Abstract
Ensuring adequate provision of municipal infrastructure, utilities and services constitutes a major rationale for the local government administration in Nigeria. This paper examined the road infrastructure delivery performance (provision, maintenance and rehabilitation) of the local administration in the two local government areas of Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Data were obtained with the aid of questionnaire and key-informant interview. Using multistage sampling, 600 residents were surveyed. The key-informant interviews were conducted on three local government senior administrative officers. Descriptive statistics and thematic content analysis were employed in the analysis. The study found that the local administrations in the city lacked autonomy, as they practically advance the cause of the state government. Thus, they could neither initiate nor execute any infrastructure project independently. It was also found that residents in the city were often required to contribute financially towards the construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure in their neighbourhoods. The study concluded that the performance of the local administration in the city was poor in terms of its statutory duty of municipal road infrastructure delivery. Consequently, the paper recommends the enhancement of the overall performance of local administration in Osun State through the granting of full political and financial autonomy to the local government.
Introduction
The primary rationale for the creation of local governments consists in the promotion of good governance (Adebayo, 2014; Agba et al., 2013; Olojede and Daramola, 2015; Sehinde, 2008; Ukiwo, 2006). In Nigeria, one of the main objectives for the introduction of the local government administration, as the third tier of government, is to ensure adequate provision of municipal infrastructure, utilities and services (Agba et al., 2013; Boris, 2015). In other words, the efficient and effective provision of basic amenities and social infrastructure for the grassroots in the country is a key factor behind the existence of the local government (Bolatito and Ibrahim, 2014). This is because governance at the local level plays a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness and provision of public goods to the people, and because the local government service delivery system affects the day-to-day activities of citizens, especially the grassroots (Ibok, 2014). It is obvious that the recognition and importance accorded local governments in the development process is premised on the imperative to tackle local socioeconomic problems and to manage grassroots development through the provision of basic infrastructure (Lawal, 2014; Wunsch, 2001). For this reason, the local government is essentially regarded as a veritable path to, and a generator of, national integration, administration and development (Adebayo, 2014).
Principal among the infrastructure priorities expected of the local government in Nigeria is the road infrastructure. The way Nigeria is structured, there are three distinct road types: Trunk A, Trunk B and Trunk C, provided and maintained by the federal, state and local governments, respectively. The economic importance of road infrastructure in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised (Atubi, 2013; Igwe et al., 2013; Lawal, 2014; Sehinde, 2008) as it is about the only functional mode of transport in the country, especially in Osun State. Consequently, more often than not, the success and/or service delivery performance of local governments are/is assessed by the people in terms of road infrastructure delivery. It usually constitutes the bulk of the campaign promises and political manifestoes at the local level. This is because any government that is seen as not prioritising it, especially at the local level, is usually unpopular.
In spite of the foregoing, the delivery of the access road infrastructure in Nigeria is generally below expectations. This manifests in the state of Trunk C roads, all over the country. Generally, Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure is in a dismal state and is insufficient to meet the transformation agenda of achieving any meaningful economic growth and development (Igwe et al., 2013; Lawal, 2014). Most Trunk C roads suffer neglect and abandonment as they are rarely maintained. In some places, this class of road is either formally non-existent or informally improvised by users, who take it upon themselves to create it to service their plots, through individual and communal efforts. This is often the case when the local government does not live up to expectations. Then, the incremental housing and urban sprawls development in many towns and cities contributes significantly to the problem. In many cases, house owners no longer wait upon the local government – who is, more often than not, not forthcoming – for the construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of these roads. Consequently, in most cases, Trunk C roads in the country are in a bad shape and are largely substandard, usually unpaved and mostly inadequately maintained. All that is usually expected and ensured is a passage, even if inconvenient. This is especially true of Osun State, where the attainment of an efficient transport system seems impossible.
The importance of Trunk C roads to the grassroots and local economy cannot be overemphasised. The grassroots are more concerned about this class of roads than any other one as it is their road of first contact every morning and that of their last contact every evening. Moreover, the state of these roads impact on their travel time and costs. Thus, many of them use it as a major yardstick for assessing the performance of the local government. In addition, Trunk C roads, especially in Nigeria, cannot be ignored in the analyses of the local economy and local politics as well as regional analyses. This paper is an attempt to empirically examine the Trunk C road infrastructure delivery performance of the local administration in the two main local government areas (Ife Central and Ife East) of Ile-Ife, one of the major cities in Osun State, South-western Nigeria. It examines delivery performance in terms of provision, maintenance and rehabilitation; assesses the state and other physical attributes of the roads; and examines the factors responsible for their present state using a multilateral approach, a largely missing dimension in the extant literature. The broad aim of the paper is to document an empirically informed policy document proposal for the general overhauling of the local government administration in Osun State in particular and Nigeria in general towards enhanced, focused, democratic and efficacious local governance towards improved local economy.
