Can Nuclear Power Come Back?

Introduction

Despite the fact that the United States has 99 operating nuclear reactors, more than any other country, supplying approximately 20% of the nation’s electricity, the nuclear industry is in trouble. Only one nuclear plant has come on-line in the past 30 years, while six nuclear reactors have closed in the last 5 years and 11 more are scheduled to shut down by 2025, while more than one-quarter of the plants do not make enough money to cover operating costs (“Lights out at Three-mile Island,” 2018). To make matters worse, two new nuclear reactors that were under construction in South Carolina have been canceled largely because the cost to finish the plant had doubled to $25 billion. Although the nuclear plant currently under construction in Georgia will apparently be finished, it is well behind schedule and 50% over budget. In addition, Westinghouse, long considered to be the world’s leader in nuclear technology, has declared bankruptcy due in large part to construction problems in Georgia and South Carolina. As a result, the company will no longer be in the construction business once the Georgia plant is completed. Many believe that the Georgia reactors will be the last constructed based on a technology that dates back to the 1950s (Caldwell, 2017). The irony is the new plants in Georgia and South Carolina were supposed to usher in a resurgence of nuclear power in which Westinghouse would implement a newly designed light water reactor deemed to be safer and more efficient. Instead, all this has had the opposite effect. Westinghouse may not survive, but more important, it has sent a message to the nation’s utilities that nuclear power is just too expensive.

Does this latest episode signal the beginning of the end of nuclear power in the United States? Natural gas is cheap and plentiful and the power plants are many times less expensive to construct than nuclear ones. This, coupled with the growing competiveness of wind and solar, does not auger well for any nuclear future. In addition, projections by the federal government do not foresee any major energy shortages where more nuclear power would be needed (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). At present, the only plausible argument for nuclear power is to lessen the impacts of global warming since the technology like wind and solar is carbon-free, which will be discussed. However, before speculating about the future of the technology, this article will first provide a brief historical context hopefully providing some understanding of how the light water reactor came to predominate and the problems with its development, which ultimately led to its demise that will make any resurgence of nuclear power difficult.

Method

The article is largely based on historical research using both primary and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted with a number of individuals, many of whom were involved with the technology during its early stages of development of the light water reactor and other designs and provided valuable insights. Various government documents were used and were also of value, including policy and technical documents along with Congressional hearings. Finally, books, magazine, newspaper, and journal articles were used when appropriate.

The Beginnings

Following World War II, the U.S. Navy decided to seriously pursue the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, which could stay submerged for longer periods enhancing the national defense. By 1948, research conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory concluded that a water-cooled reactor represented the most expeditious path to a nuclear-powered submarine. The basic idea was to use demineralized ordinary water (light water) and have it act as both a heat transfer medium and also cool the chain reaction. Why was water chosen? Perhaps a former official at one of the national laboratories put it best when he stated, “We knew a lot more about water than anything else” (N. Beldecos, former General Manager of Bettis National Laboratory, personal communication, January 21, 1985). The reactor was to be built by Westinghouse under the supervision of the Naval Reactors Branch headed by Admiral Hyman Rickover. Work on the project moved along swiftly even though many of the reactor components had to be invented. Rapid development was spurred by the first detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviets in 1949, along with generous government funding. The reactor named the Mark I went critical in 1953 powering the Nautilus submarine (Hewlett & Duncan, 1974).

The successful development of the Mark I demonstrated the technical feasibility of using nuclear fission to generate power but there were other forces at work that drove the rapid development of the technology during the early 1950s. In the midst of the Cold War, many in Washington believed that the United States had to demonstrate its technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Some in Congress even characterized the battle in religious terms in which Christianity would take on “the Soviet atheistic materialists” (U.S. Congress, 1952). How this was to be accomplished was another question. Congressional Democrats favored a substantial government-driven program, while others, including the Eisenhower administration, felt government should play a limited role.

