A Psychological Process of Bureaucratic Whistleblowing: Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior

Abstract

Whistleblowing is a psychological process that involves the calculation of risks and benefits. While there exists a broad range of research on whistleblowing in the public sector, previous studies have not examined its entire process due to the limited focus on either whistleblowing intention or whistleblowing behavior. This study aims to fill this gap by applying the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to the whistleblowing context. Specifically, we examine how individual beliefs about the likely consequences of whistleblowing (attitude toward whistleblowing), others’ expectations about whistleblowing (subjective norm), and the capability of blowing the whistle (perceived behavioral control) influence public employees’ actual whistleblowing by way of their intention to report wrongdoings. A series of structural equation models are tested using data from the 2010 Merit Principles Survey. The findings show that the more the employees perceive that the consequences of whistleblowing are important, the more the key referents support whistleblowing, and the more the protections for whistleblowers are available, the more likely are their intentions to disclose wrongdoings and then actually engage in whistleblowing behavior. We conduct additional analyses for internal and external whistleblowers separately and find that there are both meaningful similarities and differences between the two groups. This study provides support for the validity of TPB as a theoretical framework for better understanding and explicating the psychological process of bureaucratic whistleblowing.

Keywords

whistleblowing intention whistleblowing behavior theory of planned behavior U.S. federal government structural equation modeling

Introduction

In the public sector, whistleblowing has been considered as a mechanism for holding public organizations accountable to the rule of law and citizens (Bowman, 1980; Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cooper, 1998; Hill & Lynn, 2015; Perry, 1993). To amplify this positive function in the bureaucracy, whistleblowing has been “institutionalized” in every democratic society, with a strong belief that “open discussion strengthens, not weakens, democracy” (Bowman, 1980, p. 19). Although not all employees may blow the whistle with altruistic motives (Miceli et al., 2008; Perry, 1993), research has shown that whistleblowers are, in general, employees who are committed to addressing organizational wrongdoings at the risk of retaliation (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Caillier, 2012). Besides identifying and addressing organizational wrongdoings, whistleblowing, if managed appropriately, can improve organizational processes and culture in a way that more employees pursue ethical decision-making and comfortably discuss and challenge unfair personnel practices (Lavena, 2016; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006).

Whistleblowing is a psychological process that involves the calculation of risks and benefits (Graham, 1986; Miceli et al., 2008). In short, employees are more likely to blow the whistle when they perceive that observed wrongdoings are serious enough to require their actions and their organizations are willing to correct the reported wrongdoings (Miceli et al., 2008). Research has examined a number of individual (e.g., age, gender, and education) and organizational (e.g., organizational structure, and organizational climate) factors that facilitate or deter whistleblowing (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008).

It should be noted that previous research can be divided into one group of studies that have examined whistleblowing intention (Caillier, 2015; Chang et al., 2017; Cho & Song, 2015; Kwon et al., 2021; Ugaddan & Park, 2019) and another group that has focused on self-reported whistleblowing behavior (Caillier, 2017; Jeon, 2017; Lavena, 2016; Lee, 2020; Taylor, 2018). Despite the potential difference between intention and behavior, most research has relied on empirical evidence regarding whistleblowing intention to make inferences about whether employees would blow the whistle in certain contexts, grounded on the assumption that whistleblowing intention is a reasonable proxy for actual whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 2015; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Patel, 2003).

Whether behavioral intention aligns with actual behavior has been a long-standing question in the field of psychology, organizational ethics, and other related disciplines (Ajzen, 1991; Sheeran, 2002). However, the empirical evidence for the link between the two has been mixed (Sheeran, 2002). This link is likely to be particularly weak in the case of whistleblowing because engaging in such behavior involves greater costs. In other words, employees with strong motives to disclose organizational wrongdoings may suppress their whistleblowing intention due to perceived risks to their continued employment or career advancement, or other psychological factors (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008; Miller & Grush, 1988).

