as Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). The emphasis on city region level working reflects a recent period of sub-national reorganisation (DCLG, 2010, 2011) which, following the election of the Conservative/Liberal Democrats Coalition Government in 2010, saw the abolition of the previous structures of regional governance which had been in place since 1994, and placed a greater emphasis on the role of cities in driving economic development (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013; Haughton et al., 2016; Pugalis, 2011; Pugalis and Fisher, 2011; Nurse, 2015a, 2015b). This, argue Sykes and Lord (2011), can be seen as a boon to those cities who operate within the entrepreneurial thesis (Jessop, 1997, 1998), giving rise to what Williams (1996) terms ‘a foreign policy of cities’ that allows the cities to pursue a ‘paradiplomacy’ (Duchacek, 1990) in support of their own interests parallel to those efforts undertaken by national government.

Recently, this activity has been heavily influenced by the period following the 2008 economic crash and the prevalence of what Peck (2012) terms ‘austerity urbanism’, in which public sector services have faced substantial budget reductions (Tonkiss, 2013). For the English cities, which exist in a ‘perilous’ state of financial and political independence (Marshall, 2005), this had wide-ranging implications including the reduction in provision of a number of core services such as social care (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2013), with the only real respite coming through a final tranche of devolution proposals which, amongst other things, would allow local authorities to set and retain local business rates (Nurse, 2015b). For critics, this process has been viewed not as localism, but rather ‘centralisation on steroids’ (Hambleton, 2015) in which local areas are, perhaps inadvertently, implementing the state’s own cuts by reaching for greater autonomy. Thus, set within a proven legacy of improving city’s fortunes (Biddulph, 2011; Meegan, 2003; Meegan et al., 2014), the paucity of central government funding has seen EU grants become increasingly competitive as local areas seek to shore up core activity. Consequently, any paradiplomacy (Duchacek, 1990) is likely to be heightened, as cities seek to maximise every possible funding opportunity; and more focused, as experienced actors seek to best exploit proven sources of funding (Coulson, 2009). As such, understanding the ways in which these scarcer resources are allocated, and the types of projects that are funded, provides a platform through which to explore how cities are managing this ‘urban austerity’.

At the same time, the debate surrounding the role of the EU in urban development has been fundamentally altered following the UK’s recent referendum on membership of the EU and the decision to leave. This has raised further questions with regard to the process and how it will change – many of which will not be answered until ‘Brexit’ negotiations are completed. Foremost of those questions is will such funding still be available – either via the EU in a Swiss-style arrangement (Swiss Confederation, 2017), or via a UK-administered replacement? Similarly, how will the decision affect the allocation of the latest round, i.e. will it fundamentally affect which projects are funded, or otherwise?

In order to explore these issues, this paper will draw upon concepts of strategic selectivity (Jessop, 1990; Offe, 1984) as a means to examine how ESIF funding is allocated to local areas, and the extent to which local interests are served via ESIF mechanisms, or mirroring previous sub-national initiatives, whether they serve as vehicles for external (i.e. not explicitly locally driven) agendas (Nurse and Pemberton, 2010). To achieve this, the paper deploys Liverpool, United Kingdom, as a case study. Drawing upon interviews with actors involved in each element of the EU funding process, including economic managers tasked with allocating the funds, the paper explores how the EU funding process enabled organisations to meet their needs and those of their locality. The primary research was undertaken in the period leading up to the 2016 referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU and reflected a period of critical reflection on the role of the EU in public service delivery and local economic development (Jones, 2015). Then, in order to understand the ramifications of the leave vote, the analysis offered by participants is revisited through additional interview and documentary-driven discussion.

European funding mechanisms

ESIFs, and principally the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), plays a substantial role in supporting the economic development of all of the EU’s regions and is, perhaps, one of the most prominent examples of supranational funding. The historical governance of these processes is discussed in detail by Bachtler and Mendez (2007), who outline the issues at the heart of the debate and, by extension, this paper: ‘who decides what?’ (Marks, 1996: 389); ‘and to what effect’ (Bache, 1998: 14)? (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007: 535). However, to frame the broader discussion, an understanding of how such funding is managed within a current UK context is helpful.

To direct funding accordingly, each European region is placed within one of three categories used to determine the nature of funding activity, and based on its relationship with the average GDP of the EU. The three groupings are less developed, more developed and transitioning (Battista, 2005; European Commission, 2017). Regions with a GDP of <75% of the EU average are categorised as less developed and largely comprise of post-2004 ascension states, albeit with some exceptions (e.g. regions of the UK, Spain and Italy). Here the aim is convergence, i.e. raising GDP in line with the EU average. Regions categorised as ‘more developed’ must demonstrate a GDP of >90% of the EU average and predominantly comprise the regions of ‘Western Europe’ (e.g. France, Germany, Netherlands, UK). For those regions, the ERDF is intended to foster economic competitiveness, including supporting innovation and improving environmental performance for a similar or greater economic return. ‘Transitioning’ regions have a GDP between 75 and 90% of the EU average. Often in regions with economic activity based on manufacturing, transitioning regions receive a mix of funding, aimed at encouraging economic performance that edges ever closer to that of the ‘more developed’ regions.

The broad scope of ERDF spending priorities is set at the EU level, so as to best reflect the strategic priorities of the union as a whole, and is revised in half-decade-long periods (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007). Once the priorities of the spending round are agreed the funds are given over to the nation state to administer and monitor. This includes ensuring that any activity conforms to the EU regulations. In England, UK, this is currently co-ordinated by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), with separate processes in place for the devolved states (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). At present, ERDF money intended for England is portioned between 39 predominantly city region focused LEPs, which came into being following the abolition of the eight English regions by the incoming Coalition Government in 2010 (Nurse, 2015a; Pugalis and Fisher, 2011). Yet, reflecting the earlier discussion of austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012), and the heightened reliance on proven sources of funding such as the EU (Biddulph, 2011; Meegan, 2003), the allocation process has becoming increasingly competitive, and contested, with cities resorting to legal challenges if they believe their allocation is unfair (see www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-26088500).