While work on the Nautilus reactor progressed, Westinghouse began work on a larger reactor to power an aircraft carrier. However, when the Eisenhower administration assumed power in 1953, the project was cancelled as part of the president’s campaign promise to balance the federal budget (Anders, 1987). Although the cancellation was a blow to the idea of a nuclear-powered navy, some in Washington saw the cancellation as an opportunity. As early as 1952, the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy decided to investigate the possibilities of civilian nuclear power. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had invited several industrial groups to investigate the possibility of constructing reactors at their own expense but nothing came of it (U.S. Congress, 1952). Hence, certain elements within the AEC and the Joint Committee felt time was of the essence and America was falling behind in the atomic power race exacerbated by Soviet propaganda claiming that civilian atomic power was already a reality or soon would be. Admiral Rickover was then approached and asked to formulate a strategy to govern the civilian reactor program using the work on the carrier reactor as a starting point. Not surprisingly, his proposal called for the reactor to be a scaled-up version on the Nautilus and carrier reactors. By that time, it had become clear that a light water reactor was the best choice if rapid development was the key issue. Other designs, however promising, did not have the benefit of the crash program that produced the Mark I. Some saw the project as just the beginning to be followed by more advanced designs (Zinn, 1957). After all, what worked best on a submarine would not necessarily be the most advantageous for generating electricity on a large scale.

To make the proposal more politically acceptable, a private utility would serve as an industrial partner to counter those who feared the “creeping socialism” of a government-only endeavor. After some intense lobbying by certain members of the AEC and the Joint Committee, the Eisenhower administration agreed to support the project in July 1953. Shortly thereafter, Duquesne Light of Pittsburgh agreed to be the industrial partner. They would staff and operate the 60-megawtt power plant and cover roughly 10% of the costs (Duquesne Light Company, 1953). The plant would be located in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, just north of Pittsburgh.

A Government Program

In February 1954, the AEC announced a 5-year reactor development program, whose goal was to discover which reactor design could be commercialized the fastest and attract utility interest. Five reactor designs were to be tested, two of which were light water reactors including Shippingport, a sodium-graphite reactor, a so-called homogeneous reactor, and a breeder reactor. Of the five designs, it quickly became apparent that only the light water reactors had any chance of rapid commercialization. The other types were truly experimental and years away from any practical application (Dawson, 1976). Perhaps in more normal times without the tensions and political hysteria the Cold War spawned, the AEC’s 5-year program would have been treated as was it originally intended—an experimental program to gain knowledge that could be applied to construct larger reactors other than just light water. However, the United States needed to get into the power reactor game quickly keeping in mind the British plant at Calder Hall would go on-line in 1956.

Power Reactors Demonstration Program

While Shippingport was still under construction, the AEC announced its second major initiative called the Power Reactors Demonstration Program, which was an effort to entice the utilities to go nuclear despite any pressing need to do so. Fossil fuel technology was certainly adequate as electric prices continued to fall and any environmental concerns had not yet surfaced. The program was essentially a public–private partnership in which the government would provide technical expertise, while the private sector would pay to construct and operate the plant. Four proposals were received, two of which involved light water reactors. Yankee Atomic (PWR) was built by Westinghouse in New England for a consortium of utilities, and the Dresden I BWR reactor in Illinois, which was largely financed by Commonwealth Edison and General Electric. Both light water reactors performed relatively well. The other designs did not fare as well. For instance, a sodium graphite reactor was constructed in Nebraska where the government was forced to pick-up 70% of the costs when the utility involved was unable to finish the project. The plant operated until 1965; however, the reactor was plagued by technical problems, many of which were associated with liquid sodium, which can explode if exposed to water or air (Perry, 1976).

