Abstract
In this article, I consider the historical stages of development of nanotechnology in Russia as well as the political framework for this. It is shown that early federal nanotechnology programs in Russia date back to the 1990s and that since the mid-2000s, nanotechnology has attracted the increasing attention of government. I characterize the formation of the political landscape and the basic institutions for the promotion of nanotechnology in relation to the adoption of the Russian Federation president’s initiative “Strategy of Nanoindustry Development” in 2007. The evaluative part of the article deals with three aspects: (a) bibliometric to assess Russian research output in nanotechnology, (b) scientific cadre to assess the research capacity of Russia in the long term, and (c) economical to consider the early results and prospects of the domestic nanoindustry. To construct the scientometric indicators, I used the Science Citation Index Expanded and some internal databases. The texts of program documents and available reports served as the source of economic information.
Keywords
Nanotechnology is the first important global research initiative of the 21st century. However, the development of nanotechnology has quite a rich prehistory. The idea and principal possibility of it were expressed by Feynman (1960) in his famous lecture at Caltech (the California Institute of Technology) in 1959, and the term nanotechnology was first used by Taniguchi (1974) to refer to the ability to engineer materials precisely at the scale of nanometers. It is known that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) recognized the importance of nanotechnology in the early 1980s when research sponsored by DoD began to approach nanometer scale (Lau, 2003). The scanning tunneling microscope, invented in 1981, and the atomic force microscope, invented in 1986, became “eyes” and “fingers” of researchers to create nano-objects and to study their properties. These inventions have embodied some of the predictions of Feynman and symbolized the emergence of nanotechnology as, actually, technology. Discovery of a fullerene in 1985 stimulated the rapid growth of scientific interest in other nanomaterials. However, according to Shapira and Wang (2007), before the 1990s, in the nanotechnology domain, there were no explicit or dedicated R&D programs. The first of them in the United States—the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s Ultra Electronic Program and the National Science Foundation’s Nanoparticle Synthesis and Processing Initiative—were launched in 1991 (Lane & Kalil, 2005; Shapira & Wang, 2007). In the same year, the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress issued the first nanotechnology report, which triggered the first wave of assessments and policy studies. The historical context and timeline of subsequent events, which paved the way for the launch of the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 2000, are well described in the literature (Lane & Kalil, 2005; Roco, 2011; Shapira & Wang, 2007; Smith, 1998). The NNI has partially inspired or motivated sustained R&D programs in Japan, South Korea, the European Community, Germany, China, and Taiwan; over 60 countries have established nanotechnology R&D programs at the national level between 2001 and 2004. The multidisciplinary definition that was internationally adopted and the internationally generated long-term vision have made it so that nanotechnology came to develop on such an accelerated, conceptually unifying, and transformative path (Roco, 2011). Brazil, India, Russia, and several countries in the Middle East joined this club of countries later, when the second generation of nanotechnology products (active nanostructures) has already come to market. Governments in many of these countries see in nanotechnology the basis for transformative innovations that may become even more powerful through convergence with biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. Such authoritative international organizations as the World Economic Forum and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) believe that nanotechnology could significantly enhance the ability to respond to major global challenges: energy security, health, clean water, and so on.
Each country makes its own nuances and historical experience in the development of nanotechnology that are of concern both for science researchers and for informed policy making. There is quite an abundant literature, which informs about the major historical milestones in the development of nanotechnology and nanotechnology policy formation, about advancing nanotechnology through state-led programs and evaluating their outcome; but this literature refers mainly to the United States and some other developed countries. Recently, there is increasing interest in the successes in nanotechnology in such growing giants as China (Klochikhin & Shapira, 2012; Kostoff, 2012) and also other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries (Bhattacharya, Shilpa, & Bhati, 2012; Kay & Shapira, 2009; Liu et al., 2009). Russia represents in this series special interest because it has a long tradition in the development of nanotechnology without using this term. Besides, in the 1990s, it went through a transformation of the economic system, which profoundly affected the sphere of science (Saltykov, 1997). However, in the relevant literature accessible to the general reader, Russia has been paid till now not so much attention (Klochikhin, 2011; Reiss & Thielmann, 2010; Terekhov, 2012).
This study analyzes the historical aspects and policy framework for developing nanotechnology in Russia. To this end, I set the main historical milestones and traced the evolution of Russian policies and programs in nanotechnology. To assess trends and the current state of nanotechnology in Russia, as well as for comparisons with other countries, I used scientometric indicators. I paid attention to the scientific-cadre aspect of the development of nanotechnology and have considered its early economic results.
Milestones and Policy Support for Nanotechnology Development in Russia
For more than 60 years, the development of nanotechnology in Russia has passed several stages, including initial exploration, technology emergence aided by a variety of R&D programs, and then a more explicit government effort with the elaboration of nanotechnology initiatives and policies. Figure 1 presents a brief review of the milestones in the history of nanotechnology and summarizes its political support in Russia.
Milestones in the history of nanotechnology in Russia.
Next, I will focus primarily on those research areas that subsequently formed the basis of the Russian nanotechnology program. One could start counting the history of development of nanotechnology in Russia from its obtainment back in the 1950s of ultradispersed (nano-) powders and their use in solving problems related to the “uranium project.” Even then, it was noted that the new materials had many unusual properties. In 1975, the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Minsredmash set a target group of scientists to study the unusual properties and possible fields of application of these materials. Studies have shown that many fundamental physical quantities in a solid have a scale of 1 to 100 nm; that is, as soon as the particle size of powder falls into this interval, its physical properties change (Petrunin, 1997). The results were reported to the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A. P. Alexandrov, after which the scientific and technical direction “Ultra Dispersed Systems” (in open version) was formalized by the establishment in 1979 of the Council of the Academy of Sciences. In the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, the country had considerable success in developing the problem of ultradispersed (nano-) materials. However, during the collapse of the USSR, the scientific developments were not fully realized (Petrunin, 1997).
Academic scientists over decades have carried out many basic studies without which the development of state-of-the-art nanotechnology would be unthinkable (Tret’yakov, 2007). Below, I give two examples. In the late 1960s, quantum chemistry calculations of the stability of C60 molecule in the shape of truncated icosahedron were made under studies of the polyhedral inclusion complexes, which were carried out at the Institute of Organoelement Compounds (INEOS), USSR Academy of Sciences, influenced by then-president of the academy, A. N. Nesmeyanov. An article with this result was published in the Doklady Akademii Nauk USSR in 1973 but for a long time remained unnoticed by foreign scientists. Note that this was long before the discovery of fullerene C60 (see Gal’pern & Stankevich, 2000). Subsequently, Russian scientists have made a significant and recognized contribution to the study of new forms of carbon (fullerenes and nanotubes) as well as the discovery of graphene. Z. I. Alferov of the Ioffe Physico-Technical Institute (PTI), USSR Academy of Sciences, and Herbert Kroemer of Varian in Palo Alto proposed in 1963, independently of each other, the principle for a heterostructure laser. However, Alferov was the first to succeed in producing a lattice-adapted heterostructure (AlGaAs/GaAs) with clear borders between the layers. A technological breakthrough occurred around 1970, when heterostructure lasers became able to work continuously at room temperatures (Alferov, 1996). Later conceptions of heterostructure were even more fruitful for semiconductor devices due to the transition from classical toward nanoscale heterostructures, including quantum wells, wires, and dots. The first complex laser structure with quantum wells in Russia was obtained at the PTI in 1988 (Alferov, 1996). A scientific school, founded by Alferov in the area of semiconductor nanostructures, has made and continues to make a significant contribution to the development of this research area in the world.
Of course, in addition to those listed, other fields of nanoscale science were developing in Russia. Since the mid-1980s, work began on scanning probe microscopy, on nanoelectronics, and on nanocatalysis. It should be noted that behind many of these studies, which laid the foundation of the national nanotechnology field, there stood in those years their main customer and sponsor: the Soviet military-industrial complex. However, since perestroika and the collapse of the USSR, military demand fell dramatically; as a result, the scientific and technical capacity created during past decades was severely limited in access to end users.
