Whistle-Blowing

Abstract

The act of blowing the whistle on wrongdoing poses an ethical dilemma to the individual, the organization, and society. To help identify the key individual and organizational determinants that encourage or prohibit whistle-blowing in the U.S. federal government, this article presents a logistic regression analysis of survey data collected by the Merit Systems Protection Board, covering 36,926 federal employees from 24 agencies. Findings suggest that, although whistle-blowing is a rare event within most federal agencies, its likelihood is positively associated with norm-based and affective work motives, but negatively associated with several key indicators of organizational culture, including perceptions of respect and openness, cooperativeness and flexibility in the work setting, and fair treatment and trust in supervisors. This indicates intrinsic individual motives, together with organizational culture and leadership, should be taken into account when developing and sustaining policies to promote ethical behavior and responsible public service in the federal government.

Keywords

whistle-blowing individual and organizational antecedents decisions to report wrongdoing federal government

Introduction

In the late 1990s, Cathy Harris,¹ a U.S. Customs Service (USCS) agent, verified her suspicions that African American women entering the United States were being wrongfully targeted for detentions and strip searches as possible drug couriers. She reported, “illegal, demoralizing and abusive pat-downs, . . . prolonged detentions of up to 4 days and targeted intimidation by drug sniffing dogs against African American women international travelers” (Harris, 2013, p. 2). By blowing the whistle on wrongdoing, Harris was instrumental in exposing the racial profiling practices of customs and border protection services. Her revelations resulted in a U.S. Government Accountability Office (2000) study of the USCS profiling practices, and federal legislation to reform these unconstitutional practices.² Broadly, this legislation is expected to ensure that international travelers have more legal protections and stronger avenues of recourse if abused by U.S. Customs officials.

This case shows whistle-blowers and organizations have a role to play in terms of supporting shared responsibilities when things go wrong, encouraging the practice of responsible conduct and promoting integrity as a workplace value. Blowing the whistle on wrongdoing is a practice that does not always receive the expected response from colleagues, supervisors, and managers across the federal government (Bjørkelo, Ryberg, Matthiesen, & Einarsen, 2008; Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). According to the latest U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (USMSPB) Report, in 2010, 11.1% of respondents have personally observed or obtained direct evidence of one or more illegal or wasteful activities involving their agency compared with 17.7% in 1992. Although this shows a drop in perceptions by more than a third between 1992 and 2010, of those who made a report and were identified as the source, the percentage of respondents who personally experienced reprisal or a threat of reprisal remains unchanged (USMSPB, 2011). On November 27, 2012, The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA; S. 372, H.R. 1507) was signed into law to provide protection federal workers need to safely report government corruption and wrongdoing. However, more often than not, whistle-blowing triggers accusations of disloyalty, secrecy breaching, and leaking of sensitive information (Bok, 1981, 1982; Lovell, 2003).

Recent efforts by the federal government to recognize whistle-blowing as a desired behavior are evident. For example, a newspaper article appearing on USA Today 2 years ago, explains how whistle-blowers are key in fighting health care fraud (Kennedy, 2012). More recently, another article appearing on New York Times (The Associated Press, 2014; Morgenson, 2014), states whistle-blowers have provided information that helped the I.R.S. collect more than US$2 million in taxes, penalties, and interest last year. Yet, when the image of the whistle-blower becomes one of a “disloyal” employee who imperils the agency, whistle-blowing is likely to be discouraged and even punished. In turn, the organization runs the risk of normalizing wrongdoing and ultimately deceiving the public interest (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

The visibility of whistle-blowing has been captured over the years by the media and by official reports published by the USMSPB (2011). Interestingly, Harris’ case illustrates the deep complexities of those who feel compelled to oppose wrongdoing and expose it, and how concerns about loyalty and consequences are key to becoming a whistle-blower (Johnson, 2003).

Understanding why public servants blow the whistle is important because civil servants have a unique ethical responsibility to serve the public interest while being obliged to behave according to certain values and standards that guide administrative action (Bovens, 1998; Denhardt, 1988; Jubb, 1999; Rohr, 1989). It is a Merit System Principle (1978) that “all employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest” (5USC 2301 (b)(4)). And, a basic obligation of public service as “each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain” (5CFR 2635.101 (b)(1)). Thus, whistle-blowing (an ethical duty) should be an expected behavior among civil servants compelled to behave according to the hierarchy of loyalties prescribed by statute (Ethics in Government Act of 1978; Bush, 1990). In line with Johnson (2003) encouraging whistle-blowing, through the support of moral action, individual rights, and the exercise of individual responsibility, would be an important organizational/societal step toward supporting democracy (D. Lewis & Vandekerckhove, 2011). Whistle-blowers are considered to be a valuable resource to managers in terms of employee involvement and commitment through providing useful information on existing organizational wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 1994; Zipparo, 1999). For the organization, encouraging whistle-blowing is expected to lead to climate and culture change (Berry, 2004), as well as policy change (Johnson & Kraft, 1990). In this sense, organizations that foster an organizational culture that allows for employee communication, questioning, and reporting of misconduct, are thought to facilitate whistle-blowing. Moreover, organizations that create a work environment where group identity is build on common responsibilities, and where the practice of integrity helps build the necessary trust that enables the detection of organizational wrongdoing while developing an ethical work environment in compliance with public service values (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006). Again, if the organization’s goal were to reduce corruption, then an organizational context supportive of whistle-blowing (wrongdoing reporting) would ultimately help correct unsafe products or workplace conditions and curb illegal or wasteful practices (Dryburgh, 2009; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994). Thus, shedding light on how the organizational work environment and values encourage or discourage reporting of wrongdoing seems fundamental.

Previous literature on whistle-blowing has focused on answering why whistle-blowing occurs in organizations in search of an individual profile of whistle-blowers, or characteristics of the individual affecting the decision of whether or not to report wrongdoing (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; Near & Miceli, 2008, 1996; Perry & Wise, 1990; Somers & Casal, 1994; Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009). Central to this argument is the idea that loyalty or individual attachment to the organization, in terms of job satisfaction and job commitment, is the key mechanism through which whistle-blowing occurs. However, findings on the association between attachment to the organization and whistle-blowing have been inconsistent (Vadera et al., 2009). This article empirically examines how general attitudes and values toward working in the public sector influence the likelihood of actual disclosures of wrongdoing (i.e., blowing the whistle).

