Abstract
This article examines cloud seeding technology from a social perspective, with a focus on its evolution in India over the past six decades. It argues that the technology has developed in two intertwined trajectories: as a research experiment and as an operational service. The research dimension has evolved in conjunction with international development, while the operational projects are supported and sustained by the state for their appeal as drought relief. In the absence of a national policy, ambiguities over the efficacy of cloud seeding technology have remained obscured from public debate. It has brought forth a situation where the concerned agencies admit that there is no clarity as yet on effectiveness of the particular technology, and at the same time various state governments execute large cloud seeding projects using taxpayer’s money. It points toward the political dimension of the technology and calls for a review of program assessment framework and inclusion of public participation.
1. Introduction
Forty two countries conducted weather modification programs in 2013, while 56 of them did so in 2016 (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2013, 2016). China has made maximum investment, whereas the United States, Thailand, and India are the other key players seeking benefits from such programs (WMO, 2013). Majority of these programs are aimed at augmenting rainfall through “cloud seeding,” a technique in which clouds are seeded with chemicals such as silver iodide, dry ice, and so on. The technique is used for several other weather modification purposes such as hail suppression and fog clearance. Cloud seeding has a controversial history that goes back to the mid-1940s when it was heralded as a momentous breakthrough in humankind’s endeavor to control weather. By the 1980s, this euphemism was replaced by skepticism, due to lack of evidence on effectiveness of the technology (Lambright & Changnon, 1989). The desire, however, has survived and is resurrected in recent times, a development that Fleming (2006) describes as another cycle of promise and hype, emphasizing the technical or economic aspects while neglecting the historical, ethical, and social dimensions.
This article examines the evolution of cloud seeding technology from a social perspective and aims at an analysis of its purpose, usefulness, and limitations. Its objectives are twofold: first, to explicate how cloud seeding programs are assessed, highlighting ambiguities over its efficacy and neglect of social dimension, and second, to understand how the technology is appropriated within India’s social and political context. The first part of the article discusses an analytical framework followed by a brief introduction to the technology and description of some of the controversies arising out of limitation of its assessment method. In the second part, a narrative of India’s cloud seeding program is developed based on secondary sources followed by discussion and conclusion.
2. Technology Assessment
“Technology assessment” (TA) as a concept was developed in the 1960s in the United States where it emerged as a consequence of fierce political controversies over environmental and social impacts of technological development. TA was institutionalized as the Office of Technology Assessment in the United States in 1972 and subsequently in different forms in several countries (Sadowski, 2015). The initial TA approach was oriented toward forecasting technological change and resulting societal effects, which reflects in the establishment of the Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council in India in 1988 under the Department of Science and Technology. TA, however, has evolved in different dimensions. Ende et al. (1998), for example, identifies the following: (a) awareness of TA that seeks to forewarn for unintended consequences of technological changes (b) strategic TA that aims at supporting specific actors in the development of particular technology and policy (c) constructive TA to situate technological development in a broader societal processes, and (d) backcasting, in which a normative future scenario is constructed for visioning. Schot (1992) observes that TA functions such as forewarning and strategic role focus more on the external effects of a technology, while constructive TA shifts attention to its internal development. The former draws from a specific notion that “technology” is a tool in the hand of users—rational, devoid of internal politics, and capable of working in any society irrespective of social conditions (Feenberg, 2002). Such a rational and neutral view of technology have since come under criticism (Bijker et al., 1987; Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1990), and it has been pointed out that TA also involves implicit assumptions such as nature of a problem requiring assessment, setting out its scope, types of effect to be studied, method and criteria, and interpretation of results (Delvenne & Parotte, 2018; Wynne, 1975).