Once England’s funding is allocated to the LEPs, each area breaks into a set of subcommittees to administer the funds locally. These Local Management Committees take their membership from the LEPs, local authorities, higher education institutions and the business community, amongst others (DCLG, 2015a). At this point local organisations are invited to respond to a series of thematic calls under which the funding will be allocated, each in line with the EU operational programme, and the strategic and economic priorities of the area. These bids are competitive, with those who seek to access this funding assessed and prioritised based on their ability to meet the funding criteria, and to deliver ‘best value’ for the area itself.

This shift to LEPs did, however, add greater complexity to this process (Pugalis and Fisher, 2011). Previously, Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) acted as the accountable body for funding, limiting the need for excessive ultra vires interventions on behalf of local authorities which lacked a constitutional standing (Sykes and Lord, 2011). Yet whilst the LEPs replaced GORs, they lacked the same constitutional standing, meaning that now there was no body sitting beneath central government which could formally allocate EU funds (Pugalis and Fisher, 2011). Consequently, a system of local–national administration emerged whereby LEPs, designated by the UK Government to co-ordinate EU funding locally, would release a number of funding calls which would be managed by DCLG (DCLG, 2017). Consequently, the Government’s solution to the ultra vires problem raises a raft of new questions, focusing on how calls are designed, administered and ultimately reflective of local priorities. Who defines, and decides, what schemes will proceed? Are worthy or locally popular schemes eliminated from this process because they do not meet prescribed criteria from the EU or Central Government? Similarly, are schemes funded because they meet those criteria, even if not a local priority?

To help explore these issues further, the paper will now outline its conceptual framework, drawing upon the Strategic Relational Approach as a means to examine these themes.

Conceptual framework

The governance of urban development is an increasingly complex matrix of institutions operating at, and across, a variety of scales. Although the nation state, often seen as the traditional site, and creator of policy (Jessop, 1990), maintains many of its unique power bases, including the regulation of physical activity within its boundaries (e.g. through a planning system), it is in a constant state of flux (Brenner, 2004). In particular, the ‘hollowing out’ of state activity to other institutions (Marinetto, 2003; Skelcher, 2000) both downwards via processes of devolution (Lloyd and Peel, 2007), and upwards to the EU (Kjaer, 2005), means that the state becomes increasingly reliant on other institutions and actors to fulfil its traditional roles (Rhodes, 1997). Consequently, as responses from supranational organisations, such as the EU, have begun to codify and increasingly supplement activity traditionally seen as the preserve of the nation state (e.g. ESIF), transnational networks with less reliance on the state have emerged (Benington and Harvey, 1998). This creates the potential for what Gerber and Kollman (2004) describe as ‘authority migration’, whereby a reliance on those newfound resources can hinder the state’s ability to effectively govern alone. In turn, the increase in institutions involved in funding and monitoring such policy also skews traditional chains of command, adding greater complexity to accountability structures (Davies and Imbroscio, 2009; Day and Klein, 1987), and making governance increasingly difficult. Going further, as a law-making body in its own right, the EU also finds itself as both site and generator of policy and as such, faces similar challenges, albeit under the auspices of a ‘meta-governing state’ (Davies, 2014). However, as an organisation governed through multi-state consensus, such organisations must exercise any imbued power differently to the individual nation state.

Drawing upon the principles of Regulation Theory, described eloquently elsewhere (Aglietta, 1979; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1992; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1992), it is argued that this policy, and any concomitant rescaling of state activity, is often animated by market/regulatory failure (Brenner, 2009). Throughout, Jessop (1990) argues that as a result of the need to create policy which meets different needs, and because of politicisation of the policy process (Jenson, 1990, 1993), the state cannot, and does not, remain neutral and, as such, cannot develop policy in a wholly neutral way. As a result, any policy brought forward by the state can be interpreted as favouring one party over another: strategic selectivity (Jessop, 1990; Offe, 1984). This is not static, and those which benefit from such privileging will seek to maximise any opportunities which arise (Pemberton and Goodwin, 2010). Throughout, however, Somerville and Haines (2008) argue that the state will not fundamentally undermine its own powerbase and, as such, where power is relinquished in one area, it is simply reacquired or strengthened in other areas. Nonetheless, there remain significant benefits for those which are privileged through such action, including the ability to deliver more effectively on their policy objectives (Goodwin et al., 2006) and, in some cases, to decide what is in the public interest (Healey, 2006).

The issues raised thus far make the SRA a wide-ranging and useful conceptual tool, overcoming any over-generalisation (Brenner, 2009), to provide a helpful platform to explore how EU funds are allocated at the sub-national scale. Foremost of all, and building the work upon Goodwin et al. (2006), who argue that the SRA has the ability the reveal the nature and power of social forces acting with and through the state, strategic relational approaches can aid in answering who are the beneficiaries of supranational funding initiatives such as ESIF? Are funding initiatives such as ESIF a meaningful vehicle for localities to respond to pertinent policy challenges or, conversely, are local actors acting as delivery agents for national or supranational policy objectives? It also helps to explore how such funds are distributed amongst local agencies, whether some agencies are privileged over others and, if so, whether such privileging places them in a position to benefit under future schemes? Ultimately, in doing so, the paper can help to fill a gap in contemporary research identified by Brenner (2009), in that the local scale is under-represented and under-researched with regards to the SRA. Going further, SRA approaches allow for the exploration of Jones (1997) spatial privileging, examining the extent to which, through the allocation of ERDF funding, power may now be vested in new institutional contexts and not just traditional state structures (Brenner, 2004, 2009; Jessop, 1990).

Case study and methodology

Now, as a means to explore this issues, this paper uses a case study in England, United Kingdom, specifically examining the extent to which privileging occurs through EU funding mechanisms and, ultimately, the extent to which these funding initiatives represent a fundamental change in the traditional centre–local policy dynamic. This is achieved through a study of the EU funding process in Liverpool City Region (LCR), a subregional construct within North West England which combines the local authorities of Halton, Knowsley, Liverpool, Sefton, St Helens and Wirral. Broadly analogous to the former County Council of Merseyside, abolished in 1986 (Savage, 1990), LCR has a history of deploying European funding to support its economic development (Meegan, 2003).