Based on their review of empirical research on whistleblowing, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) show that factors such as organizational climate and threat of retaliation predict whistleblowing intention and behavior differently or in the same direction but with different magnitudes. They conclude that “a complete model of the whistleblowing process requires the identification and explication of the entire process (from observation, to intent, to action, and all steps between)” (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 292). Aligned with this view, some public administration scholars acknowledge the need for distinguishing whistleblowing intention from whistleblowing behavior (Caillier, 2017; Cho & Song, 2015; Lee, 2020; Taylor, 2018). Thus, studying whistleblowing intention alone, without adequately accounting for its relationship with actual whistleblowing, might be less helpful for offering public managers sound advice on whistleblowing management.

In an effort to address this gap, this study aims to apply the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to the whistleblowing context, with the theoretically guided assumption that a person’s behavior is determined by behavioral intention shaped by behavior-related beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). Specifically, we examine the links between whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and actual whistleblowing among U.S. federal employees. Whistleblowing in the U.S. federal government has received continued attention, and efforts have been made to protect federal whistleblowers from retaliation, as shown in a variety of whistleblower protection laws and management practices (U.S. Governmental Accountability Office [U.S. GAO], 2019b; U.S. MSPB, 2010; Peffer et al., 2015). Building upon the TPB, this study investigates how three types of whistleblowing-related attitudes and perceptions—(a) beliefs about the likely consequences of whistleblowing (attitude toward whistleblowing); (b) others’ expectations about or pressure for whistleblowing (subjective norm); and (c) perceived capability of blowing the whistle (perceived behavioral control)—influence federal employees’ actual whistleblowing behavior by way of their intention to report wrongdoings.

The TPB has been used to study whistleblowing in cases of police officers (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009), accountants (Brown et al., 2016; Latan et al., 2018), and government auditors (Rustiarini & Sunarsih, 2017). To our knowledge, however, few studies have examined the entire process of whistleblowing by exploring the links among whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and whistleblowing behavior all together. Instead, most research has focused on the relationship between the three aforementioned beliefs and whistleblowing intention, mainly due to the difficulty in obtaining data on actual whistleblowing (Chiu, 2003; Sims & Keenan, 1998).

To address these limitations in the literature and better understand the whistleblowing process, we use the 2010 Merit Principles Survey (MPS), a unique federal survey that enables researchers to operationalize both whistleblowing intention and behavior (Caillier, 2017; Cho & Song, 2015; Jeon, 2017; Lee, 2020). In addition, we conduct subgroup analyses by separating internal and external whistleblowers, given that employees choose to report organizational wrongdoings either internally or externally depending on different individual and organizational factors (Caillier, 2017; Lee, 2020; Sims & Keenan, 1998).

The remainder of this study is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on whistleblowing intention, behavior, and whistleblowing as a planned behavior. Second, we propose research hypotheses based on the literature review combined with an application of TPB in the U.S. federal government setting. Third, our study design, analysis, and findings will be provided and discussed. Fourth, we discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings and conclude with the study’s limitations and directions for future research.

Literature Review

Whistleblowing has received continued attention in public administration scholarship, which has regarded it as a means for internal control for the bureaucracy (Bowman, 1980; Cooper, 1998). Whistleblowing is defined as “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4) and can be understood as a “beneficial but deviant behavior” (Warren, 2003, p. 622). To date, most studies have examined whistleblowing and its multiple antecedents by focusing on either whistleblowing intention or whistleblowing behavior (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008).

Whistleblowing Intention

Whistleblowing intention refers to the “probability of actually engaging in whistleblowing behavior” (Chiu, 2003, p. 67) and focuses on “how likely” an individual is to blow the whistle having observed wrongdoings in their organizations (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 278). Whistleblowing intention has often been used as a proxy for whistleblowing behavior due to the difficulty of obtaining data on actual whistleblowing (Chiu, 2003; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims & Keenan, 1998). Thus far, many public administration studies have examined whistleblowing intention and its antecedents using survey data such as the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the MPS by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB; e.g., Cho & Song, 2015; Kwon et al., 2021).