A constructive TA approach has been further extended to include, for example, real-time TA (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002), interactive TA (Committee et al., 2010), and so on broadly seeking, to be inclusive and to make explicit the nature of negotiation among interest groups. They reflect rejection of an expert-based system in favor of a democratized decision-making process concerning science and technology. Yet they are limited in so far as attaining a deeper understanding of technology in a social context or mutual shaping is concerned (Russell et al., 2010). For, if technology is socially constructed or is taking shape in a specific social context, it gives rise to different understandings, uses, and effects as well. Stirling (2008) broadens the assessment scope by making a distinction between technology appraisals and commitment. The latter represents “ontological, discursive, institutional, economic and infrastructural attachment to particular pathways,” while appraisal “concerns the ways in which knowledge, understanding and evaluations are constructed and rendered salient to inform these commitments” (Stirling, 2008, p. 265). Appraisal in this conception includes wider sociopolitical discourse such as government reviews, parliamentary committees, academic and commercial reports, media intervention, and so on. This study draws from the framework “technology assessment in social context” (Russell et al., 2010), focusing on the context and social goals that drive technological pathways and changes.
3. Cloud Seeding: Assessment and Controversies
Cloud seeding technology derives from the work of Vincent Schaefer and Bernard Vonnegut at General Electric Laboratory, New York, 1946. They showed that naturally occurring rain-bearing clouds can be modified by injecting chemicals such as dry ice (solidified carbon dioxide) or silver iodide, which, in turn, combine with the cloud’s water content to form ice crystals (Dennis, 1980). Rapid growth of ice through this manipulation makes the resulting clouds unstable and leads to its falling off as rain. The core idea is that clouds’ water content can be translated into rain more efficiently than it occurs naturally (Bery, 1956). Two principal methods employed for cloud seeding are glaciogenic and hygroscopic. Glaciogenic method involves the use of chemicals such as silver iodide and dry ice, or sometimes liquid nitrogen, to increase the ice concentration of clouds (Simms, 2010). Hygroscopic method involves the use of salt powder of appropriate size to seed clouds. These salt particles are water attracting in nature, which allow them to grow in their size to become “artificial raindrop embryo” and hastens the process of rain water formation. The latter method is considered suitable for warm clouds found in India and Southeast Asian countries (Bruintjes, 1999). Seeding can be done from aircrafts, artillery shells, small-sized rockets, or from ground-based generators, among which aircraft seeding is considered to be more effective (Flossman et al., 2018). Once the clouds are seeded, its effects can be seen within an hour or so (Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology [IITM], 1979).
Soon after the first field trial in the United States in 1946, cloud seeding technology caught the attention for its varying application, and the idea travelled quickly around the world. By 1951, experiments were being carried out in 30 countries (U.S. National Research Council, 2003) and by mid-1970 as many as 60 countries were experimenting (Weiss, 1975). A range of application were conceived, from rain enhancement to that of snow, fog clearance, melting polar ice, diverting the jet stream, hail and hurricane suppression, and so on (Weiss, 1975). It was soon followed by operational weather modification programs, raising doubts simultaneously over readiness of the technology for its societal application (Haas, 1973). In the face of proliferation, a question that became contentious from the beginning was how to evaluate efficacy of cloud seeding programs (Dennis, 1980; U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation, 1978). Assessment was inherently problematic because of the following reasons: first, there is a natural variation in the amount of rainfall a particular area receives and how to normalize this variation to discern any additional rainfall; second, how to establish that seeding is responsible for enhancement; third, how to measure rainfall on the ground as it varies spatially and temporally; and fourth, how a particular result is to be replicated from one location to another, given that meteorological and environmental conditions can differ widely across locations (Bery, 1956; Gabriel & Petrondas, 1983).
