Motivation,Change,and Stability

Abstract

Although public-sector motivation is conceived of as dynamic, and responsive to organizational stimuli, few empirical works have treated it as such. As a result, we have little understanding about how bureaucrats’ motivations change over time or about the relative impacts of intra- and extraorganizational influences. This study contributes by examining an entering group of police officers during the first 2 years of their employment. Its findings show modest change across a variety of motives over the course of the study. At each time they were contacted, the strongest predictors of an entrant’s motivations were his or her entering motivations. However, formal and informal organization influences were also associated with entrants’ motives and the amount of change appeared to increase over time. The article concludes by considering the implications of these findings for public management research and practice.

Keywords

motivation police bureaucracy organization socialization

For many years politicians and scholars have been concerned with the motivations of public servants. This concern arises from the understanding that there is a link between motivation and behavior (Vandenabeele, 2007); in fact, two leading scholars define motivation as “the forces that energize, direct, and sustain behavior” (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008, p. 2). A public servant who is motivated by drawing a stable and decent paycheck, it is generally suspected, will act differently than a public servant who is motivated by “giving back” or “serving.” In fact, there is empirical evidence to support this expectation: a sizeable survey of federal workers shows that those who are motivated by protecting the public interest are more likely to be whistleblowers when they witness government waste or fraud (Brewer & Selden, 1998). Recognizing the importance of motivation does not imply that it causes behavior; rather, as decision-making theorists argue, motivation is one of a complex array of factors that shape the choices that an individual makes (March, 1994). The importance of motivation, however, stands out: organizations devote considerable resources to maintaining morale and creating motivated “organization citizens” (Koehler & Rainey, 2008).

Since motivation is often seen as associated with behavior, many studies have sought to describe and explain the motives of public employees. The resulting literature shows that public workers are more likely to be motivated by intrinsic rewards (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000) and that, within the category of intrinsic rewards, there is considerable diversity about what motivates public service (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Brewer, Selden, & Facer, 2000; Perry, 1996). However, two related holes in the literature remain. First, it is unclear how dynamic public-sector motivation is. One of the most prominent articles on motivation suggests that it should be understood as a “dynamic attribute that changes over time” (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 370). However, as other scholars have recently noted, most research on bureaucratic motivation treats it as stable by examining it with cross-sectional research designs (Wright, 2008; Wright & Grant, 2010). These works are useful for examining motivation across broad populations, and in multiple settings, but have difficulty explaining the origins and dynamism of motivation. Second, though theorists argue that organizations affect the individuals who enter them (Argyris, 1993; March, 1994), we have little understanding about how public organizations influence employee motivation. In particular, few motivation studies have focused on organization socialization, a process that is theorized as playing an important role in shaping entering workers.

This article contributes to the motivation literature by providing some evidence in both of these areas. To do so, it analyzes findings from a longitudinal, multimethod research project that follows a group of entering police officers during the first 2 years of their employment. Though police are not representative of all public workers, organization socialization in police departments is depicted as particularly strong (Rubinstein, 1973; Wilkins & Williams, 2008); as such, they are a useful case for studying the effects of intra- and extraorganizational influences on motivation.

The article’s findings show modest motivational change over the course of the study. At each time they were contacted, the strongest predictors of an officer’s motivations were his or her entering motivations. These findings reinforce the view that motivation is tied to sociohistorical antecedents (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997; Perry, Brudney, Coursey, & Littlepage, 2008). However, the article also shows that formal and informal organizational influences were associated with entrants’ motives and the amount of change appeared to increase over time. These findings suggest that employee motivation is dynamic and susceptible to organizational influence. The article concludes by considering the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Motivation in the Public Sector

Since scholars have studied organizations, they have examined the motives of subordinate workers. One of the themes emerging from these studies is that bureaucratic behavior, in the private and public sectors, is driven by more than just material interest. For example, Weber (1947) writes that, in addition to self-interest, subordinate behavior is motivated by custom, affective ties, and idealism. Similarly, Barnard (1968, p. 143) argues that subordinate cooperation depends upon tangible incentives and persuasion; he notes that material rewards “unaided by other motives . . . constitute weak incentives.” More recent scholarship reinforces this point by demonstrating the complex array of influences on bureaucratic motivation and behavior (Argyris, 1993; Brehm & Gates, 1997; March, 1994; Selden, Brudney, & Kellough, 1998).

Since public organizations are comparatively disadvantaged in motivating employees with material rewards, public administration scholars have devoted considerable resources to understanding what drives public servants. One of the most important concepts to emerge from such inquiries is public service motivation (PSM). This concept has various meanings (Vandenabeele, 2007) but the most established comes from Perry (1996, 1997, 2000), Perry et al. (2008), and Perry and Wise (1990). They define PSM as the “predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 368). More specifically, Perry (1996) argues that there are four key dimensions of PSM: attraction to policymaking, commitment to public interest, self-sacrifice, and compassion.

Though Perry’s (1996) approach to PSM is the most established, there are other conceptualizations of PSM and other approaches to studying motivation. For example, some researchers study the ideological motivations of public servants and ask how they respond to political change (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000; Golden, 2000). Others examine motivation by dividing worker goals into extrinsic and intrinsic (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000); intrinsically motivated workers are driven by the internal rewards that derive directly from their work while extrinsically motivated workers are driven by external rewards such as remuneration. Generally, intrinsic motivations have been seen as linked to PSM while extrinsic motivations have not. Meanwhile, other researchers conceive of PSM-motivated employees as comprised of four groups: samaritans, communitarians, patriots, and humanitarians (Brewer et al., 2000). Samaritans are motivated by wanting to help others and see themselves as the guardians of the underprivileged; communitarians are motivated by civic duty; patriots are motivated by acting for a cause that is bigger than themselves; and humanitarians are motivated by a concern with social justice. Other scholars study PSM more generally as a motivation that pushes individuals to pursue careers devoted to the service of others (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999; Wright & Christensen, 2010).

Echoing this more general approach, Perry and Hondeghem (2008, p. 3) argue that PSM refers to a cluster of “motives associated with serving the public good.” As such, PSM is useful for explaining the “service side” of public work. However, as scholars have long noted, bureaucrats, like all people, have multiple motives (Barnard, 1968; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry & Wise, 1990; Weber, 1947). They may be more likely to be motivated by service than private-sector workers but they also are likely to be driven by ego-centric desires such as job security, a pension, or the power inherent in a government position. Golden’s (2000) analysis of the bureaucratic response to the Reagan administration aptly demonstrates the complexity of public-sector motivation. After his election, Reagan and his aides were concerned that their policies would be thwarted by liberal bureaucrats in the executive branch agencies. Though not a novel presidential concern (Nathan, 1975), Golden shows that many bureaucrats did in fact disagree with the new administration’s agenda. However, across a broad array of policy areas most bureaucrats made an earnest effort to implement the new agenda. This responsiveness, she finds, was due in part to bureaucratic self-interest: many were concerned with keeping their jobs and maintaining their livelihoods. However, they were also motivated by an understanding of themselves as public servants who should be responsive to the democratic will. Findings such as this suggest that there is a complex array of factors driving bureaucratic behavior and that bureaucrats, at any particular moment in time, can be expected to have multiple motivations.