The final proposal came from Detroit Edison to construct a liquid metal fast breeder reactor. A reactor that can create its own fuel and never need refueling and would come to play an important role in the fate of nuclear power (W. Marshall, 1983). As attractive as the concept was, the decision to go ahead with the reactor called Fermi I turned out to be the worst decision the AEC ever made. In the early 1950s, the AEC had constructed an experimental breeder reactor in Idaho, which experienced a meltdown in 1955. A general problem with breeder reactors like the sodium graphite reactor is liquid sodium. Although the substance is thermally efficient with operating temperature around 800°F, it, as mentioned, can explode (Dawson, 1976). Nevertheless, Detroit Edison was given the go ahead to construct a 200-megawat plant. They agreed to finance 90% of the reactor’s costs, the kind of arrangement that the Eisenhower administration was looking for. Unfortunately, the plant was a technical disaster. The worst event happened in 1966 when a meltdown occurred, which was luckily contained within the reactor vessel. In all, Fermi I would operated a total of 30 days at full power when operation ended in 1972 (Mazuzan, 1983). In the end, the most lasting impact of Fermi I was to raise questions about the ultimate safety of nuclear power.

In 1956, the AEC announced a second round of the program. New reactor designs were introduced but most did not fare well. For instance, a design called an organic-moderating reactor, which used hydrocarbons and neutrons instead of water to cool and moderate the reactor, experienced major problems and after a few years was canceled. Only a heavy water (deuterium) reactor designed by Westinghouse, despite some problems, could be considered a technical success. In future years, a number of heavy water reactors would be constructed in Canada.

To counter the growing demand of Congressional Democrats for a substantial government-driven initiative, the AEC announced a third round of the program and then a modified third round. The most important component of this round was the construction of three light water reactors including the San Onofre plant in California and Connecticut Yankee, both PWRs, which, if anything, reinforced the assumption that light water was the only design capable of rapid commercialization (Perry, 1976).

Competition

Although attempts by the federal government to speed nuclear construction were not particularly successful, there were other forces at work, which would spur development. During the first half of the 20th century, General Electric and Westinghouse developed an intense rivalry, and in the 1950s nuclear power became part of the mix. In this regard, Westinghouse had an obvious advantage—its relationship with Naval Reactors allowing for the rapid development of the PWR, which the company was determined to make into a commercial success. By 1953, two of every five Westinghouse employees was on the atomic power payroll. As early as 1955, the company was attempting to sell reactors in Europe but with little success other than two small reactors in Belgium and Italy. Although the company did reach licensing agreements with several other countries, including Germany and later Japan to provide equipment and expertise (Polach, 1964). In this country, sales were nearly nonexistent other than the Yankee Atomic plant constructed with the aid of substantial government subsidies. In a desperate attempt to increase business, the company announced in 1959 that it would construct nuclear plants for a fixed cost. More surprising was the fact that two of the reactor designs were yet to be constructed, which included a heavy water reactor and a reactor that would operate in conjunction with fossil-fuel generation (“Calling the shots,” 1959). Despite the generous offer, no utility was willing to finance a reactor on its own. What was made clear, however, was that if utilities were going to purchase reactors, they had to be reliable and have larger capacities to take advantages of economies of scale. Hence, Westinghouse heavily marketed a 330-megawatt PWR reactor, which the company claimed could be constructed and operated at costs similar to a coal-fired plant (U.S. Congress, 1965). Two of these reactors were eventually constructed as part of the third round of Power Reactors Demonstration Program (San Onofre and the Connecticut Yankee) with the government putting up 10% of the costs.