1991 to 2000: Support for Nanotechnology in the Context of Survival of Russian Science
In the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market system, the Russian economy underwent tremendous stress. As a result, science has been put in terms of survival; due to significant underfunding, many active scientists began to leave, closing whole areas of research. The Russian government and international organizations have been the primary sponsors for nanotechnology research in Russia through specific programs and projects. It is difficult to recover a fairly complete picture of nanotechnology R&D activities funded by the government, therefore, I will mention only some programs. The target program “Ultra Dispersed (Nano-) Materials” was aimed at applied problems of nuclear industry. The interdisciplinary scientific-technical program “Physics of Solid State Nanostructures” provided an opportunity to support high-level work to study physical phenomena in semiconductor nanostructures without a mass departure of Russian scientists abroad. The state scientific-technical program “Advanced Technologies and Devices of Micro- and Nanoelectronics” was aimed at developing new generations of element base for a variety of information processing systems. In 2000, the program “Military Nanoelectronics of RF Armed Forces” was developed and approved. The purpose of this 10-year program was to reach parity with the world in development of military electronics in nanometer scale.
Interesting is the history of another nanotechnology R&D program. The invention of a simple method of obtaining fullerenes, and the discovery of their superconductivity in conjunction with alkali metals, led in the early 1990s to a real “fullerene boom” the world over. In 1992, St. Petersburg’s scientists initiated the unification of isolated Russian research projects into a scientific search program, which later, with support of the Ministry of Science and Technological Policy, was formalized as the section “Fullerenes and Atomic Clusters” of the state scientific-technical program “Actual Directions in Condensed Matter Physics.” This timely step led to the formation of the Russian community of researchers engaged in studying fullerenes and their derivatives. Under this program, dozens of research teams received backing (63 in 1997) in Moscow city and the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Nizhni Novgorod, Ufa, and Krasnoyarsk; many of them have received international recognition.
The research funding on the basis of projects was an important undertaking in the program on fullerenes. The establishment in 1992 of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) has reinforced this principle yet more. The RFBR has played an important role in the development of the fundamental scientific basis of national nanotechnology: Since 1993, the proportion of research projects on nanotechnology in their total number was continuously increasing. The term fullerene was one of the most commonly used in the titles of research projects by the RFBR in 1993 to 2006 (Terekhov, 2007). International organizations, such as INTAS and ISTC, have helped to reform and fund Russian science in these years. 1 For example, study of nanoheterostructures at the PTI of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) was supported by several grants from INTAS. ISTC has funded Project No. 079 “Fullerenes” (Research Institute “Graphite,” Moscow) and then a number of other projects in the field of nanotechnology. Note that the average grant of ISTC between 1994 and 2001 was about $260,000, which is comparable with the entire budget of the program “Fullerenes and Atomic Clusters” in 2001.
Thus, despite the extreme conditions in the 1990s, Russian science has survived, although in a much abbreviated form. The main directions of nanotechnology development were supported, as far as possible, through target programs and the RFBR activity. Of great help were grants from international organizations. According to experts, among all sources of support for R&D, the share of foreign financing has grown from 0% in 1992 to 17% in 1999 (Dezhina, 2002). Project funding through competition has become increasingly used to support R&D. However, funds have been allocated mainly for research personnel and less for infrastructure. One of the few exceptions was the opening in 1999 of the first specialized source of synchrotron radiation in the country (Russian research center Kurchatov Institute), which was attended by then-future president of Russia V. V. Putin.
Awarding Z. I. Alferov in 2000 the Nobel Prize in Physics “for developing semiconductor heterostructures used in high-speed- and opto-electronics” and fixing the international priority of Russia on obtaining and applying the superhard fullerite C60 (Blank, Buga, Dubitsky, Serebryanaya, & Popov, 2001) have become important and symbolic achievements. The Russian company NT-MDT (molecular devices and tools for nanotechnology) entered the market in 1993; subsequently (in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012), it was awarded with the R&D 100 Award, one of the main awards in the high-tech market.
2001 to 2006: Assessing Opportunities and Preparation of the President’s Nanotechnology Initiative
Since 2001, under the influence of the adoption by leading countries of nanotechnology initiatives, debates on problems of nanotechnology development in Russia finally were started. The Collegium of the Ministry of Industry, Science, and Technologies, dedicated to the state of affairs in Russia in the field of nanotechnology and chaired by the minister I. I. Klebanov, was held in March 2002. Wider discussion took place in the same year at the scientific session of the General Meeting of the RAS, where Nobel laureate Z. I. Alferov made a key report, “Nanostructures and Nanotechnology.” In 2004, a meeting was held of the interfractional association of deputies “Science and High Technology: Nanotechnology—The Problems of Development and Training” under chairmanship of Z. I. Alferov. In general, it was stated that in the field of nanotechnology, Russia has serious stock and even scientific results outstripping the world level, but powerful acceleration and competitiveness with the leading countries require substantial public support.
Since 2001, the RAS began to form competitive programs of basic research of the Presidium of RAS in order to develop studies that are prioritized in the world. Some of these programs belonged to different areas of nanoscience, for example, “Low Dimensional Quantum Structures,” “Fundamental Problems of Physics and Chemistry of Nanoscale Systems and Nanomaterials,” “Nanomaterials and Supra-Molecular Systems,” “Bionic Sensory Micro- and Nanosystems,” and so on. By the mid-2000s, the amount of RAS funds allocated for research in the field of nanotechnology totaled about 100 million rubles a year.
In 2004, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (MES) was formed, and the updated scientific leadership led by minister A. A. Fursenko took a more explicit course of the state’s prioritizing nanotechnology. In late 2004, the Russian government approved “The Conception of Development of Works in the Russian Federation in the Field of Nanotechnology in the Period Up to 2010” (hereafter, Conception; Government of the Russian Federation, 2004). Interestingly, the definition of nanotechnology in the conception was different from the definition set out in “Nanotechnology Research Directions, 1999,” according to Roco (2011). 2 The result of numerous discussions among experts by 2006 was the view that Russia has a real chance to get leading positions in some key segments of the global nanoindustry, and it should maximally use this chance (Kiselev, 2006). In 2006, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin said, “Russia has the potential to become one of the leaders in the field of nanotechnology. . . . I believe we must take rapid steps to draw up and adopt an effective program in this field” (President of the Russian Federation, 2006). In the same year, the priority “Industry of Nanosystems and Nanomaterials” was introduced in the list of “Priority Areas of Development of Science, Technology and Engineering in the Russian Federation” approved by Putin. The Russian government approved the “Program of Coordinating Works in the Field of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials in the Russian Federation,” which has become a tool for implementing the above-mentioned Conception and was in force from 2006 to 2008.
According to the MES, in 2006, the total amount of budget funding of nanotechnology was 3.5 to 4 billion rubles (Kiselev, 2006). Intensifying research confirms the launch of three Russian specialized nano-journals: Journal of Nano and Microsystem technique (since 1999), Nanotechnics (2004), and Russian Nanotechnologies (2006).