Literature underpinnings
The concept of local government
It is rather difficult to identify a universally acceptable definition of ‘local government’. This is because scholars seldom agree on a fit-all definition of it. Even among experts of public administration, there seems to be pluralism of conceptualisations as far as it is concerned. This is because the backgrounds, the foci and the rationales for its establishment vary from one country to another. In their global overview of the local government system, Alao et al. (2015) juxtapose what obtains in several countries. In Britain, local authorities perform three broad functions, classified as environmental, protective and personal. On the other hand, in the United States, the functions include management of schools, policing and fire protection, public works, libraries and recreation, public utilities, city planning, public health, airports, harbour and housing.
In New Zealand, other acts apart from the Local Government Act 2002 clearly state that the statutory responsibilities of local councils range from sustainable regional wellbeing, managing freshwater, land, air and coastal waters, transportation and environmental safety, among others. As for India, the functions of the Panchayati Raj (i.e. local government) are similar to what obtains in the United States except for police, harbours and airports, but could be classified as obligatory and discretionary which is a function of the size of the council based on three-tier arrangement. In the case of Nigeria, the functions of the local government are contained in the Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution, including the consideration and the making of recommendations to a state commission on economic planning on economic development of the state as well as social, educational, environmental and political functions.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is important to note that irrespective of the country, the fundamental goal of the creation of local governments is unmistakable. According to Kyenge (2013), no matter how differently the local government is defined or wired, the focus remains the transfer of political powers to local areas by involving the inhabitants in the provision of basic needs in their respective communities. In a federal system of government like Nigeria, local government is invariably the third tier of government. In a unitary system like Britain, however, it usually exists as the second-order government to the national level. Nonetheless, what local governments have in common, either in federal or unitary system of government, is the responsibility for the most immediate needs of their citizens without any other body between them and the individual. This makes it the level of government closest to the people (Chukwuemeka et al., 2014).
Furthermore, according to Eboh and Diejomaoh (2010), the local government is generally seen as a system of government whereby the state allows the establishment of local units of government with powers and authority to make local decisions on matters that affect the local communities, and to mobilise local resources for implementation or execution of the decisions made. Thus, it is evident that the local government is a multi-dimensional concept. As garnered from works of scholars (Alao et al., 2015; Chukwuemeka et al., 2014; Ezeani, 2004; Otinche, 2014), at least the following eight features generally characterise the local government:
it operates within a defined geographical area; it has a certain population living within the confines of a defined territory; it operates at the local or grassroots level; it has a range of constitutionally delineated functions to perform; it has a relative autonomy or independence; it is a legal entity: can sue and can be sued; it has its council composed of elected representatives; and it is the lowest level of government wherever it exists.
All the foregoing characteristics usually apply to the local government in Nigeria where it is established as the third tier of government. It is protected by the constitution, and it comprises democratically elected representatives whose purpose is to provide basic services to the grassroots (Adeyemi, 2013). However, unfortunately, this is not always the case in Nigeria as executive state governors can oftentimes decide who becomes what at the local government level. This usually renders this important tier of government vulnerable to various forms of incapacity and inefficiency, thus practically defeating the very purpose of its establishment.
Local government in Nigeria: Evolution, functions, achievements and problems
Grassroots governance or local administration has an interesting evolution in Nigeria. Three distinct stages are clearly identifiable: pre-colonial, colonial and post-Independence. When conceptualised in terms of its intrinsic fundamental attributes, local administration in Nigeria predated the colonial rule as each of the distinct ethnic groups that make up the country had its peculiar, independent system of governance (Olojede and Daramola, 2015). In the North, the Hausa/Fulani people were ruled by their Sultanate and Emirates, as dictated and influenced by the Islamic/Sharia legal system. In Yorubaland, in the southwestern part of the country, the Yoruba people were ruled by their obas (kings) and chiefs. The Ibo people had chiefs even though there was no specific, identifiable rigid line of central authority.