A good deal of previous research has investigated individual and organizational antecedents of employees’ whistleblowing intention. Based on empirical evidence from previous studies, whistleblowing intention can be understood as a function of public service motivation (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cho & Song, 2015); ethical leadership (Hassan, 2015; Hassan et al., 2014); transformational and transactional leadership (Caillier, 2015; Caillier & Sa, 2017); supervisory support, organizational commitment, and power (Caillier, 2012); and the focal individual’s intrinsic and affective motives (Lavena, 2016).

Whistleblowing Behavior

Whistleblowing behavior concerns whether someone has actually disclosed observed wrongdoings, and researchers often face difficulty in finding data which allow them to examine whistleblowing behavior (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Researchers have often encountered challenges in investigating unethical and sensitive conducts like whistleblowing in organizations and in dealing with actual whistleblowers who are concerned about their confidentiality and are reluctant to provide information (Chiu, 2003; Sims & Keenan, 1998). Most previous studies have used employees’ self-reported whistleblowing behavior from survey data.

For example, using the 2005 MPS, Lavena (2016) finds that whistleblowing behavior is positively associated with norm-based and affective work motives, but negatively with situational variables such as culture, respect, and flexibility. Using the 2010 MPS, Caillier (2017) investigated the complex relationships between public service motivation and whistleblowing behaviors, and the mediating role of the severity of wrongdoing between the two. Also based on the 2010 MPS, Lee (2020) examined the effects of organizational structure, political control, and internal system responsiveness on both internal and external whistleblowing behaviors. He offers mixed findings regarding the impact of organizational structure and internal system responsiveness and points out that political control mechanisms are generally not associated with both internal and external whistleblowing behaviors. Finally, Taylor (2018) investigated internal whistleblowing behavior in Australia, considering the behavior as a function of the high-quality social exchange within the organization. Focusing on the internal aspects of agencies, Taylor (2018) finds that public employees are more likely to blow the whistle as they have a greater level of trust toward coworkers, supervisors, and senior managers.

The Whistleblowing Intention–Whistleblowing Behavior Linkage

In line with the studies that have examined the link between behavioral intention and actual behavior and identified the potential gap between the two (Cho & Lewis, 2012; G. Cohen et al., 2016; Sheeran, 2002), it is worth examining the relationship between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior. According to the meta-analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005), the relationship between the two remains unclear due to the lack of empirical evidence. They found only two studies that had taken into account the relationship between whistleblowing intention and behavior and claimed that caution should be taken in inferring whistleblowing behavior based on research findings on whistleblowing intention (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

Their findings notwithstanding, some studies on the link between turnover intention and actual turnover support the assumption that intention can serve as a reasonable proxy for actual behavior (Dalton et al., 1999; Harrison et al., 2006). Reviewing meta-analyses on the relationship between turnover intention and actual turnover, Dalton et al. (1999) show that the correlation between the two ranges from 0.31 to 0.52. In addition, Sheeran (2002) reviewed meta-analyses on the intention-behavior consistency in a range of behaviors and found that behavioral intention explains 28% of future behavior. Still, it should be noted that the link between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior might be weak because whistleblowing involves high risks that could inhibit potential whistleblowers from carrying out their intention.

Theory and Hypotheses

Theory of Planned Behavior

The TPB provides a useful theoretical framework for examining the links between the focal individual’s whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and whistleblowing behavior. The theory conceptualizes the psychological factors that drive an individual to perform a certain action (Ajzen, 1991). Scholars have used the TPB to study ethical and unethical behaviors, such as student dishonesty (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) and driving violations (Parker et al., 1992). According to the TPB, an individual’s behavior is a result of her or his intention to perform that behavior, and this intention is formed by three beliefs: (a) attitude toward the behavior (e.g., beliefs about the likely consequences of whistleblowing); (b) subjective norm (e.g., others’ expectations about whistleblowing); and (c) perceived behavioral control (e.g., capability of blowing the whistle) (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). We will further discuss these three beliefs below.