2007 to 2012: President’s Nanotechnology Initiative and the Formation of a Systematic Framework for the Development of a National Nanoindustry
Despite the efforts and steps by 2007, Russia still did not have the coordinated scientific and industrial policies or the commercial industrial base to develop its capabilities in the field of nanotechnology. In April 2007, president V. V. Putin signed the presidential initiative “Strategy of Nanoindustry Development” (hereafter, Strategy; President of the Russian Federation, 2007). Creation of a national nanoindustry has been recognized in it as the key strategic priority that defines new approaches to transform the domestic industry. The Strategy covers a period up to 20 years, during which as a result of phased development of nanotechnology is supposed to create a fundamentally new technological basis of the economy in Russia. In the medium term, the main instruments of state policy in the field of nanotechnology are
Program of Nanoindustry Development in Russian Federation until 2015 (Program-2015) (Government of the Russian Federation, 2008)
Federal Targeted Program (FTP) “Development of the Nanoindustry Infrastructure in the Russian Federation for 2008-2011” (FTP DNI; Government of the Russian Federation, 2007)
other federal targeted, regional, branch, and departmental programs that provide financing for development in the field of nanotechnology and for bringing results into industrial production
The strategic objective of Program-2015 is to form in Russia the sector of nanoindustry, able to compete with the most economically developed countries in the world in all directions affecting technological and economic security, the defensive potentialities of Russia, and the quality of life of its population. By 2015, Russia will channel into nanotechnology development a total of 318 billion rubles (approximately US$10.6 billion). Volume of sales of Russian nano-enabled products should reach 900 billion rubles (approximately US$30 billion) by 2015 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2008). Federal ministries and federal services, government agencies, state corporations, state academies, and national research centers are the major participants in this program (total over 20). The MES is coordinator, and National Research Center Kurchatov Institute (NRC KI) is scientific coordinator of Program-2015. This program itself coordinates and accumulates other programs. Its funding is provided in three main channels: (a) R&D, (b) creating infrastructure of nanoindustry, and (c) innovative projects of nanoindustry development.
Channel (a) is mainly realized through the FTP “Research and Development in Priority Fields for the Development of Russia’s S&T Complex for 2007-2013” (FTP R&D; Government of the Russian Federation, 2006). The main purpose of the FTP R&D is the development of the scientific and technological potential for the implementation of priority areas of science, technology, and engineering in the Russian Federation (in total five of the eight such priorities). It is a key program of the Russian Federation that concentrates and mutually connects the scientific and technical, experimental, and technological developments with their infrastructural ensuring. From 2007 through the third quarter of 2012, the budget investment in the priority area “Industry of Nanosystems and Nanomaterials” under this program amounted to 24.85 billion rubles (approximately US$828 million), or a third of all budgetary expenditure on the program. Smaller budgets for this financing channel are invested in FTP “National Technological Base for 2007-2011” and FTP “Development of Electronic Components Base and Radio Electronics for 2008-2015.”
Funding for basic research rests mainly on the RFBR and on the state academies, the main of which is the RAS. In 2007, a branch of nanotechnologies and information technologies was organized in the RAS. The integrated program “Fundamentals of Basic Research of Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials” (coordinator, Z. I. Alferov), with the biggest budget in the RAS (of 250 million rubles), was established in 2009. However, in 2010 and 2011, its funding was cut back to 180 million rubles. Of course, one would have to add to this the nano-oriented studies, which are carried out at other branches of the RAS, as well as the RFBR grants on nano-projects, but all the same, the obtained sum (30 to 40 million in U.S. dollars) is too small for the substantial buildup of a fundamental scientific base for nanotechnology development.
Channel (b) deals with creating infrastructure of nanoindustry. According to the Strategy, the main problem is the gap between the high level of the research, the created scientific and technological opportunities in the field of nanotechnology, and the critically low level of infrastructure of nanoindustry in the country. Hence it was found necessary to form the National Nanotechnology Network (NNN) as the core of national nanoindustry (President of the Russian Federation, 2007). The NNN was created as a set of organizations of various legal forms that conduct basic and applied research, are engaged in the commercialization of technology, and provide skills training in the field of nanotechnology. It must combine the efforts of the federal and regional authorities and organizations to accelerate the formation of nanoindustry in Russia (Government of the Russian Federation, 2008). Work on its forming began in 2007 with the creation of Nanotechnology Research and Education Centers (NRECs) in nine leading universities, such as Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU), Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, and Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology (MIET). Since 2008, the main tool for creating the NNN became FTP DNI, with a budget of 27.41 billion rubles (approximately US$914 million). The outcome of this program was the creation of the acting network that provides the development of nanotechnology in Russia in nine thematic directions headed by designated organizations from large science-technological complexes of industries (see Table 1). Most of the head organizations are related to the atomic industry or the military-industrial complex, and only one of them is an institute of the RAS; 10 organizations are located in Moscow and 1 in St. Petersburg. This cannot but reflect a certain directionality in the network activities.
Head Organizations by Thematic Directions of Nanotechnology Development.
Source: App 1 to the federal targeted program “Development of the Nanoindustry Infrastructure in the Russian Federation for 2008-2011” (Government of the Russian Federation, 2010).
Note: FSUE = federal state unitary enterprise; JSC = joint stock company; SBI = state budgetary institution.
Forty universities with NRECs represent the educational segment of the NNN. These universities undertake to ready professionals of a new type by combining their training with involvement in research in world-class nanotechnology. However, a well-known NREC of the PTI RAS was not included in the NNN. In this connection, it should be noted that since 2006, a purposeful policy of scientific authorities of the country became a shift in the center of gravity of research activities to universities. The steps being taken in this direction (the introduction of the status of research university, the mega-grants of the Russian government for creating world-class laboratories in the universities, the stimulation of them in publication activity, etc.) are accompanied by abundant funding. Nanotechnology has become the touchstone for such policy, which has not brought so far the desired effect (Terekhov, 2012). The MES was put in charge of leading and coordinating the NNN. Other coordinating bodies are the NRC KI, the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology, and the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (Rusnano). The head organizations on thematic directions operate simultaneously as joint-use centers, which provide access to research and technological equipment for the researchers carrying out developments in the field of nanoindustry as part of various specialized FTPs. In addition to them, industrial and regional metrological centers were created. The further development of the network provides for the formation of sectoral and regional scientific-industrial clusters focused on the creation, production, and promotion of nano-enabled products in the high-tech markets.
Channel (c) is carried out due to the investments of Rusnano, which was founded by federal law in 2007 (State Duma of the Russian Federation, 2007) in order to become the fundamental institute for developing innovation processes in nanotechnology. Of course, a number of nanotech startups have been created and successfully worked with before: closed joint stock company (CJSC) NT-MDT (nanotech equipment), CJSC Unihimtek (nanomaterials and products based on them), CJSC Astrin–Holding (carbon nanomaterials and their applications), and others. However, their paucity and, most importantly, the absence in this field of large industrial players have determined the need for creation of such state corporation. The Russian Federation made an initial asset contribution in Rusnano in the amount of 130 billion rubles (approximately US$4.3 billion). Rusnano defines its mission as promoting the implementation of public policies designed to speed Russia’s entry into the world leaders in nanotechnology. That implies, first of all, the conquest of a leading position in the global nanotechnology products market (Supervisory Board of Rusnano, 2008). This poses two main tasks: the commercialization of applied research and development and coordination of innovation in nanoindustry. The main instrument for achieving these tasks is investment projects in which the corporation acts as co-investor together with the private partner; its financial involvement in the early stages of projects reduces risks of private investors. Rusnano has a minority stake in all projects and does not aim to maximize its share price but only to cover the expenses. The corporation participates in building nanotechnology infrastructure. According to its strategy, by 2015, Rusnano intends to create the conditions for large-scale growth in the volume of nanoindustry products as well as for the entry of specialized Russian organizations to the world market in high-tech. The long-term aim (2008 to 2025) is to create a fundamentally new technological base of the economy in Russia. The main indicator for assessing the achievement of the goals set by Rusnano, by 2015, is the volume of Russian nanoindustry products generated by projects with its participation in the amount of 300 billion rubles (approximately US$10 billion) annually. This corresponds to about 1% of the global market for nanotechnology products by the forecast for 2015 (Supervisory Board of Rusnano, 2008). In addition, the corporation must, by catalyzing innovation processes, help all Russian nanoindustry to reach a 3% contribution in the global market for nanotechnology products in the same year.