Explaining Police Officers’ Motivations

Thus far the article has focused on the content of bureaucratic motivation. However, its main goal is to explore the various influences on motivation. Thus, this section considers the forces that might shape motivational change and continuity during organization socialization.

Extraorganizational Influences

The strongest explanatory component of the PSM literature to date has been its focus on sociohistorical antecedents such as pre- or extraorganization influences. For instance, one study examines the relationship between PSM and five sets of preorganization correlates: parental socialization, religious socialization, professional identification, political ideology, and individual demographic characteristics (Perry, 1997). The findings show that individuals are more likely to be motivated by public service if they: have a closer relationship with god, have parents who value public service, and achieve more education. The study concludes that formative experiences often affect motivation. Other studies reinforce this view by showing that: education, training, and particular life events are associated with motivation (Perry, 2000); education is related to motivation (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007); age and education are associated with motivation (Houston, 2000); and the motivations of public service award winners are related to family socialization, religious activity, and volunteer experiences (Perry et al., 2008).

At a conceptual level, sociohistorical research fits with what this article refers to as the continuity approach to understanding psychology and behavior. This approach expects that certain psychological characteristics, such as attitudes, motivations, and identities, are likely to remain consistent throughout life (Atchley, 1999; Hampson & Goldberg, 2006; Inglehart, 1981). It does not argue that individuals are static but that they tend to rely on past experiences and preformed psychological strategies when they encounter new situations. As a result, certain psychological and behavioral characteristics are expected to be stable over time. Empirical support for the continuity approach can be found in various public administration literatures. For instance, representative bureaucracy studies show that extraorganizational factors, such as racial and gender identities, are important factors in shaping how public workers see themselves and act in their official capacities (Dolan, 2000; Selden et al., 1998). Similarly, street-level bureaucracy studies suggest that the identities and attitudes that workers bring into their organizations are likely to remain salient even after they begin work (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Portillo & DeHart-Davis, 2009; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).

In the policing literature there is mixed support for the expectations born of the continuity approach. Some studies suggest that police remain connected to the identities that they form early in life (Raganella & White, 2004; Sun, 2003; Sun & Payne, 2004). For example, police of different racial identities appear to hold different views about their roles as police—minority officers appear to have a broader view of the role of an officer while also having more positive views about the legal restrictions on their behavior (Sun, 2003). In contrast, other studies imply that the power of preorganizational influences wither after cadets enter their departments. For instance, one study shows that Black officers are actually more likely to engage in racial profiling than White officers (Wilkins & Williams, 2008). The authors speculate that the cause of this may be socialization: being in the department irons out differences in attitudes and behavior among the officers. Other studies reinforce this view by showing that significant changes occur during socialization (Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1974).

Although there is mixed empirical evidence in the policing literature, the article tests two continuity-related expectations:

Hypothesis 1: Entering police officers will maintain their motivations during organization socialization.

Hypothesis 2: Entering police officers’ motivations will remain associated with extraorganization influences.

Organizational Influences

Although the majority of motivation studies explore the effects of sociohistorical influences, recently studies have begun to examine organizational influences. For example, one study shows that tenure in an organization and membership in a professional organization are related to motivation (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007). These findings suggest that organizations may be exerting some influence on employees’ motivations. Since organizations are difficult to define, and there are competing views about how they influence members, the article considers two basic perspectives. The natural systems perspective sees organizations as porous, multigoaled collectivities (Scott, 2003). This definition directs attention to the informal structures inside organizations such as cultures, relationships, and networks. Though not necessarily controlled by the organization or organization leaders, these structures can play an important role in shaping how public servants think and act (Wilson, 1989). For instance, a wide ranging study of bureaucratic behavior shows that bureaucrats’ decisions to work, shirk, and sabotage are driven primarily by solidary preferences—the connections that bureaucrats have with one another (Brehm & Gates, 1997).

Across the policing literature there is considerable evidence that informal influences shape police thought and action (Chemerinsky, 2000; Goldsmith, 1990; Skolnick, 1966; Walker & Katz, 2008). For example, although there are some important regional differences, there is general agreement that police are linked by a common culture and that the culture molds the attitudes of entrants (Van Maanen, 1975). In addition, peers and veterans are seen as having a major influence on rookie police officers. Since most departments use institutionalized training, rather than individualized training (Jones, 1986), rookies bond with their fellow trainees and rely on one another to make sense out of their new surroundings. In addition to leaning on fellow rookies to pass tests and navigate interactions with instructors, cadets use one another to build understandings of how they expect to act in their new role. However, when rookies arrive at their districts they encounter a new social group: veterans. Veterans complete the training of newcomers by showing them how to apply “theory” to “reality” and disabusing them of “myths” perpetuated by academy trainers (Van Maanen, 1974). Thus, as they begin work, veterans are thought to play an essential role in shaping rookie development.

Based on the natural systems perspective, and this review of the policing literature, the article tests the following expectation:

Hypothesis 3: Informal organization influences will be associated with entering police officers’ motivations.

Next, the article turns to a cluster of approaches to organizational study referred to as the rational systems perspective (Scott, 2003). Researchers from this tradition define organizations as groups that are unified in their pursuit of specific goals. Organizations ensure that members’ goals and behaviors are aligned using formal organization influences—management tools that are relatively in their control, such as supervision and monitoring. There is abundant empirical evidence that “management matters” and that employees’ views and actions are shaped by formal organization influences (Ingraham, Joyce, & Donahue, 2003; Riccucci, 2005; Wanous, 1992). In addition, recent work suggests that leadership may play a role in fostering PSM across an array of public bureaucracies (Wright, Moynihan, & Pandey, 2012).

Similarly, in the policing literature there is evidence that formal influences affect how police think and act (Fyfe, 1982; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987). At the start of their careers police departments use academy training to shower entrants with messages about department rules and conduct (Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1975). Though there is some debate about the durability of the academy’s influence, by most accounts the academy at least shapes cadets’ views in the short term. In addition, after they graduate and move onto the streets, departments use superiors and advanced technology to monitor behavior. Although police are famously difficult to monitor, there is some evidence that monitoring shapes officer’s thought and behavior (Westphal, 2004).

Based on the rational systems perceptive, and this review of the policing literature, the article tests the following expectation:

Hypothesis 4: Formal organization influences will be associated with entering police officers’ motivations.