Moving away from the pre-colonial experience, local government, as it is known today in Nigeria, emerged as a creation of the British colonial rule. However, over time, it has experienced change in name, structure and composition (Adebayo, 2014). The Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 by the then Governor-General, Lord Lugard. Consequent upon the amalgamation, Lugard introduced the Indirect Rule administrative system, which lent some measure of credence to the prominence of the traditional rulers. This served as a formal recognition by the colonial masters of the already existing local governance structure in the country. Meanwhile, according to Alao et al. (2015), a major motivation for the introduction of indirect rule in Nigeria was the success it had recorded in India and elsewhere. By virtue of the Local Government Ordinance of 1950, reforms were brought to the system leading to a British-like three-tier structure: counties, districts and local councils. Apart from country-wide reforms, the respective regional governments also introduced some reforms thereby leading to different paces of development of the local government system. For instance, reforms in the Western Region did not start until 1952 when the region promulgated the Local Government Law of 1952, whereas in the East, it was the Local Government Law of 1955 that replaced the 1950 ordinance. Both the Eastern and Western authorities had three years’ tenure, while 75% of members of the councils were elected (Ezeani, 2004).
From 1960, the year of Nigeria’s independence from the British colonial masters, through the years prior to 1976, a lot of restructuring and reengineering took place in the local government system of Nigeria. These were as influenced by the creation of regions, states and local government areas. Another significant point to note is that through this period Nigeria underwent a trying routine of political instability, moving from civilian to military and from military to civilian regimes with unstable political ideologies and structures. Different ideas were tested and several approaches were experimented with. Some failed; some recorded notable success.
The most fundamental post-Independence reforms in local government administration in Nigeria came with the 1976 Local Government Reform. It was masterminded by the Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime (1976–1979). By virtue of the 1976 reform, the local government was formally recognised as the third tier of government in Nigeria. The reform was a watershed and revolutionary inasmuch as for the first time a uniform country-wide local government system was initiated. The reforms were also monumental in the sense that by one stroke, local governments were equipped with political, administrative and fiscal capabilities (Oviasuyi et al., 2010; Ukiwo, 2006) for service delivery. By all standards, the 1976 reform constituted a major departure from the previous practice and systems of local government administration in Nigeria. In terms of structure, composition, functions, finance and democratic existence, it laid the foundation of the present-day structure of the local government system in Nigeria (Oviasuyi et al., 2010). The reforms also introduced a population criterion under which a local government could be created. A population of 150,000–300,000 was considered feasible for a local government area. This was done to avoid the creation of non-viable local councils and for easy accessibility. In addition, there was a provision for elective positions with the Chairman as the executive head and supervisory councillors constituting the cabinet.
Hitherto the 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reform has been the most important document in the local government system in the country. However, according to NAIJ.com (2018), after the adoption of the document, seven more official documents have been signed. They are:
the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 1984 Dasuki Report on the Nigerian Local Government System, the 1988 Civil Service Reforms in the Local Government System, the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 1992 Handbook on Local Government Administration, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the 2003 Review of Local Government Councils in Nigeria.
The Shehu Shagari’s civilian regime (1979–1983) followed through and built on the 1976 structure. Following the military coup d’état that saw the Shagari’s administration out of office, the 1976 structure was initially dismantled by the Muhammadu Buhari’s regime (1983–1985), but was later upheld by the same government based on the 1984 Dasuki Report on the Nigerian Local Government System. The structure was eventually implemented by the Ibrahim Babangida’s government (1985–1993). Meanwhile, the Ibrahim Babangida’s military government increased the number of local government areas from the 301 in 1979 to 453 in 1989, and 589 in 1991. The structure continued to survive and endured through the last two military regimes in Nigeria: Sani Abacha’s (1993–1998) and Abdulsalam Abubakar’s (1998–1999). The Sani Abacha’s government also increased the number of local government areas to 774 in 1996. However, the generality of Nigerians tend to believe that Babangida and Abacha only created local government areas for selfish reasons. It was a subtle means, for them, of gaining popularity, acceptance and legitimacy.
When the country returned to democracy in 1999, the structure built in 1976 and maintained over the years was maintained under the Olusegun Obasanjo’s democratic government (1999–2007) through Musa Yar’adua/Goodluck Jonathan (2007–2011), Goodluck Jonathan (2011–2015) and the present regime of Muhammadu Buhari (2015–present). Today, Nigeria is a federation comprising three tiers of government made up of the federal government, 36 state governments and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), as well as 774 local governments. It is of interest to this study, however, that the generally recognised 774 local government areas in Nigeria actually comprise 768 local government areas and six area councils. The six area councils make up the FCT, Abuja.