LCR, with Liverpool at its core, was once a wealthy area, premised on succesful port and industrial sectors. However, this social and economic fabric was fundamentally undermined by a period of prolonged economic decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Sykes et al., 2013). Alongside a period of political unrest (Frost and North, 2013, Parkinson 1985), Liverpool became dubbed ‘the city of lost opportunities’ as it failed to capitalise on investment opportunities (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993) and the subregion fell well behind the UK and Europe in terms of economic performance. This economic decline would see LCR designated by the EU as a less developed region in 1994, and thus eligible for ‘Objective One’ funding. This Objective One funding would serve as one of the drivers of the city’s regeneration (Meegan, 2003), funding a raft of major projects including improvements to Liverpool John Lennon Airport; Liverpool South Parkway, a major transport interchange linking the city centre and the airport via buses and train; and the Liverpool ACC, a new arena/convention centre on the banks of the Mersey (Biddulph, 2011; Liverpool City Council, 2013).

Yet it was another EU initiative that would cap off Liverpool’s revitalisation when, in 2008, Liverpool hosted the European Capital of Culture celebrations, attracting an estimated 15 million tourists, and £800 m in revenue (Garcia et al., 2010). This, coupled with the opening of Liverpool One, a private-financed shopping centre, served to place culture and tourism at the heart of the city’s economic regeneration strategy (Boland, 2007; Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004; Meegan, 2003), and left LCR in a position to weather the post-2008 financial crisis as the fastest growing UK city region outside of London (TMP, 2009). As a marker of its economic progress, for the 2007–2013 round Merseyside was moved out of European Objective One funding, and into ‘Transitional’ funding, meaning that Liverpool needed competitiveness funding, not basic infrastructure, as it moved closer towards the EU average GDP.

The shift towards Transitional funding coincided with a change in the economic outlook of LCR itself, as it sought to shore up its revitalisation through economic models which shifted the emphasis away from regeneration, and more towards sustained and systemic growth (North et al., 2017). To achieve this, the Mersey Partnership launched its Economic Growth Strategy (TMP, 2009), which outlined four areas upon which economic activity would be premised, namely:

The Knowledge Economy

The Visitor Economy

The Low Carbon Economy

The Super Port

Focusing on high-end economic growth, the four thematic areas provided the city with a suite of economic activity which would complement the competitiveness budgets whilst simultaneously developing the city’s strategic economic objectives. Such was the certainty underpinning those economic goals that in 2010, when the Coalition Government announced their intention to replace the structures of regional governance with city region focused LEPs tasked with a broad remit including establishing strategic economic priorities (DCLG, 2010; Nurse, 2015a; Pugalis and Fisher, 2011), the new LCR-LEP maintained all four core economic goals for the city region.

Now, as the city region attempts to shore up its hard-won revival, this paper will explore how ESIF programmes such as the ERDF have affected this activity. In doing so, it will explore how recent policy developments in the city region align with European funding priorities, considering the extent to which the four economic drivers reflect LCR’s natural (i.e. unfettered) economic priorities or an attempt to realign the city with new European funding opportunities. In doing so, it explores how, per Coulson (2009), EU priorities and those of the LCR represent the individual priorities of local institutions. In doing so, the paper ultimately explores whose needs are being served locally in the designation of EU funding: the organisations setting out the parameters for access or the beneficiaries of that funding. Latterly, the paper also explores the effect of the UK’s ‘Brexit’ vote, how it is being perceived by local actors and the policy environment being developed in its wake.

Using Liverpool as a case study to explore these issues, the paper draws on the findings of a series of interviews with actors involved in the EU funding process. This includes those responsible for setting the parameters of funding calls and subsequently allocating the funding, and those working on funded programmes. Interviews were also undertaken with those operating at central and EU governance levels in order to gain a view of how the various tiers of governance interlinked. In those interviews, respondents were asked about their role in relation to EU funding and for their impressions on how the strategic objectives set out by the EU (and the bodies responsible for administering the funding in England) matched with the objectives of those institutions in search or receipt of funding. In doing so, the interviewees were also invited to share their perspectives on how this process might be improved moving forward. The interviews were primarily undertaken in the 12 months leading up to the referendum vote, supplemented by follow-up discussions in the immediate aftermath.

Findings – The EU and Liverpool

New economic drivers for EU transition?

The consensus surrounding Liverpool’s position as benefactors of EU funding is far reaching (Biddulph, 2011; Meegan, 2003; Sykes et al., 2013), and that Liverpool has made the shift from ‘less developed’ to transition is a clear point of pride for the city’s leaders (Cowley, 2015). Yet, whilst a new set of economic drivers for the city region was brought forward in 2009, primarily designed to capitalise on Liverpool’s revitalisation (North et al., 2017), questions remained as to how this process also reflected Liverpool’s shift towards ‘transitional’ status which occurred during the same period, and the new economic opportunities that this may bring.

When this premise was explored amongst LCR’s policy actors it emerged that the confluence of the new economic strategy and the shift towards transitional funding were, largely, serendipitous. Those who had an intimate involvement with the development of the new economic strategy and those with responsibility for delivering that strategy in the period since 2010 suggested that the economic drivers were primarily developed as a vehicle through which the city could build on its progress in the post Capital of Culture period and embed that newfound sense of economic vitality whilst improving previously hard-to-reach areas (Boland, 2010; Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004; Sykes et al., 2013). As such, although those in the city were keenly aware of the EU’s contribution to LCR life – ultimately reflected by public comments from Mayor Joe Anderson (Cowley, 2015) – it was universally conveyed by those interviewees that the city region’s economic strategy was created independently to reflect the city’s ongoing economic priorities rather than any conscious decision to capitalise on new EU funding streams, which could be viewed more simply as a marker of that progress. That said, although the development of LCR’s core economic drivers was not explicitly tailored to capitalise on European funding, there was evidence to suggest that LCR’s leaders remained keenly aware of the opportunities that the EU held, and actively sought to maximise the funding streams that could be brought to the area.