Evaluation of cloud seeding is based on two kinds of evidences: statistical and physical (Bruintjes, 1999). Statistical method involves comparison between target or seeded areas with a control or nonseeded area. To rule out chance occurrences, strategies such as random selection of areas, replication of results, and so on are used in conjunction with other methods and tools, for example, alternating target and control areas, rerandomization, Bayesian technique, and so on. Physical evaluation corresponds to mapping out a chain of events as envisaged in the conceptual model, to show that seeding results in additional rainfall. Uncertainty stems from limits to our understanding of cloud physics, weather processes, and even in measuring the amount of rainfall reaching the ground (Kerr, 1982b). Overall, while there is much evidence to suggest a seeding effect, the same does not establish that the effect is significant enough to reach a statistical conclusion (Braham, 1986; Wu et al., 2018). In addition to gathering direct evidence, there are times when cloud seeding projects are assessed through circumstantial evidence as well such as crop yields, insurance claims, hydropower energy production, and so on.
Historically, lack of a consensus over assessment has posed the most serious impediment to the technology’s adoption and progress (Kerr, 1982a). In the United States, where it originated, a number of commissions and committees were constituted in the early years to evaluate seeder’s claims. A review by the U.S. National Academy of Science in 1973 concluded that barring snowpack augmentation and cold fog dispersion all other applications, including rainfall augmentation, are not ready for operational use (Farhar, 1977). As a matter of fact, there was a decline in the U.S. budgetary support to cloud seeding from the late 1970s onward coming close to termination in 1989 (Lambright & Changnon, 1989) even though maximum number of weather modification projects were carried out in the United States during the 1990s (WMO, 1995). The U.S. National Research Council finally constituted a committee in 2003 to review the technology, which, in its report, observed that there is still no convincing scientific proof of the efficacy of international weather modification efforts and declared that “at this stage initiation of large scale operational weather modification programs would be premature” (U.S. National Research Council, 2003, p. 67).
Similar controversies broke out elsewhere, for example, in Australia, one of the earliest to launch cloud seeding programs, and disputes arose between the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, the lead scientific agency, and Snowy Mountain Hydro Electricity Authority (SMHEA) over efficacy. It led to independent assessments, which reported that claims of rainfall enhancement were either inconclusive or controversial (Ryan & Sadler, 1995). It was found to be useful in snowy mountain regions and under limited meteorological conditions and of very little use for drought (Ryan & King, 1997). Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization conducted further assessment during the 1970s and 1980s and concluded that cloud seeding is neither reliable nor an economical way of increasing rainfall (Holper, 2001). Cloud seeding experiments conducted in Israel during the 1960s and 1970s were often showcased as the only proven success story (Kerr, 1982a; Levin et al., 2010). However, these too came under the cloud in the 1990s’ when new studies showed that enhancement could be due to measurement error than success of the technique (Rangno & Hobbs, 1995).
3.1. Social Assessment: Does “Cloud Seeding” Work During Drought?
Which specific social needs are cloud seeding programs designed to fulfill? What are the criteria of assessment and to what extent do such criteria meet public expectations? These questions have barely got any attention, while efficacy is framed within a technocratic perspective, relying on normative goals such as percentage increase in amount of rainfall received. Cocheme et al. (1970) identify the following five conditions that weather modification programs should meet: technically effective, economically cost-effective, socially acceptable, ecologically harmless, and so designed that trustworthy evaluation results can be derived. Weiss (1975) points out that water scarcity or hail damage are such a severe problem that countries are willing to invest in any technology that offers a chance of relief. There is neither a cost and benefits analysis of alternate programs to achieve similar objectives nor an examination of social and ecological consequences on trade pattern, employment, rural development, and so on.
Cloud seeding projects are often launched as drought relief and discontinued soon after, exhibiting their use for a political purpose (Bruintjes, 1999; Haas, 1973). To put it in perspective, the technology from its early phase was projected as a potential solution for drought, based on which operational programs were launched in the midst of a drought period, be it in Australia (Ryan & Sadler, 1995), the United States (Howell, 1965), China (Gasser, 2016), and so on. This idea, however, has been challenged and is seen to be fundamentally flawed as during a drought there will be a limited amount of clouds to be seeded, reducing the overall efficiency. The technology is designed to work only when there is at least normal or higher than normal level of precipitation and is not a solution at all if there are insufficient clouds (Bery, 1956; Moseman, 2009). Keith Seitter, president of the American Meteorological Society, thus observes that there is no technology that can create rain when there is no potential for it (Rohrer, 2006). The only way the program becomes useful is when it is planned in advance, through the process of storage of additional rainfall and employing an efficient water management program (Bruintjes, 1999; Simms, 2010).
