Theory-Pluralism in Public Administration

Introduction

Neopragmatists in public administration (PA) consistently make the argument that neopragmatism upgrades regular, classical pragmatism. In this tradition, Kasdan (2011) most recently argued neopragmatism is “The upgrade of pragmatism’s truth-utility function,” echoing Miller (2004) who argued, “The new version of pragmatism is a significant upgrade” (p. 248). This claim is problematic but nevertheless provides an opportunity to reorient pragmatism toward the broader goal of theory-pluralism in PA research methods.

Miller’s (2004) “upgrade” claim received attention from several PA scholars in Administration & Society, who opposed Rortyan neopragmatism in support of classical pragmatism (Evans, 2005; Hickman, 2004; Shields, 2005; Snider, 2005; Stolcis, 2004; Webb, 2005). Aside from Hoch (2006) who harmonized Dewey and Rorty, these responses generally rejected the “upgrade” claim, concluding Rorty’s neopragmatism is not useful to practitioners and is also problematic for academic research. Although these authors tended toward the polemical, occasionally overstepping the bounds of measured response, this article offers a new refutation of the “upgrade” claim while incorporating the value of neopragmatism’s approach to applied research and emphasizing the shared problem-solving orientation of pragmatism(s).

In contemporary PA, advocates of various pragmatisms have emerged, including Abel, Box, Evans, Harmon, McSwite, Miller, Shields, Stivers, Webb, and most recently Kasdan. This article focuses on the linguistic neopragmatism of Kasdan, Miller, and to some extent McSwite. These PA theorists offer thorough, postmodern exegeses against foundationalist epistemology, often linked to an attendant thesis on the illegitimacy of authority in both matters of truth and governance. The purpose of this article is not to dispute antifoundationalism but to dissolve the hard-link between epistemology and legitimacy, a link which seems to be the source of much divisiveness. In so doing, a more pluralistic approach to theory use and evaluation is proffered.

This article begins by presenting Susan Haack’s analytic framework as a useful conceptualization for the debate between pragmatism and neopragmatism, a debate that reveals some of the implicit presuppositions informing contemporary beliefs about research methods in PA. It then unfolds some of the more obvious similarities, differences, and omissions between pragmatism and neopragmatism. Next, Laudan’s concept of research traditions is applied as a vehicle for theory-pluralism, offering a more sensible application than Kuhn’s widely discussed paradigms. Finally, this article explores different types of PA research methodology and advances a cooperative vision for PA’s traditions working together toward problem resolution through theory-pluralism in PA research methods.

A Framework for Debate

In “Theories of Knowledge,” Haack (1982) introduces an analytic framework for theories of epistemic justification, presaging her analysis with Sellars’ metaphorical rendition of two well-known theories of knowledge: “One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do” (quoted in Haack 1982, p.143). Encapsulating the classic philosophic debate over what qualifies as justified belief, the elephant resting on the back of a tortoise represents the pure foundationalist view, whereas the Ouroboros, endlessly consuming its own tail, represents the pure coherentist view. Of these two images Haack (1982) argues:

It is commonly supposed that one is obliged to choose, in the theory of knowledge, between two, fundamentally opposed models: The foundationalist, according to which the rest of our knowledge is supported by the foundation of a relatively small class of epistemically privileged beliefs, and the coherentist, according to which the various parts of our knowledge are mutually supportive (p. 143).

These models of knowledge represent “Two extreme kinds of theory,” both suffering logical defects along the epistemological continuum: One is reductionist and the other is circular. For present purposes, neither can promote the theory-pluralism necessary to address the multifaceted public problems with which the study of administration grapples. Fortunately as Haack (1995) indicates, “Foundationalism and coherentism do not exhaust the options; there is logical space in between” (p. 19). Within this “logical space” rests a third metaphor: the crossword puzzle.

In this metaphor every element of belief (word) in the system of knowledge (puzzle) is justified by both its interconnectivity with previously established “intersecting entries”, as well as its basis in “experiential evidence” (clues). Thus, justification is warranted both by mutual “integration” with other propositions (the defining feature of coherentism) and support provided by “experiential evidence and background beliefs” (the defining feature of foundationalism) (Haack, 1998, p. 95). Through a double aspect including both logical integration and experiential causation, the crossword metaphor illustrates a system that is both coherent and supported by a sort of unfixed foundation. ¹

This middle range theory, which Haack terms foundherentism, occupies an epistemic position between foundationalism and coherentism. It borrows elements from the webbed, anarchic interconnection of coherentism, as well as the hierarchical, reductionist structure of foundationalism. It rejects wholesale neither and attempts to reconcile the two well-known philosophical dilemmas of reductionism and circularity. But articulating foundherentism is not the focus of this article. Rather, the epistemic continuum in which foundherentism rests provides a useful point of departure for elucidating the nature of epistemological and methodological presuppositions in PA—a way to evaluate beliefs concerning this or that public program, public organization, public problem, etc.