In the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the local government is saddled with a number of responsibilities, among which is the provision of certain infrastructure, facilities and services. The construction and maintenance of roads, streets, drains and other public highways, parks, and open spaces constitute some of these. According to Olamigoke and Emmanuel (2013), the local government road ownership accounts for about 67% of the total road stock in the country. This implies that the local government delivers (construct, maintain and rehabilitate) about 130,600 kilometres of roads. State governments and the federal government deliver the remaining 30,500 and 32,100 kilometres, respectively. Thus, on the average, each of the 774 local governments in Nigeria delivers approximately 168.73 kilometres of road. On the other hand, the Federal Ministry of Works (2013) puts the total national road network in Nigeria, the largest in West Africa and the second largest in the South of Sahara, at approximately 200,000 kilometres, made up of 33,000, 50,000 and 117,000 kilometres for the federal, state and local governments, respectively. The Federal Ministry of Works (2013) further states that about 65,000 kilometres of the 200,000 kilometres are paved mostly in bituminous layers; others are earth roads. Out of this, the federal government owns about 35,000 kilometres representing 54% of the entire bituminous road network in Nigeria. The balance is shared between the 36 states and the 774 local government areas. Meanwhile, SBM Intelligence (2017) claims that there are 108,000 kilometres of surfaced roads in Nigeria, 32,000 kilometres of which has been built and is managed by the federal government.
Apart from these apparent discrepancies as regards the country’s road network, going by the claims of the Federal Ministry of Works, there are internal inconsistencies even in the ‘official’ statistics. If Nigeria had just 33,000 kilometres of federal roads, definitely, 65,000 kilometres of the 33,000 kilometres could not possibly have been paved. As such, this should be brushed aside as an error. Nevertheless, taking the claims of Olamigoke and Emmanuel (2013) and that of the Federal Ministry of Works together, we can suppose that there are at least 117,000 kilometres and at most 130,600 kilometres of Trunk C road in Nigeria. It then follows that at least, on the average, a local government in Nigeria is responsible for the delivery of at least 151.16 kilometres of roads. Meanwhile, in reality, going by their distribution across local government areas in Nigeria, roads that are neither the federal government’s nor the state governments’ are far lengthier than 151.16 kilometres. What this implies is that in reality many supposed Trunk C roads are actually not recognised by the government. Then, it is deducible that many access roads in Nigeria are improvised by their users and without the approval or knowledge of the government.
Local governments in Nigeria have for a long time been assessed and evaluated in performance terms and on how well they have been carrying out their constitutional responsibilities (Adeyemi, 2013; Afrobarometer, 2008; Alao et al., 2015; Bolatito and Ibrahim, 2014; Boris, 2015). Many times, their operations have been severely criticised with some people calling for the scrapping of this third tier of government consequent upon their poor service delivery (Agba et al., 2013). The derelict state of Trunk C roads in major parts of the country is one of the bases usually cited to support this outcry. Meanwhile, even though much has been done on the state of Nigerian roads in the literature, empirical research on the Trunk C road is hard to come by. Also, when it is said that Nigerian roads are in a state of disrepair, the emphasis is usually on Trunk A and Trunk B roads (Alabi and Ocholi, 2010; Atubi, 2013; Federal Ministry of Works, 2013; Igwe et al., 2013; SBM Intelligence, 2017). Thus, the state of Trunk C roads is under-reported.
Generally, Nigerians have over time rated local governments poorly in terms of efficient and effective social service delivery. There are claims that they have failed to satisfactorily facilitate rapid development at the grassroots level, the very essence of their creation. Thus, the citizens are beginning to lose trust in them and question their continued existence (Agba, 2006; Agba et al., 2013; Boris, 2015; Lawal, 2014; Olusola, 2011). According to Alabi and Ocholi (2010), the Nigerian roads are described as the lowest in density in Africa with only 31% paved as compared to 50% in the middle-income countries. The situation has hardly improved in the past years. Even where roads are provided, only 40% of these roads are in good condition, with some of them constructed over 30 years ago having not been rehabilitated even once (Lawal, 2014). The failure of the local government system in the country contributes significantly to this.
Pertinent questions have been asked, and studies have revealed the reasons behind the service delivery failure of the local government system in Nigeria. According to Ukiwo (2006), one major factor behind the failure of local governments in Nigeria is that associated with commitment. Many local administrators are not committed. Some of them are perpetual absentees from office. All what brings some local government bosses to office is the monthly allocation, after the disbursement of which they disappear. Meanwhile, financial constraints as brought about by inadequate statutory allocations and grants from the federal and state governments constitute another factor. This is exacerbated by the low revenue generation capacity of the council, frequent sundry deductions by the federal and state governments from their monthly allocations, and the failure of most state governments to fulfil their monthly statutory obligations to local government by outright refusal to remit 10% of the monthly internally generated revenue (IGR) accruing to the state (Ibok, 2014).