In practice, however, operational cloud seeding programs continue to be executed in drought conditions, for example, in Philippines (Simms, 2010), Kenya (Njeru, 2011), and so on. Haas (1973) has aptly observed, Never mind if the majority of atmospheric scientists in the country believe that such emergency drought relief cloud seeding efforts are premature. Most voters and powerful politicians are not scientists. If it is believed that an emergency rainmaking effort will win more votes than it will lose, the effort will be authorized even when there are very severe budget constraints. (p. 651)
An equally contentious question in relation to drought is “For which type of agricultural crops, for whom, and when are seeding programs launched?” Drought sets in over a period of time with differential impact on crops. Rain induced through seeding can also have varying impacts depending on crops and time of season (Cocheme et al., 1970; Haas, 1973). It raises further questions such as “Who are best placed to decide on such a program, scientists, policymakers, or the target communities?” Surveys in the 1970s conducted in the United States showed that while most people are nonskeptical about the scientific program, they believe that weather modification decisions are political in nature and hence should be taken at a local level (Farhar, 1977; Haas et al., 1971).
The technology has also raised environmental concerns in different times, mainly in terms of (a) modifying the weather and consequent effect on ecosystem and (b) implication of injecting large amounts of silver iodide or other chemicals into clouds. The former is entangled in debates over morality or appropriateness of human intervention in weather processes (Farhar, 1977) and legal ownership, or who owns clouds (Simms, 2010). The latter has prompted calls for periodic monitoring of chemicals used as seeding agents and explores environment friendly alternatives (Williams & Denholm, 2009). Cloud seeding has also been opposed for its adverse weather consequences, for example, it was blamed for a blizzard in China that killed 40 people (Simms, 2010) or a severe flood in South Dakota, the United States, in 1976 (Farhar, 1977).
4. Cloud Seeding Experiments in India
Cloud seeding programs in the United States and Australia inspired similar experiments in India (Sikka, 2011). Seeding experiments were conducted by the Tata’s over the Western Ghats in the 1950s using silver iodide and dry ice. Attempts were also made in Calcutta in 1952 using salt and silver iodide through hydrogen-filled balloons (IITM, 1979). It was soon taken up by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research by establishing the Rain and Cloud Physics Research (RCPR) Centre in 1955 as part of National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi (Sikka, 2011). RCPR carried out cloud seeding experiments in the late 1950s and 1960s over three cities in North India—Delhi (1957-1966), Agra (1960-1965), and Jaipur (1960-1966)—and one in South India, over Munnar (1964-1966). During this phase, clouds were injected with salt of appropriate sizes during the summer monsoon period, from ground-based propellers, except in 1962 when an Indian Air Force aircraft was used (IITM, 1979). Results assessed for a total of 526 seeding days as against 516 nonseeding days showed an increase of 20% rainfall (B. V. R. Murty & Biswas, 1968). Based on this positive assessment, similar experiments were recommended for other northwest Indian cities (B. V. R. Murty & Biswas, 1968), even though the same results were disputed later and reevaluated subsequently to be statistically insignificant (B. V. R. Murty, 1981).
The RCPR unit was shifted in 1967 from New Delhi to the Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Poona. The Institute of Tropical Meteorology itself was renamed in 1971 as the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology and remains the lead agency in India so far as cloud seeding is concerned. Numerous experiments were conducted around this period, some of which were initiated by state governments such as Tamilnadu, Haryana, and Gujarat with an aim to explore potential for operational purposes. For example, clouds were seeded over Tiruvallur, near Chennai, Tamilnadu, during 1973 and 1975-1977, and assessment showed an increase of 32% in rainfall for the region during the southwest monsoon and a decrease of 17% for the northeast monsoon or the principal rainy season (A. S. R. Murty et al., 1981). Limited rainmaking attempts using ground-based generators were undertaken in the state of Haryana over Bhiwani and Hissar district during 1973. Experiments were also conducted over Godhra region in Gujarat in 1972-1974, results of which were found inconclusive (IITM, 1979).