Haack’s (1982) continuum assumes pure foundationalism and pure coherentism are polar, though nonexhaustive, extremes, between which numerous middle ground positions reside. At the foundationalist pole, old logical positivists as Moritz Schlick, A. J. Ayer, and Herbert Simon reside; whereas neopragmatists such as Rorty, McSwite, and Miller would seem to fall closer to or at the pure coherentism pole. However, to what extent neopragmatism even fits within this framework remains unclear, especially considering its tendency to reject epistemology and philosophy wholesale. ² Classical pragmatism seems to reside somewhere in the middle range, providing a moderated and inclusive approach which grants use of a broader range of methods of inquiry. In other words, regular pragmatism is consistent with the goal of theory-pluralism in PA research methods.

The problem for theory-pluralism in research methodology seems not to be with moderate epistemic positions, but rather with rigid adherence to purist positions. The present question is, what are the specific consequences of adhering to polar epistemic positions? The foibles of logical empiricism, ³ the failure to construct a language of only factually verifiable elements and its embrace of pure foundationalism, are well established. But the consequences of neopragmatism are less clear. As a point of conjecture, the hard-link between epistemology and legitimacy is most likely the consequence of embracing pure forms on either side: Foundationalists argue that the claims of coherentism are illegitimate because they are circular, whereas coherentists argue that foundationalist claims are illegitimate because they are reductionist. But noting the fallacy does not necessarily invalidate the specific truth claims of either side; it merely indicates the logic by which such claims are established is suspect. The real source of illegitimacy attaches to the fallacy of hastily and prejudicially dismissing a theory on the basis of prior Truth/Nontruth conceptions, rather than comparative evaluation between its rival theories.

The hard-link neopragmatism constructs between epistemology and legitimacy is at the heart of the postmodern critique against authority in PA. This link however is far more tenuous than postmodernism, in neopramatism’s form, assumes. Haack’s continuum is useful because it places the problem in perspective, demonstrating alternatives to the interminable bickering between foundationalism and coherentism. However, the fit of the coherentism label should not be overstated as neopragmatism often wanders outside the realm of epistemic justification toward conventionalism. Also, neopragmatists in PA comprise a relatively small group, so consideration of the social force of this movement should be given. The much larger epistemic membership in PA undoubtedly belongs to positivist foundationalism, but unfortunately foundationalists have tended not to engage in these debates.

At this point the reader may ask, what does this debate have to do with research methods in PA? The answer is, this philosophical exchange reveals some of the most fundamental problems and presuppositions that inform beliefs about the validity of research—presuppositions that require, and may always have required, scrutiny for progress.

Similarities, Differences, and Omissions

Neopragmatism shares much with its parent philosophy, a disdain for dogmatic foundationalism and a focus on the power of the community. Many of neopragmatism’s postmodernist qualities were anticipated by early pragmatism, but American postmodernism was most strongly ‘pre-figured’ by Nietzsche (West 1981, p. 248). Both pragmatisms agree that absolute Truth is a fool’s quest, subordinate to problem solving. Kasdan (2011) concedes this much in stating, neopragmatism’s “Position is lifted, for the most part, from classical pragmatism’s focus on inquiry as the means of finding effective outcomes regardless of their accuracy in representing reality” (p. 571). Social progressivism is also a similar aim of both varieties, as is political pluralism; but theory-pluralism seems far less robust in neopragmatism, as its proponents reject theories that hint of epistemic foundationalism. For example, Miller (2005) rejects the classical pragmatism of Shields (2003) because he detects “residues of foundationalism” in her use of words such as “equity” and “efficiency” (Miller, 2004, p. 245). ⁴

Neopragmatists in PA are fearful of “the man of reason” who wields a dangerous sense of self-confidence and certainty in his actions derived from axiomatic (foundational) beliefs. This led McSwite (1997) to argue, “What seems to be behind evil most often is certainty” (p. 272). But although classical pragmatists agree that certainty is a fools quest, they are however less fearful of the scientific attitude and to some extent the “man of reason” as well. The regular pragmatist view is more flexible, adhering more faithfully to theories-as-useful-instruments and not as keys to Truth. The pluralistic quality of regular pragmatism opens it to conclusions arrived at through foundationalist methodology, evaluating such theories on the basis of their instrumentality in the resolution of problems. Neopragmatism, however, limits its analyses to only those tools that it deems sufficiently antifoundationalist.

James (1907) construed pragmatism as “A method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable” (p. 142). In many ways, neopragmatism has gained notability in PA by reopening the interminable foundationalism/coherentism debate and linking it to a critique of the legitimacy of authority. In the context of PA research, this has meant an almost exclusive focus on qualitative methods, loosely defined. Classical pragmatism, however, is more greatly predisposed toward resolving the quantitative/qualitative divide, which Raadschelders (2011) recently called for through greater attention to ontology and epistemology, as well as finding a way to employ mixed methods in a rigorous and coherent manner.