By September 2010, Rusnano has approved for implementation 93 projects after evaluating 1,758 applications. Of these, 82 are production projects and 11 are infrastructure projects (seven venture capital funds, four nanocenters; Chubais, 2010). Since Rusnano gives priority to projects at a stage close to entering the market, it is interesting to see in what nanotechnology areas Russia has had advanced developments. These were as follows: nanomaterials, 31 projects; nanophotonics, 15 projects; and nanomedicine, 14 projects. A further 10 projects were related to technologies and equipment for the production of nanomaterials. It follows that among the immediate prospects of Russian nano-production, nearly half will be associated with nanomaterials. According to Rusnano’s classification of competitiveness, 11 production projects were assessed above world level, among them optical modules, disorders diagnostics of blood clotting, pyrolytic boron nitride, and others. The first project with production in St. Petersburg, as expected, will allow Russia to increase its share in the world market for optical components for high-speed data transmission from 2.5% in 2012 to 18% in 2015 (Chubais, 2010). Projects with the biggest budgets are aimed at the production of thin film photovoltaic cells (Hevel LLC, the Chuvash Republic), 90-nm integrated circuits (JSC Sitronics, Zelenograd), and new lithium ion batteries for electric vehicles (Liotech LLC, Novosibirsk region). The last of the listed projects is a technology transfer project with a Chinese company, Thunder Sky Group. Russia’s share of the world market for batteries for electric vehicles was expected to grow from 0% in 2010 to 17% in 2014. Two dedicated projects (optical modules and lithium ion batteries) fit into Rusnano’s course for development production clusters “optoelectronics” and “energy efficiency.” By 2015, the volume of production of nano-enabled products by these clusters should reach 62 and 36 billion rubles, respectively. Already listed plans are very ambitious. Several do not meet the objectives of Rusnano, for example, the project for creation of large-scale production of polysilicon and monosilane in Usolie-Sibirskoe, Irkutsk region, on the basis of NITOL Group of Companies. However, along with the development of microelectronics, this project is important to build solar energetics in Russia and can be linked with the project “Hevel.”
In its role as a catalyst in the creation of the entire Russian nanoindustry, Rusnano carries through formation nanocenters, venture capital funds, and varied educational programs. The initial phase of Rusnano’s activities has shown that investing only in fairly large projects with the R&D stage completed leaves overboard potentially breakthrough technologies that require basic research, which is characteristic of nanotechnology. To remedy the situation, the Rusnano Supervisory Board approved in June 2009 the concept of corporate participation in venture and seed funds. This allowed for investment support of projects at an early stage, a number of which could have subsequently become the basis for larger projects of Rusnano. By September 2010, Rusnano took part in seven venture capital funds, including those with international participation (Chubais, 2010). Nanocenters are a significant element of infrastructure for developing Russia’s nanoindustry. They incubate startups and prepare small innovative companies for market entry. For this, they concentrate in one place technological equipment and a complete cycle of necessary services: management, patent, and marketing support; technology licensing; testing; and obtaining product certifications and so on. Nanocenters are selected through tenders; the first of them created were nanocenter IDEA (Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan), nanocenter of Nano- and Microsystem Equipment (Zelenograd), multidisciplinary nanocenter SIGMA (Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Siberia), and multifunctional nanocenter DUBNA (Moscow region). For example, to create a center in Kazan, which will specialize in the field of petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, and composite materials, 3.8 billion rubles were spent, of which 47% was from Rusnano and 53% from the budget of Tatarstan. Then, there were selected projects to create nanocenters in cities such as Moscow (two), St. Petersburg, Ulyanovsk, Troitsk, Saransk, Stavropol, and Yekaterinburg. In all, by 2015, it is planned to create 15 to 17 nanocenters, which will incubate around 400 nanotech startups. Formation of the nanocenters promotes nanotechnology to the regions as well as conduces the policies by regional authorities on the creation of growth points.
Thus, Rusnano (in essence, the largest venture capital fund with 100% state-owned participation) has become the hallmark of the Russian nanotechnology program. In 2011, the state corporation has been transformed into a JSC and got a state guarantee for debt financing (bonds issuance) in the amount of 180 billion rubles (approximately US$6 billion). While the JSC would focus on investment projects on producing nano-enabled products, for investment in infrastructure and education, there was established a noncommercial fund. This reorganization has given a number of advantages, in particular, now JSC Rosnano can participate in the capital of foreign companies directly. Nowadays the company is developing an updated strategy up to 2015, leaving unshakable the main output benchmark of 900 billion rubles.
The regional, branch, or departmental programs and initiatives are in the second tier; they have a different yet complementary focus when compared with federal programs. Since regional authorities are more concerned with regional economic development and job creation, republic and regional nanotechnology programs play an active role in promoting university (research institute)–industry partnership and facilitating nanotechnology commercialization. It should be understood that the development of nanoindustry will be accompanied by a redistribution of resources between Russian regions and will create new opportunities for those who in a short time are able to develop the infrastructure of nanoindustry and provide the commercialization of nanotechnology research. Although Moscow and St. Petersburg for objective reasons are the leaders, there is a good chance for the Republic of Tatarstan, the Tomsk region, and some other territories. Such large state establishments as Rosatom and Roscosmos seek to have programs and roadmaps for the introduction of nanotechnology in their respective areas. So, Rosatom has developed a roadmap “Functional Nanomaterials for Energy,” which covers the three major processes: the development of nanomaterials for electric power generation, electric power transmission, and consumption of electricity. Another document is the analytical program “Development of the Foundations of Nanoindustry in the Nuclear Industry in the Russian Federation Up to 2015.” Roscosmos, for example, within “Russian Federal Space Program for 2006-2015,” has concluded in 2012 a contract for the research work “Studies on Creation of Scientific and Technical Basis on Use of the Nanotechnology for Perspective Products of Space Engineering With Heightened Reliability and Quality,” one outcome of which should become two projects of technological roadmaps.
It should be noted also the following very proper steps:
Nanotechnology International Forum in Moscow (in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively) as a platform for discussion and organizing interaction in the triangle: the government, science, business
launching federal Internet portal “Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials” in 2009 for informing on the adoption and the course of executing official decisions and for other supporting info
founding Nanotechnological Society of Russia in 2008 for propaganda of the knowledge and achievements in the field of nanotechnology
Thus, since 2007, Russia has undertaken very significant nanotechnology efforts. To evaluate these efforts in terms of outputs, including attainability of some program targets, I present below bibliometric and patent data, information on scientific personnel, and some economic estimation and comparison.
Evaluating the Performance of Russia in the Development of Nanotechnology
In the evaluative part of the article, I will touch on three aspects: (a) bibliometric to assess the Russian research output in nanotechnology, (b) scientific-cadre to assess the research capacity of Russia in the long term, and (c) economical to consider early results and prospects of the domestic nanoindustry. All three will be considered in the context of nanotechnology policy.
Publication Activity and Research Performance
Nanotech is an emerging science-intensive technology, so scientific publications and patents are early indicators of its outcome. Now I will compare Russian nanotech research with that of other countries. By quantity and quality of selected publications (articles, reviews, letters, proceeding papers, etc.), the SCIE is the leading multidisciplinary database in the world. From 1990 up to the time of my study in December 2012, Russia had contributed to the database SCIE about 662,000 publications, occupying 10th place. To identify the nanotech publications, our approach relies on a combination of traditional nanotechnology search terminology and search terms covering some new research directions, such as graphene or nanophotonics. 3 A search by keywords, contained in the titles of publications, has identified 427,647 nanotech publications for the period 1990 to 2011. Figure 2 shows that global production of nanotech publications has exhibited exponential growth during the period under consideration. The number of Russian nanotech publications also grows year by year, but after 1998, the pace is slower than global growth. As a result, Russia’s share in the world nanotech research output fell from 8.1% in 1998 to 3.0% in 2011, and this decline was monotone, despite sharply increased funding since 2008. Figure 3 shows how Russia’s positions were changing in comparison with some other countries. By 2011, Russia dropped out of the top 10 countries on the number of nanotech publications and, by this indicator, loses the competition to its main partners in the BRIC, China and India.
Growth of research output on nanotechnology (by SCIE database).
Change in the ranking of countries by the number of nanotech publications.