General Electric was also heavily committed to selling commercial reactors. However, the company never developed a relationship with the federal government equivalent to the one between Westinghouse and Naval Reactors. Nonetheless, General Electric felt it possessed the resources and talent to move forward. Although the company had explored other reactor designs under government contract including a breeder reactor, it also settled on light water as the most expeditious path to commercial success. As mentioned, the company along with Commonwealth Edison constructed Dresden I largely at their own expense. The 200-megawatt BWR reactor went on-line in 1961 and was a dramatic scale-up of the technology, something the company hoped would attract utility interest (U.S. NRC, 2016). When that did not happen, General Electric also took a major gamble, which did pay off. In 1963, the company agreed to construct a 515-megawatt BWR for $66 million located in Oyster Creek, New Jersey. The Oyster Creek plant became known as a “turnkey” since the operating utility would simply walk in and begin to operate the plant. If nothing else, the offer reinforced the perception that nuclear power was economically viable—something that both General Electric and Westinghouse had claimed for years but had never proven. What it did trigger was what a Westinghouse vice-president called a “turnkey war” since Westinghouse felt compelled to match General Electric’s offer (C. Weaver, Westinghouse Vice-President, personal communication, March 3, 1988). In all, 13 turnkey plants were constructed. Although neither company ever revealed their losses, estimates put them upwards of $1 billion (Perry, 1976). Nonetheless, the turnkeys along with rising electrical demand, increased coal prices, and emerging pollution concerns had the desired effect. In 1966 and 1967 alone, orders were placed for 49 light water reactors but now with cost-plus contracts. Utilities were ordering reactors many times larger than anything in operation, and with minimal construction experience, costs to finish these plants were underestimated by a factor of two as long delays became the norm. There was also little opportunity to develop standardization of parts due to the rapid scale-up. Adding to the problem were the ever-increasing level of regulations. As mentioned, light water plants are complex. A large plant has 40,000 valves alone, and by now regulators were asking “what if” something goes wrong. By 1975, 50 reactors were operating, but none ordered after 1968 had come on-line (Bupp & Derian, 1978). Utilities began to cancel orders. Between 1978 and 1985, 75 plants were cancelled, 24 of which were under construction. Certainly, the meltdown at Three Mile Island had something to do with it, but more important, light water reactors were just too expensive for the typical utility. Consider that of those plants completed, the costs of construction averaged $800 million over original estimates (Cook, 1985).

Thus, the rush to construct light water plants came to an abrupt end. The reason it happened was perhaps best summed up by David Lilienthal, former AEC chairman, when he wrote, “The reliance on a single virtually unchanging technology is contrary to everything we’ve learned about science and industrial development” (Lilienthal, 1980). In short, there was no time for the normal processes of technological innovation to occur where different designs could have been developed and tested more in accord with market conditions. The United States had to demonstrate technological superiority and manufacturers wanted a return on their considerable investment. All of which led one writer to call the entire episode “the largest managerial disaster in business history” (Cook, 1985).

The Waste Problem

Although unfavorable economics became and remains the major deterrent to nuclear power, another problem has always lingered in the background—what to do with the nuclear waste? The typical commercial reactor contains hundreds of 12-foot long cylindrical fuel rods, which contain uranium-235, the only naturally occurring fissionable material. As fission occurs water flows around the rods absorbing the heat given off. Fuel rods after a time wear out and must be replaced, and they will be highly radioactive for 10,000 years. Commercial nuclear plants all have “swimming pools” where the rods can be safely stored underwater. In this regard, more than 79,000 tons of spent fuel rods have piled up at country’s commercial reactor sites, and the swimming pools are full. Over the years, any number of alternatives have been proposed from launching waste into outer space to burying them in deep ocean, sentiments to reprocessing, where the spent fuel is chemically dissolved recovering usable uranium and plutonium to make new fuel rods. Although reprocessing makes sense, it appears unlikely it could ever be profitable unless the price of mined uranium soared by a factor of 10 (Beaver, 2010).

With all the uncertainties and potential dangers involved, Congress settled on what was deemed to be safest and most practical alternative—deep underground burial in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 90 miles southeast of Las Vegas. Even before work began in 1991 on the 1,200-feet deep site, state officials vehemently objected to the facility. Nevertheless, construction with a price tag of $15 billion did continue until 2009, when the Obama administration decided to cancel the project in a concession to then Senate majority leader Harry Reid of Nevada (Hawthorne, 2009). The Obama administration then purposed on-site above ground storage in dry-casks. The casks consist of steel and reinforced concrete where the spent fuel rods are placed and are reportedly safe for 100 years. Up until a few years ago, such an alternative was considered unacceptable since nuclear plants are often located near population centers. But with few other options on the horizon, the thinking changed, although the U.S. NRC has proposed an interim storage facility for the casks in New Mexico until a permanent solution is found (Conca, 2018). The Trump administration has indicated it desires to finish Yucca Mountain and has requested funding aimed at restarting the project but nothing concrete has occurred (DiChristopher, 2017). Although concerns about nuclear waste are unlikely to stop any resurgence of the technology, it will do nothing to help and is an issue that will undoubtedly be raised by those opposed to the technology.