Reflecting this, upon election to the newly created post of Mayor of Liverpool in 2012, Joe Anderson established a series of three Mayoral Commissions intended to provide independent guidance of key policy issues facing the City. The EU would form one of the three priority areas, alongside health and education, with the commission tasked with reviewing ‘the benefit that the EU has already brought to Liverpool, and to consider how the city can maximise opportunities from future EU funding’ (Liverpool City Council, 2013). Chaired by the former Liberal Democrat Deputy Mayor of Liverpool, Flo Clucas, upon its conclusion the Commission made five key recommendations to the Mayor. Amongst them was continue to ensure that the EU’s funding cycles remained immune from political uncertainty. This, argued an EU administrator responsible for supporting projects within LCR, is a specific benefit of EU funding streams, ensuring that not only would appropriate projects be funded, but that funding decisions would remain insulated from, and consistent across/despite election cycles, allowing a stable platform from which cities could develop their ambitions. In another move to ensure that the city could determine its own course, the Commission also encouraged the LCR-LEP to ensure that it maintained full decision-making powers for EU funding allocation in the 2020 spending round, as well as fostering local capacity to maximise this. This, the commission argued, reflected findings which suggested that EU funding had the best value for the city when decisions were made and informed locally (Liverpool City Council, 2013).

Though the Commission sat and reported ahead of the most recent ERDF funding round for 2014–2020, as will be observed throughout the sections below, the Commission’s recommendations provide an indication of the key issues influencing how EU funding would be allocated and deployed within the city over the coming years.

The allocation of funding

For those LCR actors involved with EU funding, the processes of funding allocation, now transferred from GOR to the LEPs (Sykes and Lord, 2011), would provide the greatest insight into the efficacy of the EU funding system and the city region agenda more broadly. Debate on this theme was, to some extent, coloured by events ahead of the formal 2014–2020 ERDF funding round where, referencing broader debates surrounding the effects of urban austerity (Hambleton, 2015; Peck, 2012) LCR, alongside Sheffield, took legal action against the UK government following a cut in the EU funding allocation for the LCR from £290 m to £167 m (www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/merseyside-miss-out-100m-eu-8718067). In the view of one EU representative, this situation reflected ‘a good vision that [was] corrupted’ in the multi-level governance of the EU, arising from the way in which the UK government decided to allocate its own money – essentially extrapolating from earlier funding rounds, rather than producing fresh allocations: something which would adversely affect both LCR and Sheffield. Ultimately losing this legal challenge, the cut in LCR’s EU allocation would force LCR-LEP administrators to undertake a significant rationalisation of which bids would be allowed to progress. In initial discussions, potential applicants were told that bids from ‘pet projects’ or projects seeking to work disparately towards the same outcomes would not be viewed favourably and, instead, applicants working in similar areas should aim to collaborate and consolidate their efforts into one coherent offer for the city region.

Against this backdrop, some local actors were critical of how the early stages of the allocation process had been handled by the LEP. In particular, one actor described the advice provided at a local level as ‘very poor’ and often inconsistent, with decisions on funding priorities being made behind closed doors and then poorly communicated to the point where organisations were ‘swimming to keep up’ and keep their activities in line with the latest thinking. Indeed, such was the rate of change of those decisions that some projects bore similarity to a hokey-cokey, whereby the likelihood of attaining funding status varied frequently. This, argued one actor, reflected a capacity issue within the LEPs who initially had little experience of this scale of activity and faced challenges in how to deliver a programme of activity within a substantially straightened funding brief.

Amidst this activity, there was a perceived pressure to focus on ‘big ticket’ issues which would help drive city region economic targets, e.g. major low carbon investment, with smaller actors largely seen as the major casualties of this decision. In the view of those familiar with the funding landscape, the reasons for this were numerous, but broadly settled into two main categories relating to institutional capacity.

The first was financial capacity. Although ERDF monies are substantial, awards are premised on ‘match’ funding. This means that for every pound of overall project cost, the organisation in receipt of the funds is expected to contribute a specified amount from their own resources. For ‘transitional’ areas this amount is usually set at 60% of the total project cost coming from the EU, with the funded organisation contributing the remaining 40%. However, as a money saving measure, LCR-LEP set the local match threshold at 50% – the same as those within more developed regions.

This ‘match’ funding can come through a direct financial endowment from public or private funds, or via ‘in kind’ payments, which can include staff time (Gov.uk, 2017). Crucially, whilst building costs would be classified as ‘in kind’ payments in previous rounds, this time they would not. However for the 2014–2020 round the focus on the previously mentioned big ticket projects meant that when expressions of interest were invited for the low carbon funding stream, the minimum threshold for project funding would be £500,000. This would mean that organisations would have to provide £500,000 in match funding, and in some cases made it practically impossible for smaller projects to participate, with several potential participants saying they simply couldn’t afford the match. Going further, stories emerged of coalitions which had formed in response to the call for consolidation of overlapping projects which had to streamline – essentially forced to jettison members who could not afford to contribute towards the match. Indeed many of the interviewees acknowledged that one of the significant drawbacks of ESIFs was that smaller projects, which may be entirely viable and make a meaningful contribution to the city’s goals, may be shut out in an effective state of ‘pay to play’. In the same vein, it was widely felt that larger organisations, e.g. the universities and major public sector organisations, would be significant beneficiaries as they would be able to easily generate the match funding through staff time and institutional resources.

The second issue was closely related to the first and reflected a vastly differing institutional capacity across city region actors. As well as being able to generate match, it was widely felt that the city region’s larger organisations also held an advantage with regards to their ability to write funding bids – drawing upon staff with vast experience of writing previous successful bids, and capitalising on pre-existing networks (Healey, 1998) to engage with ESIF gatekeepers. In contrast, those smaller organisations were engaging, some for the first time, with a complex multistage process. Although the LCR-LEP did provide events and workshops to assist in this process, reflecting the need of smaller organisations to focus on core business needs (North and Nurse, 2014), many smaller organisations felt they lacked either the capacity or time to write a successful application.