Research Design, Data, and Analytic Strategy

The above hypotheses point to different explanations about how police officers might develop their motivations. The article tests these expectations using data from a 2-year, longitudinal study of entering police officers. Though the article cannot divulge the name of the city in which these police worked, it is important to note that it does not claim that this city, or the police studied here, are empirically representative.¹ Nonetheless, police share much in common with the general class of bureaucrats: they reckon with voluminous rules and regulations, they must learn to apply the general to the specific, and they are symbolic of the governments that employ them. As such, police have served as useful subjects in a variety of public administration studies (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Brehm & Gates, 1997; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003).

In addition, police are a useful case because their experience during socialization is frequently depicted as intense (Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1975). For instance, Van Maanen (1974, p. 84) quotes a police chief as saying: “The day the new recruit walks through the doors of the police academy he leaves society behind him to enter a profession that does more than give him a job, it defines who he is. For all the years he remains, closed into the sphere of its rituals . . . he will be a cop.”² The implications of this statement are that entry into the police department plays a transformational role in the lives of entrants: it separates them from the outside world and gives them a new frame of reference for understanding and acting in the social world. This basic expectation has been echoed by researchers from a variety of scholarly traditions (Fielding, 1988; Muir, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). Since this project aims to understand the relative effects of organizational and extraorganizational influences, police are an important case to examine.

In early 2006 the researcher recruited approximately 80 police cadets for this project. Surveys were administered to the entire group at five times (Time 1-Time 5): at the outset of training, after 3 months, after 6 months, after 1 year, and after 2 years. At Times 2 and 3 cadets were in training at the police academy; at Times 4 and 5 they had graduated from the academy and were police officers. Some sampling issues were avoided since all entrants had the opportunity to complete surveys at each time; however, it is important to explore the possibility of response or attrition bias. While at the police academy such inquiries are not possible because few cadets had dropped out and more than 97% of cadets participated at each time. At Times 4 and 5, the response rates dropped to 57% and 74%, respectively. To determine if there was any response or attrition bias, the researcher estimated their likelihood of responding or dropping out based on the control variables that previous motivation research suggests might shape workers’ motivations: age, education, and income (Houston, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). These estimates, which can be found in Appendix A, show that the data are generally free of statistically significant patterns; at Time 4 older officers were slightly more likely to drop out than younger officers but this relationship dissipated by Time 5.³ These findings suggest that attrition and response bias are not substantive problems for this analysis.

The article’s dependent variables are ordered survey responses that ask police how much they are motivated by eight motives; the article analyzes their answers using ordered probit. Since the results of ordered probit estimates are difficult to interpret on their own, the article reports odds ratios based on these estimates (Liao, 1994). Odds ratios present the probability of an outcome based on a one-unit change in an independent variable. They are interpreted such that an increase in an independent variable is associated with an increase or decrease in the probability of a particular outcome. An odds ratio of 1 implies that an outcome is equally likely; an odds ratio above one implies that an outcome is more likely based on a change in an independent variable; an odds ratio below one implies that the outcome is less likely based on a change in an independent variable. Asterisks indicate that the underlying coefficient is statistically significant.

At different times the analysis employs different models. At Time 1, before cadets have entered the department, the model includes extraorganizational influences. At Times 2 and 3 cadets are in the academy but have not yet begun work; thus, at these times, the training models include extraorganizational influences as well as variables that measure the effects of training and cadets; the posttraining models (Times 4 and 5) include extraorganizational influences as well as variables that measure the influence of training, rookies, monitoring, and veterans.

In addition, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of 15 workers at three times (Time 1, Time 4, and Time 5). In total the researcher conducted 39 interviews.⁴ On the first round of surveys cadets were asked if they were willing to be interviewed; in exchange for their participation, they were offered a small gift or meal. Nearly two thirds (63%) indicated a willingness to participate. In choosing interviewees the researcher sought individuals that reflected the demographic attributes of the group as a whole. By and large this goal was achieved: Appendix A shows that interviewees are similar to the general groups of entrants.

The researcher conducted interviews in person or by phone. In form, the interviews were semistructured: an interview protocol was used so that all interviews followed the same pattern and included a basic set of questions; however, the researcher also asked nonstandardized follow-up questions. In regards to motivation, the researcher asked officers to describe what was motivating them to work in the department. For example, at Time 5, the researcher asked: “It’s been nearly two years, what’s motivating you to work as a police officer?” If officers could not answer this question, they were asked: “What drives you to go to the district each day?” Interviews lasted from 30 to 45 min and were recorded and transcribed.

Although this research design will be useful in evaluating the above hypotheses, it is important to acknowledge that 2 years is not the entirety of officers’ careers; observed change and stability may not be reflective of future developments. Nonetheless, the organization socialization literature typically studies socialization by following entrants for the first 6 months of their careers (Saks & Ashforth, 1997; Wanous, 1992). This is theorized as an important period of development for entrants since they are encountering the organization for the first time. Since the length of time examined in this study is longer than typical studies, it will be useful in establishing a longer and more extensive view of entry.

Also, prior to entering the police academy recruits underwent considerable testing (cognitive and psychological). The department, like most departments, uses these tests to increase the likelihood of a good individual–organization fit and decrease the likelihood of hiring violence-prone individuals (Davis, Rostow, Pinkston, & Cowick, 1999).⁵ The tests are not explicitly directed at detecting particular motivational tendencies. However, this filtering may select for recruits with particular motives and shape this article’s findings. For instance, if the department recruits cadets who share the department’s values, motivational congruence may be achieved prior to training, and the findings here would indicate stability. Since most departments engage in screening this is not a research limitation per se; rather, preentry testing should be understood as a potential influence on police socialization.⁶

Dependent Variables

The outcomes of interest in this study are police officers’ motivations. Because the study aims to understand a diverse array of motivations (some linked to service and others that are not), the police were given a list of eight motivations drawn from an analysis of the policing literature (Fielding, 1988; Muir, 1977; Raganella & White, 2004; Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Van Maanen, 1974, 1975). In all, the article examines three service-oriented motivations “Protecting law abiding citizens,” “Keeping order in the streets,” and “To make sure that people are treated fairly and equitably” and five self-interested motivations, “The excitement,” “Getting a job with good benefits,” “Influences from your family,” “Getting a respected job,” and “The power that police have.” Since the cadets were at different points in their careers throughout the study, the question prompts were necessarily different. At Time 1, on their first day of training, cadets were asked: “When you think back to why you wanted to join the force, how important was each of the following?” At Times 2 and 3, when cadets were at the police academy, they were asked: “What is your motivation for completing the Academy and becoming a police officer?” At Times 4 and 5, when the cadets had graduated and become officers, they were asked: “What is your motivation for being a police officer?” At each time police answered these questions using a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1, “Not at all,” to 5, “A lot.”