In addition, there is an unacceptably high level of corruption, which has eaten deep into the fabric of the local government system in Nigeria (Alao et al., 2015; Bolatito and Ibrahim, 2014). Then, there is a high degree of external influence or lack of true autonomy, as many state governors overbearingly interfere in the affairs of local governments (Adeyemi, 2013; Eboh and Diejomaoh, 2010). At times, governors refuse to conduct local government elections. Instead, they appoint stooges as administrators, most of whom are party loyalists, friends and relations, thereby turning the entire local government system into ridiculous irrelevances (Abutudu, 2011) and at times leading to confusion, absurdities and uncertainties. In fact, there is no state in Nigeria where one form of illegality or the other is not committed with the funds of local governments (Adeyemi, 2013).
Moreover, the workforce of many a local government is characterised by poor staff quality and bad work attitude. Many workers are unqualified, while some of the qualified ones are not committed (Akerele, 1986; Maduabum, 1990; Odiaka, 1991; Ogunrin and Erhijakpor, 2009). More often than not it seems the local government system cannot afford the pay of the qualified and committed ones who eventually seek greener pastures in higher-order government establishments or in the organised private sector.
With this array of problems dogging the local government system in Nigeria, and which has adversely affected its service delivery, people usually step in by providing some of the services themselves. Given this situation, it would be very difficult for the people not to score their local government low in service delivery performance. For instance, in a survey conducted by Afrobarometer (2008), it was found that most Nigerians do not trust local government officials, 55% of the respondents disapproved of the performance of the local government, while 67% scored local governments low in road maintenance. These and more are pointers to the generally unacceptable level of service delivery performance of the third tier of government in Nigeria.
Methodology
Study area
Ile-Ife, or simply Ife, is one of the major cities in Osun State, South-western Nigeria. It is an ancient city with very significant historical importance to the Yoruba race. Ile-Ife lies between Latitudes 7°28′N and 7°45′N, and Longitudes 4°30′E and 4°34′E. The city is 72 kilometres by road from Ibadan, Oyo State; about 25 kilometres by road from Ilesa, Osun State; 109 kilometres by road from Akure, Ondo State; and about 59 kilometres by road from Ondo, Ondo State. Ile-Ife is also a university town, hosting Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and The Polytechnic, Ile-Ife. Two local government areas, Ife Central and Ife East, have their headquarters in Ile-Ife at Ajebamidele and Oke-Ogbo, respectively. The former has its bulk made up of a significant part of Ile-Ife, while the latter traverses the remaining part of Ile-Ife and Modakeke with extension to some villages. These two local government areas used to be part of the defunct Oranmiyan Local Government Area, headquartered in Ile-Ife. While Ife Central Local Government Area was carved out of the Oranmiyan Local Government Area in 1989 by the General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, Ife East Local Government Area was created (with extracts from Ife Central and Ife North Local Government Areas) in 1996 during the General Sani Abacha’s regime.
Following series of perennial hostilities and internecine inter-communal crises between the people of Ile-Ife and Modakeke, which resurfaced between 1997 and 2000 over the seat of the Ife East Local Government Area, the government of Osun State, under Governor Adebisi Akande, created an autonomous Area Office (comprising three political wards: Modakeke I–III) for Modakeke on 22 March 2002. Ever since then, Osun State has been recognising its 30 local government areas and one area office. However, it is really difficult to draw a definite physical boundary line between Ile-Ife and Modakeke. They are more of Siamese towns than contiguous towns, a veritable spatial continuum. On many occasions and in several studies (such as this), the two of them are taken together and treated as one entity. The populations of Ife Central Local Government Area and Ife East Local Government Area released by the National Population Commission were 167,254 and 188,087 as arrived at by the 2006 National Housing and Population Census. There are 11 political wards in Ife Central Local Government Area, while Ife East Local Government Area has 10 political wards (INEC, 2015). All the wards in Ife Central Local Government Area are urban, while Ife East Local Government Area has nine urban and one rural ward (Yekemi). Being rural, Yekemi is not considered as part of Ile-Ife in this study.
Not unlike many other Yoruba traditional towns, Ile-Ife has a radial road network. Most of the major roads in the city converge around the king’s palace. Hitherto, there is no known official record that has detailed information on the exact numbers and lengths of the different road types in Ile-Ife. In a somewhat comprehensive street mapping project undertaken by Kolawole et al. (2016), 512 roads were captured in the city. According to the authors, these 512 roads comprised five expressways, 22 primary roads, 25 secondary roads and 460 streets (access roads). However, they employed this arbitrary classification to suit the aim of their study; the classification did not follow the conventional trunk system. It was established by the team that a larger percentage of the roads in the city were not paved, while most of the paved ones had deteriorated. Meanwhile, the newly constructed ones were not documented. The study also found that some of the roads in the city were not named according to the expected standards, while some were not even named. In spite of the foregoing, going by the knowledge of the geography of Ile-Ife, it is convenient to state that the majority (well over 70%) of all the roads in Ile-Ife are Trunk C roads.