In 1973, IITM started a major cloud seeding experimental program over the “Western Ghats” in Maharashtra with two key objectives: (a) verify the statistical results obtained from the first phase conducted over North Indian cities and (b) study cloud’s physical properties to gain insights for a better conceptual design (B. V. R. Murty, 1981). Initial experiments, during 1973-1974 and 1976, showed a positive result but were statistically insignificant, which led to continuation of the experiment to secure a more reliable result (IITM, 1979). It was carried forward from 1979 to 1987, and based on findings from a cumulative period of 11 year, IITM reported in 2000 of an increase of 24% in rainfall under favorable conditions, such as the appropriate vertical thickness of cloud, its water contents, size of seeding particle, and so on (A. S. R. Murty et al., 1998). However, in a related report, IITM (n.d.) conceded that the result is not supported by other independent studies and hence should be taken cautiously. More categorically, it admitted, “IITM’s past result cannot be considered universal and therefore cannot be taken as basis for operational programmes in the present situation” (IITM, n.d., p. 24).
The third phase of IITM’s experimental program started in 2008, which is known as “Cloud Aerosol Interaction and Precipitation Enhancement Experiment,” or “CAIPEEX,” with an initial estimated budget of INR 49 crore under Government of India’s 11th five-year plan. Declared as a “national experiment,” the program drew inspiration from reported progress in experiments conducted in South Africa (1991-1995) and Mexico (1996-1998) (IITM, 2009). CAIPEEX was executed over 2009-2015, divided into three phases, and one of its key objective was “to formulate a scientific basis for rain formation and rain enhancement using the recent cloud seeding technologies” (Prabhakaran, 2014, p. 5). It aimed at greater insights into the processes of cloud seeding to obtain a clearer understanding of when, where, and how cloud seeding works or fails. Scientific findings of this experiment have been reported periodically (Kulkarni et al., 2012). However, in terms of measuring usefulness of the technology, the concerned ministry has informed the Indian Parliament that the experiment could not provide a statistically significant result because of inadequate samples (Government of India Ministry of Earth Sciences [GOI MOES], 2016). It has led to an extension of the experiment, and the fourth phase of CAIPEEX has commenced in 2018, limited to the Solapur region of Maharashtra. The aim of the extended phase has a ring of similarity to the earlier ones—to provide guidance so that cloud seeding technique can be better utilized particularly for the rain-parched Western Ghats region (IITM, 2018).
These experiments, conducted over the past six decades, have claimed encouraging results, while IITM has consistently maintained that assessment results require validation. This viewpoint reflects in the responses of MOES in Parliament, where, during 2009-2017, the specific topic of cloud seeding/rain enhancement/artificial rainmaking was raised nine times in the “Lok Sabha” and an equal number of times in the “Rajya Sabha” under the “question-answer” session (Table 1). Each time there are multiple related questions seeking information on a state-specific operational program to clarify on the central government’s policy, findings and status of the research program, and so on. MOES, under which IITM works, in its responses, makes three key admissions: (a) it is aware that state governments are implementing operational cloud seeding programs at their own expenses (b) IITM is part of such an operational program but not in a position to certify a definite outcome based on its own research, and (c) technique of cloud seeding cannot be used for bringing rain clouds to rainfall-deficit or drought areas. It can only induce preexisting clouds passing over to enhance rain if organized intervention becomes successful (emphasis added). The last in particular has been repeated as many as nine times during this period. The ministry, however, remains silent on having a national policy (GOI MOES, 2012b) and also rules out any environmental side effects of the technique (GOI MOES, 2017).