The TPB is relevant to examining the overarching process through which the focal individual decides to blow the whistle. Besides motives and personal characteristics of whistleblowers, a decision to blow the whistle involves the focal individual’s deliberation of costs and benefits associated with whistleblowing and depends on the interactions and power relationships among the focal individual and coworkers, supervisors, organizational leaders, and wrongdoers (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2012). The TPB aligns with this idea in that the dimension of attitude toward whistleblowing focuses on the prospective whistleblower’s intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for disclosing wrongdoings. The dimension of subjective norm addresses the focal individual’s consideration of whether relevant actors (e.g., supervisors) in her or his organization have favorable views about and will approve of whistleblowing. Finally, the dimension of perceived behavioral control concerns the focal individual’s consideration of her or his ability to blow the whistle and the availability of resources for performing such behavior.

Several scholars have used the TPB in the whistleblowing context. Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), for instance, examined the impacts of police officers’ attitude toward whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control on their whistleblowing intention. Similarly, Zakaria et al. (2016) analyzed Malaysian police officers’ whistleblowing intention. Brown et al. (2016) applied the TPB to model private accountants’ whistleblowing intention. These studies suggest that the three whistleblowing-related beliefs are the driving factors of whistleblowing intention.

However, the evidence for the link between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior is scarce (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008). To our knowledge, no public administration research has examined the link between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior. Instead, as mentioned earlier, previous studies have focused on either whistleblowing intention or whistleblowing behavior. In this study, we argue that the whistleblowing process can be better understood from the planned behavior perspective. Furthermore, we propose that the three whistleblowing-related beliefs influence whistleblowing intention, which, in turn, leads to actual whistleblowing. Our research model is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Research framework and hypotheses: Whistleblowing as planned behavior.

Predicting Whistleblowing Intention: A Function of Attitude Towards Whistleblowing, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Behavioral Control

According to the TPB, an individual’s intention is a central factor in predicting a given behavior. Intention is defined as the “motivational factors that influence a behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). In the whistleblowing context, whistleblowing intention can be viewed as an intention to make a “disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). The TPB explains that the focal individual’s behavioral intention is determined by the following beliefs: (a) attitude towards the behavior; (b) subjective norm; and (c) perceived behavioral control.

Attitude towards the behavior

The TPB defines attitude towards the behavior as “the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). According to Ajzen (1991), attitude towards the behavior can be operationalized by summing up the multiplicative product of the strength of each salient belief about the behavior—that is, “the subjective probability that a given behavior will produce a certain outcome” (p. 192)—and the subjective (favorable or unfavorable) evaluation of such outcomes. Consistent with this view, Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) proposed that whistleblowing-related attitude can be operationalized as “the sum of the products of the employee’s beliefs about the consequences of whistleblowing and his or her subjective evaluation of those consequences” (p. 546).

According to expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), the focal individual is more likely to blow the whistle when doing so leads to intrinsic or extrinsic rewards. Studies on public service motivation and ethics in public administration have examined how personal attitudes towards whistleblowing shape the focal individual’s whistleblowing intention. Scholars have shown that public employees’ whistleblowing behaviors are often facilitated by their public service motivation (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cho & Song, 2015; Wright et al., 2016), which reflects “self-sacrifice, altruism, and prosocial [motives]” (Perry et al., 2010, p. 682). Similarly, other studies reveal that whistleblowing depends on the focal individual’s sense of moral obligation to act against injustice and address wrongdoings in organizations (Keenan, 2000; Miceli et al., 1988).