Independent Variables

One of this study’s hypotheses is that officers’ motivations will remain associated with certain extraorganization influences.⁷ In particular, it is important to focus on income, education, and age that prior research shows are, at least sometimes, associated with motivation (Houston, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). Entrants’ ages are coded as indicated, educational attainment is coded on a scale from “1” (high school diploma or GED) to “6” (graduate degree), and preorganization family income is coded from “1” (US$19,999 and below) to “8” (US$80,000 and up). In addition, a review of the policing literature suggests the importance of race, experiences with class, political ideology, and service in the armed forces. To measure race the article employs a dummy variable that codes “0” for minority and “1” for non-Hispanic White. To measure class experience the models include a variable that indicates whether police had ever received welfare benefits; to examine political ideology the models include a question that asked entrants: “When it comes to politics do you usually consider yourself liberal or conservative?” Entrants were given a 7-point scale ranging from “1” liberal to “7” conservative. The models also include a dummy variable for armed service experiences. Finally, officers’ entering motivations will be used to predict their motivations at subsequent times.

The second set of hypotheses is concerned with how informal and formal organizational influences shape motivation. The questions used to generate the organizational variables can be found in Appendix B. To measure the effect of peers and veterans the researcher asked police officers how much these other officers contributed to their learning (during the academy) or affected how they did their jobs (after the academy). To measure the effect of police academy training, the article uses an index that tallied cadets’ answers to five questions about the influence of trainers. To operationalize the effect of training after cadets had graduated from the academy, a two-question index is used. To measure the effect of monitoring the researcher asked officers how closely they were monitored on seven typical police actions. Summary statistics of independent and dependent variables are located in Table 1.

Table 1.

Summary Statistics.

	Independent variables						Dependent variables
Extraorganizational Influences	N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.		N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Age	74	26.39	4.81	19	39	Protection T1	84	4.85	0.40	3	5
Family income pre-T1	82	4.87	1.68	1	7	Protection T2	75	4.68*	0.60	2	5
Education	83	2.00	0.96	1	4	Protection T3	73	4.73	0.51	3	5
Former welfare recipient	80	0.25	0.44	0	1	Protection T4	41	4.61	0.63	3	5
White (non-Hispanic)	81	0.67	0.47	0	1	Protection T5	50	4.60*	0.67	2	5
Former armed forces	84	0.35	0.48	0	1	Excitement T1	84	4.21	0.96	1	5
Conservative	81	4.06	1.29	1	7	Excitement T2	75	4.32	0.81	1	5
						Excitement T3	73	4.47*	0.65	2	5
Organizational Influences						Excitement T4	41	4.39	0.67	2	5
Training T2	75	22.16	2.28	16	25	Excitement T5	49	4.39	0.86	1	5
Training T3	72	21.00	2.95	12	25	Order T1	83	4.76	0.46	3	5
Training T4	39	6.56	1.87	3	10	Order T2	75	4.59*	0.57	3	5
Training T5	48	6.33	1.94	2	10	Order T3	73	4.58*	0.60	2	5
Cadets T2	74	3.88	0.91	1	5	Order T4	41	4.37*	0.83	1	5
Cadets T3	72	3.83	0.93	1	5	Order T5	50	4.35*	0.77	2	5
Rookies T4	40	2.53	1.22	1	5	Benefits T1	84	4.55	0.83	1	5
Rookies T5	50	2.20	1.20	1	5	Benefits T2	75	4.57	0.68	2	5
Monitoring T4	41	24.15	5.17	11	35	Benefits T3	72	4.61	0.57	3	5
Monitoring T5	50	23.26	6.64	10	35	Benefits T4	41	4.27	0.92	2	5
Veterans T4	40	3.88	1.02	1	5	Benefits T5	50	4.47	0.84	2	5
Veterans T5	50	3.16	1.20	1	5	Family T1	83	3.02	1.22	1	5
						Family T2	74	3.04	1.22	1	5
						Family T3	73	3.14	1.29	1	5
						Family T4	41	2.80	1.27	1	5
						Family T5	50	2.68	1.33	1	5
						Fair treatment T1	84	4.64	0.65	3	5
						Fair treatment T2	75	4.37*	0.80	1	5
						Fair treatment T3	73	4.42*	0.71	2	5
						Fair treatment T4	41	3.98*	0.85	2	5
						Fair treatment T5	50	4.02*	0.94	1	5
						Respected job T1	84	4.27	0.97	1	5
						Respected job T2	75	4.15	1.07	1	5
						Respected job T3	73	4.25	0.90	1	5
						Respected job T4	41	3.90*	1.02	1	5
						Respected job T5	48	3.77*	1.12	1	5
						Power T1	83	2.72	1.14	1	5
						Power T2	73	2.88	1.14	1	5
						Power T3	73	3.22*	1.17	1	5
						Power T4	41	2.71	1.19	1	5
						Power T5	49	2.51	1.24	1	5

Note. Cronbach’s α (index reliability measure): Training T2 = 0.80, Training T3 = 0.79, Training T4 = 0.69, Training T5 = 0.69, Monitoring T4 = 0.83, and Monitoring T5 = 0.86. Asterisks indicate that a later variable’s (T2-T5) mean is different from its initial mean (T1) at the p < .05 level. Correlation matrixes, indicating the extent to which organizational variables were associated at each time, can be found in Appendix A.

Findings

To begin, it is useful to examine the dependent variable means in Table 1. Means with asterisks next to them indicate that a subsequent motivation mean was statistically different (at the p < .05 level) from the motivation mean at entry. At the 2-year point (Time 5), we see statistically significant change in four of the eight motives. To provide a slightly different view, panel 1 of Figure 1 displays the percentage of police at each time that indicated being motivated “somewhat” or “a lot” (scores 4 and 5 on the 5-point scale) by each motive.

Figure 1.

Police officers’ motivations over time.

As in Table 1, in this figure we see consistency and change. On the consistency side, we see that over two thirds of police were motivated by protection, order, fair treatment, benefits, and the job’s respect in each time. We also see that fewer than half were ever motivated by the job’s power or by family influences. However, looking within some areas we see evidence of change. For example, the percentage of police motivated by protection and order dropped steadily over the course of entry; although the drop was not precipitous, the data in Table 1 show that these changes are both statistically significant. We also see a major drop in the number of police motivated by providing fair treatment; again, this shift is statistically significant as seen in Table 1. Also there are gradual (but nonlinear) increases in the percentage motivated by the job’s benefits and excitement; however, these changes are not statistically significant at the end of the second year. In addition, panel 1 suggests that most police had service-oriented and self-interested motives throughout the course of the study.

In addition, it is useful to examine the extent to which individual entrants shifted their motives from entry. Panel 2 in Figure 1 presents the average motivational change of all entrants. Change is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between each entrant’s initial and subsequent responses in each area. The figure again shows change and continuity. In terms of change, we see that in seven of the eight outcomes there is increased change at Time 5 compared to Time 2. We also see that for almost all outcomes there is at least half a point of change out of a possible 4 points (12.5%) by Time 5. However, by the same token, this panel also suggests that no radical motivational changes occur: none of the outcomes reach the 1 point (25%) mark by the end of the second year.