More broadly, and reflecting earlier discussion about LEP capacity, there was also substantial discussion of how the centre–local relationship was managed. Specifically, those discussions related to how funding was allocated in light of the LEP’s inability to act as an intermediary body following the abolition of GOR (Sykes and Lord, 2011), and how DCLG administered the process of formally signing off funding. In practice, there was little evidence locally to suggest that the LCR was the unwilling recipient of funded projects as a result of this DCLG oversight. However, there was discussion of how this process did lead to a perception that, ultimately, a lack of local control did partly characterise the allocation process. Such concerns emerged through the work of a series of committees, each consisting of a variety of local actors, and convened to assess the merits of a tranche of funding bids. In particular, one member of this committee expressed concerns with regards to how such committees would take a meaningful role in deciding funding outcomes. Rather than wielding any particular powers, it was reported that, in this member’s view, the committee took on an advisory role, considering bids which were already well advanced as a means to help central government civil servants determine if an application should proceed. In doing so, the committee held no final decision-making powers, with DCLG retaining control over this process. Such was the extent of this disconnect that, having made recommendations, the committee member was unaware of the status of proposals, and whether they had been funded or rejected. This, therefore, raised fundamental questions as to whether such committees did represent a meaningful branch of the local decision-making process, or were simply a small, ornamental, cog within a wider centralised process.

In practice and, alongside what was perceived as inconsistent messages coming from within the LEP, other actors spoke of informal channels emerging where they could engage with DCLG civil servants and assess whether elements of their funding proposals were eligible or viable. Although those informal channels were viewed as effective, and widely praised, they had the effect of creating a state of dual diplomacy whereby messages could vary or conflict – particularly as the often un-transparent LEP processes were liable to change course, whilst central advice remained consistent. Combined, this contributed to wider confusion with regards to who was making the decisions and at what scale?

Above this, LCR actors were also able to engage with the EU directly through the Merseyside Brussels Office (MBO) which acted as a conduit between LCR and Brussels. In doing so, the MBO worked to track EU legislation as it developed, providing guidance on broader strategic issues related to funding streams and the processes surrounding them, as well as helping to connect with potential collaborators in transnational funding streams. As part of this work the MBO representative provided a series of workshops for parties seeking to engage with ESIF, detailing eligibility criteria and the scope of the awards. Here, local partners who had engaged with ESIF spoke positively of the role of MBO – with their role compared, favourably, to the DCLG civil servants who worked to provide clarity and guidance to those working with a complex system.

As such it was possible to conclude that, in the absence of clear decision-making powers, central government played a clear and decisive role in allocating ESIF funds within LCR. That said, it was widely agreed that this was done in an even-handed manner and with the city region in mind. Ultimately, however, this raises significant questions about whether city regions have the capacity to administer such programmes, or whether that capacity is located in the appropriate institutions. As will be observed later in this paper, this presents a fundamental issue for the future of the UK Government’s city region agenda and the devolution of powers away from London. In this case, therefore, there appears to be little evidence to support supra-state selectivity in the policy-making process. Indeed, although there is evidence of state control through national funding bids with regards to delivering against local priorities, the main critique lies in the capacity and transparency of local decision makers and, by extension, how locally set agendas truly reflect the wishes of local actors who would ultimately benefit from ESIF funds.

The post-‘Brexit’ landscape

The result of the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU coincided with a period when the 2014–2020 round of ERDF was still being allocated. Some projects had received their funding and were underway, some were awaiting the outcome of their funding bids and some monies had yet to be allocated. However, the immediate effect of the vote to leave the EU was to create an atmosphere of uncertainty across the range of ESF activities – with the lack of clarity broadly reflecting the initial uncertainty surrounding the process of the UK’s formal exit from the EU.

For those projects which had been funded and were underway the immediate concern was whether the projects remained viable (Gleeson, 2016b). For their part the LCR-LEP went to great lengths to assure those whose projects that had already been funded that funding would remain. Yet, despite these efforts, funded projects reported that a wider atmosphere of uncertainty persisted amongst the wider public which had slowed progress. In one instance, an ERDF project tasked with working with SMEs, and with funded work either underway or under negotiation, reported having to assure their project partners that the funding would not be withdrawn and that agreed work should proceed. Going further, for new engagements the topic of ‘Brexit’ would be a key question for those companies seeking to best allocate potentially limited resources (North and Nurse, 2014; Parker et al., 2009), with project managers having to make assurances that, again, engaging with the ERDF programme remained viable.

For those projects which had yet to be granted funding there was greater uncertainty. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum result the Treasury placed a moratorium on all funding before later issuing a guarantee that any ESIF project agreed by the time of the Autumn Statement would be supported, after which point applications would be treated on a case-by-case basis (Gleeson, 2016a). This process would take into account recommendations from LEPs but, the government argued, would ensure that projects would align with strategic priorities and show value for money. In doing so, this represented a significant withdrawal of local autonomy meaning that, in essence, local areas would have increasingly less say in how money intended for their areas would be spent. Ultimately, therefore, what we can observe is that ‘Brexit’ served as the effective remedy to the ultra vires funding allocation process (Sykes and Lord, 2011). Whilst, initially, this was remedied through hands-off management in which the LCR-LEP co-ordinated with DCLG civil servants, this became a heavy intervention in which ministers would wield the ultimate sign-off of local funds.

ERDF and broader sub-national strategies

Whilst those interviewed did not see the LCR’s new economic drivers as being explicitly driven by ESIF priorities, there was a consensus that ESIF was vital in achieving other sub-national policy objectives. In particular, there was a broad agreement that ESIF projects would be central to the delivery of the UK Government’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ programme, premised on devolving powers away from London as a means to foster economic growth in the Northern city regions (Haughton et al., 2016; Nurse, 2015b). Originally focused on the northern core cities and their surrounding regions – the terms would be defined through a bespoke ‘devolution deal’ – a compact between the city region and central government.

The view that the EU held a key role in the city’s economic future (Cowley, 2015), widely held around the city prior to the referendum, was reflected in the LCR devolution deal (DCLG, 2015b). Reflecting both the recommendations of the Mayoral Commission, and the process of working with DCLG civil servants to allocate ESIF monies, LCR’s devolution deal specified that:

Liverpool City Region is seeking Intermediate Body status for ERDF and ESF funding by April 2016 or as soon as possible thereafter. This would give the City Region powers to select ERDF and ESF projects on the basis of strategic fit with Operational Programmes and local conditions. (DCLG, 2015b: 15)

It was clear, therefore, that LCR’s leaders saw EU structural funds, and the freedom to allocate them locally, as central to their ambitions and the success of this Northern Powerhouse. As such, in the aftermath of the decision to leave the EU, it was not unreasonable to ask what effect the removal of structural funds would have. Such questions have been heightened in the period following the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond’s, Autumn Statement – the first meaningful financial discussion since the referendum (HM Treasury, 2016). In it and in the Government’s subsequent revised industrial strategy (HM Government, 2017), the Government placed a particular economic focus on innovation and skills as the elements of the economy the UK would look to in a post-Brexit environment. In other circumstances, the Government’s reaffirmed focus on the key tenants of LCR’s economic drivers, with innovation playing a central role in the LCR’s knowledge economy plan (Liverpool LEP, 2009), would appear to be pleasing to LCR economic managers. However, given that LCR’s ambitions in this arena are underpinned by ESIF, and ERDF in particular, it now remains to be seen how, in the absence of EU monies post-2020, both the Government’s and LCR’s ambitions will be realised.