Neopragmatism focuses on a postmodern critique of the legitimacy of authority through an exposition of the epistemic failures of scientism and foundationalist epistemology. But the argument has never been convincingly made why anything other than epistemic antifoundationalism leads to illegitimate government? As a result, neopragmatism’s vision remains obscured. Indeed, neopragmatism is convincing in its deconstruction of foundationalism and authority, but it fails to embrace theory-pluralism in the spirit of reconstruction.

Miller and Kasdan repeat neopragmatism’s omissions, excluding key figures in its parent tradition, instead promoting Rorty and continental philosophers such as Lyotard and Marleau-Ponty. Kasdan (2011) omits all of pragmatism’s early figures, as well as its more recent defenders. Webb (2005) made a similar observation of Miller (2004), including a broad list of excluded pragmatists. However, it must be noted that one certainly cannot be blamed for having not read everything that others demand; but the “upgrade” claim seems to elevate the burden of justification. Not only do these omissions call into question the claim to have “upgraded” regular pragmatism but also the deep philosophic reserve available in their works remains untapped.

These omissions occasionally lead to the ironic construction of a straw man. In an illuminating passage, Kasdan (2011) argues that Rorty’s progressivism is “significantly different” and “more hopeful” than Dewey’s: “Rorty turned (Dewey’s) notion around to avoid Truths as grand objectives and instead views progress as change from a state that is dissatisfactory. . . . We may argue that Rorty’s version is the more hopeful type of progress only if it is qualified as an effort to alleviate a situation. . .” (p. 572). However, Dewey cannot be appropriately read as supporting the “grand” Truths here claimed. Moreover, the “hopeful type” of situational progress Rorty espouses, if it is to be construed as “An effort to alleviate a situation”, can easily be found among Dewey’s most common citations. For example, “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (Dewey, 1938, p. 108).

As Shields (2008) has noted, both Peirce and Dewey were centrally concerned with embracing doubt as an initial stage in making an indeterminate situation clearer. Pragmatic inquiry is thus directed at resolving problems through the embrace of indeterminacy. As perhaps goes without saying, pragmatic doubt and foundationalist certainty are in opposition to each other. But neopragmatism constructs a straw man on the false critique of classical pragmatism as a foundationalist philosophy. ⁵ The failure to make this distinction is perhaps the shortcoming of a purist epistemic commitment, stimulating the rejection of anything insufficiently antifoundationalist. As Webb (2007) noted, “The position of classical pragmatism is not so much antifoundationalism, as afoundationalism” (p. 1069). But this nuance is omitted, as neopragmatism misconstrues classical pragmatism’s afoundationalism as insufficiently antifoundationalist. This seems an apt characterization of PA’s neopragmatism, as “An effort to alleviate a situation” is precisely what Kasdan (2011) argues makes Rorty “more hopeful” than Dewey’s transformation of the indeterminate situation “into a more unified whole.” Ironically, this point may be one in which there is little difference of opinion. Indeed, we see Rorty’s Deweyan roots in Kasdan’s selection.

Pragmatism and neopragmatism have obvious similarities, especially in their critique of the scientism of the logical empiricist movement. Dewey was in fact one of logical empiricism’s first major critics. Stimulated by an ironically solicited request for approval by Hans Reichenbach, Dewey waged a “stinging, even insulting, attack of the positivist’s emotive account of value,” ascribing the new empiricism’s shallow pretense of trivial consequence.

When sociological theory withdraws from consideration of the basic interests, concerns, and actively moving aims of human culture on the grounds that “values” are involved, and that inquiry as “scientific” has nothing to do with values, the inevitable consequence is that inquiry in the human area is confined to what is superficial and comparatively trivial, no matter what its parade of technical skill (Dewey quoted in Depew, 1999, p. 116).

Yet even as Dewey stood against the new empiricism, the Vienna Circle’s influence came to dominate the schools of philosophy and social science in America. As Depew (1999) noted, American philosophy in the 1920s was “Stuck in an unstable stalemate between pragmatists and realists” (p. 113). Under the direction of Charles W. Morris in the 1930s, pragmatism adopted logical empiricism, taking “The linguistic turn” and relegating the realist camp to obscurity. ⁶ Thus, pragmatism survived, but its progressive Deweyan character was “positivized” (p. 119). However, the linguistic turn proved to be a momentary fad, and the logical positivist quest to construct a linguistic foundation for knowledge failed. Rorty’s antifoundationalism was a reaction to their failure, but in many ways it seems to reverse the double standard and commit similar errors of self-reference—this time through linguistic coherentism.