Since the researcher also conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of entrants, it is useful to examine interview findings to gain a better understanding of worker motivation. First consider the police who appear to shift motives over the course of 2 years. For instance, one officer initially indicated that he was motivated by protection: “I wanted to get into this because I really wanted to protect people . . . I want to help people and I’ve always been good with problem solving. So, I figured what better way to exercise problem solving skills, and I wanted to provide people with the same protection that I’ve felt growing up.” Two years later he indicates that his motivation is a mix: “. . . my motivation about a year ago is something completely different from what it is now . . . [which] is getting what the sergeant wants. Getting what the captain wants at this point. As well as [we are] looking at the impact on the neighborhood that I have.”

Similarly, another police officer initially appeared to be mixed in his motives but moved, over 2 years, toward being motivated by the job’s benefits. Initially he commented: “I just love being out in the dirt doing the hard work and being real physical so I figured, hey, if you’re not going to stay in the military for a living next best thing is to be a cop and make a difference doing it . . . it’s their duty to, uh, put their life in a harm’s way.” At Time 5 he noted that he was mostly driven by making money: “Just basically working with . . . any good partner that I can and making like good arrests and get overtime and make money for my family and me.” When asked what he meant by a “good arrest” he responded that good arrests have: “court time and when we get court time we’re guaranteed overtime. And overtime is money which is money for our families.”

Though some police appear to shift motivations, others maintain their initial motivations. For instance, one officer appeared to maintain an interest in using his predepartment skills and advancing his career. Initially he was motivated by getting a job in which he could use his military skills; however, he indicated that this was driven by the ease of the process not some external goal. “I joined the military right out of high school and a lot of what I did at the military could be used for police work . . . I was in a special operations unit in the Army, I was an Army Ranger for 4 years, and I figured I got out and I was eligible for the points—I got the 10 points on the test—and a lot of my background on the military could be used . . . so I figured why not use it? . . . I had the points and I knew I could get in pretty easily and I had training in that area of police enforcement.” After 2 years he commented: “Well basically just making money. We’re going, me and my partner, we’re going to plainclothes and an unmarked car and shit so that and making as much money as I can and not work in a patrol car anymore.”

Another officer maintained an interest in service even after joining the force. At Time 1 this officer talked about troubled youth in the city “[the problem] weighs heavy on my heart . . . I refuse to believe there’s nothing that can’t be done with the youth in the city . . . and [describes a personal experience with troubled youth]. So it affects me directly . . . that got the ball rolling with my thoughts what I could do what avenues I could take to work with at-risk youth which is my goal long term . . . but this is an excellent foot in the door in that direction.” After 2 years the officer again pointed to service as a motivation: “Just the fact that it’s a necessity in the community so my desire to offer community service is the same, that hasn’t changed.”

These interview findings suggest that there was considerable variation across the police entrants. Even though it was a relatively short time period, we see that some police shifted from a desire to help others to a desire to further their careers. However, we also detect that there is considerable consistency in some officers’ motives. Some officers entered the academy intent on giving back and maintained that motivation throughout the end of 2 years; others were motivated by advancing their careers and maintained this interest. These findings also show the richness and diversity of police motivation and suggest that individual officers often have multiple motives at any one point in time.

In addition to describing officers’ motivation trajectories, this section analyzes their survey responses at each time to evaluate the article’s hypotheses.

To begin, Table 2 presents findings from an analysis of entrants’ motivations at Times 1 to 3. At Time 1 we see that there are few strong patterns of motivation across the various extraorganizational influences. However, older cadets were 0.07 times less likely to be motivated by the job’s benefits, 0.09 times less likely to be motivated by excitement, and 0.13 times less likely to be motivated by the respect that comes with the job. In contrast, conservatives were 0.26 times more likely to be motivated by benefits and 0.30 times more likely to be motivated by the job’s excitement and respect.

Table 2.

Police Motivation: Times 1 to 3.

Time 1
	Protection	Order	Fair treatment	Excitement	Benefits	Family	Respected job	Power
Education	1.008	1.121	1.007	1.045	0.728*	1.035	0.851	0.954
Age	1.048	0.947	0.963	0.905***	0.927**	0.994	0.867***	0.963
Family income pre-T1	1.096	0.842	0.938	0.920	1.020	1.103	0.909	1.055
Former welfare recipient	1.105	1.192	1.096	0.964	2.727**	1.210	1.218	1.422
White (non-Hispanic)	1.074	0.781	0.671	0.727	1.112	1.343	0.951	0.902
Former armed forces	0.978	0.992	0.576	1.043	0.728	0.879	0.518**	0.888
Conservative	0.858	1.106	1.022	1.303**	1.264*	1.119	1.296**	1.122
N	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69

Time 2
	Protection	Order	Fair treatment	Excitement	Benefits	Family	Respected job	Power

Time 1 motivation	1.254	0.791	3.658***	3.380***	3.328***	1.693***	2.386***	1.951***
Education	1.062	1.021	0.907	0.803	0.981	0.914	0.990	1.023
Age	0.889***	0.923*	1.046	1.054	0.942	0.999	1.083*	0.984
Family income pre-T1	1.004	1.002	0.967	1.120	0.794*	1.034	1.161	0.970
Former welfare recipient	1.102	0.893	0.796	2.372*	2.566*	0.805	2.675**	1.444
White (non-Hispanic)	0.705	0.439*	0.451*	0.928	0.660	1.099	0.843	0.555*
Former armed forces	1.671	1.597	1.093	0.955	1.006	0.864	0.667	1.127
Conservative	0.745*	0.707**	0.798	0.657***	0.947	1.043	1.122	1.089
Training	1.053	1.102	1.138	1.123	1.427***	1.026	1.185**	1.092
Cadets	1.396	1.512	1.509	1.243	0.658	1.319	0.982	0.890
N	62	62	62	62	62	61	62	59

Time 3
	Protection	Order	Fair treatment	Excitement	Benefits	Family	Respected job	Power

Time 1 motivation	2.113	1.175	4.386***	5.355***	1.671**	1.616***	2.294***	1.747***
Education	1.399	1.119	0.974	1.158	1.258	0.919	1.202	0.964
Age	1.006	0.998	0.972	0.897*	0.906**	0.983	1.079*	0.956
Family income pre-T1	1.100	0.990	1.030	1.380**	1.054	0.960	1.157	0.975
Former welfare recipient	1.204	0.897	0.983	4.944**	2.105	0.932	1.428	1.277
White (non-Hispanic)	0.979	0.659	0.388**	1.696	0.952	0.692	0.913	0.696
Former armed forces	1.585	0.877	1.347	6.491***	0.993	0.801	1.166	0.782
Conservative	0.707**	0.616***	1.094	0.441***	0.974	1.318**	0.951	0.952
Training	1.191**	1.196**	1.199***	1.223**	1.011	0.939	1.002	0.944
Cadets	1.102	1.314	0.768	0.517*	1.008	1.303	1.145	0.905
N	60	60	60	60	59	59	60	59

Note. The entries are odds ratios based on multivariate ordered probit estimates (since the outcomes are scalar). Extraorganization variables are shaded for ease of interpretation.

p ≤ .10. **p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .01.