In scientific competition, not only the number of produced publications is important but also their quality, measured by citations. The total number of citations, citations per publication, and the share of most cited publications can give insight into the quality of research output of the country. According to calculations a year earlier, Russia was Number 12 in the world in the total number of citations to all its nanotech publications but only Number 43 of 65 countries with more than 100 nanotech publications by the average sum of citations per publication (Terekhov, 2012). By the first indicator, Russia lagged in the BRIC only behind China; by the second indicator, it was behind India and Brazil too. There were identified 199 nanotech publications with more than 1,000 citations for that moment, authors (coauthors) of which were representatives from 22 countries. One hundred forty-four publications in the top 199 belonged to the United States, indicating its leading role in nanoscience. Three excellent articles on graphene and a review of the bulk nanostructured materials by severe plastic deformation made Russia the 10th of the 22 countries. In the top 199, also there were 6 nanotech publications from China and 2 from Brazil. One reason why Russia stands so low by average number of citations per nanotech publication is that a large number of these publications are in Russian journals (translated into English) with a low impact factor (IF). However, at the end of year 2011, Russia had 9 and 13 nanotech publications in prestigious journals Nature (IF = 36.101) and Science (IF = 31.364), respectively. A further 56 were published in 7 of the top 10 journals in nanoscience and nanotechnology according to the ISI classification in 2008: Nano Letters (IF = 10.371), ACS Nano (IF = 5.472), Small (IF = 6.525), Biosensors and Bioelectronics (IF = 5.143), Nature Nanotechnology (IF = 20.571), Nanomedicine (IF = 6.093), and Plasmonics (IF = 3.488). But the share of Russian publications in the top 10 nanotech journals by ISI was only 0.5% in 2005 and 0.7% in 2010, which corresponds to the level of Scotland.
By its very nature, nanotechnology greatly strengthens cross-border research collaboration. During the period from 1990 to 2011, 29.1% of all Russian scientific publications and 41.1% of nanotech publications were of international coauthorship. As confirmed by Terekhov (2012), international coauthorship greatly increases the visibility of Russian scientists’ publications in the global nanotech landscape. In this regard, consistent decline in the share of Russian nanotech publications with international coauthorship, from 48.5% in 2006 to 34.8% in 2011, can be viewed negatively for receiving citations in the future. Perhaps not accidentally, this trend coincided with the beginning of the above-mentioned policy to shift the center of gravity of research activities to universities. The RAS is the most prolific organization-participant of nanotech research in Russia. Domestically, it is the leader almost in all bibliometric indicators, and by the number of produced nanotech publications in the world, it is behind only the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Despite the long period of underfunding and an aging personnel, the RAS still remains the most effective sector of nanotech research in Russia. So, in 2009, the percentage of the RAS in public spending on nanotechnology R&D amounted to approximately 11%. Nevertheless, in this year, the RAS contributed to 67.3% of nanotech publications, which brought Russia 73.7% of the citations (Terekhov, 2012). Given this, the preferred funding research in universities to the detriment of support of the RAS does not seem well founded. Thus, the existing trends and features of public policy do not raise hopes for a rapid entry of Russia to the leading nanotechnological powers, since the quantity of research output and especially its quality cannot be increased quickly. The financial factor is not yet triggered. Patents are the applied research, so patenting statistics might say more on the potential impact of nanotechnology on the economy. However, according to an OECD report (OECD, 2009), by the number of nanotechnology patents filed under Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in the period 2004 to 2006, Russia is 21st, and its share (0.39%) is almost negligible. Of the BRIC countries, only Brazil is behind Russia. I can point only to the rise in the nanotechnology specialization index (country’s share of patents in the field of nanotechnology divided by country’s share in all patent fields) from 0.76 in the period 2004 to 2006 to 1.01 in the period 2007 to 2009 (OECD, 2011).
And yet to Russia belong recognized scientific achievements, related primarily to carbon nanostructures. Russia’s participation in the global carbon nanotechnology race deserves special attention, including from the point of view of the effects of public policy.
“Carbon Nanorace” as Case Study
The “carbon nanorace” has become perhaps one of the key episodes in the development of nanotechnology. Having started more than 25 years ago, this race keeps the global research community in an intense search and excites considerable expectations of society. Through a combination of their phenomenal properties, carbon nanostructures are highly useful for many applications in nanoelectronics, bionanotechnology, nanoenergy, and so on. Publications that report on the discovery of fullerene C60 (in 1985; Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1996), carbon nanotubes (CNT; in 1991), and graphene (in 2004; Nobel Prize in Physics in 2010) were by the number of received citations in the SCIE at the time of the study in the 96th, 16th, and 83rd places, respectively. We add that the root article by S. Iijima on CNT has climbed over the previous year from 33rd to 16th place. In general, CNT became a “favorite child” for receiving state support for nanotechnology; with the adoption of nanotechnology initiatives in the early 2000s in many countries, the global flow of publications on CNT began to drastically increase (Figure 4). As can be seen from Figure 4, after the short-term growth, a certain stabilization occurred in the global research interest in fullerenes, and since 2001, the global trend has shifted in favor of more promising CNT. The next point of growth in the study of new forms of carbon was created in 2004 by the experimental discovery of graphene—a two-dimensional material with a thickness of one atom of carbon—a possible future basis of nanoelectronics. Figure 4 demonstrates explosive interest in this nanomaterial, even against the background of its two outstanding predecessors.
Growth of the publications number in the field of carbon nanostructures (by SCIE database).
Soviet and Russian scientific schools traditionally maintained a high level of research and quite often reached advanced results in the study of new forms of carbon. Thanks to good scientific basis, Russia has made a fairly noticeable contribution to the carbon nanorace, as evidenced by the bibliometric indicators. Of the group of 165 highly cited Russian nanotech publications identified in Terekhov (2012), 14 were devoted to fullerenes, 12 to CNT, and 13 to graphene. However, these 39 publications constituted 43.4% of all citations received by the entire group. They include work on fullerenes carried out in the INEOS since the late 1960s, work on superhard fullerite in the state budgetary institution Technological Institute of Superhard and New Carbon Materials (SBI TISNCM; formerly the Research Center for Superhard Materials), work on CNT in the MSU, and so on. Ten most cited among 13 publications on graphene were written by scientists from the Institute of Microelectronics Technology and High Purity Materials (IMT) of the RAS in coauthorship with scientists from England and the Netherlands (coauthors in two articles additionally were scientists from the United States and Germany). All publications appeared in prestigious journals: Nature, Nature Materials, Nature Physics, Science (2), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, Nano Letters (2), and Physical Review Letters (2). State support through the program “Fullerenes and Atomic Clusters” and the RFBR projects has allowed Russian researchers not only to successfully develop fullerene science in the country (Figure 5) but also to form the patent foundation of this direction. From 1997 to 2012, Rospatent has issued 338 fullerene-related patent documents, with about 40% of them having been received by institutes of the RAS. 4 Interesting inventions about how to obtain and use superhard fullerite C60 were created in the SBI TISNCM (two Russian patents as well as the above-mentioned U.S. patent). This institute holds 4 more fullerene-related patent documents. Other head organizations hold such patents: federal state unitary enterprise (FSUE) All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Materials (VIAM), 4; FSUE Central Research Institute of Structural Materials “PROMETEY”, 3; and Baikov Institute of Metallurgy and Materials Science of the RAS and MIET, 1 each. Also note the patented inventions of researchers from the Research Institute for Laser Physics (ILP) on the topics “Method for generating stimulated radiation across iodine atoms” and “Fullerene-containing nematic liquid-crystal complex with fast electrooptical response and liquid-crystal device based on said complex” (proprietor is also Samsung Electronics). Unfortunately, a large share of patents owned by the RAS rather quickly ceases to apply.
The number of Russian publications in the field of carbon nanostructures (flags show Russia’s place).