Sources and treatment of data
Data for the study were obtained using a structured questionnaire and key-informant interview. All the 20 urban wards in Ile-Ife constituted the sampling frame for the study. They are Ilare I–IV, Iremo/Ajebamidele, Iremo I–V, Akarabata, Moore/Ojaja, Ilode I–II, Okerewe I–III, and Modakeke I–III (Ife East). Five of these wards (25%) were randomly selected. These were Ilare III, Iremo II, Akarabata, Okerewe III and Modakeke I. With the spatial scope and extent of the wards in mind, 120 adult residents were randomly sampled in each ward for questionnaire administration. This resulted in the administration of 600 questionnaires, 581 of which were successfully retrieved. However, another 13 of the questionnaires were excluded in the analysis on internal consistency grounds. Thus, 568 questionnaires were analysed. In addition, a key-informant interview was conducted on one (1) available and willing senior administrative officer at each of Ajebamidele (Ife Central), Oke-Ogbo (Ife East) and Oke-D.O. (Modakeke Area Office). All the key-informant interviewees granted the interviews on the condition of anonymity, as they anticipated possible victimisation on some of the opinions expressed. Descriptive statistical methods were used in the analysis of the data obtained through the questionnaire administration, while thematic content analysis was used to analyse the responses obtained from the key-informant interviews.
Further, the Road Infrastructure Condition Index (RICI) and the Road Infrastructure Delivery Performance Index (RIDPI) were used to analyse residents’ assessment of the local government roads’ condition and the local government’s road infrastructure delivery performance, respectively. The RICI and RIDPI have not been specifically employed in previous similar studies. However, the underlying principle is essentially the same as what obtains in the more popular Relative Importance Index (RII). Consequently, the computation of RICI and RIDPI follows a process similar to the RII’s. Literature abounds with many other similar applications. Examples include Afon (2000, 2006), Sambasivan and Soon (2007) and Olojede et al. (2017a, 2017b). The respondents were guided through the rating of the two variables of interest following the principle of the Likert-type scale (Likert, 1961; Vagias, 2006). In each case, the scale was from 5 through 1 in a descending order of significance (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair and Poor). The total weight value (TWV) for each variable was obtained through the summation of the product of the number of responses for each rating of the variable and the respective weight value. The mathematical expression for this is
The closer the RICI of a facility is to 5, the higher the residents’ rating of it; the farther it is from 5, the weaker the rating of respondents of such a facility. The RIDPI was also measured and computed the same way.
Results and discussion
Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents
The socioeconomic characteristics of respondents are considered very important for this study as they go a long way in influencing opinions. The summary of findings on the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents who responded to the questionnaire is as presented in Table 1. The gender distribution shows that while 52.1% of the respondents were female, the remaining 47.9% were male. This is deemed a balanced distribution. Being under or at most 60, a significant majority of the respondents (97.2%) were in their active years. The implication of this is that they were very likely to be politically conscious. While 54.2% were married, the remaining 45.8% were either single or no longer with a spouse. This shows that more of the respondents had a family, a pointer to the likelihood of household political discussion. Only 5.8% of the respondents had no formal education, and as much as 55.8% had at least senior secondary education or its equivalent. This implies that the literacy rate of the respondents is comparatively high. As such, it is expected that they would be fairly objective in their assessment.
Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents.
APC: All Progressives Congress; PDP: Peoples Democratic Party.
As of 21 April 2018 a US dollar exchanged for Nigerian 360.00 naira.
The major occupations of the respondents were grouped into five classes, while those who were not sure of where they belonged (0.5%) were simply tagged uncategorised. The underlying assumption for ‘major occupation’ is that some of the respondents could be engaged in some other income-generating economic activities apart from their primary job. At the time of the survey, 32.0% of the respondents were students at one level or the other. This category had the highest frequency. In a way, this is good for the reliability of the findings obtained from this kind of study. The religious inclination of the respondents tended slightly towards Christianity (55.5%), while 0.7 and 0.2% practised traditional religion and another unspecified form of religion.
The income distribution of the respondents compares a bit favourably with their levels of education. However, generally, going by the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Nigerian naira at the time of the survey, the people were not very financially buoyant. Over 57% of the respondents were from Ile-Ife or its environs, 18.0% were from other parts of Osun State, 24.1% were from states other than the state, while just one respondent (0.2%) was a foreigner (a Beninese). Again, this distribution underscores the objectivity of the respondents’ performance assessment. Similarly, only 24.5% of the respondents had lived in the study area for less than five years. In fact, 54.2% of them had spent over 10 years in the city. Thus, they were familiar with the state of road infrastructure in the study area over the years.