A Comeback?

When one considers the checkered history of nuclear power combined with the recent construction problems in Georgia and South Carolina, it is unlikely light water reactors will be part of any nuclear revival. As discussed, the construction costs are excessive and long delays are common. What other designs might emerge? One design that will not be used is the breeder reactor whose development is also tied to the decline of nuclear power.

For many years breeders were thought to be the solution to the nation’s energy problems and would eventually replace light water reactors. Beginning in the early 1960s, the AEC had decided to develop the liquid metal fast breeder reactor as the major alternative to fossil fuels (U.S. AEC, 1962). The decision to emphasize breeders was based on the assumption that the supply of uranium-235 would soon run out—it never did. Second, the idea of a reactor that would create its own fuel was compelling—a literal perpetual motion machine could go a long way in solving future energy problems. The AEC had sponsored two experimental breeders in the 1950s and 1960s but no breeding ever occurred. Nevertheless, the AEC maintained that much had been learned and a larger demonstration reactor was needed. The Nixon administration agreed and initially funded a plant to be located along the Clinch River in Tennessee. The President called the breeder “our best hope” for the country’s energy future (Shabecoff, 1971). That said, the Clinch River plant was never built. A combination of environmental concerns, President Carter’s fear that plutonium (a product of the breeding process) would fall into the wrong hands and be used to manufacture a nuclear weapon, along with ever-rising costs of construction led to the cancellation of Clinch River in 1983, despite support from the Reagan administration (E. Marshall, 1983). Other countries, particularly France and Japan, instituted major programs to develop breeder reactors with little success. Although many problems occurred, the one troubling issue continued to be liquid sodium. When leaks of the substance occur, there can be explosions. None of the leaks in Japan or France were catastrophic but neither country is currently pursuing the breeder (M. Schneider, 2009).

A causality of the breeder program was that other promising designs were given short-shrift similar to what occurred with the development of the light water reactor (Hammond, 1971). Currently, some of these other reactor technologies are being explored by China, which hopes to become the world leader in nuclear power. In 2012, construction began on a 250-megawatt high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) where helium is used as a coolant instead of water. Besides less complexity, the main advantage of the design, which is scheduled to go on-line in the near future, is increased thermal efficiency due to higher operating temperatures (World Nuclear News, 2018). Even more promising is the molten salt reactor, a design that uses liquid fuel with molten salt mixed in to cool the chain reaction. The reactor also operates at higher temperatures (700°F), not only making them more thermally efficient but because liquid fuel is used a meltdown cannot occur. In addition, the nuclear waste will be highly radioactive for only 300 years as opposed to 10,000 years. The major downside to the design is the fact that molten salt is highly corrosive.

Ironically, there is nothing new about this type of reactor. An experimental molten salt reactor operated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1950s and 1960s, but it became a causality of the rush to develop breeders (Hammond, 1971). Much of the Chinese efforts to revive the technology is based on information made available from the early work at Oak Ridge, which is currently aiding the Chinese in the developing their reactor. This free flow of information dates to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations in 1953, where he promised to freely share information about the peaceful atom with the nations of the world (Pilat, Pendler, & Ebinger, 1985). Unlike American efforts, the Chinese are not in any rush to implement the molten salt design. They hope to have a demonstration plant in operation by 2035 (Martin, 2016). One can only wonder if the nuclear outcome would have been different had more funding been available in this country for molten salt. The advantages seem obvious; that said, the history of nuclear power is replete with claims that were either exaggerations or never proven.