Whistleblowers’ motives are not limited to moral or intrinsic drivers. There may be extrinsic motives for blowing the whistle. Potential whistleblowers may have mixed motives, including financial or other personal gains that whistleblowing can bring to them (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Perry, 1993; Smaili & Arroyo, 2019). Also, it is possible that whistleblowing is acknowledged or rewarded by supervisors or organizational leaders who support internal whistleblowing as a means to identify waste and other unlawful practices in the organization. Finally, in some circumstances, addressing wrongdoings through whistleblowing can benefit whistleblowers’ working conditions—for example, by improving the quality of management and enhancing work productivity or effectiveness.

Another important aspect of whistleblowing attitude is whether such whistleblowing will lead to corrective actions by supervisors or organizational leaders (Miceli et al., 2001, 2008). This idea is aligned with expectancy theory in that the more the employee believes that the goal of addressing observed wrongdoings is attainable, the more he or she is likely to blow the whistle. This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Federal employees’ positive attitude(s) towards whistleblowing will be positively associated with their whistleblowing intention.

Subjective norm

In the TPB, subjective norm is conceptually defined as “the likelihood that important referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of performing a given behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 195). Ajzen (1991) proposed that subjective norm can be operationalized by summing up the multiplications of beliefs about important others’ normative expectations regarding the behavior in question and the focal individual’s motivation to comply with the expectations.

In the whistleblowing context, research shows that a decision to disclose wrongdoings depends on the employees’ perceptions about how key referents such as colleagues and supervisors view whistleblowing. If potential whistleblowers perceive that key referents support whistleblowing, they are more likely to engage in whistleblowing behaviors when they have observed wrongdoings. The opposite is the case when they perceive that their key referents do not support whistleblowing (Biaggio et al., 1998; Park et al., 2014; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2013).

Social pressure to blow or not to blow the whistle can also come from the focal individual’s perceptions about leadership and organizational policies related to whistleblowing. Prior leadership studies in the public sector have examined whether and how ethical and transformational leadership encourages whistleblowing (Caillier, 2017; Caillier & Sa, 2017; Hassan, 2015). Employees may face certain pressure to disclose wrongdoings when their supervisors or organizational leaders promote ethical workplace climates and encourage prosocial behaviors (Bhal & Dadhich, 2011; Keenan, 2000). Furthermore, research has suggested that organizations with whistleblowing policies in place or designated personnel officers or departments dealing with whistleblowing can help overcome reluctance and motivate employees to engage in whistleblowing (Keenan, 1990; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006; Sims & Keenan, 1998).

In the U.S. federal government context, besides internal referent groups such as supervisors and Inspector General (IG), it is important to consider the role that external referent groups such as Congress, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the GAO (GAO), the MSPB (MSPB), and the media play in facilitating or inhibiting federal employees’ whistleblowing (U.S. GAO, 2019; U.S. MSPB, 2010). The MSPB, OSC, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration adjudicate appeals by employees who argue that they have been retaliated against due to whistleblowing, investigate those retaliation claims, and remedy the situations (Peffer et al., 2015).

In addition, given that federal agencies are subject to congressional monitoring and influence through congressional committees and other oversight mechanisms such as the GAO, how Congress shapes federal employees’ whistleblowing merits consideration. The GAO often investigates and audits federal agencies’ whistleblowing protection practices and offers suggestions for improvement (U.S. GAO, 2016, 2019a). Oversight committees in Congress can work with whistleblowers that have been pressured to be silent within federal agencies and help them address potential retaliation concerns and alleged wrongdoings. Recognizing Congress as one of the main reporting channels for whistleblowing, the Government Accountability Project published guidelines about how to best use Congress to reveal organizational wrongdoings (Devine, 1997). Finally, as shown in such whistleblowing cases as Edward Snowden and the Phoenix Veterans Affairs hospital, the media has served as an alternative and effective reporting channel for whistleblowers including federal ones, when internal referents disapprove of whistleblowing (D. Cohen, 2013; Hicks, 2014). Thus, our second hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Federal employees’ positive subjective norm about whistleblowing will be positively associated with their whistleblowing intention.