Rain Enhancement—Cloud Seeding—Related Question and Answer in Parliament.
Source. Compiled from various reports accessed from Government of India Ministry of Earth Sciences website: www.moes.gov.in/parliament.
5. Operational Cloud Seeding: India
In the face of IITM’s continuing efforts to establish a definite outcome of the cloud seeding technique, a simultaneous development was underway since the 1970s—launching of operational projects or being deployed for public service. It took place first in the backdrop of a weak monsoon in 1973-1975, which led to severe power shortage in several parts of the country and prompted rainmaking projects over hydroelectric catchment areas. For example, over Rihand reservoir in Uttar Pradesh in 1973-1974 and one over Linganamakki catchment area in Karnataka in 1975, both of which were initiated on the request of the concerned state government. The Rihand project was assessed to have increased rainfall by 17% to 18%, though, eventually, it was evaluated to be statistically insignificant (B. V. R. Murty, 1981). That of Linganamakki showed an increase of 25% in reservoir water level than the maximum recorded over the preceding 10 years. However, in the absence of data on reservoir water release, no definite conclusion could be drawn here as well (A. S. R. Murty et al., 1981). A monsoon deficit in 1974 and consequent water scarcity led to Government of Tamilnadu embark on a cloud seeding project in 1975 around the city of Madras. Executed with the help of an overseas private agency, the project ran into controversy when its claims of positive result were questioned. It led to the appointment of an expert committee by the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, which concluded that the evaluation methodology employed was flawed, seeding was effective at best in few places, and there is no clear evidence to link rainfall reported in the target areas to seeding conducted (Reddy, 1993).
This controversy, however, was left behind quickly as operational cloud seeding reappeared in Tamilnadu during 1984-1986. Seeding sites were strategically selected near Madras, over the catchment areas of three reservoirs: Poondi, Red Hills, and Cholavaram. The project was implemented by Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board with support of the same private operator and in collaboration with the India Meteorological Department (IMD). R. G. Subramanian (2017), a meteorologist from IMD involved in this operation, estimated that “the increase at best could be 10%.” He goes on to add, “It is not possible to prove that a cloud seeded would have produced the same quantity of rain without seeding. During extreme drought conditions, cloud seeding may not be effective” (p. 9). Similar projects were launched periodically in the state with a decadal gap—in 1993, 2003, and 2013—and each time, the scenario was near similar—acute water scarcity in Madras city and a looming threat of a weak or delayed monsoon that forced the political establishment to opt for cloud seeding over the feeding reservoirs that supply water to the city (Venkatesh, 2003).
The second phase of interest in operational cloud seeding programs can be traced to early 2000s when three major Indian states, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra, started their own projects. This phase was preceded by a 3-year severe drought spell that commenced from 2000. State governments were under pressure to tackle the emerging situation and among a slew of relief measures announced to ease drought distress; making rain artificially was a celebrated one (Roy, 2003). The Government of Karnataka launched “Project Varuna” in 2003 in collaboration with IMD, an international private agency, and a domestic aviation firm. Preceding its launch, the state amidst drought conditions was already experimenting with a rain-enhancement program in 1999 for a nine-day period over North Karnataka, and it had drawn media criticism as well. Rainfalls were claimed to be in “Belgaum,” while the experiment was conducted a good hundred kilometers away in the “Dharwad” region (Aiyappa, 2012). In spite of it, the attempt continued for the next 2 years in limited form, though it had failed to please either the farmers or the policymakers (Ventrapragada & Rayavarupa, 2017). In that background, “Project Varuna” was launched, and immediately after that, the minister concerned declared that “the project has been successful 95 percent” (Ataulla, 2003). And yet during a later period, the same project was termed a failure (Shetty, 2017). Rainmaking program made a comeback in Karnataka in 2012 in the wake of Supreme Courts’ directive to release water to Tamilnadu. To meet this requirement, the state government started seeding over the catchment region of Cauvery river (GOI MOES, 2012a). Deficient rainfall in Karnataka in 2017 led to the launch of yet another cloud seeding project, “Varshadhare,” with a budget of INR 35 crore. According to an expert panel constituted to evaluate the project’s outcome, localized rainfall increased as much by 28%, which is way above its original target of 10% to 15%. Scientists from IITM involved in this evaluation have since declared it to be the most successful in the country and a model for all future programs (M. M. Rao, 2018). The claim, however, is yet to be validated, and if found true, this will be the case of an operational cloud seeding project contributing to a scientific breakthrough.