Going further, what this means for the wider Northern Powerhouse programme, now expanded and on offer to other city regions across England, remains unclear. If one of the principal mechanisms through which areas can service their economic ambitions is withdrawn, the quality of what replaces it, if anything, should be critically examined. Given that the May Government has not significantly distanced itself from the need to move economic growth away from London (Mance and Bounds, 2016), in the absence of a regional policy which specifically and proportionally allocates funding it is not unreasonable to ask how such monies will be allocated and for what purposes. Similarly, and reflecting the role of DCLG in administering the funding, any future streams brought forward by the government post-Brexit should be examined with regard to how they address the processes of allocation and, in light of the requests seen in some devolution deals, whether local areas have a meaningful say in how such funding is used.

Analysis

The main thematic issue arising from the study of the processes of allocating EU structural funds in the LCR is that local control over funding has a profound influence on how effective the process is.

It is clear that, for LCR’s decision makers, holding meaningful control over the allocation of ESIF monies was vital to the city region’s long-term success. This is evidenced by repeated calls for full decision-making powers to be granted, first in the local-level Mayoral Commission (Liverpool City Council, 2013) and then again in the 2015 Devolution Deal (DCLG, 2015b). However, the evidence suggests that when LCR did have such powers at its disposal it was not particularly effective – with the decision-making process muddied by a lack of clarity, transparency and communication. It is suggested through interviews with local stakeholders that this may be a result of the process being dealt with by the LEP and, in practice, reflects capacity issues rather than any mal-intent. Indeed it is those actors with local experience of engaging with EU delivery – most notably central government civil servants – who are praised for their clarity. Combined this suggests that, while local decision making is a laudable aim, and entirely in line with current UK devolution agendas, such a transfer of powers may require a period of capacity building where central government works with local stakeholders to enable a smooth delivery process. Otherwise we may see a process which, although appearing promising at face value, may well under-deliver for those the funding is intended to benefit.

When considering these findings in light of the conceptual framework, there appears little evidence at the local scale to suggest that a supra-state selectivity (in other words, the imposition of EU values upon city regions) is occurring. Indeed the evidence from LCR suggests that EU funding priorities are broadly in line with those of the city region and the two have developed in tandem. However, beneath this, there is evidence to suggest that state selectivity is maintained to some degree. In particular, this can be seen through the decision to remove GORs and designate LEPs the deciding body, despite this being beyond the official capability of the LEPs (Sykes and Lord, 2011). The effect was that national government took on a greater role in the local decision-making process and held the power to generate national funding calls – potentially excluding local actors from delivery in their own area. Although in the case of LCR the influence of DCLG was seen as being positive, the experiences of local ESIF committees suggested that, ultimately, local views were marginalised in the decision-making process.

At the local level we can observe the presence of the paradiplomacy discussed by Duchacek (1990). Crucially, however, this appears to take the form of strategic selectivity at the city–regional scale, whereby effective privileging can be observed by those able to navigate a process which underwent frequent shifts in priorities. Similarly, an effective privileging occurred through the ability of potential fundees to participate either financially or in terms of capacity. The result was that some organisations which may have made a meaningful contribution through ESIF were excluded from the process.

Policy lessons

From the case of LCR it is possible to draw a number of policy lessons to improve future practice. Such lessons can serve two audiences. The first is those working within a UK context, either working to refine the ESIF allocation process to 2020 and beyond, and those working to develop the sub-national funding schemes which are brought forward to replace ESIF upon the UK’s departure from the EU. Such lessons will be applicable to those working with the UK’s current devolution agenda in which city region actors will play a key role. The second is those members of the EU who are implementing ESIF within their own contexts and may look the UK for policy lessons, particularly with regard to devolving powers away from the state.

The first transferrable lesson is that whilst local control can be a positive thing – providing clarity and consistency throughout the funding allocation process are vital. Potential fundees are keen to engage with the process in a meaningful way, but this is made difficult if funding criteria/priorities shift during the process. For organisations which may fundamentally rely on such funding streams, a lack of such clarity which may result in a failure to attain funding can present an existential threat. Therefore, it is important that alongside broader strategic goals, the explicit focus of funding projects should be established well in advance of the calls opening to give local actors the best chance to prepare feasible bids.

Linked to this, the second transferrable lesson is that, at present, ESIF funding streams appear to favour those organisations with the capacity (either financial or personnel) to participate in a long and complex funding process. This can be to the exclusion of worthy proposals and actors who may play an otherwise central in local delivery. As such any future scheme should attempt to minimise this capacity gap. This could include alternatives to match funding or a lower match funding threshold to accommodate smaller organisations with good ideas. Similarly, LEPs (or their alternatives) could consider providing independent bid writing expertise to help those who cannot provide/spare the resource to produce a complex bid document.

Finally, the third transferrable lesson is that good advice networks are vital to the successful delivery of funding schemes such as ESIF. Alongside greater clarity, it is essential that funders do provide clear advice on what is eligible, or not, and how organisations might best engage potentially limited resources to their best effect. At present, in the UK, this is primarily done at the national level, with the EU providing broader strategic advice. This is seen as a positive and best practice could be extended elsewhere. However, there is a greater role for the LEPs in this process whereby, in linking to the first policy lesson, a greater lead in to the funding process may create the space for LEPs to provide a larger degree of policy guidance as to their expectations.

Conclusion

Using the case of Liverpool, UK, we can observe a great deal about how major funding streams can be implemented at the local level. Although this paper has examined how ESIF money is allocated at the city region scale, and therefore can be of use to those EU nation states seeking to refine their own allocation processes, there are valuable lessons for the UK in the post-Brexit landscape particularly within the context of the UK’s own devolution agenda.