Nevertheless, Russia proved incapable to react and to join the global trend on transferring the emphasis on more promising CNT (compare Figures 4 and 5). Revealingly, China began to study CNT later than Russia; however, target support by the state allowed it to drastically increase its efforts in this area and take first place in the world by the number of annual publications. In Russia, it did not, and from some moment, for example, the lack of their own costly production of the pure single-wall nanotubes and inability to provide even the labs for them have considerably hindered this research.Yet another loosening factor distinctly proved itself, namely, the scientific-cadre factor. Relative success in fullerenes has been ensured in essence by the active research personnel as yet of the Soviet era. Be that as it may, according to my survey, about 1,800 Russian scientists took part in the development of fullerene science during the period 1991 to 2003, and only 370 of them remained active (have published in 2002-2003 two or more articles on the theme) at the end of this period. 5 The average age of the 50 most productive scientists of 370 in 2003 was 52 years and of the top 10 exceeded 56 years. Subsequently, the two youngest from the top 10 emigrated to the USA, including O. V. Boltalina from MSU, a member of the top 10 world-ranking scientists in the field of fullerenes. In general, there was a significant outflow of world-class Russian scientists working in the field of carbon nanostructures to European countries, the United States, and Japan. For example, the future Nobel laureates for the discovery of grapheme, A. K. Geim and K. S. Novoselov, left the country in 1990 and 1999, respectively. Erosion of qualified scientific personnel, including as a result of internal brain drain, has played a noticeable role in the deterioration of scientific productivity in terms of bibliometric indicators. By the number of publications on fullerenes, Russia lost the third place that it occupied for a long time. In moving from researching fullerenes to the field of CNT, Russia dropped to 16th place. Thanks to coauthorship in the discovery of graphene, Russia is second only to the United Kingdom by the average number of citations per publication. However, it does not have a sufficiently broad scientific school to consolidate and develop this scientific excellence as evidenced by only 11th place by the number of publications on graphene in 2011 (Figure 5). By the chain, this narrows the base for patentable inventions and reduces the possibility of original domestic developments and patent-clean industrial technologies. Therefore it is necessary to more thoroughly consider human resources and, first and foremost, national research personnel when evaluating prospective research initiatives.
On the Scientific-Cadre Resource for Development of Nanotechnology
Unfortunately, as a result of a set of causes, the situation, as well as conditions and possibilities of reproduction of the research personnel in Russia over the past two decades, has deteriorated vastly. By the start of the national nanotechnology program, Russia had a more productive research community in this area than in all: According to SCIE, the contribution of Russian scientists to the world scientific output during 2003 to 2007 amounted to 2.2%, whereas to the array of nanotech publications, 4.1%. But here, the scientific personnel problem is very serious. So, in 2008, the average age of the first 100 of the most productive Russian nanotechnology scientists in the years 2006 to 2008 (according to SCIE) was equal to 51 years and of the top 10 most highly productive of them was 56.6 years. If in 1997, twelve scientists from Russia entered in the world top 100 most productive authors in the area; then in 2008 and subsequent years, they were not even among the first 500. In the large scientific personnel systems, such as the RAS and the MSU, which produce the lion’s share of the Russian nanotech publications, the average age of researchers and faculty members in 2011 was equal to 51 to 53 years.
Let us now consider the age distribution of about 8,700 participants of the RFBR nanotech projects in 2008 (Figure 6). Despite the significant youth component, including undergraduate and graduate students, the average age of the given community is 43.5 years. Along with the youth “peak” in the interval of 23 to 27 years, the age distribution has a “dip” in the age interval that is the most favorable to scientific productivity (33 to 50 years) and also a long “tail” falling after pension ages. About 43% of the participants of RFBR nanotech projects are in age group 35 years or younger, about the same as among the participants of state contracts by the FTP R&D (e.g., in the RAS, this age group is 25%). However, such an indicator is good only for superficial reporting and is often misused. In reality the youth peaks are highly flow-through formations, and stimulated involvement of youth does not always give the proper result in terms of scientific productivity. In the SCIE, about one third of the Russian nanotech publications for the period 2008 to 2010 have a reference to support by the RFBR. Having a slightly smaller number of participants of nanotech research than in the RFBR, the RAS provides, nevertheless, more than two thirds of all nanotech publications. That is, this rather rough comparison shows, the older, scientific-cadre contingent may be more productive than the younger, “flow-through” contingent (of course, the first and second contingents intersect with each other). It follows that the formal rejuvenation of research personnel in a short time cannot be a goal in itself. It is not difficult to show (Terekhov, 2011) that it is impossible through natural regulation of personnel processes (recruiting, promotion, outflow) to create by 2015 an effective research community targeted by Program-2015: 12,400 researchers, half of whom are younger than 39 years old. But if one can construct artificially such a community, then it would have turned out little productive and incapable to provide in 2015 the targeted 4% contribution of Russian nanotech publications to the database SCIE and, especially, to the top nanotech journals according to this program. Therefore, these are just the landmarks, which may be worthwhile to aim for, and no more.
Age distribution of the participants of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research nanotech projects in 2008.
The real long-term problem of restoration of the scientific-cadre potential is related to the painful gap of scientific generations as well as the demographic factor. Since 2012, Russian universities are beginning to let out of their walls the generation of the 1990s. Due to the demographic hole whose depth is measured by the twofold decreasing birth rates from 1987 to 1997, the youth reserve for science in the next 10 to 15 years will replenish at the expense of the weakened age cohorts, and this will reduce, in turn, the reservoir for replenishment of the mature scientists. As a consequence, the generation gap, which breaks the natural cycle of reproduction of scientific personnel, shall not be able to be overcome for a long time yet. These problems have been partly understood and included in the policy decisions, however, without proper proactive effect. In 2004, several leading universities in the country started a targeted training of students specializing in “nanotechnology in electronics” and “nanomaterials,” and in 2006, there was adopted a state educational standard of higher education in the field of nanotechnology. In 2011, there were no more than 3,000 such students, and mass training of certified specialists will fall just on those weakened demographic cohorts mentioned above. According to statistics extracted from the database of the Higher Attestation Commission of Russia, less than 1% of all PhD degrees in the field of natural sciences and engineering in 1999 to 2003 were awarded in nanotech-related fields. For doctorate degrees (the second stage), the similar figure was slightly more than 1%. The specialty “nanotechnologies and nanomaterials (by industries)” was introduced in the nomenclature of specialties for the awarding of academic degrees only in 2009. A number of general and specific government initiatives were aimed at strengthening scientific-cadre potential, including in nanotechnology. In 2008 to 2010, the status of national research universities (NRUs) was assigned on a competitive basis to 29 higher education institutes; 21 of them had NRECs and 2 were head organizations of nanotechnology directions. The FTP “Scientific and Scientific-Pedagogic Cadres of Innovation Russia for 2009-2013,” which is included in Program-2015, focuses on state support of young scientists and leading scientific schools as well as on the research and education centers as a mechanism for retention of youth in science and development of domestic mobility of scientific personnel. In recent years, the government has sought to use the international brain circulation by conducting, in particular, contests of mega-grants (up to 150 million rubles) for creation of world-class laboratories in Russian universities. Representatives of the nanotech scientist diaspora take part in these contests. So, Y. S. Kivshar (specialist in metamaterials; Australian National University) and J. K. Gun’ko (specialist in nanocomposite materials and quantum dots for biomedical applications; Trinity College Dublin, Ireland) helped to create the world-class laboratories at the NRU of Information Technologies, Mechanics, and Optics within the framework of the received mega-grants. V. D. Golberg (specialist in boron nitride nanomaterials; National Institute for Material Science, Japan) and J. Z. Estrin (specialist in hybrid nanostructured materials; Monash University, Australia) do the same at the NRU Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys. Talented students at pre-university levels stream to the Nano Olympiads at the MSU, the Rusnano School League. However, such policy will not soon bring the desired results; its effectiveness inevitably will be weakened by the unfavorable demographic factor, by deterioration of quality of school education, and by the declining prestige of science in society. In addition, young, novice researchers as yet have not enough opportunities for designing their careers, for example, proving themselves well in an academic environment, then moving into a more high-paid corporate sector of science, and so on.