At Time 2, after spending 3 months in the academy, we see that the most consistent significant predictor of cadets’ motivations is their Time 1 motivations. Also, comparing the odds ratios from across the model, we see that entering motivations are considerably stronger than other variables. For example, a cadet motivated by excitement at entry was 2.3 times more likely to be motivated that way at Time 2. The associations between age and conservatism, seen at Time 1, appear to either recede or reverse: at Time 2 older cadets were 0.08 times more likely to be motivated by the respect that comes with the job and conservatives were 0.34 times less likely to be motivated by the job’s excitement. On the organizational side, we see fairly limited associations; nonetheless, we see that cadets influenced by training were 0.43 times more likely to be motivated by the job’s benefits and 0.19 times more likely to be motivated by the respect that comes with the job.

At Time 3, cadets had been inside the academy for nearly 6 months and were approaching graduation. Again we see that their Time 1 motivations were the strongest and most consistent predictors of their subsequent motivations. For example, a cadet motivated by excitement or fair treatment at Time 1 was between 3.4 and 4.4 times more likely to be motivated by these respective motives at Time 3. However, we also see the emergence of the strength of training. Though there are few associations at Time 2, at Time 3 we see that cadets influenced by academy training were around 0.20 times more likely to be motivated by three service-oriented motives: protection, order, and fair treatment.

Next we turn to examine police motives after exiting the academy and beginning work on the streets (Table 3). At Time 4 they had been inside the department for a year and working on the street for 6 months. Again we see that cadets’ entering motives were the strongest and most consistent predictors of their subsequent motives; for instance, an officer motivated by the job’s benefits at Time 1 was 2.4 times more likely to be motivated by benefits at Time 4. We also see the rise of race as an important predictor of motivation; Whites were 0.90 times less likely to be motivated by protection, 0.93 times less likely to be motivated by keeping order, and 0.80 times less likely to be motivated by fair treatment. On the organizational side we see the importance of veterans: those influenced by veterans were 0.63 times less likely to be motivated by keeping order, 0.59 times less likely to be motivated by attaining power, and 0.84 times more likely to be motivated by the job’s respect.

Table 3.

Police Motivation: Times 4 and 5.

Time 4
	Protection	Order	Fair treatment	Benefits		Family	Respected job	Power
Time 1 motivation	1.205	3.070*	2.135*	2.391***		1.696***	1.809**	2.863***
Education	1.216	1.248	1.695**	0.872		1.744**	1.339	0.824
Age	0.961	1.014	0.904	1.001		0.927	0.963	0.938
Family income pre-T1	0.616**	0.900	0.846	0.786		0.969	1.091	0.662***
Former welfare recipient	0.630	1.244	0.741	1.247		0.592	0.936	1.389
White (non-Hispanic)	0.102**	0.071***	0.210**	1.392		0.580	0.490	1.082
Former armed forces	1.561	4.682**	0.879	0.430		2.222	0.859	1.911
Conservative	1.617*	1.231	1.701**	1.163		1.411	0.991	1.516*
Training	0.938	1.051	0.778*	1.101		0.998	0.779*	0.747**
Rookies	1.627	1.174	1.000	1.083		1.015	1.823***	1.175
Veterans	0.561	0.372**	0.998	1.186		0.725	1.840**	0.413***
Monitoring	1.133	1.166**	1.064	1.022		1.068	1.015	1.195***
N	35	35	35	35		34	35	34

Time 5
	Protection	Order	Fair t9reatment	Excitement	Benefits	Family	Respected job	Power

Time 1 motivation	1.526	2.679*	3.016***	1.679*	2.081**	1.872***	1.389	2.251***
Education	1.011	0.773	1.035	1.145	1.182	1.192	1.095	1.395*
Age	0.997	0.982	0.918	0.905	0.904	0.951	1.013	0.879**
Family income pre-T1	0.884	1.056	0.819	1.016	0.729*	0.874	1.068	0.834
Former welfare recipient	0.773	0.645	0.540	1.669	1.745	1.675	1.795	1.347
White (non-Hispanic)	0.383*	0.398	0.298**	0.602	0.117***	0.783	0.594	0.348**
Former armed forces	1.142	1.177	0.948	1.047	1.540	0.514	0.545	1.193
Conservative	1.037	1.146	1.372	0.837	1.584**	1.872***	0.853	1.207
Training	1.300*	2.127***	1.548***	1.021	0.828	1.053	0.992	0.809*
Rookies	0.781	0.848	1.067	1.029	0.729	0.642**	1.199	1.055
Veterans	0.670	0.556**	0.813	0.561**	0.581*	0.710	0.745	0.710
Monitoring	1.043	1.070	0.979	1.061	1.108*	1.042	1.024	1.070*
N	42	42	42	42	42	42	40	40

Note. The entries are odds ratios based on multivariate ordered probit estimates (since the outcomes are scalar). Due to little variation, it was not possible to estimate “Excitement” at Time 4. Extraorganization variables are shaded for ease of interpretation.

p ≤ .10. **p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ 0.01.

Finally, as they reached the 2-year point we again see change and continuity. Again entering motives appear to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of subsequent motivation. For example, an officer motivated by fair treatment at Time 1 was 2 times more likely to be motivated this way at Time 5. We also see that race was again an important predictor of motives: Whites were 0.62 times less likely to be motivated by protection and 0.70 times less likely to be motivated by fair treatment. On the organizational side we see training reemerge as an important influence: those who remained connected to training were 0.30 times more likely to be motivated by protection, 1.1 times more likely to be motivated by order, and 0.55 times more likely to be motivated by fair treatment. Veterans also appeared to continue to exert some influence on entrants’ motives: police influenced by veterans were around 0.40 times less likely to be motivated by keeping order and the job’s excitement and benefits.

Considered in sum, the results of this statistical analysis reveal general support for the expectations set forth in this article. Entering police officers did not quickly and radically depart from their entering motivations; rather, they remained connected to them even after 2 years. Similarly, one extraorganization influence, race, remained an important predictor of motivation even after police completed formal training and began work. However, just as obvious, we see that motivational change did occur and that formal and informal organization influences were associated with entrants’ motives.

Conclusion

For many years the motivation of public servants has been an important focus for public officials and public administration scholarship. As motivation studies have increased over time, our understanding of public-sector motivation has improved. This article contributes to a growing literature that explores the dynamism, origins, and institutional components of motivation (Georgellis & Tabvuma, 2010; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008; Wright & Christensen, 2010). To do so it presents data and analysis from a 2-year, multimethod study of entering police officers in a single city. Although these data are useful, it is important to acknowledge that 2 years is not the entirety of officers’ careers; it is not clear what happened after the study was completed. Also, due to the difficulties inherent in longitudinal studies, the statistical analysis relies on a small number of surveys. Finally, as noted above, the police do not represent all public workers: there are distinctive elements to police work and socialization. In particular, prior to entering their organizations they undergo considerable preorganizational screening. As such, scholars should aim to study motivational development in a diverse array of bureaucrats to determine the extent to which this article’s findings are generalizable. Despite these limitations, the article is useful as there are relatively few studies that trace the motivation of a group of entering public officials over time.