Ultimately, through this case study, it can be observed that the EU is not perceived as the perpetrator of a significant overreach at the local scale and, whilst it sets the broad scope of funding, this remains largely in line with local priorities. Instead the EU is largely viewed as a positive force by local actors, and one which has transformed the LCR and continues to underpin its economic growth. Closely linked to this, ESIF money is closely linked with LCR’s objective in relation to the UK government’s devolution agenda otherwise known as the Northern Powerhouse. In particular, ESIF projects form a central raft of the innovation agenda which is central to both LCR and the government’s ambitions (HM Government, 2017). Therefore, and given that innovation is set to form a key part of the UK’s post-Brexit economic agenda (HM Treasury, 2016), what replaces ESIF in this regard will be crucial to the region’s economic success.

For the future implementation of any ESIF replacement, clarity of local decision making is key. For local actors the ability to understand the priorities well in advance is vital in order to allow them to prepare appropriate bids and potentially access any funding. Similarly, whilst ‘big ticket’ items often attract much attention, there should be conscientious efforts to avoid ‘pay-to-play’ style outcomes in which smaller actors cannot spare the capacity to engage with funding despite otherwise being well placed to conduct meaningful activity at the local. The failure to do this could lead to a risk that funding streams are only accessible to a narrow band of institutions which are able to deploy significant financial resource both pre- and post-award.

Combined, the implications of what replaces ESIF are likely to be profound for those cities dealing with facing urban austerity. The failure to win EU funding can be seen as an existential threat to some organisations, many which may provide important local services and underpin economic growth. It is clear that, if the Government does wish to realise its economic strategy and continue to drive growth in the regions outside of London, a viable ESIF replacement should form part of these plans.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

Aglietta

(1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, London: NLB.

Bache

(1998) The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping, Sheffield: Sheffield University Press.

Bachtler

Mendez

(2007) Who governs EU cohesion policy? Deconstructing the reforms of the structural funds. Journal of Common Market Studies 45: 535–564.

Battista

(2005) Latest developments in regional and horizontal state aid. European State Aid Law Quarterly 3: 407–414.

Benington

Harvey

(1998) Transnational local authority networking within the European union. In: Marsh

(ed.) Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Bentley

Pugalis

(2013) New directions in economic development: Localist policy discourses and the localism act. Local Economy 28: 257–274.

Bianchini F and Parkinson M (1993) Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Biddulph

(2011) Urban design, regeneration and the entrepreneurial city. Progress in Planning 76: 63–103.

Boland

(2007) Unpacking the theory – Policy interface of local economic development: An analysis of Cardiff and Liverpool. Urban Studies 44: 1019–1039.

10.

Boland

(2010) Capital of culture—You must be having a laugh!. Social and Cultural Geography 11: 627–645.

11.

Brenner

(2004) New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12.

Brenner

(2009) Open questions of state rescaling. Economy and Society 2: 123–139.

13.

Coulson

(2009) Targets and terror: Government by performance indicators. Local Government Studies 35: 9–19.

14.

Cowley

(2015) Europe? ‘We’ll never work alone’ is this city’s promise. Super North (in the Times). 14–15.

15.

Davies

(2014) Rethinking urban power and the local state. Urban Studies 51: 3215–3232.

16.

Davies

Imbroscio

(2009) Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage.

17.

Day

Klein

(1987) Accountabilities: Five Public Services, London: Tavistock.

18.

DCLG (2010) Letter to local authority leaders and business leaders. DCLG, London.

19.

DCLG (2011) Unlocking growth in cities. DCLG, London.

20.

DCLG (2015a) 2010 to 2015 government policy: Management of the European Regional Development Fund. DCLG, London.

21.

DCLG (2015b) Liverpool city region devolution agreement. HM Treasury, London.

22.

DCLG (2017) European Structural and Investment Funds. DCLG, London.

23.

Duchacek

(1990) Perforated sovereignties: Towards a typology of new actors in international relations. In: Michelmann

Soldatos

(eds) Federalism and International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3–4.

24.

European Commission (2017) Cohesion Policy Frequently Asked Questions. Brussels, European Commission.

25.

European Parliament (2016) Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion. Brussels, European Parliament.

26.

Frost D and North P (2013) Militant Liverpool a City on the Edge. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

27.

Garcia

Melville

Cox

(2010) Creating an Impact: Liverpool’s Year as Capital of Culture, Liverpool: Impacts08.

28.

Gerber

Kollman

(2004) Authority migration: Defining an emerging research agenda. Political Science 37: 397–401.

29.

Gleeson B (2016a) Chancellor sets deadline for applications for Merseyside’s European cash. Liverpool Echo. Accessed online 5 April 2017.

30.

Gleeson B (2016b) Has £190m of EU cash destined for Merseyside been suspended in the wake of Brexit? Liverpool Echo. Accessed online 5 April 2017.

31.

Goodwin

Jones

(2006) Devolution and economic governance in the UK: Rescaling territories and organisations. European Planning Studies 14: 979–995.

32.

Goodwin

Painter

(1996) Local governance, the crises of Fordism and the changing geographies of regulation. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 21: 635–648.

33.

Gov.uk (2017) England 2014 to 2020 European Structural and Investment Funds. Accessed online 5 April 2017.

34.

Grimshaw

Rubery

(2013) The end of the UK’s liberal collectivist social model? The implications of the coalition government’s policy during the austerity crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36: 105–126.

35.

Hambleton

(2015) Power, place and the new civic leadership. Local Economy 30: 167–172.

36.

Haughton

Deas

Hincks

(2016) Mythic Manchester: Devo Manc, the Northern Powerhouse and rebalancing the English economy. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 9.

37.

Healey

(1998) Building institutional capacity through collaborative approaches to urban planning. Environment and Planning A 30: 1531–1546.

38.

Healey

(2006) Transforming governance: Challenges of institutional adaptation and new politics of space. European Planning Studies 14: 299–320.

39.

HM Government (2017) Building our industrial strategy. DBEIS, London.

40.

Treasury

(2016) Autumn Statement, London: HM Treasury.