Likewise, researchers have acknowledged that contextual conditions in organizations (organizational culture, ethical climate, performance, justice, resources, organizational size, etc.) influence the decision to report wrongdoing (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006; Vadera et al., 2009). Public administrators operate in an environment characterized by diverse and conflicting values (Cooper, 2006; C. W. Lewis, 1991; Menzel, 1993; O’Leary, 2006). This conflicting values context is thought to influence compliance with merit principles and obligations, and affect decisions of whether to blow the whistle or not (Miethe & Rothschild, 1994). Overall, previous research findings show ethical climate in organizations failed to predict whistle-blowing consistently. Moreover, research on contextual predictors is limited as it does not take into account the responsibilities of public organizations of detecting and reducing fraud and abuse while ensuring whistle-blowers are not retaliated against for their actions. This article extends the literature by analyzing the context of employee perceptions of the organizational work environment and culture (values) within public organizations and how these affect the likelihood of actual disclosures of wrongdoing (i.e., blowing the whistle).

With the debates about whistle-blowing as context, this article looks into the individual and organizational predictors of the likelihood of an employee formally disclosing fraud, waste, abuse, or unlawful behavior (i.e., blowing the whistle) in the federal government (USMSPB, 2005a; Whistleblower Protection Act [WPA], 1989). The focus is on the federal level of government, where whistle-blowing predominates (Miceli, Rehg, Near, & Ryan, 1999; Near & Miceli, 2008; USMSPB, 2011), and where legal protections offered to federal employees who report wrongdoing have recently expanded (Johnson, 2003; Peffer et al., 2013; WPEA, 2012). The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between perceptions of individual work motives and organizational work environment and culture, and actual wrongdoing disclosures while uncovering the general pattern of whistle-blowing behavior across federal agencies. In addition to examining the individual and organizational determinants of whistle-blowing in the federal government by using publicly available secondary sources of data, the present study extends the literature by suggesting possible scenarios where whistle-blowing is more likely to occur in federal government.

This article is organized as follows. First, the work on individual and organizational antecedents of whistle-blowing is reviewed. Second, the study’s research questions and objectives are presented and hypotheses are proposed based on relevant literature. Third, the “Data, Measures, and Methodology” section describes the data and items used to measure the study variables. Fourth, the “Findings” section reports the results of a series of logistic regression models of whistle-blowing. Last, the discussion and implications explain the findings and analyze further model predictions to enable the application of results to different possible contextual scenarios. The article ends with an acknowledgment of this study’s limitations and offers suggestions for further research.

Explanations of Whistle-Blowing Behavior

Public administration theory looks into whistle-blowing in public organizations through the following lenses: political control of bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics, organizations and management, and public service ethics (see Frederickson & Smith, 2002; Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; O’Leary, 2006; Rainey, 2009; among others). This article looks into the organizations and management lens to review the key empirical findings related to the antecedents of whistle-blowing behavior in the context of public organizations (Vadera et al., 2009). Under such perspective whistle-blowing is considered behavior occurring in public organizations that is linked to an organization’s environment, structure (responsibility, hierarchy, rules and regulations), culture, processes (power relationships, decision making, communication, and change), and people (values/motives, perceptions, motivation and organizational commitment).

Certain studies using the organizations and management lens have moved further into the empirical analysis of whistle-blowing to discover a model for whistle-blowing behavior or prosocial organizational behavior as a process as well as for predicting retaliation (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Miceli et al., 2008). Miceli et al. (2008) consider that consistent with a prosocial organizational behavior “when a questionable activity occurs, organizational members experience up to three general phases of decision-making or affective reactions, which influence their actions” (p. 37). This article takes into account the notion that whistle-blowing is a prosocial organizational behavior involving a series of decisions (process). However, the focus here is on the stage when the employee recognizes the wrongdoing occurring within the organization, assesses whether to act or not, considers whether she or he is responsible for acting, and finally chooses to act (or not) in response to the identified wrongdoing.

In line with the belief that organizations both are shaped by, and seek to shape, the environment in which they exist, organizations and management scholars offer some testable hypotheses on the link between the presence of certain individual and organizational characteristics and the occurrence of whistle-blowing in the context of public organizations. This study uses publicly available secondary sources of data to analyze the determinants of whistle-blowing allowing for the operationalization of certain variables into measurable theoretical constructs that have been discussed in previous research. Thus, the operationalization of such determinants is informed by theory but is limited by the use of an already existing instrument for data collection.

Individual Characteristics

Mission valence

Whistle-blowing actions have been related to employee commitment to organizational values as well as loyalty to the organization (Jos, Tompkins & Hays, 1989). Accordingly, an agency’s mission is understood to represent the agency’s pursued goals and values (Rainey, 2009). Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) advance the concept of “mission valence” to describe employee “affective orientation toward particular outcomes” (p. 1) associated with an organization’s mission. Also, it has been used to refer to an employee’s perceptions of the attractiveness or salience of an organization’s purpose or social contribution that is derived from the satisfaction and individual experiences from advancing that purpose (Pandey, Wright, & Moynihan, 2008; Wright, 2007). Wright and Pandey (2010) consider different levels of “mission valence” (or attractiveness of organizational goals) have effects on human resource outcomes (job satisfaction and absenteeism) in public organizations. Consistent with these expectations, it has been found that the more attractive the mission, the more likely an employee will want to be associated with the organization and strive to help it succeed. And, the individual value given to the agency’s mission or mission valence is likely to reflect a personal commitment and alignment with public values. In this sense, individuals who are more attracted to the organizational goals (mission valence) are expected to be more prone to whistle-blowing behavior, especially in the context of public organizations. This article explores the association between employees’ commitment to public values as expressed in the agency’s mission, as an antecedent of whistle-blowing behavior, and the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing among public servants.

Work motives

Related to the notion that public-sector workers are imbued with a unique service ethic, the theory of public service motivation has linked this construct with employees’ proneness to engage in whistle-blowing. Perry and Wise (1990) introduce a discussion of what constitutes a public service ethic and speculate about the behavioral implications of public service motivation theory in the field of public administration (also see Rainey, 1982). For Perry and Wise (1990), public service motivation comprises “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” (p. 368). This individual predisposition is generally characterized by rational (utility maximization), norm-based (public interest: patriotism, duty, and loyalty) and affective (human emotion) motives. In line with public service motivation theory, public-sector employees are expected to be motivated to engage in whistle-blowing in response to motives inherent in public institutions such as following the rules and protecting the public interest (norm-based and affective motives). For example, Brewer and Selden (2000) examine the conceptual linkage between public service motivation and whistle-blowing. In studying the link between public service motivation and work-related attitudes and behavior, Brewer and Selden (2000) found “public service motivation is linked to important work-related attitudes and behaviors such as achievement, commitment, job satisfaction, individual performance, and whistleblowing” (p. 695). The expectation is that public employees are more likely to blow the whistle on wrongdoing given that they will more likely hold prosocial values, seek opportunities to help others, and benefit society.

In addition to these variables, the literature suggests other factors such as personality and morality of individuals involved in ethical decision making in public organizations. Unfortunately, these variables are not included in the survey instrument used for empirically testing the determinants of whistle-blowing on this article. Thus, these variables will not be discussed here (see Frederickson & Ghere, 2005; Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thomas, 1999). This article tests the relationship between individual characteristics of public servants (mission valence and predisposition to public service values) and whistle-blowing to know whether or not hiring motivated people is enough to promote integrity in government.