In 2003, the state of Andhra Pradesh was facing similar conditions as Karnataka—weak monsoon and an ensuing drought—and it encouraged an emergency announcement by the state government to seed clouds over Anantapur district, which was one of the worst affected. The same private firms involved in Karnataka provided the services here as well. Media reports raised questions over the method employed as clouds instead of being seeded over the target area Anantapur were seeded in neighboring Chittoor where probably it would have rained anyway (Reddy, 1993). Next year, after the election to the state assembly was over, a new political dispensation took charge in Andhra Pradesh and launched one of the biggest cloud seeding programs named “Indira Meghamadhanamu” (B. V. Rao et al., 2012). It was carried out during 2004-2009 and covered 10 to 12 districts every year with a total budget outlay of INR 127 crore (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2014). A new Centre for Atmospheric Sciences and Weather Modification Technologies was set up under Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad, to monitor and evaluate the program. It claimed additional rainfall between 12% in 2005 and 18% in 2008 (B. V. Rao et al., 2014). The program secured an extension in 2007 to run until 2012, but it was discontinued in 2009 amidst a raging controversy over corruption allegations and exaggerated claims of rainfall (“Cloud Seeding During Congress Rule to Be Probed” 2015). Subsequently, in a white paper on agriculture brought out by the Government of Andhra Pradesh (2014), the project was declared a failure, and the report asserted that “there is no effective evidence to show that it really induced rains and benefited farmers” (p. 8).
Operational cloud seeding program in Maharashtra followed a similar pattern as in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. In 2003, the state government launched a rainmaking project for seven parched districts at a cost of INR 5.4 Crore. It involved the same set of key players, IMD, IITM, and two commercial firms. The following year the project expanded its coverage area to include rain-scarce Vidharbha and Marathwada region and was named “Prakalpa Varsha,” rolled out at a cost of INR 18 Crore (Vaidya, 2004). A delayed monsoon in 2005 ensured the continuation of this project but with a diminishing expectation evident from a change in its original goal of “filling reservoirs” to generate moisture for vegetation and “somehow ease farmer’s distress” (Vijapurkar, 2005). At the end of the first year of this project, a high-level committee was formed to assess its outcome, which recommended discontinuation and declared that cloud seeding is a waste of public money, and this resource should be used instead for other measures (Bhosale, 2008). The indictment did not appear to have much consequence as rainmaking was back in the state as early as 2008 and continued the next year as well at a cost of INR 8 Crore (Lewis, 2012). It was revived again in 2015 when a deficit rainfall forecast forced the state government to reconceptualize cloud seeding for drought mitigation measures. Initiated by the disaster management unit under the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, the project envisaged cloud seeding in rain-deficit areas of Aurangabad, Latur, Osmanabad, Beed, and so on at a cost of INR 27 crore (Khapre, 2015). Officials involved in the operation claim to have achieved rainfall 48.3% of times clouds were seeded while conceding that there is no way one can assess increase in rainfall due to the lack of a dense network of rainfall monitoring system (Diwase & Sharma, n.d.). The project was to continue the next year or 2016, and accordingly, bids were invited (Government of Maharashtra 2016), but eventually, they were scrapped as monsoon rainfall became reasonably adequate (Gangan, 2016).