Political affiliation is a very pertinent variable in this study. It goes a long way in the way the activities of the government is viewed. The All Progressives Congress was the ruling party in Osun State at the time of this survey, while the Peoples Democratic Party was the most prominent opposition party in the state. The political affiliation distribution of the respondents shows that the main opposition party was more represented than the ruling party by 2.8%. However, the reliability and objectivity of the findings of this study are immune to sentimental inaccuracies inasmuch as 68.0% of the respondents indicated political neutrality.
Further, vehicle ownership of the respondents was deemed very relevant to the study as the bulk of road infrastructure serves vehicles. People who have their own vehicles are likely to assess road infrastructure delivery performance differently from those who do not have any vehicle. Meanwhile, over 73% of the respondents indicated that they did not have any vehicle. However, we can safely consider their opinion relevant as there is no way they can do without using the road infrastructure for commuting and other economic activities. Generally, a cursory look at the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents is sufficient to establish it that they quite understood what the assessment was about.
Road infrastructure delivery performance of local governments in Ile-Ife
Prior to assessing the road infrastructure delivery performance of the local governments in Ile-Ife, the respondents were asked to assess the state or condition of road infrastructure in the city with focus on seven distinct elements. Table 2 gives the summary of their assessment of the state of these road infrastructure elements.
Road infrastructure condition assessment.
RICI: Road Infrastructure Condition Index.
According to Table 2, on the average, the condition of road infrastructure elements provided by the local governments in Ile-Ife is generally poor. Even with an average score of 2.4 out of 5, drainage topped the assessment as the best road infrastructure element. Carriageways, bridges/culverts, bus stops/laybys, streetlights, parking facilities and traffic light ranked next with 2.3, 2.2, 1.9, 1.5, 1.4 and 1.2, respectively. Further, a mean score of 1.9 was obtained for all the elements taken together. This shows that the respondents rated the state of road infrastructure in the city low. Following the assessment of the state of road infrastructure elements, the respondents were asked to assess the road infrastructure delivery performance of the local governments in Ile-Ife. Table 3 gives the summary of their assessment.
Local government road infrastructure delivery performance assessment.
RIDPI: Road Infrastructure Delivery Performance Index.
As presented in Table 3, respondents scored the local governments very low in road infrastructure delivery performance in the city. The local governments were rated low even on street naming, the activity where their performance was adjudged the best (2.1 out of 5). Road infrastructure construction was the activity next in rank to street naming with an RIDPI score of 2.0 out of 5. Road infrastructure rehabilitation, traffic management and road infrastructure maintenance followed with 1.7, 1.6 and 1.4, respectively. A mean score of 1.8 out of 5 was obtained as the overall performance of the local governments in Ile-Ife on road infrastructure delivery. This is really a poor performance.
Factors working against local governments’ performance in Ile-Ife
Reasons for the poor performance of local governments in Ile-Ife were adduced by the responses fielded by the key-informant interviewees. As garnered from the interviewees, statutory duties of the local governments that relate to road infrastructure delivery are as contained in the 1999 Constitution. They include the provision of roads, motor parks, streetlights, drainage and motor parks, among other things. Naming of roads and streets as well as numbering of houses are also responsibilities of local governments. The local governments have been involved in road infrastructure development. The requisite capacity and competence for the various statutory functions are available. There are skilled labourers, professionals, technologists as well as equipment and machinery. However, in terms of the overall road infrastructure delivery performance, the interviewees rated the local governments low. According to them, a lot of factors have been hindering the efficiency of the local governments. Three themes cut across the responses of the key-informant interviewees: poor funding, lack of autonomy, and corruption. A summary of their submissions was thematically undertaken in the following paragraphs.
The first factor working against the service delivery and efficiency of the local governments in Ile-Ife is inadequate finance, without which the available human resources (qualified professionals and technicians) are ‘rendered useless’, especially in the era of the economic recession plaguing the entire country. Besides, the joint account being used by the state government and the local governments works against the interests of the local governments in the state. The local government administrators (better known as council managers and chief executive officers in Osun State) are sometimes only briefed on how the state government has disbursed their monthly allocations with or with no reference to their aspirations and prioritisations. This is because the state government must approve the budgets prepared by the local governments. Thus, the local government administrators do not really have a say. Other sources of revenue for the local governments include IGR, usually obtained from market stall owners in form of fees, slaughterhouses, charges on marriages, fines, tenement rate, Local Government Identification fees and Town Planning/development fees, among other sources. However, all these monies cannot adequately fund the local governments in view of their many responsibilities. Sometimes, when landlords’ associations approach the local governments for road construction and maintenance, they are encouraged to contribute money as a form of assistance to the government. This money could be used to fuel the machinery for road work.