Organizational Characteristics

Environment, culture, and structure

Previous research has suggested that particular characteristics of an organization’s environment, structure, and culture are important determinants of whistle-blowing within organizations. For example, by providing a supportive climate for the legitimation of certain organizational values, organizations might influence the likelihood of whistle-blowing (Miethe & Rothschild, 1994). Moreover, an organizational culture more tolerant to responsible public service might be associated to an increased likelihood of whistle-blowing. Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found that, whistle-blowers “tend to report externally when the context seems unfavorable . . . if the organization does not tolerate dissent” (p. 1284). This article considers the following organizational and cultural characteristics of public agencies and how these might be related antecedents of whistle-blowing behavior.

Respect and openness

Researchers have suggested a work environment more respectful of workers reflects a favorable ethical climate that will more likely encourage whistle-blowing actions by employees. Miethe and Rothschild (1994) found that when an organization is seen as open, “permissive of employee voice in a decision-making process” (p. 124) employees will be more likely to blow the whistle internally in an attempt to return to the legitimate purpose of the organization.

But, a more open and respectful organizational culture may offer more ready access to internal channels for resolving wrongdoing. According to Miethe (1999) open organizations are less formalized and participatory work environments that respond to employees’ concerns through group solidarity and greater personal involvement in working relationships. If so, openness and respect could be negatively related to the probability of blowing the whistle as employees find ways to address wrongdoing without needing to report to an outside authority or oversight body. In addition, more open and respectful organizations may actually encourage more ethical behavior in the aggregate, resulting in less wrongdoing within the organization to report on. In this way, an open and respectful organization may be associated with less whistle-blowing.

Cooperativeness and flexibility

The existence of a cooperative work environment, that is, one in which teamwork and group cohesiveness prevails for making decisions about the organization’s ethical climate might be considered a predictor of whistle-blowing behavior. Public administration scholars suggest groups in organizations matter not only because of the strong pressures to conform these usually represent but also for the implications of certain group operations to the enforcement of attitudes and norms within an organization. In an empirical study on the relationship between ethical climates and police whistle-blowing in the state of Georgia, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007a) show that friendship or team interest climates (a caring dimension of the organization) are significantly related to willingness to report misdemeanors, felonies, and misconduct as well as willingness to blow the whistle (not actual reporting; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a, p. 353).

However, it is possible that wrongdoing is less likely to occur in cooperative organizations. Because such environments are characterized by information sharing and flexibility of communication flows among employees, or evidence lower levels of wrongdoing occurrence and consequently less likelihood of whistle-blowing by employees. Likewise, it is also possible that cooperativeness or teamwork among employees might also produce a lower propensity to blow the whistle as such cohesion and commitment to teamwork might enforce attitudes such as allowing wrongdoing to be handled internally (cooperatively). For example, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007b) refer to silence among police officers as “a means of internal cohesion necessary for solidarity and protection,” ensuring police officers “will act according to their collective well-being” (p. 610). Thus, whistle-blowing is handled internally (cooperatively by the group) as external responses are seen as threatening solidarity among police officers.

Fair treatment

Previous research has suggested that perceived fairness in the work environment could increase the reporting of wrongdoing within organizations. Miethe (1999) considers “employees in fair and high integrity settings . . . may feel at greater ease talking to management about misconduct without fear of reprisals” (p. 66). Trevino and Weaver (2001) considered perceptions of an organization’s overall fairness affect how employees will conform to organizational expectations, suggesting “when employees are treated fairly by an organization . . . they believe that they owe something in return to the organization” (p. 653). Thus, employees might engage in extra-role behavior to support the organization through reporting ethical problems rather than keeping silent about them. Trevino and Weaver (2001) found that perceived fair treatment was a significant predictor of reporting problems to management.

Another possible explanation is that supportive, cooperative, and fair work environments allow for group solidarity that results in addressing wrongdoing internally in the organization before these escalate to the point of being formally reported by employees. As Miceli and Near (1992) suggest “group norms may interact with the power of the group to enforce norms ( . . . ) to produce or inhibit whistleblowing” (p. 144). The authors suggest that when potential whistle-blowers acknowledge others have observed the wrongdoing and are aware of it, “they are less likely to intervene that when they believe they are alone, because of the ‘diffusion of responsibility’ for intervention” (Miceli & Near, 1992, p. 144). Thus, it might be that a supportive, cooperative, and fair work environment operates as a diffuser of responsibility, as observers of wrongdoing might expect a group rather than individual intervention on the wrongdoing before formally disclosing it. Similarly, a supportive, cooperative, and fair work environment does not necessarily mean that the organization supports or encourages whistle-blowing or those employees who report wrongdoing. Employees might perceive the work environment as cooperative, supportive, and fair, and this might not necessarily be connected to situations where wrongdoing occurs or to the history of reactions of wrongdoing within the organizations. The organization might be more tolerant of wrongdoing and less tolerant of whistle-blowers, intervening to inhibit disclosures of wrongdoing among employees.

Trust in supervisory authority

The fear of retaliation, which is a major deterrent to whistle-blowing, might be mediated by an employee’s evaluation of the supportiveness of the work environment, especially the supportiveness of supervisors. Supervisor support seems to increase the likelihood that an observer of wrongdoing will intend to blow the whistle, but to decrease actual whistle-blowing behavior. Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) suggest that employees who enjoy the support of their supervisors in some domains perceive that this support is likely to extend to a whistle-blowing situation. As such, they may be more likely to intend to blow the whistle on observing a wrongdoing, knowing their supervisor will likely “back them up.” Thus, perceptions of trust in the supervisory authority build into employees’ perceptions of the supervisor as an authority who would reward whistle-blowing behavior or employee ethical behavior (refrain from favoritism and act with integrity). Sims and Keenan (1998) found that perceived supervisor support is significantly related to the choice to blow the whistle among employees.

However, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found an inverse relationship with actual whistle-blowing behavior, suggesting that employees with supportive supervisors were less likely to actually blow the whistle. The authors consider one possible explanation is that employees with supportive supervisors may feel a greater responsibility to ensure that their supervisors are not adversely affected by a whistle-blowing claim. These individuals may choose silence to voice in an effort to spare the supervisor embarrassment or discipline that may result from a report of illegitimate, unsanctioned, or immoral acts occurring within their department/division.