One new reactor design that is receiving a great deal of attention in the United States is the small 50-megawatt reactor being developed by NuScale, an Oregon firm. The design is very close to receiving the final safety go-ahead by the NRC, which should come in 2020. The reactor is air-cooled, eliminating much of the need for pumps, motors, valves, and piping. NuScale plans to sell each reactor as a module, which can be shipped by rail or truck to a site. Utilities could also add modules as the need arises. NuScale has received more than $700 million in public and private funds and hopes to install its first module in Idaho by 2025, and soon thereafter, 12 modules for a Utah utility. The company maintains their design is simplistic making construction costs lower (an estimated $2.6 billion for 12 modules) and operating costs competitive with natural gas (K. Schneider, 2018). Only time will tell if these projections are close to being accurate. The point that needs to be emphasized is that any type of new reactor must have significantly lower construction costs than light water plants to have any chance of widespread use.

Global Warming

If nuclear power does make a comeback global warming will likely be the driving force. Indeed, recent experience indicates when nuclear plants are shut down pollution levels increase. Following the Fukushima disaster, Japan’s nuclear plants were closed and emissions have risen to record levels. Germany is also phasing out nuclear power. As a result, the country is burning more coal and now has some the of highest carbon dioxide emissions in Europe (Pearce, 2017). Much the same could happen in this country if the number of operating reactors continues to decline considering nuclear power generates 60% of the carbon-free electricity (Profeta, 2018).

The 2015 Paris Climate Accords proposed that world temperatures should rise by less than 2°C by 2050, which according to Jacopo Buongiorno, director of MITs Center for Advanced Nuclear Engineering Systems, are “going into the toilet” if nuclear plants continue to be shut down (Martin, 2015). Along these lines, 15,000 scientists signed an open letter warning that quick and drastic action is required to mitigate the impacts of global warming. Yet more serious action seems unlikely anytime soon. Consider that a recent Gallop Poll found 54% of Americans do not believe that global warming will affect them in their lifetime. Although concerns about global warming have gradually increased, the election of Donald Trump may quell the trend. The president has called global warming a hoax and has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Accords. In addition, federal government websites no longer use the terms climate change or global warming (Lemon, 2018). Perhaps not surprisingly, 69% of Republicans say global warming is exaggerated, a slight increase since Trump’s election (Brennan & Saad, 2018).

The Trump administration has shown some support for nuclear power but not for environmental reasons. To boost the fortunes of coal and nuclear power, the Department of Energy recently proposed requiring power plants to have a 90-day supply of fuel on hand to guard against severe weather and other potential disruptions. However, the Federal Energy Regulating Commission rejected the proposal maintaining that there is no evidence that retiring power plants (coal or nuclear) pose any threat to the national electric grid (U.S. News, 2018). More recently, President Trump directed the Department of Energy to prepare “immediate steps” to keep financially troubled coal and nuclear plants open. To do so, operators of the country’s power grid would be required to purchase electricity from coal and nuclear plants. The administration claims the new policy is necessary to keep from harming the nation’s power grid, while critics maintain the plan is simply a way for the president to fulfill his campaign promise to support coal and also aid struggling energy companies (Daly, 2018).

One policy change that could facilitate a nuclear revival is carbon pricing where those who emit carbon dioxide are charged for doing so, which many believe would reflect the real costs of burning fossil fuels (“Nuclear Power and Global Warming,” n.d.). The Obama Administration favored carbon pricing but had no success in its implementation (Lehmann, 2015). To reiterate, sentiments about global warming among both the public and elected officials will have to change for this to occur. Certainly, the political party in power will help determine the outcome coupled without how extreme conditions might become. Democrats much more than Rpublicans support measures to reduce the effects of global warming. There have even been suggestions that new nuclear plants should receive government subsidies in order to combat climate change (Brennan & Saad, 2018).

Conclusion

The end of the nuclear power era may well occur. The troubled history of the light water reactor in this country where there was an attempt to mesh political needs, technological development, along with commercial viability may never be overcome. At present, the current alternatives to nuclear power, natural gas, solar, and wind, are much more attractive when compared with constructing a nuclear plant. In this regard, it seems highly unlikely that any large light water plants will be constructed at least in the foreseeable future. Perhaps some of the new reactor designs will eventually be adopted if shown to be technically and financially viable. But if a comeback occurs, it will in all likelihood be tied to rising and widespread fears about global warming, which have yet to appear either among many elected officials or their constituents.