Perceived behavioral control

According to Ajzen (1991), perceived behavioral control, which is expected to shape both behavioral intention and actual behavior, is conceptually defined as “the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles” (p. 188). Like attitude towards the behavior and subjective norm, perceived behavioral control can be operationalized by summing up the multiplicative products of “beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede performance of the behavior” and “the perceived power of these factors” (Ajzen, 2006, p. 1).

Whistleblowers often face retaliation in personnel practices (e.g., isolation, disadvantages in promotion) and risk those possibilities when deciding to blow the whistle (U.S. MSPB, 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rothschild, 2008). A number of previous studies show that the fear of negative consequences including reprisal makes the focal individual reluctant to blow the whistle (Keenan, 1990; Keil et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2001).

The focal individual’s perceived behavioral control regarding disclosing wrongdoings can be affected by her or his organization’s whistleblower-related policies and culture as well as the expected retaliation. Studies on organizational justice illustrate how perceived behavioral control shapes whistleblowing intention. Employees are more likely to blow the whistle when their organizations maintain high levels of procedural, distributive, and informational justice in the workplace (Seifert, 2008; Seifert et al., 2014). In addition, support from supervisors and coworkers can enhance the focal individual’s perceived behavioral control by mitigating psychological barriers to blow the whistle (Caillier, 2012; Cho & Song, 2015). This leads to our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Federal employees’ greater perceived behavioral control will be positively associated with their whistleblowing intention.

Predicting Whistleblowing Behavior: A Function of Whistleblowing Intention and Perceived Behavioral Control

We test not only the psychological formation of whistleblowing intention but also the link between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior. Whistleblowing intention that is formulated by a function of the three aforementioned beliefs would determine the probability of actual whistleblowing. In addition, drawing on the TPB, we investigate whether perceived behavioral control directly shapes whistleblowing behavior.

Whistleblowing intention

As a general mechanism for predicting the individual’s behavior, Ajzen (1991) argues that “the stronger the intention to engage in behavior, the more likely should be its performance” (p. 181). Whistleblowing intention captures the motivational factors that indicate a bureaucrat’s willingness to blow the whistle. Put differently, whistleblowing intention represents one’s “actual control over the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 182). The preceding links between the three whistleblowing-related beliefs (i.e., attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control) and whistleblowing intention reflect one’s considerations and subjective calculations.

As discussed previously, some whistleblowing studies document that whistleblowing intention might not be able to predict whistleblowing behavior due to the higher risk and greater difficulty associated with whistleblowing when compared to other types of behaviors (Chiu, 2003; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Taylor, 2018). However, empirical evidence on the link between the two is scarce. Drawing on the theoretical ground offered by the TPB, we hypothesize that there will be a positive and significant relationship between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior. Our fourth hypothesis, then, is:

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Federal employees’ whistleblowing intention will be positively associated with their whistleblowing behavior.

Perceived behavioral control

The TPB postulates that behavior is a function of both intention and perceived behavior control (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). Ajzen (1991) provides explanations for the possible direct link between perceived behavioral control and actual behavior, stating that “holding intention constant, the effort expended to bring a course of behavior to a successful conclusion is likely to increase with perceived behavioral control” (p. 184). Indeed, there are “situations in which people may lack complete volitional control over the behavior of interest” (Ajzen, 2002, p. 666), such as whistleblowing. Whistleblowing intention may not always translate into whistleblowing behavior if perceived behavioral control is deficient. To illustrate, the individual who has an intention to blow the whistle and high confidence in the availability of relevant resources is more likely to perform whistleblowing than another individual who also has an intention to blow the whistle but with low confidence. Ajzen (1991) argues that perceived behavior control “can often be used as a substitute for a measure of actual control” (p. 184), which can shape the individual’s actual behavior as well as her or his behavioral intention.