Another possible explanation is that employees who trust their supervisors, can find ways to get their concerns addressed within their work unit or department, by the supervisor even, without feeling compelled to turn to an outside authority or arbitrator. Research has shown that nearly every observer of perceived wrongdoing who reports it to someone outside the organization reports it to at least one party within the organization as well (Miceli et al., 2008). A supervisor who is perceived by employees as trustful, may represent a decrease in the number of actual whistle-blowing acts as observers of wrongdoing would decide against escalating the complaint to someone external with more power to bring pressure on the organization, given the supportive environment within the organization. Furthermore, even if employees perceive they can trust the supervisor to be supportive of ethical behavior, distrust of organizational procedures and fear of retaliation, dismissal, transfer, personal harassment, and so on might intervene to discourage employees’ willingness to report wrongdoing. This article examines the relationship between organizational characteristics (work environment and culture) and whistle-blowing to help design frameworks that would facilitate and promote the practice of integrity once the effect of perceived organizational values (ethical context) on the likelihood of actual reporting of wrongdoing is acknowledged.

Research Questions and Objectives

The present study asks what are some of the key characteristics of individuals that encourage or discourage whistle-blowing? And in what ways do organizational work environment and culture characteristics affect the likelihood of actual disclosures of wrongdoing (or whistle-blowing)?

Figure 1 shows the conceptual and the key variables used in this study.

Figure 1.

Model variables.

Using the previously discussed hypotheses, this study examines the individual and organizational antecedents of public employee disclosures of wrongdoing, or actual whistle-blowing. Related to the individual characteristics influencing federal employees to blow the whistle, this study addresses whether there is an association between mission valence, rational work motives, norm-based and affective work motives, and the likelihood of blowing the whistle on wrongdoing (actual reporting). Related to the organizational characteristics or culture influencing federal employees to blow the whistle, this study draws attention to whether there is an association between perceptions of respect and openness, perceptions of cooperativeness and flexibility, perceptions of fair treatment, perceptions of a trustful supervisory authority within the organization’s work environment and culture and the likelihood of blowing the whistle on wrongdoing (actual reporting). The reason for considering these variables as relevant is given by the fact that the previously discussed individual and organizational characteristics were included in the survey, allowing for the operationalization of variables into measurable concepts. Moreover, while previous research on whistle-blowing in government used MSPB data from 1980s and 1990s, findings show inconsistencies when analyzing predictors of whistle-blowing behavior.

The ultimate goal of this study is to arrive at a better understanding of the individual and organizational characteristics operating to influence the individual decision-making process when observing wrongdoing in the federal government. This will hopefully advance knowledge on the affective involvement, in terms of perceived work motives and organizational work environment and culture conditions, of federal employees who blow the whistle. This will ultimately lead to improved management strategies for channeling protected employee disclosure practices and addressing/redressing wrongdoing within the federal government.

Data, Measures, and Methodology

The USMSPB is an independent quasi-judicial agency in the executive branch established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The Board regularly conducts studies related to the civil service and the merit system. This study uses existing survey data collected by the USMSPB (2005a) from “a representative, random sample of full-time, permanent, non-seasonal employees in 24 participating agencies” (p. 2).³ For the 2005 MSPB Merit Principles Survey, the methodology for recruiting participants included an online administration of the survey via the World Wide Web in collaboration with agency leaders, human resources Directors, and Chief Human Capital Officers who encouraged employees to participate. A total of 36,926 employees (out of 74,000) completed the survey resulting in a response rate of approximately 50% (USMSPB, 2005a, p. 2). The 2005 MSPB survey questionnaire comprises 69 primarily closed-ended questions organized according to themes, with 59 to be answered by all employees and 10 to be answered only by supervisory employees. The questions focus on the following themes or topics: agency, job, work unit, job performance, pay and rewards, fairness, employee’s supervisor, training, career plans, supervisory status, management perspective, employment facts, and demographics.

Organizational behavior scholars theoretically define whistle-blowing as “disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 6). Actual whistle-blowing is understood as a practice involving the formal disclosure of information and is protected by the (WPA, 1989). The WPA considers disclosures on prohibited personnel practices,

any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. (WPA, 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 [b] [8] [A])

For the purposes of this article, the dependent or main outcome variable refers to actual disclosures of information evidencing the items mentioned in the WPA (1989).

Fortunately, the 2005 Merit Principles Survey (MPS) questionnaire contains a direct question measuring respondent’s decision to formally blow the whistle or exercise whistle-blowing behavior (question number 23 under the “fairness” section). This question states, “In the past 2 years, have you made any formal disclosure of fraud, waste, abuse, or unlawful behavior at work?” Responses to this question, which are either yes or no, are used to operationalize the dependent variable or main outcome (whistle-blowing). The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coded “1” for respondents answering “yes,” and “0” for respondents answering “no.” Table 1 shows the percentages indicating “yes” to having formally disclosed fraud, waste, abuse, or unlawful behavior by agency, as well as overall percentage of whistle-blowing cases across the federal government. Table 1 also shows the reporting of wrongdoing among federal employees is a rare event, representing only 5.6% of the cases, but that it varies by agency (1,876 employees answered “yes” out of 34,066 respondents). According to the survey, whistle-blowing in the federal government is more frequent in the following agencies: Department of Housing and Urban Development (12.9%), Homeland Security (9.7%), State Department (8.4%), Department of Interior (7.0%), Department of Defense (6.7%), Veterans Affairs (6.5%), Department of Transportation (6.1%), and Navy (5.8%). All of these agencies show a percentage of whistle-blowing cases above the total average of 5.6%.

Table 1.

Percentage of Whistle-Blowing Cases by Agency.

Agency	Whistle-blowing cases (%)
Housing and Urban Development	12.89
Homeland Security	9.69
State Department	8.35
Interior	6.95
Department of Defense	6.70
Veterans Affairs	6.48
Transportation	6.10
Navy	5.82
Agriculture	5.63
Health and Human Services	5.59
National Aeronautics	5.45
General Services Administration	5.36
Army	5.27
Justice	5.22
Labor	4.85
Social Security Admin	4.70
Department of Education	4.65
Was not specified	4.56
Treasury	4.50
Environmental Protection	4.07
Air Force	4.02
Department of Energy	3.98
Commerce	3.50
Office of Personnel Management	2.92
Federal Deposit Insurance	2.78
Total	5.63

Source. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (2005b).

Based on theory, several independent (explanatory) variables possibly associated with actual whistle-blowing were operationalized from the available survey questions. The Merit Principles Survey 2005 is divided into different sections⁴ that contain a short series of questions (items) about work and work environment (USMSPB, 2005b). The independent variables in the conceptual model were created using a selected series of questions on federal employees’ perceptions on the following themes: agency, job, work unit, fairness, and supervisor.