Rorty’s neopragmatism again asks pragmatism to dispense with experience emphasizing the priority of language and the linguistic debunking of objectivism, what Hildebrand (2003b) called “The Neopragmatist Turn.” And, this distinction remains one of the central points of contention between pragmatism and neopragmatism. As Koopman (2007) observed:

Of all the internecine conflicts which continue to rage, perhaps the most ink has been spilled over issues concerning the relative priority of language and experience in pragmatism. . . . This is one issue on which nearly everyone agrees that there is an important split within the heart of pragmatism itself (pp. 694-695).

Indeed, this has also been the key distinction between pragmatism’s varieties in PA. Maintaining this conflict, Miller (2004) argued that classical pragmatists, such as Shields (2003), have failed to realize “Like fact, or evidence, experience is a word shaped object whose meaning is up for grabs” (Miller, 2004, p. 244). The rejection of experience, however, is objectionable to practitioners, for example Stolcis (2004), who place value in their experiences as administrators. For practitioners, the rejection of experience looks more as West’s (1981) description of “Paralyzing nihilism and ironic skepticism” (p. 242).

Although intellectually interesting, Rorty’s rejection of experience as well as the linguistic debunking of foundationalism and legitimacy provides but one aspect in a broader array of research traditions spanning the epistemic continuum. Moreover as Koopman (2007) has noted, “language is a kind of experience.” (p. 716). But this is a more excursive digression into what, nevertheless, appears to be a promising resolution to the debate over the primacy of language and experience in pragmatism. More importantly, the multitude of approaches to inquiry is reconciled within the theory-pluralism available in the rich and varied tradition of pragmatism.

Pragmatists Other Than Rorty: Larry Laudan

Rorty’s neopragmatism is important, but application of his “ironism” to the discipline of PA has clear limits—the most notable of which is the rejection of experience. How can PA theorists ever hope to appeal to practitioners while simultaneously denigrating their most important resource? This makes the contention of “use” implied in the term “upgrade” hollow. As evidenced in the works of contemporary pragmatists other than Rorty, pragmatism provides a useful starting point for advancing a practitioner inclusive theory-pluralism. Classical pragmatists like John Dewey, William James, and C. S. Peirce established pragmatism as America’s contribution to Western philosophy, but several newer pragmatists have emerged in the second half of the 20th century, making considerable advancements to the original design.

This section employs Larry Laudan’s pragmatic philosophy of science. Within this context, Laudan’s (1977) Progress and its Problems provides a more plausible update consistent with the broader tradition of pragmatism. Moreover, the pragmatic nature of Laudan’s historical model of science makes it applicable not only to the natural sciences but to the social sciences as well.

In similar fashion to Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975), Laudan (1977) argues that the progress of science has had little to do with the revelation and accumulation of objective truth. Rather, as Laudan (1977) most explicitly argues, science has historically advanced according to the priority of addressing problems. In Laudan’s words, “The rationality and progressiveness of a theory are most closely linked—not with its confirmation or its falsification—but rather with its problem solving effectiveness” (p. 5).

Laudan’s problem-solving science starts with the utility of a problem-solving concept of theory. Laudan explicates two primary theses, which neatly convey the meaning of this concept:

Thesis 1: The first and essential acid test for any theory is whether it provides acceptable answers to interesting questions: whether, in other words, it provides satisfactory solutions to important problems (Laudan 1977, pp. 13-14, Italics not mine).

Thesis 2: In appraising the merits of theories, it is more important to ask whether they constitute adequate solutions to significant problems than it is to ask whether they are ‘true’, ‘corroborated’, ‘well confirmed’ or otherwise justifiable within the framework of contemporary epistemology (Laudan 1977, pp. 13-14, Italics not mine).

Among the implications of this view of theory is the utility of comparative evaluation. Thus, theory evaluation involves not the verification or falsifiability of isolated theories by empirical evidence but a pluralistic comparison between multiple theories in competition toward the achievement of particular goals. As Laudan (1977) states, “Absolute measures of the empirical or conceptual credentials of a theory are of no significance; decisive is the judgment of how a theory stacks up against its known contenders” (p. 71). This approach promulgates a less monolithic and historically insolvent model of science—a less rigid and ironically ambiguous, encapsulation than “paradigms”—allowing for a basis of comparison between theories, or complexes of theory, contrary to the thesis of incommensurability (p. 73).

It should be noted at this point that the importance of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is not lost on this author, nor is it lost on Laudan (1977, p. 74). At the same time, that is not to say that it is beyond criticism. Laudan explicates five significant problems with Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, in addition to six problems with its most plausible update at the time, that of Lakatos’ “research programmes” (pp. 73-78). ⁷ Of primary concern in this article, however, are those problems related to theory-pluralism: First, previous models survey only the narrow purview of empirical problems, excluding the role of conceptual problems in science; second, both downplay the fluidity of progress in favor of rigid conceptualizations of incommensurability. Laudan widens the narrow purview of empiricism, emphasizing the importance of empirical and conceptual problems, as well as once disparate notions such as ontology and methodology, formulating a more fluid and—for present purposes—pluralistic model of science. This model Laudan terms research traditions.