In addition, the undue influence of the state government in the discharge of the local government statutory duties strips the local governments of their much-needed autonomy. Throughout Osun State, no local government is truly autonomous. In fact, at times, the state government merely issues circulars to checkmate certain activities of the local governments in the state. The relevance of the legislative arm of the local governments has been eroded as the council manager/chief executive officer is not answerable to the councillors, but to the state governor. No local government administrator dare question this prerogative! Even the 10 kilometre road constructed in every local government area by the state government was constructed ‘on behalf of’ and ‘for’ the local governments. In most cases, it was the state government who provided the technical personnel needed for project. The human resources at the local government were not engaged. The local governments only recommended where the roads should be. Meanwhile, the state government still reserved the right to suit itself. More often than not, loyalty to the ruling political party in the state was a major consideration in choosing the areas where roads were to be constructed. Meanwhile, that has been all for road construction in the last seven years! The only other road infrastructure delivery activity has been grading. Even then, a lot of politicisation goes into this, and party loyalty is often considered. Areas perceived as ‘enemies’ of the ruling party were at times sidelined.
Furthermore, the human or social problem was identified by the interviewees as one of the factors militating against the efficiency and success of local governments in Ile-Ife. This is in two major ways. First, laziness and the poor attitude to work by some staff members in the discharge of their duties render them unproductive and the local governments inefficient. There are also claims that some of them were brought into the local government service without due process. Another manifestation of corruption is in the appointment of the council managers and chief executive officers, some of whom are qualified based on their loyalty to the governor. These ones are usually obliged to the governor and cannot stand against him no matter how unconstitutionally they are treated. This adversely affects the local governments significantly.
Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations
This study undertook an assessment of the road infrastructure delivery performance, in terms of provision, maintenance and rehabilitation, of the two major local governments and an area office that make up Ile-Ife and the adjoining Modakeke Township. It was found that the condition of road infrastructure in the city was poor and that the local governments’ delivery performance of road infrastructure was unacceptably low. To a large extent, this finding is considered valid and fairly objective as the respondents who provided the information on which it is based were strategically selected. In addition, they came from spatially balanced and socioeconomically well-adjusted cohorts. Thus, their assessment was deemed representative of the generality of the people in the study area. The study also discovered that the local governments in charge of the city are incapacitated by poor funding, lack of autonomy and corruption. These go a long way in rendering them inefficient. Meanwhile, this situation applies in all the local government areas in Osun State. The implications of these findings are many. For one thing, it is obvious that local governments in the study area are run in an undemocratic manner. Besides, the guidelines for the establishment and operation of the local government system are not diligently adhered to. If this trend continues, the raison d’être and relevance of this important tier of government will be defeated.
With a view to addressing the menace of unsustainability threat that is staring the local government system in the face and creating a lasting solution to the problems militating against the efficient functioning of the local governments in Ile-Ife, and by extension in the entire Osun State, certain policy responses are non-negotiable. First, as a matter of urgency, constitutional reform that would guarantee the full and unqualified autonomy of local governments in Nigeria should be initiated and followed through. An end should be brought to every form of interference of the state government in the affairs of local governments. In the same vein, the idea of joint accounts for state and local governments should be completely proscribed. Local governments should be granted full political and financial autonomy. Autonomy that is devoid of financial independence is a veritable travesty. Local governments should be allowed to enjoy their freedom as a formally recognised tier of government so that governance can be made close to the people again.
In addition, adequate financial allocation to local governments should be prioritised. To this end, both the federal and state governments should review upwardly their financial allocations to local governments. However, with a view to ensuring a proper expenditure of the allocations, all forms of corruption at the local government level should be tackled head-on. Restructuring should be made. To this end, there should be periodic assessment of staff as well as monitoring and evaluation aimed at ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the local government service. Staff should be employed strictly on merit, and administrators elected via free and fair local government polls. There should be no form of imposition or ‘godfatherism’.
Furthermore, at the local government level, adequate provision should be made for all the service delivery expected of the local government, road infrastructure inclusive. Maintenance culture should also be embraced, as it underlies several cases of major infrastructure breakdown. Moreover, rather than relying solely on federal allocation, local governments should identify and create ways of augmenting their revenue internally. This also implies that viability and the ability to generate sufficient IGR should guide future local government creation.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