Table 2 shows the item wording for each of the series of survey questions identified as potential measures for the independent variables in the model. In the original questionnaire, agreement or disagreement with the statements could be expressed using five presented (ordinal) categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. However, the publicly available data reduced the responses to three ordinal categories by collapsing agree and strongly agree (important/very important, considerable extent/very great extent), as well as disagree and strongly disagree (unimportant/very important, no extent/little extent). Thus, the analyses that follow rely on this reduced, three-category (ordinal) response scale for each item, with the data transformed, so that 1 = strongly disagree (very unimportant, no extent), 2 = neither agree nor disagree (neither important nor unimportant, some extent), and 3 = strongly agree (very important, very great extent).

Table 2.

Independent Variables Construction Based on the USMSPB, 2005 Survey Questionnaire.

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your agency (1: Strongly agree, 2: Agree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Disagree, 5: Strongly disagree)
Agency section of the questionnaire, question 1, “mission valence” measure
“I understand my agency’s mission”
“My agency’s mission is important to me”
“I understand how I contribute to my agency’s mission”
“The workforce has the job-relevant knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish organizational goals”
“I am given a real opportunity to improve my skills in my organization”
“My agency produces high quality products and services”
“During the last 2 years, my agency’s organizational structure has been stable”
“My agency responds constructively to workplace conflicts”
“My agency is successful in accomplishing its mission”
“I would recommend my agency as a place to work”
“I would recommend the Government as a place to work”
Job section of the questionnaire, question 2, “respect and openness” measure
“I am treated with respect at work”
“I am able to openly express concerns at work”
“My opinions count at work”
“I know what is expected of me on the job”
“I receive the training I need to perform my job”
“I need more training to perform my job effectively”
“My job makes good use of my skills and abilities”
“Creativity and innovation are rewarded”
“There are private sector jobs which require the same skills and abilities as my job”
“I have resources to do my job well”
“The work I do is meaningful to me”
“My job is secure”
“In general, I am satisfied with my job”
Work unit section of the questionnaire, question 5, “cooperativeness and flexibility” measure
“My work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills”
“Information is shared freely in my work unit”
“A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists in my work unit”
“A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists between my work unit and other work units”
“My work unit responds flexibly to changing conditions”
“My work unit produces high quality products and services”
“In my work unit, performance ratings accurately reflect job performance”
“Recognition and rewards are based on performance in my work unit”
How important are each of the following in motivating you to do a good job? (1: Strongly agree, 2: Agree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Disagree, 5: Strongly disagree)
Pay and rewards section of the questionnaire, question 16, “rational, norm-based and affective work motives” measures
“A cash award of US$100”
“A cash award of US$1,000”
“Desire not to let my supervisor down”
“Desire not to let my coworkers down”
“Recognition from my coworkers”
“Desire for a good performance rating”
“My duty as a public employee”
“Increased chances for promotion”
“Desire to help my work unit meet its goals”
“Personal pride or satisfaction in my work”
“A time off reward of 8 hr”
“Non-cash recognition (e.g., letter of appreciation, plaque)”
In the past 2 years, to what extent do you believe you have been treated fairly regarding the following? (1: Very great extent, 2: Considerable extent, 3: Some extent, 4: Little extent, 5: No extent)
Fairness section of the questionnaire, question 22, “fair treatment” measure
Career advancement
Awards
Training
Performance appraisals
Job assignments
Discipline
Pay
Please answer the following questions about your supervisor and agency leadership (1: Strongly agree, 2: Agree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Disagree, 5: Strongly disagree).
Your supervisor section of the questionnaire, question 33, “supervisor trust” measure
I trust my supervisor to,
“Fairly assess my performance and contributions”
“Support me in pay and award discussions with upper management”
“Listen fairly to my concerns”
“Apply discipline fairly and only when justified”
“Clearly communicate conduct expectations”
“Act with integrity”
“Refrain from favoritism”
“Keep me informed”

For each question series, exploratory factor analysis⁵ was conducted to investigate the underlying dimensions of the data and reliability analysis was used to select items and evaluate the scales. Following the factor analysis, factor-based scales were created and reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) was used to assess scale reliability. Finally, the factor-based scales were standardized to make the coefficients comparable and to better deal with missing data on the items.⁶ As Table 2 shows, data reduction resulted in the following constructed measures of individual and organizational characteristics together with the internal reliability of the created factor-based scales (Cronbach’s alpha): mission valence scale (.75), rational work motives scale (.74), norm-based and affective work motives scale (.66), respect and openness scale (.84), cooperativeness and flexibility scale (.83), fair treatment scale (.77), and trust in the supervisory authority scale (.94).

Table 3 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics for all of these independent variables, as well as for the control variables included in the analysis of this study. The constructed scales used as independent variables have moderate to strong reliability, ranging from .66 to .94. The following demographic characteristics which might influence both respondents’ disclosure decisions and perceptions of the situation and organization are included as controls: age, sex, ethnicity, education, years in civil service, and salary level. In terms of demographic characteristics of the sample, respondents are on average 49 years, have spent 20 years working in civil service, earn US$84,000 on average annually, are mostly male (61%), of White ethnicity (71%), and have more than a high school diploma level of education (67%).

Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics for Analytical Variables.

Variable name (items)	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum	α
Independent variables
Mission valence scale (3)	0.001	0.82	−6.83	0.26	.75
Rational work motives scale (6)	−0.002	0.66	−2.15	0.97	.74
Norm-based and affective work motives scale (6)	0.007	0.59	−5.98	0.42	.66
Respect and openness scale (7)	0.007	0.72	−2.52	0.64	.84
Cooperativeness and flexibility scale (4)	0.006	0.82	−2.18	0.66	.83
Fair treatment scale (4)	0.005	0.77	−1.78	0.98	.77
Trust in supervisor scale (5)	0.006	0.86	−2.23	0.65	.94
Control variables (continuous)
Age	49.02	8.74	20	80
Years in civil service	19.65	9.77	0	82
Annual salary	84.28	41.52	1	991
Control variables (categorical)
Gender (women)	11,830	40.23	0	1
Education (>High School)	19,822	67.41	0	1
Ethnicity (non-White)	7,726	26.27	0	1
n = 29,405

Source. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (2005b).

To provide additional statistical control, models are estimated with and without a set of dummy variables representing the federal agencies, which capture unobserved agency effects on whistle-blowing. Controlling for these demographic and job characteristics, as well as agency effects, provides a more rigorous test of the main expected relationships; however, including these variables does not fully address the possibility of reverse causation, or the problem of omitted variables that were not measured in the survey.

Findings

A logistic regression model was used to examine the individual and organizational factors associated with the likelihood of blowing the whistle in federal government. The logistic regression model is appropriate for the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables and as mentioned, the dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous measure of whether or not an individual formally disclosed wrongdoing occurring in the workplace. The independent variables in the model include the following: mission valence scale, rational work motives scale, norm-based and affective work motives scale, respect/openness scale, cooperativeness/flexibility scale, fair treatment scale, and trust in the supervisory authority scale. The control variables in the model include respondents’ age, salary, years of service, education level, gender, and ethnicity.