41.

Jenson

(1990) Representations in crisis: The roots of Canada’s Permeable Fordism. Canadian Journal of Political Science 23: 653–684.

42.

Jenson J (1993) Naming nations: Making nationalist claims in Canadian public discourse. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 30: 337–358.

43.

Jessop

(1990) State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Cambridge: Polity Press.

44.

Jessop

(1992) Fordism and post-Fordism: A critical reformulation. In: Storper

Scott

(eds) Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development, London: Routledge, pp. 46–69.

45.

Jessop

(1997) The entrepreneurial city. Re-imagining localities, redesigning economic governance or restructuring capital? In: Jewson

MacGregor

(eds) Transforming Cities, London: Routledge, pp. 28–41.

46.

Jessop

(1998) The narrative of enterprise and the enterprise of narrative: Place making and the entrepreneurial city. In: Hubbard

Hall

(eds) The Entrepreneurial City, Chichester: Wiley, pp. 77–99.

47.

Jones

(2015) Re-building Europe from the bottom up. Local Economy 30: 702–711.

48.

Jones

(1997) Spatial selectivity of the state? The regulationist enigma and local struggles over economic governance. Environment and Planning A 29: 831–864.

49.

Jones

Wilks-Heeg

(2004) Capitalising culture: Liverpool 2008. Local Economy 19: 341–360.

50.

Kjaer

(2005) Governance and the urban bureaucracy. In: Davies

Imbroscio

(eds) Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage, pp. 137–152.

51.

Liverpool City Council (2013) Mayors Commission on Europe – Report and Recommendations. Liverpool: Liverpool City Council.

52.

Liverpool

LEP

(2009) Liverpool City Region Skills for Growth, Liverpool: Liverpool LEP.

53.

Lloyd

Peel

(2007) Regional development in Scotland and Wales. In: Bradbury

(ed.) Devolution, Regionalism and Regional Development: The UK Experience, London: Routledge, pp. 166–182.

54.

Mance H and Bounds A (2016) Theresa May shifts focus from ‘Northern Powerhouse’. Financial Times. Accessed online 5 April 2017.

55.

Marinetto

(2003) Governing beyond the centre: A critique of the Anglo-governance school. Political Studies 51: 592–608.

56.

Marks

(1996) Exploring and explaining variation in EU cohesion policy. In: Hooghe

(ed.) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multilevel Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

57.

Marshall

(2005) Europeanization at the urban level. Journal of European Public Policy 12: 668–686.

58.

Meegan

(2003) Urban regeneration, politics and social cohesion: The Liverpool Case. In: Munck

(ed.) Reinventing the City: Liverpool in Comparative Perspective, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 53–79.

59.

Meegan

Kennett

Jones

(2014) Global economic crisis, austerity and neoliberal urban governance in England. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 7: 137–153.

60.

North

Nurse

(2014) ‘War Stories’: Morality, curiosity, enthusiasm and commitment as facilitators of SME owners’ engagement in low carbon transitions. Geoforum 52: 32–41.

61.

North P, Nurse A and Baker T (2017) The neoliberalisation of climate? Constructing a climate policy partnership in an austerity city. Environment and Planning A. Epub ahead of print 5 January 2017. DOI: 10.1177/0308518X16686353.

62.

Nurse

(2015a) Bridging the gap? The role of regional governance in delivering effective public services evidence from England. Planning Practice and Research 30: 69–82.

63.

Nurse A (2015b) Creating the north from the sum of its parts? Research questions to assess the Northern Powerhouse. Local Economy 30: 689–701.

64.

Nurse

Pemberton

(2010) Local area agreements as a tool for addressing deprivation within UK cities. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal 4: 158–167.

65.

O’Brien

Sykes

Shaw

(2015) The evolving context for territorial development policy and governance in Europe – From shifting paradigms to new policy approaches. L’Information géographique 79: 72–97.

66.

Offe

(1984) Crisis of Crisis Management: Elements of a Political Crisis Theory. Contradictions of the Welfare State, Cambridge: MIT Press.

67.

Painter

Goodwin

(1995) Local governance and concrete research: Investigating the uneven development of regulation. Economy and Society 24: 334–356.

68.

Parkinson M (1985) Liverpool on the Brink. London: Hermitage.

69.

Parker

Redmond

Simpson

(2009) A review of interventions to encourage SMEs to make environmental improvements. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 27: 279–301.

70.

Peck

(2012) Austerity urbanism. City 16: 626–655.

71.

Peck

Tickell

(1992) Local modes of social regulation? Regulation theory, thatcherism and uneven development. Geoforum 23: 347–363.

72.

Pemberton

Goodwin

(2010) Rethinking the changing structures of rural local government – State power, rural politics and local political strategies? Journal of Rural Studies 26: 272–283.

73.

Pugalis

(2011) Look before you LEP. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal 5: 7–22.

74.

Pugalis

Fisher

(2011) English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration implications. Local Economy 26: 500–516.

75.

Rhodes

RAW

(1997) Understanding Governance, Buckingham: Open University Press.

76.

Savage

(1990) Public Policy Under Thatcher, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

77.

Skelcher

(2000) Changing images of the state: Overloaded, hollowed-out, congested. Public Policy and Administration 15: 3–19.

78.

Somerville

Haines

(2008) Prospects for local co-governance. Local Government Studies 34: 61–79.

79.

Swiss Confederation (2017) HORIZON 2020: Participation by Swiss Research Entities. Bern: EAER.

80.

Sykes O, Brown J, Cocks M, et al. (2013) A city profile of Liverpool. Cities 35: 299–316.

81.

Sykes

Lord

(2011) Whither a Europe of the (English) regions? Reflections on the prospects for the representation of English territorial interests in Europe. Local Economy 26: 486–499.

82.

TMP (2009) Economic Review 2009, Liverpool: The Mersey Partnership.

83.

Tonkiss

(2013) Austerity urbanism and the makeshift city. City 17: 312–324.

84.

Vigar

(2013) Promoting fairer neighbourhood planning. In: Shaw

Blackie

(eds) New Directions in Planning: Beyond Localism, Newcastle: Northumbria University, pp. 104–113.

85.

Williams

(1996) European Union Spatial Policy and Planning, London: Paul Chapman.