Abstract
In Federalist 9, Alexander Hamilton promised that the American republic would flourish and prove lasting due to the modern “science of politics.” The United States had embraced the “great improvement[s]” of this new science, creating “models of a more perfect structure” which would allow the country to maintain both liberty and stability. Richard Green’s Alexander Hamilton’s Public Administration shows how Hamilton, as both theorist and practitioner, developed stable, modern administrative structures by which republican government could be reliably maintained. As Green argues, Hamilton believed that his republican vision could be attained and secured through the workings of a stable administration. However, Hamilton’s administrative plans pointed beyond bureaucratic structures, as he understood that efficient government machinery and effective public policy were necessary to invigorate a modern constitutional republic. Green’s book thus sketches Hamilton’s understanding of the complex interplay of constitutionalism, administration, and policy.
As Green explains, in Hamilton’s theory of government, the Constitution embodies the permanent will of the people and lays the groundwork for an administration that is not only accountable and limited by law but also powerful and energetic. This administration would serve the will of the people, in part through its ability to form “the expression of society’s permanent will” (p. 30). Moreover, by administering Hamilton’s ambitious economic, financial, military, and foreign policies, the administration would contribute to the constitutional republic’s lasting security. It would make America a strong, independent commercial republic, while also producing a citizenry capable of living in such a modern regime. Critically, Hamilton hoped this regime would transcend mere self-interest. The character of its rulers and citizens, alongside the wealth it generated, would permit and encourage generosity and liberality, thus promoting a certain form of modern, liberal virtue and producing an “admirable and powerful national character” (p. 38). In this way, Green shows how administration did not simply address the “how” of American politics, but the “why” and “what” as well (p. 3); for Green, Hamilton’s theory of public administration must be situated within his understanding of political life and constitutionalism.
Green provides a particularly interesting analysis of Hamilton’s view of separation of powers and administrative authority. Federalist 47 argues that the separation of powers can be maintained only by mixing the three powers and giving each branch a “partial agency” in the actions of the others. As Green argues, Hamilton happily embraced such “flexible and pragmatic” mixing of powers (p. 54). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Hamilton readily accepted the fact that bureaucrats would wield even “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers (p. 67). Green points out the broad delegations of powers that occurred even early in the republic, including the substantial discretionary powers held by port collectors, the Treasury’s extensive influence over the management and sale of public lands, and its limited superintendence over the Coast Guard, Postal Service, the Bank of the United States, and the sinking fund. Administrators, he concludes, “govern in the fullest sense of the word” (p. 42). Yet, even though Green defends the complex, mixed powers administrators wielded, he explains how Hamilton attempted to maintain a meaningful doctrine of separation of powers. Administrators may hold non-executive powers, yet they “apply all three powers of governance in focused and limited ways” and their authority is “confined to a narrow field of policy” (pp. 52–53). This permissive understanding of separation of powers, combined with Hamilton’s broad construction of constitutional powers, enabled the creation of the powerful national government Hamilton believed was necessary to protect the developing republic.
Thus, Hamilton supported expansive administrative powers and discretion. At the same time, he wanted to hold administrators responsible to their superiors, to the rule of law, and ultimately to the American people. This “tension between subordination and autonomy” (p. 97) could be maintained through structural and procedural restraints and also through the character of administrators, the professional integrity that marked their calling. Hamilton sought to inculcate a desire for reputation that could be gained through loyal public service, encouraging a love of honor which “approximated the love of virtue” and proffering duration in office and the “accoutrements of office” (salary, status, power, etc.) that would promote the growth of a stable cadre of sophisticated expert administrators (pp. 100, 105). In this way, Green suggests, Hamilton avoided two extremes. He did not idolize the Constitution and the rule of law, in the vain belief that they could impose rigid restrictions on discretion and produce near-perfect politics; nor did he expect that public servants could be relied upon to perform heroic acts of self-sacrifice. Instead, believing that the nation needed a strong government and administrative discretion, he made room for independent judgment; but recognizing the foibles of human nature, he promoted a type of public morality based on selfish but socially useful passions (self-interest, ambition, love of honor). This resulted in a “public morality of administration” which focused less on classical or Christian virtues and more on republican principles such as “representation, due process, equity, accountability, transparency, [and] responsiveness” (p. 118).
Hamilton’s robust administration could therefore play a significant role in promoting a stable and strong United States, particularly through economic policy. Green outlines Hamilton’s financial plans, providing copious yet coherent detail. Most notably, Hamilton hoped to promote economic stability and growth through an approach that emphasized simplicity and transparency, a policy that promoted the good of the common man while tax burdens fell primarily on ‘objects of luxury and splendor’ (p. 126). His policy called for significant, yet ultimately finite, governmental involvement in economic affairs. First and foremost, the government must provide a stable economic playing field, providing a reliable currency and restoring faith in public credit. Moreover, government could use tariffs and bounties to encourage fledgling American industry. At the same time, Hamilton also recognized the bounds of government action and “cautioned against extended use of tariffs for protection rather than revenue purposes” (p. 153). His understanding of the government’s financial role was therefore not only broad and positive but also limited.
Finally, Green examines Hamilton’s military and foreign policy. Hamilton believed the nation would remain free only if supported by a strong military and a prudent foreign policy. In contrast to Antifederalist and Jeffersonian fears that military might would undermine republican liberty, Hamilton believed that a strong, professionalized, and responsible military establishment was necessary for maintaining the nation’s freedom. In addition, this force would ensure the nation was respected “not only for its might and readiness but also for its restraint, good judgment, and proportionality in response to hostility” (pp. 158–159). During the Quasi-War with France, Hamilton took an active role in advising War Secretary James McHenry on military affairs, proffering suggestions on issues as diverse as supply procurement, personnel policy, and organizational structure. Hamilton’s recommendations for the administration of foreign affairs may have been more restricted, yet Green not only outlines the contours of Hamilton’s foreign policy realism but also reminds us that Hamilton believed a steady and respectable foreign policy could only be maintained through a professional and disciplined diplomatic corps. As Hamilton was only the Treasury Secretary, not the Prime Minister, Green’s chapter on military and foreign affairs is ultimately more theoretical and somewhat less focused on administration, yet he successfully shows the influence Hamilton had—or tried to have—on the War and State departments. Administration is government in action, and Hamilton was fascinated with (and expertly conversant in) virtually all aspects of administration.
Green has produced an insightful and provocative account—which we might describe as an administrative-intellectual biography—of the intricate and multivariate role of public administration in Hamilton’s political thought. Green responds to and builds upon prior work on Hamilton by Karl-Friedrich Walling, Harvey Flaumenhaft, and Michael Federici; in contrast to these scholars, Green strives to engage more seriously with the way Hamilton’s public policy and administrative theory interacted seamlessly. This work is influenced by scholars such as Leonard White, Herbert Storing, and John Rohr. It is a worthy contribution from a scholar of the Constitutional School of public administration. Strikingly, Green also manages to explain the larger intellectual tradition that influenced Hamilton, interspersing his analysis of Hamilton with references to major political and economic thinkers, from Locke to Smith, and from Hume to Aristotle. His work will be of interest not only to public administration scholars but also to students of American Political Thought, constitutional law, and the presidency. Green has undertaken the enormous task of engaging with one of America’s political giants and has ably displayed his mastery of Hamilton’s thought. This is no mean accomplishment.