As part of the logistic regression analysis, diagnostics were run to look for the problematic effects and check that the model fits sufficiently well. A goodness-of-fit check was performed to diagnose the overall fitness of the logistic regression model. A log likelihood criterion was used to test for statistical and substantive significance. To evaluate the statistical significance of the contribution of an independent variable, the likelihood ratio statistics are presented. The reported overall model fit is given by the chi-square likelihood ratio (LR) test χ²(13) = 731.13 with a p value = .000, which tells us that this model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model (with no predictors). Multicollinearity diagnostics were performed after running the logistic regression models and measures show no causes for concern about multicollinearity among the independent variables. The data were screened in search of influential observations showing no reason for concern.

Table 4 reports the logistic regression results of the whistle-blowing model applied to the full sample with and without agency-fixed effects. Table 4 also shows the coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratio to facilitate comparison of the strength of relationships. Significance tests are based on the default standard errors in Stata 12 (the MSPB 2005 survey data involved independently sampled employees). To help interpret substantive significance, the exponentiated coefficients or odds ratios in the model are presented and will be the main focus of the discussion below. Because the independent variables are all standardized, the odds ratios for these variables represent the number by which we would multiply the odds of being a whistle-blower for each standard deviation increase in the independent variable. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates the likelihood of blowing the whistle will increase when the independent variable increases, and an odds ratio of less than 1 indicates the likelihood of blowing the whistle will decrease when the independent variable increases. This study asks, What are the individual and organizational characteristics that encourage or discourage whistle-blowing in the federal government?

Table 4.

Logistic Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Perceived Individual Motives and Organizational Context, and Whistle-Blowing Across Agencies.

	LOGIT without agency dummies		LOGIT with agency dummies
Whistle blowing reporting	Coefficients	OR	Coefficients	OR
Main predictors
Individual motives
Mission valence scale	0.03	1.03	0.04	1.04
Rational work motives scale	−0.04	0.96	−0.04	0.96
Norm-based and affective work motives scale	0.15***	1.16	0.13***	1.14
Organizational work environment, values/culture
Respect and openness scale	−0.35***	0.71	−0.35***	0.70
Cooperativeness and flexibility scale	−0.11***	0.90	−0.11***	0.89
Fair treatment scale	−0.26***	0.77	−0.25***	0.78
Trust in supervisor scale	−0.23***	0.79	−0.23***	0.79
Deviation coding
Agency dummies
Air Force			−0.44*	0.64
Commerce			−0.53***	0.59
Education			−0.43*	0.65
Energy			−0.45*	0.64
Federal Deposit Insurance			−0.84***	0.43
Homeland Security			0.45***	1.57
Housing and Urban Development			0.88***	2.42
Office of Personnel Management			−0.76***	0.47
State Department			0.51***	1.66
Treasury			−0.25*	0.78
Model significance
LR χ²(13)	731.13		LR χ²(36)	873.05
Goodness of fit
Pseudo R²	.06			.07
Count R²	.94			.94
n	29,558			29,089

Source. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (2005b).

Note. The model controls for sex (women), age, education (more than a high school diploma), ethnicity (non-White), years in civil service and annual salary. For agency dummies, only those significant in the model were included in the table. OR = odds ratio.

Significance levels are indicated by the following notation: *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 4 (model without agency dummies) shows that reporting of wrongdoing in the federal government is significantly and positively associated with employee norm-based and affective work motives. In terms of magnitude, a 1 SD increase in norm-based and affective work motives increases the odds of being a whistle-blower by 16%. This study found that perceiving the agency’s mission as important and being rationally motivated to do the job are not significantly related to the likelihood of blowing the whistle in the federal government.

Table 4 also shows that reporting of wrongdoing is significantly associated with respect and openness, cooperativeness and flexibility, fair treatment, and trust in the supervisor as organizational work environment or culture characteristics predicting whistle-blowing in the federal government. First, in terms of respect and openness, this significant association represents a negative relationship with the outcome (whistle-blowing). And a 1 SD increase in respondent’s perception of a respectful work environment decreases the odds of being a whistle-blower by 29%. Second, in terms of cooperativeness and flexibility, this significant association represents a negative relationship with the outcome (whistle-blowing). Accordingly, a 1 SD increase in respondent’s perception of a cooperative and flexible organization decreases the odds of being a whistle-blower by 10%. Third, in terms of fair treatment, this significant association represents a negative relationship with the outcome (whistle-blowing). A 1 SD increase in respondent’s perception of a fair treatment in the organization decreases the odds of being a whistle-blower by 23%. Fourth, in terms of trust in the supervisor, this significant association represents a negative relationship with the outcome (whistle-blowing). Therefore, a 1 SD increase in respondent’s perception of trust in the supervisor decreases the odds of being a whistle-blower by 21%.

Overall, this study found a significant association between norm-based and affective work motives, perceptions of respect and openness, cooperativeness and flexibility, fair treatment and trust in the supervisor, and the likelihood of blowing the whistle in the federal government. While norm-based and affective work motives increase the likelihood of blowing the whistle in the federal government, respect and openness, cooperativeness and flexibility, fair treatment, and trust in the supervisor decrease it. According to the presented findings, the strongest positive effect is given by employee norm-based and affective work motives. And the strongest negative effect is given by perceiving fair treatment followed by perceiving respect and openness in the work environment.

As mentioned, the logistic regression analysis was conducted with and without agency dummy variables to compare the effects when fixing the agency type. Deviation coding was used to perform this logistic regression analysis, to compare the effect of each agency with the grand mean across all agencies. After fixing the effect of the agency type (Table 4 with agency dummies), no changes in significance and direction of findings were observed. Table 4 (with agency dummies) shows agencies with significant model results in the reported directions include: Air Force (significant at .10 level), Commerce (significant at .01 level), Education (significant at .10 level), Energy (significant at .10 level), Federal Deposit Insurance (significant at .01 level), Homeland Security (significant at .01 level), Housing and Urban Development (significant at .01 level), Office of Personnel Management (significant at .01 level), and State Department and Treasury (significant at .10 level). Agencies where the model is not significant include the following: Army, Defense, Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, Labor, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Navy, Social Security Administration, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs.

Discussion and Implications

The findings on this article suggest that the likelihood of an employee reporting wrongdoing in the federal government is a function of both individual and organizational characteristics. Although whistle-blowing is a rare event within federal agencies, with only 5.6% of employees having formally reported wrongdoing (see Table 1), results demonstrate that a federal employee with a sense of norm-based and affective work motives is more likely to formally report wrongdoing or blow the whistle. However, an employee working in a work environment and organizational culture characterized by perceived respect and openness in the job setting, cooperativeness and flexibility in the work unit, fair treatment, and trust in the supervisor, is less likely to formally report wrongdoing or blow the whistle.