To provide a “simplistically” abbreviated description: “A research tradition is thus a set of ontological and methodological ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’” (Laudan, 1977, p. 80). Moving closer towards a “preliminary, working definition,” research traditions are described as “A set of general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of study, and about the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing the theories in that domain” (p. 81). And to define more specifically the historical purposiveness of this model of the sciences, “The whole function of a research tradition is to provide us with the crucial tools we need for solving problems, both empirical and conceptual. . . [thus] a successful research tradition is one which leads, via its component theories, to the adequate solution of an increasing range of empirical and conceptual problems” (p. 82). Finally, this model of science is not limited to the natural sciences, as Kuhn’s paradigms seem to be. Rather, “Every intellectual discipline, scientific as well as nonscientific, has a history replete with research traditions,” for example, philosophy, theology, psychology, ethics, economics, and physiology “to name a few” (p. 78).

Taking a short excursus into one such discipline, the study of international relations is characteristically marked by an impressive number of competing research traditions, such as realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberalism, constructivism, critical theory, and a host of “post”-theoretical schools. This plurality of traditions has emerged in part as the result of multiple levels of analysis. As Waltz (1959) famously noted, international relations can be productively conceptualized in terms of different levels of abstraction, or “images.” The first image deals with the individual, the second with the nation-state, and the third deals with the international system. Nye (1994, p. 87) later attempted, rather convincingly, to reconcile these images through the metaphorical illustration of a three-dimensional chessboard. Returning to the point at hand, Katzenstein and Sil (2010) most recently grappled with this problem, using Laudan’s research traditions in the construction of “analytic eclecticism”—a pluralistic approach for reconciling unproductive theory competition in this discipline. As they argue:

Unlike Kuhnian paradigms and Lakatosian research programs, however, Laudan’s research traditions can coexist and compete for long periods of time, generating substantive claims that may overlap with those produced in other traditions. . .diverse scholarly practices and research products need not be shoehorned into one of a handful of mutually exclusive paradigms or research programs (Katzenstein & Sil, 2010, p. 413).

In light of Laudan’s research traditions, the application of Kuhn’s paradigms to PA seems more visibly problematic. PA is simply not a paradigmatic field, and the future progression of the discipline requires this recognition. Unfortunately, social scientists continue to “Frequently use philosophy of science (and meta-scientific studies more generally) as obstructive or destructive devices for methodological dogmatism and ideological attacks” (Webb, 2007, p. 1064). The use of Kuhn in PA often qualifies as such.

Kuhn’s paradigms, as well as the corollary exegesis on “normal science”, are simply not consistent with the interdisciplinary nature of PA, nor the more robust theory-pluralism needed to ease PA’s academic/practitioner tensions. Riccucci (2010) recently noted the misapplication of Kuhn to PA; but as Ospina (2011) also pointed out, Riccucci’s reconceptualization of PA as a “postnormal science” presupposes the same sort of Kuhnian paradigm. This is perhaps the result of Ospina’s lament on the misconception “that the choice of methods has nothing to do with broader philosophical and epistemological concerns associated with the nature of the research problem itself” (p. 959). In the tradition of philosophical pragmatism, Laudan provides a treatment of these concerns necessary for constructing a broader theory-pluralism in PA.

The interdisciplinary multitude of theories from economics, sociology, psychology, politics, philosophy, etc., can be better utilized in the study of administration through a pluralistic approach to science unencumbered by the need to prove absolutely true or false—by verification, confirmation, falsification, etc.—the theories used to evaluate public problems. Whether they are foundationalist condemnations of qualitative methods, or postmodern condemnations of quantitative methods, no theory is tenable or desirable when taken as anything more than an instrument for use in the resolution of specific problems. We fool ourselves to think that one theory in isolation can tell us the truth about the world perhaps as often as we fool ourselves into believing we engage in only one theory at a time.

What better compatibility with PA than the goal of progressive, pragmatic problem resolution as its guide? Laudan’s progressive vision of a historically problem-solving science is perhaps a clearer exegesis of the philosophy of science that Dewey advocated in The Quest for Certainty (1928) and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). This philosophy is of use to PA as it shares the goal of problem solving within context diverse communities, operating in the middle space between subjective experience and objective truth. Laudan’s focus on the interplay of research traditions is simply more appropriate to PA than the procrustean application of Kuhn’s monolithic paradigms as neither positivism, pragmatism, nor postmodernism can claim exclusive dominion of the discipline.