In recent times, few other Indian states have shown interest in cloud seeding. Gujarat, for example, implemented a project in 2012 (GOI MOES, 2012b), and Kerala faced with a monsoon deficit in 2017 submitted a proposal to the central authority seeking permission to seed clouds (“Desperate Kerala’s Cloud Seeding Plan Shot Down by Centre,” 2017). Given that India faces increasing water scarcity, the number of states that are likely to consider cloud seeding is only going to increase further. Besides, not just for rain enhancement, states like Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, are exploring the idea of applying cloud seeding technique to suppress air pollution as well (Verma, 2018).
6. Discussion
Operational cloud seeding programs have been assessed occasionally in India in its limited social form such as by an expert committee or groups that are generally critical of its benefits. Technical assessment, on the other hand, is led by the IITM, which has carried out three phases of experimental programs since the 1960s with a key objective: to develop a reliable method of assessment. From this perspective, the agency is well aware of the basic challenge the technology faces and has pursued improvement through various means including augmentation of rain measurement network, development of appropriate statistical tools and methods, understanding cloud physics, and so on. However, it is yet to achieve success, which is evident from concerned ministries responses in Parliament. Concurrent with IITM’s efforts, operational cloud seeding projects have continued in different states involving IITM as a key collaborator. The question is which role does the agency IITM envisage for itself in these operational programs? How does it seek to provide technical guidance for conducting a project in the absence of a mechanism to assess its effectiveness? Besides, these programs with their societal goals are entirely public funded, and yet there is no scope for the general public to participate or be involved at any stage.
Given that the usefulness of the cloud seeding approach during a drought period has been questioned widely, including by those members of the scientific community who are otherwise supportive of the technology, it remains intriguing how this fails to deter the political leadership in India to make use of it repeatedly. Governments across the political spectrum when faced with deficient rainfall and drought-like conditions embrace the idea. Without clear evidence, what explains this kind of support or in other words who drives the technology? Appeal of the technology for political leadership lies in its perceived potential to enhance rainfall or even try and create them artificially. Emergency situations arising during a drought demand display of the government’s commitment to alleviate citizens’ misery and deployment of all available means to ease public distress. It does not serve the politics well, if ambiguities over technological efficacy are highlighted or debated. Finally, drought conditions set in over a period of time. From that perspective, when does a government decide to start a cloud seeding project? As recommended, for example, by Bruintjes (1999), Moseman (2009), and so on, if such a program is started early or during a normal precipitation phase, can its effect be distinguished from the natural rain? Importantly, in such cases, can the state government in a developing country like India justify its expenses? The specific example of Maharashtra in 2016 shows that once monsoon rain became abundant, the proposed project failed to have any backing and was scrapped. On the other hand, if the launching of the project is delayed, as is often the case in India, how effective will it be in the absence of favorable meteorological conditions? Considering the question is yet to be settled by the scientific community even after six decades of research, social assessment of the technology gains further credence.
7. Conclusion
Cloud seeding experiments began in India in the late 1950s, drawing inspiration from overseas initiatives, and it remains closely tied to international development. The recent revival of experimental programs is once again based on progress reported from other countries, for example, South Africa and Mexico (IITM, 2009). During this period, IITM in its capacity as lead agency has got entangled with operational services and consequently has failed to assume the role of an independent regulator. There is no clarity on its role in so far as its involvement in operational programs is concerned. To conclude, the article makes the following three recommendations: First, decision for a weather modification program is as technical as it is political; recognition of this dimension is of importance to develop a framework for program assessment. Second, any framework must envisage mechanisms that allow public participation in more direct ways; participation will ensure that choice is democratic, and it incorporates concerns of diverse social groups. Finally, a national policy should be developed to clear the air over some of the key ethical, environmental, and legal questions related to cloud seeding in addition to clarifying roles of the agencies and method of evaluation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge gratefully contributions from Sachin Pippiri, Raghava Raj, Pranesh Bhargava, and Suchismita Sathpathy. I thank Shairendri Adhikari, Sarita, and Sai for their most valuable support.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