In terms of the individual characteristics, the data do provide enough evidence to suggest norm-based and affective work motives (both motivational bases for public service in Perry & Wise, 1990) are positively and significantly associated with an increased likelihood of blowing the whistle within federal government. In line with previous research findings, this study evidences public-sector workers imbued with a public service ethic are more prone to blow the whistle. This might indicate commitment to public service, loyalty to duty and the government as a whole matter for identifying and ultimately redressing wrongdoing in the federal agencies studied. Likewise, this suggests that individuals who are committed to certain values manage to act according to a certain sense of obligation in the public interest. Another possibility is that higher levels of norm-based and affective work motives signal higher commitment to principled levels of moral judgment. This means that those individuals who are highly motivated to public service are more inclined to be aware of and assess wrongdoing when they see it. Again, highly motivated public servants might be more prone to feel responsible for reporting increasing the likelihood of whistle-blowing. Moreover, being norm-based and affectively motivated to public service is the strongest significant characteristic even after fixing the effect of agency type, and adding control variables. It seems that norm-based and affective aspects of work motives are associated with the likelihood of whistle-blowing in the federal government across individual demographics, agencies, and individual job characteristics within agencies.

This finding is relevant for the field of public administration, in that it points toward the importance of reinforcing professional values and ethical decision-making skills to either encourage or maintain an ethical conduct in the federal government (Cooper, 2006). First, this study’s findings are in line with previous public service motivation theories (Brewer, 2003; Crewson, 1997; Pandey et al., 2008; Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise, 2010; Perry & Wise, 1990) suggesting public service motivation shapes individual attitudes and behaviors that in this case relate to maintaining a responsible conduct or ethical behavior through blowing the whistle. Second, it is possible to conclude that norm-based and affective work motives (public service motivation) foster desirable role-based attitudes, individual attributes moving federal employees to a responsible conduct that ultimately advance a public service ethics (Crewson, 1997). Evidence for a positive association between individual intrinsic work motives factors and the likelihood of blowing the whistle suggests the idea that if public service motivation was encouraged and maintained among public servants, this would help generate or sustain an ethical context in organizations that would advance public service values.

In terms of organizational characteristics, the data also provide enough evidence to suggest an association between work environment characteristics and the incidence of these on the likelihood of whistle-blowing in the federal government. These study’s findings are consistent with the notion that certain characteristics of the organization work environment and organizational culture are associated with the likelihood of whistle-blowing (Miceli et al., 2008). It is important to note that the discussion of these findings pertains only to situational characteristics related to federal employees’ immediate social or work environment. The data show that, interestingly, whistle-blowing is negatively associated with an open and respectful job setting, cooperative and flexible work unit, fair treatment within the organization, and trusting supervisor. These findings suggest several possible interpretations.

To begin with, perceptions of a more respectful, cooperative, fair work environment, and trustful supervisor might act as diffusers of responsibility among public employees who observe wrongdoing but expect certain group recognition of the moral imperative to report it. Thus, it is possible that such environments are more prone to lower levels of individual whistle-blowing. Given that all of these variables might interact with the power of the group in defining which wrongdoing is reported, the strength of such group norms might produce or inhibit the likelihood of whistle-blowing. If there is respect, cooperativeness, fairness in the work environment, and trust in the supervisor, the expectation and enforced group norm will be that the group as a whole is responsible, inhibiting the individual proneness to blowing the whistle in the federal government. Thus, it is possible that in such environments few federal employees feel individually responsible to report wrongdoing as the work environment operates as a diffuser of responsibility for intervention.

Another possible explanation for the negative association between perceptions of a respectful, cooperative, fair work environment, and the likelihood of whistle-blowing in the federal government is that such organizational climates and cultures are either less prone to the occurrence of wrongdoing or more likely to support wrongdoing reporting as a way of handling conflict within the organization. For example, more respectful, cooperative and fair organizations might more clearly communicate the meaning of wrongdoing among employees and sanctioning procedures. Thus, it is possible that such organizational climate and culture conditions operate to produce lower levels of wrongdoing and consequently lower levels of whistle-blowing.

It has also been suggested that employees’ perceptions of the work environment as respectful, cooperative, fair, and trustful supervisory authority might not necessarily be connected to a quantitative effect on the reporting of wrongdoing. It is possible that some organizations might be more tolerant of wrongdoing and less tolerant of whistle-blowers, intervening through work environment characteristics to inhibit disclosures of wrongdoing among employees. Thus, fear of retaliation or consequences of reporting wrongdoing might intervene with federal employees’ perceptions of the work environment as respectful, cooperative, fair, and trustful to reduce the likelihood of whistle-blowing in such environments.

Likewise, these findings might suggest whistle-blowing might be an outcome of a malfunctioning organizational work environment and organizational culture characterized by lower levels of respect and openness in the job setting, cooperativeness, and flexibility in the work units, general fair treatment of employees, and trust toward the supervisors. It is possible that such work environments and organizational culture activate employees’ voice against wrongdoing occurring within federal agencies. The observance of wrongdoing in a malfunctioning work setting might increase the likelihood of employees’ expressions of concerns about wrongdoing as employees associate such conditions as evidence of organizational decline of some sort. Thus, in fear of a greater moral decline of an organization that allows for thriving conflict, federal employees respond through blowing the whistle.

Although the negative association between perceiving a trustful supervisor and the likelihood of wrongdoing reporting has been previously discussed, it is important to suggest a separate explanation for this organizational factor. Findings evidence that perceiving a trustful supervisor negatively affects individual proneness to blow the whistle. It might be that trusting the supervisor impedes one’s decision to disclose wrongdoing functioning as a value that inhibits behaviors required to actually blow the whistle. Likewise, those employees perceiving a trustful supervisor might be less likely to formally report wrongdoing for other reasons, such as fearing reprisals from colleagues or other authorities, or willingness to maintain the status quo in line with organizational survival. Again, this might also mean that the organizational ethical climate through the role of the supervisor allows for lower wrongdoing occurring and lower likelihood of reporting, or for higher levels of employee silence. This implies attention should be given to the supervisory role in present or future ethical programs designed to facilitate rather than inhibit wrongdoing reporting within public organizations. Overall, these findings are significant for the field of public administration, in that they point toward the importance of strengthening the role of leaders (supervisors, managers, etc.) and human resources professionals in public organizations to either develop or enhance ethical management skills toward rewarding responsible conduct in the federal government (Caillier, 2013; Peeples, Stokes, & Stewart Wingfield, 2009).

Predicted Probabilities

To present a sense of the magnitude of these effects on the likelihood of whistle-blowing, it is useful to generate some predictions combining the strongest individual and organizational factors (independent variables). Using the agency-fixed effects model, results from this analysis show the predicted probabilities for different combinations of the independent variables. These predictions are intended simply to illustrate the substantive and practical significance of the effects of such factors in an attempt to answer how much difference would the strongest individual and organizational factors (independent variables) make to the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing in the federal government.