Applying Theory-Pluralism to Research

Research methods in many areas of social science in the past have been rigidified by dogmatic adherence to one or another research tradition. For example, in the second half of the 20th century the discipline of political science witnessed the increasing domination of positivist, quantitative methodology. But by the turn of the 21st century this bias stimulated a “raucous rebellion” known as the Perestroika Movement (Monroe, 2005). Many of the problems associated with rigid adherence to positivism seemed to be embodied in the highly influential political science research methods text Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohan, & Verba, 1994), popularly known as KKV (Johnson, 2006). But after the Perestroika Movement, KKV received much criticism in, for example, Rethinking Social Inquiry (Brady & Collier, 2004). As a result of Perestroika and the general malcontent with positivist social science, methodological pluralism seems to have scored some victories in the field of political science, though these victories should not be overstated.

The domination of positivism in political science was and remains more pervasive than in PA, presumably because PA is more robustly a dual practitioner/academic discipline. The influence of this duality, as well as the exigencies of real public problems on PA as a discipline, arguably prevented it from being dominated—in a paradigmatic way—by one or another research tradition (Riccucci, 2010). Moreover, PA tends to focus more on gathering data to evaluate specific, often local, public problems, which is an inherently qualitative process. Hence, pragmatism seems to have leveraged greater influence in PA than in other disciplines, such as political science or economics, where it remains in obscurity. Unfortunately as Raadschelders (2005) has noted, PA has suffered a different problem: From a “birds eye view of PA theory. . .one might conclude that the study is hopelessly befuddled and fragmented.” However, Raadschelders also notes that the field could benefit from greater emphasis on pedagogical and pragmatic perspectives (p. 595).

PA could benefit from the greater application of James’s pragmatic method—a method for resolving “interminable” debates, for example, the qualitative/quantitative and fact/value dichotomies. Pragmatism provides a way of arranging the fragmented theories of philosophy and science as diverse instruments in a handy toolbox. This approach is perhaps best exemplified by theoretical pluralism, which emanates from pragmatism’s middle ground position between foundationalism and coherentism. Pragmatism’s contribution to PA research methods could be far greater if applied more substantively as a whole, inclusive of its classical/neo variations. But some of pragmatism’s specific applications in research methodology should first be more concretely identified.

The “collaborative pragmatist” O. C. McSwite identified mediation as an area of application for pragmatism. McSwite (2005) argued that successful mediations do not focus on the hard line demands of the participants of a dispute, but rather toward identifying common metaphors between the disputants—on which can be constructed new narratives of reconciliation. Thus, the function of the mediator is to “Help the participants to elaborate the metaphor and to articulate the vital interest that attach to it. They then construct the circumstances in which this can be presented to the other side” (p. 569). Incidentally, the metaphor driven approach to inquiry advocated by McSwite is consistent with developments in “embodied cognition,” found in—for example—Lakoff and Johnson (1999), ⁸ and Varela (1999). ⁹ Lackoff and Johnson, in particular, argue that the embodied nature of experience, cognition, and knowledge make metaphorical expression an appropriate subject of inquiry. In their words, “Metaphor allows conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of subjective experience” (p. 45). However, while the embodied view is in part consistent with the narrative approach of neopragmatism, it simultaneously contradicts the disembodied linguistic basis of knowledge that Rorty’s neopragmatism assumes. More importantly, it opposes the disembodied, “computationalist” view of cognition that presupposes the mind-body, mind-world dualisms characterizing much of Cartesian, Enlightenment philosophy and the positivist tradition of research in the social sciences.

Ospina and Dodge (2005a, 2005b) and Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy (2005) have similarly argued convincingly against the myopic focus on positivist explanation, in favor of narrative inquiry. The survey instrument is perhaps the most commonly used method of data collection in the social sciences, but surveys necessarily reduce and constrain “Complexity, intentionally leaving out context” (2005a, p. 151). Setting aside the practical problem of dismal response rates, questionnaires often provide only relative options along a predetermined scale, prefiguring responses and cutting off extended meanings, laying social phenomena into the procrustean bed of verificationism. In contrast, narrative inquiry reveals aspects of social reality impossible to even the most well designed survey questionnaire: “Narrative inquiry is appropriate for learning about social phenomena in context because it allows people to tell stories that reflect the richness and complexity of their experience” (2005a, p. 151). Narrative inquiry is highly useful in areas of qualitative research in PA, and is included as an important research form under the big tent of methodological pluralism.

Narrative inquiry is obviously useful to both practice and academic research, but it is here applied more substantively to program evaluation. Evaluation is highly subjective, particularly in the early exploratory phases—often involving direct observation and interviews. Program managers are often perturbed by these methods, as evaluators commonly just do some number crunching of quantitative data points at the end of the program, failing to recognize the importance of how data is collected. However as Fox and Miller (1996) have noted, the essential fixedness and objectivity of empirical “data” is far more problematic than many practitioners may realize:

Formal institutions exist in the context of legitimating value orientations (efficiency, for example) that are both culture-bound and historically contingent, not at all “objective.” Our habits of mind influence the way we see things. Perceptions are easily channeled and ossified when participants, analysts, or managers think that they convey something concrete, whereas the reference is actually to a shared idea—a tacitly agreed-upon set of symbols and expectations (Fox & Miller, 1996, p. 99).