Applying this logic to the whistleblowing context, likely retaliation can serve as a demotivator of whistleblowing behavior because it can increase the risks involved (Near & Jensen, 1983). The greater likelihood for prospective whistleblowers to experience retaliation from their organizations has been considered as a critical factor encouraging their silence (Miceli et al., 2008; Rehg et al., 2008). In addition, knowledge of the whistleblowing process, which could be fostered through ethics or whistleblowing process training, would also foster the focal individual’s perceived behavioral control, thus promoting whistleblowing behavior (Chordiya et al., 2020; Trevino & Weaver, 2001).

In a similar vein, Hassan (2015) finds that bureaucrats are more likely to actually voice their concerns to improve their organizations’ performance when they perceive greater personal control that reflects their perceived levels of autonomy. This finding implies that the focal individuals are more likely to disclose organizational wrongdoings when they perceive their organizations are likely to accept such a dissenting voice and they have enough resources to ensure the effectiveness of whistleblowing. Furthermore, in the U.S. federal government setting, research shows that an employee’s high level of personal control is significantly related with self-reported whistleblowing behavior while the direction and magnitude of such relationship vary between internal and external whistleblowing (Caillier, 2017; Jeon, 2017; Lee, 2020). Thus, our fifth and final hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Federal employees’ greater perceived behavioral control will be positively associated with their whistleblowing behavior.

Data, Variables, and Method

Data

We drew data from the 2010 MPS administered by the U.S. MSPB. The 2010 MPS was administered to 71,970 full-time federal employees in 18 cabinet departments and six independent agencies, and 42,020 employees responded to the survey, yielding the response rate of 58.4%. The survey includes questions on federal employees’ perceptions about whistleblowing, which enables us to empirically investigate the links between three whistleblowing-related beliefs (i.e., attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control), whistleblowing intention, and whistleblowing behavior. For the purpose of exploring these links, we limited our analysis to the sample of federal employees who had observed wrongdoing(s) in their agencies (N = 3,770)—those who answered “yes” to the question, “During the last 12 months, did you personally observe or obtain direct evidence of one or more illegal or wasteful activities involving your agency?”—which is a prerequisite for potential whistleblowing behavior.

Variables

Whistleblowing behavior

In line with the measurement approach in previous research (Caillier, 2017; Jeon, 2017; Lee, 2020), we used the following survey question to measure whistleblowing behavior: “Did you report this activity to any of the following?” This question comes with 15 response categories as shown below. Those who answered “no” to this question were coded as inactive observers, which means that they had observed wrongdoing but did not report it. The “family or friend” and “other” categories were excluded because they are not aligned with the typical definition of whistleblowing (for “family or friend”) or it is ambiguous which channel(s) the individual used to report observed wrongdoings (for “other”).

We created the following three variables: whistleblowing (1 = whistleblower, 0 = inactive observer), internal whistleblowing (1 = internal whistleblower, 0 = inactive observer), and external whistleblowing (1 = external whistleblower, 0 = inactive observer). The inactive observer is the base category for the three variables. Internal whistleblowing was coded as 1 for the respondents who only selected one or more of the following channels: “co-worker,” “immediate supervisor,” “higher level supervisor,” “higher level agency official,” and “agency Inspector General.” External whistleblowing was coded 1 for those who selected one or more of the following channels, regardless of whether they also used the aforementioned internal channels to blow the whistle: “Office of Special Counsel,” “Government Accountability Office,” “law enforcement official,” “union representative,” “news media,” “Congressional staff member or member of Congress,” and “advocacy group outside the government.” External whistleblowing was coded in this way as research shows that external whistleblowing typically occurs after internal whistleblowing has been attempted but failed to address wrongdoings (Miceli et al., 2008; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Rehg et al., 2008). Finally, whistleblowing was coded as 1 for those who reported that they had disclosed wrongdoings through internal channels, external channels, or both. The internal whistleblower sample consists of 1,848 internal whistleblowers and 1,312 inactive observers (N = 3,160). The external whistleblower sample comprises 361 external whistleblowers and 1,312 inactive observers (N = 1,673). 304 out of 361 external whistleblowers used both internal and external channels. The whistleblower sample consists of 2,209 whistleblowers and 1,312 inactive observers (N = 3,521).