Figure 2 presents the results from the predicted probabilities of a federal employee blowing the whistle, given different combinations of the independent variables. It is important to note these scenarios used the agency-fixed effects model and are based on the coefficients on Table 4 (model results without agency dummies).

Figure 2.

Scenarios combining different independent variables showing the predicted probability of whistle-blowing in the federal government.

The independent variables that resulted in the strongest model predictors of whistle-blowing in the federal government were explored: work motivation (norm-based and affective work motives), respect and openness, and fair treatment in the work environment. First, in a scenario where fair treatment, respect, and openness are low (work environment characteristics), but where norm-based and affective work motives are high (individual characteristic), we would expect the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing among federal employees to be 9.7%. When comparing this scenario with one in which fair treatment, respect, and openness remain low, but where norm-based and affective work motives are low, we would expect a lower likelihood of reporting wrongdoing among federal employees (7.4%). This means that in a scenario where employees perceive lower levels of work environment characteristics (related to fair treatment and respect and openness), norm-based and affective work motives make a difference in the likelihood of employees blowing the whistle. Second, in a scenario where fair treatment, respect, and openness are high (work environment), but where norm-based and affective work motives are high (individual characteristics), we would expect the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing among federal employees to be 3.1%. When comparing this scenario with one in which fair treatment, respect, and openness remain high (work environment characteristics), but where norm-based and affective work motives are low (individual characteristics), we would expect an even lower likelihood of reporting wrongdoing among federal employees (2.3%). This means that when employees perceive higher levels of work environment characteristics (related to fair treatment and respect and openness), norm-based and affective work motives make a difference in the likelihood of employees blowing the whistle. Overall, the strongest effect on the likelihood of wrongdoing reporting across scenarios is given by individual characteristics in terms of scenarios with higher levels of norm-based and affective work motives.

Limitations and Further Research

This article has presented the findings from a logistic regression analysis of the individual and organizational antecedents of whistle-blowing in federal agencies. Although findings suggest the likelihood of blowing the whistle is positively associated with a person’s norm-based and affective work motives, but negatively associated with perceptions of a supportive work environment (respect, cooperativeness, fairness, and trust in the supervisor), this study has some limitations that need to be acknowledged.

First, the use of secondary data analysis includes problems that are intrinsic to the survey method for data collection. Unfortunately, design or coding errors made in the original survey might no longer be visible in the provided data file and survey items might be imprecise measures representing a poor operationalization of the variables used in the study. The Merit Principles Survey for 2005 has only one question that could be operationalized to measure the dependent variable (decision to formally report waste, fraud, abuse, or unlawful behavior). However, the operationalized dependent variable captures actions by employees of formal disclosures on wrongdoing (in the form of waste, fraud, abuse, or unlawful behavior) for a 2-year period and is precise for not referring to hypothetical contexts for individual willingness to blow the whistle. Moreover, external validity is a major advantage when using secondary survey data.

Second, treatment selection bias might occur to the extent that the independent variables to be included in the model are influenced by other factors that are also related to the dependent variable. Threats of treatment selection bias were accounted for by including control variables (gender, age, education level, ethnicity, annual salary, number of years in civil service, and agency type) in the logistic regression model. However, some unobserved variables that might be important determinants of actual whistle-blowing, could not be included in the analysis, with the result that some part of the relationship between the individual and organizational factors and the likelihood of whistle-blowing could still be spurious. For example, individual role responsibility, type of wrongdoing reporting, history of responses to whistle-blowing within the organizations, employee distrust of the organization’s response to whistle-blowing, existing disclosure mechanisms, structural agency factors, and so on, need to be considered in further studies.

It is important to note that these methodological limitations suggest that managerial implications from this study should be taken with caution. This study has provided evidence for understanding what motivates public-sector employees to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. However, more research examining the complexities involved in whistle-blowing actions, including studies that make use of strong natural or quasi experiments and semi-structured interviews comparing whistle-blowers with non-whistle-blowers should be done. Related to individual motives, results show norm-based and affective work motives matter and are specifically related to the relationship between public service motivation and ethical behavior in federal government. In terms of organizational values, the importance of how employees view their supervisor, related to how trustful this authority results to employees, and how this inhibits the likelihood of whistle-blowing, is interesting. This suggests how important is the role of the supervisor in maintaining an environment that allows for increased employee trust toward authorities and feeling of a supportive work environment for blowing the whistle (where supervisors refrain from favoritism and act with integrity). Also, the results provide further empirical evidence linking organizational values of respect, cooperativeness, and fairness to a lower likelihood of blowing the whistle in public agencies. These findings, though perplexing might be signaling that though employees perceive the organizational setting as respectful, cooperative, and fair, certain structural and contextual conditions related to the organizational norms and responses to past and present whistle-blowing might operate to inhibit employee reporting of wrongdoing.

Knowledge on the factors anteceding the decision to report wrongdoing is crucial for improving behavioral ethics in the federal government. In terms of practice, the findings suggest that managers willing to create an ethical environment in organizations, will need to have an understanding of the individual and organizational factors that affect the likelihood of employee disclosures of wrongdoing within the federal government. In line with the pre-existing research, this study sheds light on the individual and organizational value context anteceding the decision to report wrongdoing in federal government. Results from this study might help clarify and point toward potential strategies for enhancing conditions that increase behavior that is ethical within public organizations as well as improve workplace environment and culture toward achieving whistle-blowing effectiveness. For example, managers should enhance a culture supporting communication, developing, and making available multiple channels for the reporting of employee concerns. This will hopefully stimulate the development of guidelines to institutionalize ethical behavior in the form of whistle-blowing and the subsequent protections intended to benefit organizations and individuals.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Cecilia Florencia Lavena, in 2010, joined the School of Public Affairs and Administration at Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, where she received her PhD in public administration with a dissertation on whistle-blowing behavior in the U.S. federal government (2013). She obtained her MPA from University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public Affairs and Administration in 2009 under a Fulbright Masters Scholarship and graduated from the master in education management from University of San Andres, Argentina in 2002. Prior to pursuing her doctoral degree, she has worked for the Ministry of Education in Argentina consulting on Educational Planning through multiple levels of government administration. She was a research assistant for different public policy initiatives including the planning and implementation of a rural education project at the World Bank in Argentina. She has published collaboratively on topics of corruption and comparative public policy (education, gender) in national and international journals. She is co-authoring a book (with Yahong Zhang) Government Counter Corruption Strategies: A Public Solutions Handbook to be published by ME Sharpe. As a researcher, she specializes in research methodology into topics of corruption and ethics in public service as well as in comparative public policy (education, gender, integrity systems).

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