A pragmatic approach, specifically using narrative inquiry, more fully appreciates the qualitative, historical, and comparative context in which programs are situated. At the same time, a program in the grip of management obstruction loses legitimacy in the more obvious manner of defrauding the public of its right to know what its taxes are paying for. Narrative inquiry can reveal “tacitly agreed upon” assumptions, as well as—in certain cases—the essential foundationlessness of empirical measurement in program evaluation by providing a deeper treatment of context and historicity in the pragmatic sense.

With careful planning and attention to research design, narrative inquiry can help researchers identify the relevant factors of analysis, forming a ground and providing the direction for data collection and quantitative analysis. This is particularly true in the early stages of program evaluation, where good questions have yet to even be identified. Without the necessary groundwork, such as direct observation and interviewing of program staff, the relevant factors of analysis may go unidentified, and quantitative analysis may prove impossible, pointless, or biased. In many such cases only a mixed methods approach will produce a thorough, rigorous, and balanced evaluation.

Criminal investigation is an area where overreliance on one or another method can have particularly dire consequences, such as wrongful conviction and execution. The idea that a police investigator would forego interrogating suspects or examining forensic evidence in favor of witness identification alone is preposterous. But unfortunately, this scenario is very real. Investigators, prosecutors, and juries often focus on witness testimony in isolation from contradicting evidence. As a result, faulty witness identification is a factor in 75% of all postconviction DNA exonerations—“The single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide” (Innocence Project, 2012). Within this context, the criminal justice system is perhaps most visibly subject to neopragmatism’s charge of illegitimacy. However, contrary to the problematic construction of legitimacy solely on neopragmatist antifoundationalism, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system has been enhanced through the advance of scientific, empirical methods (DNA testing).

As this example illustrates, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system requires the utilization and embrace of theory-pluralism and mixed methods. It needs what Stivers (2008) has labeled, a “philosophy of practice,” which “Requires not a transformation of reality but a change in awareness so that action can be consciously creative, and a change in approach, so that inquiry can be democratic” (p. 138). The democratic impulse in pragmatism is what informs its pluralistic approach to inquiry, the only priority being the practical resolution of problematic situations. In contrast, one of the key failures of past philosophical systems has been the divorce of theory and practice.

Cook and Wagenaar (2012) recently advanced an “epistemology of practice” consistent with the tenor of this pragmatic philosophy. Constructing a unified concept of knowledge and practice, they argue, “Indeed, we wish to characterize knowledge as part of an epistemic dimension of practice, and the elements of context as artifacts of practice that constitute its social and physical worlds” (p. 18). This view is more broadly understood within the context of Dewey’s critique of philosophy’s traditional quest for certainty, what Cook and Wagenaar call the received view. Dewey identified the prime motivation for the quest as the central but faulty presupposition that “What is known is antecedent to the mental act of observation and inquiry”(Dewey, 1928, p. 23). Laying out the essential division between theory and practice, Dewey (1928) argued:

All of these notions about certainty and the fixed, about the nature of the real world, about the nature of the mind and the organs of knowing, are completely bound up with one another, and their consequences ramify into practically all important ideas entertained upon any philosophic question. They all flow- such is my basic thesis—from the separation (set up in the interest of the quest for absolute certainty) between theory and practice, knowledge and action (pp. 23-24).

This basic problem of philosophy is precisely what Cook and Wagenaar (2012) argue against in their construction of an epistemology of practice: “It is no longer secure to assume that knowledge necessarily precedes, underlies and enables action” (p. 26). Rather, PA, as a discipline with a substantial practitioner component, should recognize the essential embodied, contextual, and historical quality of knowledge. However, as Cook and Wagenaar also note, the design of research in PA often continues to presuppose the core dualities of the received view. This sentiment is supported by Raadschelders’ and Kwang-Hoons’ (2011) recent review of Public Administration Review articles, which pointed out the diminishing presence of practitioner research and qualitative “big questions” research. Rather, the trend favors quantitative and empirical research, representing the “Increasing domination of ‘science,’ narrowly defined” (p. 28).

Positive social science was developed and standardized quite some time ago. Indeed the 20th century saw the rise and fall of logical empiricism in the schools of philosophy, but the downside of that trend was not paralleled in the schools of social science, which often maintain strict positivist standards of quantitative verification in order to make their disciplines seem more scientific. The task of methodological pluralism in the social sciences, at this point, primarily requires the identification of social problems as fundamentally qualitative. Indeed the most rigorous statistical surveys are ultimately reducible to, for example, census takers questioning individuals face-to-face at their front doors. No amount of statistical analysis can make this process totally objective. In a series of articles, Evans and Lowery (2006, 2008; Lowery & Evans, 2004) identified this problem on pragmatic grounds, arguing for greater development, standardization, and use of qualitative methods in PA, advancing a series of taxonomic models for social inquiry in PA which span the methodological continuum. Luton (2010) has similarly called for greater standardization of qualitative methods.