Thus, the desired transition of Russia to an innovative economy coincided with a profound crisis of national research personnel. Recreating them in a worthy kind is a difficult and lengthy process, even under the best economic conditions. Therefore, a deficit of appropriately trained research personnel may become a long-term barrier for successful development of nanotechnology in Russia.
Assessment of Early Results and of the Prospects of National Nanoindustry
The favorable world market conditions for main Russian export goods in the 2000s have allowed the accumulation of financial resources to try to move to an innovative economy, the locomotive of which, according to plan, should become nanotechnology. To give a comparative view on the scale of nanoindustry, being created during the period between 2008 and 2015, I note that the programmable volume of sales of all Russian nano-enabled products by 2015 is only 28.6% of the revenue of JSC Lukoil (oil and gas company) in 2010. The next international comparison shows that this indicator may prove to be overambitious. Let us compare the 8-year period of time after launch of the U.S. NNI (2001-2008) and the similar period after the launch of the Russian Strategy (2008-2015). We know that having invested in nanotechnology over the 8-year period around US$28 billion (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2010), the United States produced in 2008 products incorporating nanotechnology as the key component worth a total of US$80 billion (Roco, 2011). Russia intends, according to Program-2015, by investing during an 8-year period about US$10.6 billion, to produce in 2015 nano-enabled products worth a total of US$30 billion. The output-input ratio in both cases is about the same. However, for Russia to achieve such a ratio is very problematic due to the much worse infrastructure of research and innovation than in the United States. In addition, it remains unclear what mechanism will support the functioning of the NNN after the expiration of the FTP DNI.
According to data released at the Congress of Nanoindustry Enterprises (2012), the volume of sales of Russian nano-enabled products in 2011 was about 155 billion rubles (>US$5 billion). But 76% of this volume is attributed to petroleum products produced using nano-catalysts. Even with the downward trend (in 2010, this share was 82.2%, and for the first half of 2012, 62%), it is highly likely that by 2015, more than half of the national nanoindustry will focus on the same oil industry, that is, will not be related to high technology. According to even more depressing information (Gokhberg, 2012), in 2011, 86% of nano-enabled products in Russia consisted of elementary nanotech products and conventional goods manufactured using nano-enabled processes. And this occurs when newer commercial products of the second and third generations are already entering the market (Roco, 2011). Of course, in Russia, there are companies that can successfully operate in the global nanotechnology products market. So, according to assessment of consulting company Future Markets, Inc., the share of CJSC NT-MDT (Zelenograd) in the global market of scanning probe microscopes is 16% (NT-MDT, 2011). JSC Chepetsky mechanical plant (Glazov, Udmurtia) is a main supplier of nanostructured composite low-temperature superconductors developed in the JSC VNIINM for the ITER Project. However, such examples are few, and in addition, when one considers that 80% of export products of nanoindustry are nothing else but mentioned petroleum products (Congress of Nanoindustry Enterprises, 2012), then the conquest by Russia of a leading position in the global nanotechnology products market in the short- or medium-term perspective remains very questionable. It should be noted that the efforts of Russian scientists and inventors in the field of carbon nanostructures in a number of cases have been brought to specific technologies. These are
synthesis of superhard fullerite for use of it as structural and semiconductor material in metalworking and electronics (SBI TISNCM)
fullerene-oxygen-iodine laser for potential applications in laser energetics and medicine (ILP)
polymer composites with the addition of fullerenes and CNT for use in structural elements of aviation and space engineering (FSUE VIAM)
technology of obtaining the nonlinear optical media for laser radiation limiters as well as switches and filters for new-generation optical systems (CJSC Astrin–Holding and ILP).
But these and some similar technological developments did not find, however, widespread commercial application. Not by chance, at the meeting of Nobelist K. S. Novoselov and CEO of Rusnano A. B. Chubais during the Third Nanotechnology International Forum in Moscow, there were discussed possible strategies for interaction between science, business, and government to accelerate the process of transition from the laboratory technologies of creation and use of carbon nanomaterials to the industrial ones.
By April 2013, JSC Rusnano funded 100 projects (of these, 93 were production projects, 7 were venture capital funds) totaling more than 263 billion rubles, including 133 billion rubles of its own funds and 130 billion rubles in funds of co-investors. The project companies of Rusnano have sold 11.3 billion rubles of nanotechnology products in 2011, and 23.4 billion rubles in 2012 (Chubais, 2013). By this point, Rusnano has exited from three projects with a yield on investment (internal rate of return) of more than 27%. Fund for Infrastructure and Educational Programs has funded 111 projects (of these, 21 were infrastructure projects, 90 were educational programs) totaling 21 billion rubles. Revenue of the formed nanocenters was 365 million rubles in 2012; their boards of directors have approved for funding 48 nanotech startups. A total of 2,280 people have been trained by the educational programs at different levels (Chubais, 2013).
The main revenues of Rusnano in 2011 were received from extension of already existing productions that have sales markets, for example, TMK-INOX LLC (production of high-precision pipes with improved resistance to aggressive environments by modifying the metal at the nanolevel) 3.2 billion rubles; IRE-Polus LLC (production of fiber lasers and modern high-tech communications equipment), 2.4 billion rubles; Virial LLC (manufacturing tribotechnical products from nanostructured ceramic and metal-ceramic materials), 0.7 billion rubles. However, several large investment projects, which were to provide further increase of Rusnano sales, failed due to undercounting of the technological and market uncertainties. Construction in the Irkutsk region of the largest complex for the production of polysilicon and monosilane, into which Rusnano has invested 13.9 billion rubles, is currently being prepared for temporary closing because of a sharp fall in world prices for polysilicon. Worsening conditions in the solar energetics market as a whole (as a result of curtailing of government subsidies in European countries and the price dumping of Chinese manufacturers of solar panels) undermines the prospects of another project in this area: Hevel LLC, a joint venture between Rusnano and Renova Group of Companies, in which Rusnano invested 13.5 billion rubles. The construction of solar generation facilities inside Russia is heavily unprofitable without government support, for which legal basis is still out. Therefore, commissioning of a plant for the production of solar modules in the Chuvash Republic has been postponed once again, this time until the end of 2013. In addition, the thin film technology of the Swiss company Oerlicon Solar was sufficiently outdated, and scientists from PTI RAS are still working to improve it. Rusnano analysts have seriously erred in prospectively evaluating the sales markets for high-capacity lithium ion batteries (manufacturer, Liotech LLC; investment of Rusnano, 7.6 billion rubles) and LEDs and LED-based lighting systems (manufacturer, CJSC Optogan; investment of Rusnano, 2.3 billion rubles). For both companies, now one cannot do without adjusting marketing strategies and, most likely, additional investments. The listed unsuccessful (at least, hitherto) companies are in the production cluster “energy efficiency,” where achieving a sales volume of 36 billion rubles by 2015 seems very problematic. In the cluster “optoelectronics”, sales plans for 2015 seem to lose the largest and the much-touted project “Plastic Logic,” into which Rusnano has invested 7.1 billion rubles out of the total budget of 33.7 billion rubles. Originally under this project, it was supposed to involve construction of a plant in Zelenograd for production of displays and devices using plastic electronic technology. However, as the e-reader with flexible display was in development, its cost exceeded the cost of similar products by other companies, so that the construction of the plant under its production became economically unsound. To date, there remained only the research component of this project, and much of the invested money is reserved for writing off business loss. Rusnano is still trying to save the unprofitable projects although not excluding the possibility of closing some of them in the future. However, for various reasons, the company refused to implement the 41 previously approved but not yet funded projects (Chubais, 2013). A number of disadvantages and abuses in activities of Rusnano were identified by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (ACh): ineffective management and excessive costs of the company for maintenance itself, purpose for expenditure of funds and the availability of related party transactions, provision of long-term soft intragroup loans, contracts for the supply and purchase of various products with affiliated entities registered in offshore countries, and others (ACh, 2013). Thus a key financial mechanism for development of nanoindustry, created by the government, often stumbles, and references to the inevitable riskiness of innovation business do not always work.