At the article’s outset it develops four hypotheses to guide the analysis. First, it expects that police entrants will maintain their entering motivations. Second, it hypothesizes that their motivations will remain associated with extraorganization influences. Third, informal organization influences, such as peers and veterans, are expected to be associated with police entrants’ motivations. Fourth, it expects that formal organization influences, such as training and monitoring, will be associated with entrants’ motivations.

The findings here offer support for each of these hypotheses. To begin, in the project’s interview data there was evidence that some entrants maintained their motivations over the course of 2 years. Similarly, an analysis of the survey data shows that the strongest and most consistent predictors of entrants’ motives were their entering motivations. Also, as panel 2 of Figure 1 shows, the scope of motivational change by the end of the second year was relatively modest. This stability may have resulted from the department’s success in attracting recruits that shared its values and because it used screening to filter out certain recruits. Whatever the explanation, this finding is surprising since prior works depict police socialization, beginning with training, as intense.

It is also interesting to note that minority police, throughout their time in the department, maintained a stronger motivation to ensure that people were treated fairly and equitably. In many U.S. cities there is historical tension between police departments and minority communities (Nelson, 2001). For years this tension was exacerbated because urban police forces had few minority police and, perhaps as a result, police actions were perceived by minorities as arbitrary or unfair (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). As police forces have become more racially diverse there has been considerable interest in understanding how connected minority officers remain to their entering identities and motivations (Wilkins & Williams, 2008). In other words, does police socialization reorient minority cadets to see the world differently? Although the findings here derive from one city and class of cadets, they suggest that minority police remain connected to their entering motives throughout their first 2 years. This does not mean that minorities are impervious to police socialization nor that they act differently on the job; however, it may imply that policy socialization has a weaker effect than previously thought.

Although there is evidence of continuity here, there is also support for the expectations about the importance of organization socialization and change. In interviews it was evident that some officers had different motivations after entering the department and beginning work. Also, an analysis of the survey data shows that change, albeit slow, did occur. Panel 2 of Figure 1 shows that in almost every motivational area there was at least 12.5% change (0.5 points out of 4) by the end of the second year. Also, although not evident early in the academy, as cadets neared graduation we saw the influence of training. This influence waned after graduation but reemerged at Time 5. For the most part, police influenced by training were more likely to articulate service-oriented motives.

These findings have implications for public administration research and practice. First, at the level of theory, the findings here support the continuity approach: entering motivation appears to remain salient even after organization socialization. Thus, it seems appropriate that our understanding public-sector motivation gives considerable weight to the importance of sociohistorical antecedents (Perry, 1997). The practical implication of this understanding is that managers should devote considerable resources to the front end of personnel management; knowing what motivates employees on day one may be the best way for managers to predict what will motivate them later in their careers (at least until the end of their second year). Since public managers are limited in using material resources to motivate employees (Wilson, 1989), it may be crucial that they attract and retain employees who are already motivated in ways that they desire.

Second, the findings here demonstrate the importance of studying the institutional context in which public employees operate. Theorists have long argued that organizations have the potential to shape members’ views and behavior (Argyris, 1993; Kaufman, 1960; Perry & Wise, 1990; Scott, 2003). Recently there has been renewed interest in understanding how organizations might influence bureaucratic motivation (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Wright & Grant, 2010). Although recruiting is likely to be essential in this endeavor, the findings here also point to the importance of organizational influences. Since we cannot extrapolate beyond the subjects of this analysis, more work is needed to understand how the various tools available to public managers can and cannot affect employee motivation. Nonetheless, the findings here show that it may be possible for organizations to shape employees’ motivations.

Third, in the organization socialization literature there is a basic understanding that socialization happens quickly. With this in mind, many works tend to focus on 6 months or less of entrants’ careers. The findings here suggest that socialization, at least in regards to motivation, may be considerably slower. Since these findings come from a case in which change was expected to be quick and complete, this is particularly striking. Future studies should examine other sets of entrants to determine how bureaucratic motivation develops in a variety of government agencies.

Finally, the findings here suggest the importance of exploring multiple components of motivation and the importance of understanding motivation as dynamic. As such, researchers should, to the extent possible, study motivation over time. As they do so, it is important to examine a broad array of motivational outcomes. The PSM literature has advanced our understanding of public workers considerably. However, moving forward it will be useful for motivational inquiries to examine the full spectrum of motives that drive public-sector work: service-oriented motives and egoistic motives. In this way, we can develop a broader understanding of bureaucratic motivation and the processes by which motivations originate and change.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Correlation Matrixes

Time 2
	Training
Rookies	0.30

Time 3
	Training

Rookies	0.35

Time 4
	Training	Rookies	Veterans

Rookies	0.11
Veterans	−0.10	0.14
Monitoring	0.11	0.31	0.15

Time 5
	Training	Rookies	Veterans

Rookies	0.35
Veterans	0.06	0.36
Monitoring	0.18	0.25	0.46

Appendix B

Veterans question (T4 and T5)

Thinking about how you do your job, how much [does] the following influence you:

	None	←	Some	→	A lot
Veteran officers in your district	▀	▀	▀	▀	▀

Note. Question order does not represent actual order from surveys. (R) denotes that the question was reverse coded in the analysis.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author would like to thank the Institute for Research on Poverty and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School for their generous support of this research. This support does not imply endorsement of the article’s findings or conclusions.

Notes

Author Biography

Zachary Oberfield is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College. His research focuses on public management, privatization, organization socialization, and street-level bureaucracy. His work has appeared in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory and Administration & Society.

References

Aberbach

Rockman

(2000). In the web of politics: Three decades of the US federal executive. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Ahern

(1972). Police in trouble: Our frightening crisis in law enforcement. New York, NY: Hawthorn Books.

Argyris

(1993). Integrating the individual and the organization. New York, NY: Wiley.

Atchley

(1999). Continuity and adaptation in aging: Creating positive experiences. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bardach

Kagan

(1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory unreasonableness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Barnard

(1968). The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brehm

Gates

(1997). Working, shirking, and sabotage: Bureaucratic response to a democratic public. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Brewer

Selden

(1998). Whistle blowers in the federal civil service: New evidence of the public service ethic. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8, 413-440.

Brewer

Selden

Facer

(2000). Individual conceptions of public service motivation. Public Administration Review, 60, 254-264.

10.

Chemerinsky

(2000). An independent analysis of the Los Angeles police department’s board of inquiry report on the Rampart scandal. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 34, 545.