One exemplar of both qualitative research operationalization and theory-pluralism can be found in student research design at Texas State University, where Shields and Tajalli (2006) successfully applied a pragmatic approach to the design of MPA student capstone applied research projects (ARPs). Borrowing from multiple research traditions, spanning the continuum from narrative inquiry to aggregated time series, MPA students select from five broad research purposes/conceptual frameworks to guide the design of the project. The overarching theme in the explicit utilization of conceptual frameworks is the purposive and pragmatic emphasis on theory-as-a-tool. Not only does this system guide the research process, it also places heavy emphasis on explicitly embracing doubt, conceptualizing a problematic situation, and using/creating rules of operationalization to develop a more unified picture of the situation. No method is eschewed, and ARPs often employ multiple methods simultaneously. After the implementation of this system, the quality of the ARPs increased dramatically. Several of Texas State’s 294 ARPs have won regional and national awards, and since 2006 have been downloaded from Texas State University’s institutional repository “More than 325,000 times from 148 countries” (Shields, Rangarajan, & Stewart, 2012, p. 158). This is truly a testament to the potential of pragmatic theory-pluralism at work in PA research methods.

Mediation, narrative inquiry, program evaluation, criminal investigation, and research design are all areas where pragmatism and theory-pluralism has been and can be incorporated more substantively into PA. Undoubtedly, the future holds unforeseen areas of research, as well as unforeseen public problems, which no one theory or set of theories will be able to cope with in isolation. Only a truly pluralistic approach to inquiry, focused on the problematic situation and problem resolution will be able to cope with these changes.

Pragmatists in PA should focus more on the specifics of developing and applying new methods to PA research, as well as identifying productive ways to combine methods, rather than continually rehashing the exhausting epistemic debate over foundationalism and legitimacy—though it must be stated that such debate is nevertheless still a positive indication of the self-awareness of the discipline. Of paramount importance is recognizing that any method in isolation (whether qualitative or quantitative) provides only limited understandings of problem situations in PA. Multiple methods must be integrated simultaneously to provide the broadest and deepest possible treatment of complex public problems.

Conclusion

Returning back to the initial impetus for this article—the defense of pragmatism against the neopragmatist “upgrade” claim—it seems that neopragmatism’s primary source of opposition to PA’s regular pragmatism seems to roughly trace its critique of legitimacy and authority. Neopragmatists believe that pragmatism’s regard for the scientific attitude negatively influences the ethics of its advocates. To sum up the response offered in this article, there are two main problems with this argument.

First, classical pragmatism may not be as antifoundationalist as neopragmatism, but it simply cannot be appropriately characterized as a foundationalist philosophy. As Hickman (2004) noted, Dewey’s The Quest For Certainty should be read as “An antifoundationalist, anticartesian, and postmodernist tract” (p. 498). Second, what specifically is the connection between pragmatist epistemology and legitimacy in decision making? The imputation that pragmatism’s vision for PA will lead to illegitimate governmental forms because of an insufficiently robust rejection of epistemic foundationalism is a diversion. The attack is waged against the method by which conclusions are generated, rather than dealing with the consequences of the conclusions drawn, as well as the potential usefulness of the method in given problem situations.

Kasdan, like Miller, leverages the imputation of illegitimacy on the impractical conflation between epistemic and ethical justification. Ironically, the argument is equally applicable to the epistemic commitments of neopragmatism—but that is an unproductive ending point. The hard-link between epistemology and legitimacy dissolves when conceptualized from the middle range described in Haack’s analytic framework. I remain skeptical that epistemology and legitimacy are so tightly intertwined that differences at the epistemic middle ground necessarily result in divergent consequences for decision making in the PA context. The problem lies—as it may always have—with adherence to inflexible purist epistemic preformulations.

In the past PA theorists have inappropriately characterized PA as a paradigmatic field, subject to the Kuhnian analysis of normal science and theory incommensurability. This application however has served as little more than a device for insulating one or another theory from criticism. Laudan’s historical problem-solving view of scientific progress and his attendant focus on research traditions provides a better frame of reference, that is, if philosophy of science is to be applied to PA at all. Moreover, Laudan’s research traditions are consistent with the broader disciplinary goal of theory-pluralism.

Finally, the “upgrade” claim dissolves in light of the potential for greater collaboration between PA theorists of all stripes. This article identifies just a few of the areas where collaboration is possible, such as program evaluation and research design. Focusing on the problem of disciplinary rigor mortis in the social sciences, theory-pluralism seems to provide a broader goal and a greater rationale for collaboration in mixed methods research. No theory in isolation will be able to cope with the constantly evolving problems of administration, but the pluralistic approach found in philosophical pragmatism can guide us forward through unpredictable developments in the future of human life.