So, today Russia has 15,000 to 20,000 nanotechnology scientists who work predominantly in academic institutes as well as in universities and research organizations included in NNN. Forty NRECs, 79 joint-use centers of scientific equipment, and eight nanocenters, which incubate nanotech startups, were created. At last, there are 287 manufacturers of nanotechnology products, located in 50 regions of the country, including 38 plants of Rusnano. However, could one say that the Russian nanoindustry does exist? Perhaps no; rather, its contours are built, which show that the intended targets are still very far away. Without the petroleum products produced using nano-catalysts, volume of sales of the Russian nano-enabled products in 2011 was only about 37 billion rubles (approximately US$1.2 billion), and even then, most of them are products of the first generation. The activity of Rusnano proved not as effective as expected. According to the findings of the ACh (2013), the volume of sales of 300 billion rubles by 2015 for the company is not attainable. Rare success stories, when Russian nanotech companies were able to reach the global high-tech markets, are not associated with Rusnano. Lying-on-the-surface and ready-for-commercializing domestic developments are practically exhausted; therefore more often one has to import foreign technology and production. However, it is not suitable to create a fundamentally new technological basis of the economy in Russia. Russia’s share in the world’s nanotech research output continually decreases, beginning from 1998, and its nanotech publications on average are not often cited. The bad situation with publications, among others, is not conducive to the development of inventive activity in nanotechnology, which in turn exacerbates technological dependence of the country.
Summary and Conclusions
Russia has a rather long tradition in nanotechnology development. Interestingly, in the 1990s, when nanotechnology evolved in competition with other scientific fields, Russia had a decent position in terms of contribution to the global research output. The situation has changed since 2000, when countries one after another began to prioritize nanotechnology at the state level. Under the influence of the global trend, as well as understanding that nanotechnology might be the last chance for the transfer of the economy on the innovation path, the country’s leadership adopted in 2007 the Strategy of Nanoindustry Development. Historically, three large directions of nanotechnology were developed in Russia: ultradispersed (nano-) materials, semiconductor nanostructures, and carbon nanostructures. Of course, there were other directions (e.g., nanocatalysis, nanoelectronics, nanophotonics), but these three were basic. Nuclear scientists were the first who approached nanometer scale under the solution of applied problems. Subsequently, it has played a specific role in forming the vision and definition of nanotechnology, which formed the basis of policy documents. Traditional confidentiality and significance of material science problems affected the choice of thematic directions and head organizations during creation of the NNN (Table 1). However, reliance on the military-industrial complex and its innovative capabilities presupposes a long way to diversify the economy, what prompted in particular the creation of Rusnano. The state corporation form was in the historical tradition of the country. It should be noted that along with such key players in the nanotechnology development as the RAS, NRC KI, and Rusnano, there is another, essentially dominant one: a bureaucratic apparatus with its inertness, prevalent incompetence, and propensity for corruption among state officials. These are some path dependencies, which in combination with modernization initiatives impacted Russia’s nanotechnology policy during the 2000s. The performed study revealed some its inconsistencies.
Inflexibility and reactive nature of this policy. So, there was belated support by the state of fullerene direction and, later, lack of response to changeover in the global trend toward more promising CNT. Russia established the national nanotechnology program after all other developed countries, and this conditioned overly forced deployment of the program. The main emphasis was placed on the commercialization of applied research, which was reflected even in the term nanoindustry. Inexpert evaluation of the situation and decision-making influence of the representatives of atomic industry prevailed. So, historical achievements of Russia’s nuclear science and technology have been affected, apparently, by overestimation of the initial opportunities in the global nanotechnology race when making policy documents. A bibliometric analysis, if it had been performed in advance, would have shown more bibliometric “harvest” from the directions of carbon nanostructures and semiconductor nanostructures, which evolved in a more open, competitive environment than from the direction of ultradispersed materials. It is also significant that general research of materials was not explicitly excluded from the definition of nanotechnology, as is done, for example, in the definition of the U.S. NNI (Roco, 2011).
Wrong emphases in current policy. In my estimate, funding for basic research will not exceed 6% of total investment under Program-2015. After a long period of significant decline in Russia’s share of global nanotech research output, such an approach seems erroneous. The former minister of education and science, A. A. Fursenko, indirectly confirmed this, admitting in February 2012, “We have actually exhausted of the existing reserve of basic science, therefore we need generating qualitatively new scientific knowledge” (MES, 2012). The number and quality of researchers are essential to maintaining a competitive edge in this science-driven field. Their protracted crisis is the most serious threat to the long-term prospects of nanotechnology development in Russia. Cadre problems have already been partly understood and included in policy actions (e.g., encourage international mobility, support young scientists), but their effect is yet to be seen. Besides, shifting the center of gravity of research activities from the more productive RAS into as-yet weak research universities seems ill founded. Rather, integrative forms of nanotech research development must be sought. According to this study, Russia is not able to support a broad front and a pace of nanotech research on the level of leaders; therefore it should focus on the directions, where competitiveness is confirmed by recognized scientific achievements. These include, for example, semiconductor nanostructures, bulk nanostructured materials, and nanophotonics. Of particular note is the nanocarbon direction, where Russia has a good tradition of research, highly cited publications, inventive activity, and possible support from the Russian scientific diaspora.
Unsettledness issues of intellectual property (IP). In the former Soviet Union, IP did not play an important role, so Russia has inherited a poor tradition of patenting, especially internationally. So, OECD data show that by the number of nanotechnology patents in the period 2004 to 2006, Russia was 21st, ahead of only Brazil among the BRIC countries. Creation and commercialization of IP objects are the important target indicators of Program-2015. Rusnano has adopted the concept of management and protection of IP, and according to its strategy, one of the expected results in the short term was to be the formation of an efficient system for the commercialization of IP. But by 2013, Rusnano failed to organize even proper monitoring of the presence and use of IP objects by its project companies (ACh, 2013), and it does not indicate the importance of this aspect. Fullerene-related patents granted by Rospatent confirm the inventive activity in the field, but without prospects of commercialization, many of them quickly cease to apply.
Bureaucratic influence; dualism of Rusnano. Not the best features of the national bureaucracy have left their mark on development and implementation of the policy. The main target indicator of Program-2015, volume of sales of the nano-enabled products, is not set, to our knowledge, in government documents of other countries but is estimated by analysts and consulting companies according to their own methods. Despite the formal importance, this indicator was calculated primitively: through taking 3% (approximately at the level of Russia’s contribution to world GDP) from a moderate forecast of the world’s sales for 2015. Although the value of 900 billion rubles does not imply any significant structural shift, apparently, it will not be achieved by 2015. Predominance of expert opinions over the principle of evidence-based policy creates grounds for manifestation of subjectivism, principle of clannishness, and personal ties. In November 2010, then-president D. A. Medvedev acknowledged existing legal and bureaucratic obstacles to nanotechnology research, innovation, and commercialization. To overcome them, according to him, the state must perfect taxation, administrative, and civil law (Medvedev, 2010). Although since then, some positive steps have been made, to create a conducive innovation environment still has a long way to go. Rusnano was created as a state corporation, being essentially a specialized venture capital fund. This duality, accompanied by state intervention, as well as manifestations of insider control in the company itself, greatly impairs its effectiveness. Now Rusnano strives for transformation into an international equity fund in the organizational-legal form of general partner/limited partner, but due to unprofitableness and in the absence of vivid stories of success, it will be difficult to attract investors.
To date, after summing up of 5 years, there has been perceptible cooling of the Kremlin to nanotechnology and a change of already two curators of Program-2015 from the government’s side. Rusnano has presented a new strategy to 2020, which has not yet been approved by the government. The FTP R&D and cadre FTP have been prolonged from 2014 up to 2020 and, in general, have kept the previously received course. Positive novelty became the transition from contracts toward the grant funding of applied research by the FTP R&D. It is not yet clear whether formulation of an updated long-term vision for nanotechnology development would permit to see new challenges, to clarify the program goals and emphases, and to eliminate inconsistencies in the policy.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
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