11.

Crewson

(1997). Public-service motivation: Building empirical evidence of incidence and effect. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7, 499-518.

12.

Davis

Rostow

Pinkston

Cowick

(1999). An investigation into the usefulness of the MMPI and MMPI-2 in municipal and state police candidate selection. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 14(1), 100-106.

13.

Dolan

(2000). The senior executive service: Gender, attitudes, and representative bureaucracy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 513-529.

14.

Dynan

Elmendorf

Sichel

(2007). The evolution of household income volatility. Federal Reserve Working Paper Series, 61, 1-47.

15.

Fielding

(1988). Joining forces: Police training, socialization, and occupational competence. New York, NY: Routledge.

16.

Fyfe

J. J.

(1982). Blind justice: Police shootings in Memphis. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 73, 707-722.

17.

Georgellis

Tabvuma

(2010). Does public service motivation adapt? Kyklos, 63, 176-191.

18.

Golden

(2000). What motivates bureaucrats? Politics and administration during the reagan years. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

19.

Goldsmith

(1990). Taking police culture seriously: Police discretion and the limits of law. Policing and Society, 1(2), 91-114.

20.

Haider

(2001). Earnings instability and earnings inequality of males in the United States: 1967-1991. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 799-836.

21.

Hampson

Goldberg

(2006). A first large-cohort study of personality-trait stability over the 40 years between elementary school and midlife. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 763-769.

22.

Houston

(2000). Public-service motivation: A multivariate test. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 713-728.

23.

Inglehart

(1981). Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. The American Political Science Review, 75, 880-900.

24.

Ingraham

Joyce

Donahue

(2003). Government performance: Why management matters. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

25.

Jones

(1986). Socialization tactics, self-efficacy, and newcomers’ adjustments to organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 29, 262-279.

26.

Kaufman

(1960). The forest ranger: A study in administrative behavior. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

27.

Koehler

Rainey

(2008). Interdisciplinary foundations of public service motivation. In Perry

Hondeghem

(Eds.), Motivation in public management: The call of public service. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

28.

Liao

(1994). Interpreting probability models: Logit, probit, and other generalized linear models. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

29.

March

(1994). A primer on decision making: How decisions happen. New York, NY: Free Press.

30.

Mastrofski

Ritti

Hoffmaster

(1987). Organizational determinants of police discretion: The case of drinking-driving. Journal of Criminal Justice, 15, 387-402.

31.

Maynard-Moody

Musheno

(2003). Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

32.

Moynihan

Pandey

(2007). The role of organizations in fostering public service motivation. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 40-53.

33.

Muir

(1977). Police: Streetcorner politicians. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

34.

Nathan

(1975). The plot that failed: Nixon and the administrative presidency. New York, NY: Wiley.

35.

Nelson

(2001). Police brutality: An anthology. New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.

36.

Perry

(1996). Measuring public service motivation: An assessment of construct reliability and validity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6(1), 5-22.

37.

Perry

(1997). Antecedents of public service motivation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7, 181-197.

38.

Perry

(2000). Bringing society in: Toward a theory of public-service motivation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 471-488.

39.

Perry

Brudney

Coursey

Littlepage

(2008). What drives morally committed citizens? A study of the antecedents of public service motivation. Public Administration Review, 68, 445-458.

40.

Perry

Hondeghem

(2008). Editors’ introduction. In Perry

Hondeghem

(Eds.), Motivation in public management: The call of public service. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

41.

Perry

Vandenabeele

(2008). Behavioral dynamics: Institutions, identities, and self-regulation. In Perry

Hondeghem

(Eds.), Motivation in public management: The call of public service. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

42.

Perry

Wise

(1990). The motivational bases of public service. Public Administration Review, 50, 367-373.

43.

Portillo

DeHart-Davis

(2009). Gender and organizational rule abidance. Public Administration Review, 69, 339-347.

44.

Raganella

White

(2004). Race, gender, and motivation for becoming a police officer: Implications for building a representative police department. Journal of Criminal Justice, 32, 501-513.

45.

Rainey

Steinbauer

(1999). Galloping elephants: Developing elements of a theory of effective government organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9(1), 1-32.

46.

Riccucci

(2005). How management matters: Street-level bureaucrats and welfare reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

47.

Rona

Hyams

Wessely

(2005). Screening for psychological illness in military personnel. JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 293, 1257-1260.

48.

Rubinstein

(1973). City police. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.

49.

Saks

Ashforth

(1997). Organizational socialization: Making sense of the past and present as a prologue for the future. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 51, 234-279.

50.

Scott

(2003). Organizations: Rational, natural, and open systems. Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

51.

Selden

Brudney

Kellough

(1998). Bureaucracy as a representative institution: Toward a reconciliation of bureaucratic government and democratic theory. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 717-744.

52.

Skolnick

(1966). Justice without trial. New York, NY: Wiley.

53.

Sun

(2003). Police officers’ attitudes toward their role and work: A comparison of black and white officers. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 28(1), 89-108.

54.

Sun

Payne

(2004). Racial differences in resolving conflicts: A comparison between black and white police officers. Crime & Delinquency, 50, 516-541.

55.

Theobald

Haider-Markel

(2009). Race, bureaucracy, and symbolic representation: Interactions between citizens and police. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19, 409-426.

56.

Van Maanen

(1974). Working the street: A developmental view of police behavior. In Jacob

(Ed.), The potential for reform of criminal justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

57.

Van Maanen

(1975). Police socialization: A longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an urban police department. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, 207-228.

58.

Vandenabeele

(2007). Toward a public administration theory of public service motivation. Public Management Review, 9, 545-556.

59.

Walker

Katz

(2008). The police in America: An introduction. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

60.

Wanous

(1992). Organizational entry: Recruitment, selection, and socialization of newcomers. Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley.

61.

Watkins-Hayes

(2009). The new welfare bureaucrats: Entanglements of race, class, and policy reform. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

62.

Weber

(1947). The theory of social and economic organization. ( Parsons

, Trans.). New York, NY: Free Press.

63.

Westphal

(2004). In-car camera: Value and impact. Police Chief, 71(8), 59-65.

64.

Wilkins

Williams

(2008). Black or blue: Racial profiling and representative bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, 68, 654-664.

65.

Wilson

(1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York, NY: Basic Books.

66.

Wright

(2008). Methodological challenges associated with public service motivation research. In Perry

Hondeghem

(Eds.), Motivation in public management: The call of public service (pp. 80-98). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

67.

Wright

Christensen

(2010). Public service motivation: A test of the job attraction–selection–attrition model. International Public Management Journal, 13, 155-176.

68.

Wright

Grant

(2010). Unanswered questions about public service motivation: designing research to address key issues of emergence and effects. Public Administration Review, 70, 691-700.

69.

Wright

Moynihan

Pandey

(2012). Pulling the levers: transformational leadership, public service motivation, and mission valence. Public Administration Review, 72, 206-215.