Whistleblowing intention

Following Cho and Song’s (2015) approach, we used five survey items to measure whistleblowing intention, which is a latent variable. The lead-in of the question reads, “How likely would you be to “blow the whistle” when the wrongdoer is [one of the following]?” The types of wrongdoer include the respondent’s supervisor, a high-level supervisor, a coworker (in the respondent’s work group), a political appointee in the respondent’s agency, a federal employee outside the respondent’s work group, and a contractor or vendor. This question presents hypothetical situations and asks the employee’s willingness to blow the whistle in each situation, with a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 = very unlikely” to “5 = very likely.” We used the first five types of wrongdoers to focus on whistleblowing related to employees in the federal government.

Three whistleblowing-related beliefs

Attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control are latent variables, and the survey items used for each latent variable are reported in Appendix. For the attitude (toward whistleblowing) construct, we used five items with the question, “How important, if at all, would each of the following be in encouraging you to report an illegal or wasteful activity?” A 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 = unimportant” to “5 = very important” was used.

Regarding the subjective norm construct, six items were used with the following question: “If you were to report wrongdoing to one of the following organizations, to what extent do you believe the organization would give careful consideration to your allegations?” The items were measured using a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 = not at all” to “4 = great extent.”

For perceived behavioral control, we used the following three items: “My agency actively encourages employees to report wrongdoing,” “I feel that I could disclose wrongdoing without any concerns that the disclosure would make my life harder,” and “In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate is the protection against reprisal for federal employees who report wrongdoing?” The first two items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 = strongly disagree” to “5 = strongly agree.” The last question came with a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 = very inadequate” to “5 = very adequate.”

These three latent variables, which are theorized to affect whistleblowing behavior through their effects on whistleblowing intention, are not completely aligned with Ajzen’s (1991) operationalizations of attitude towards behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. As mentioned previously, Ajzen (1991) operationalized each construct as the multiplication of “the strength of each salient belief” and “subjective evaluation of the belief’s attributes” (p. 191). Unfortunately, the 2010 MPS does not enable us to generate the multiplicative forms of measurement for the three latent variables.

However, we argue that our measures of attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control have face validity in that the survey items being used in this study reasonably capture what each whistleblowing belief intends to measure and reflect the unique nature of whistleblowing in the context of the U.S. federal government (e.g., considering external referents in shaping the focal individual’s subjective norm). Moreover, our approach is consistent with several whistleblowing studies that have used parsimonious measures of whistleblowing beliefs instead of multiplicative ones (Chang et al., 2017; Cho & Song, 2015; Chudzicka-Czupała et al., 2016; Ferdous et al., 2014; Latan et al., 2018; Rustiarini & Sunarsih, 2017).

To test the reliability of the observed variables used to create the corresponding latent constructs, we calculated Cronbach Alpha values for the whistleblower, internal whistleblower, and external whistleblower samples. The values are greater than the conventional threshold of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2016), except for the attitude (towards whistleblowing) latent variable that has the values of 0.65 for the whistleblower and internal whistleblower samples and 0.69 for the external whistleblower sample.

We conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and compared fit indices of the 4-factor model (attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and whistleblowing intention) with the 3-factor models that combined any two constructs of whistleblowing-related beliefs as one factor and the 2-factor model that combined all three constructs of whistleblowing-related beliefs as one factor (see Table 1). In addition, we included a “single unmeasured latent method factor” in our CFA models to account for potential common method variance, as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Podsakoff et al. (2012). Specifically, each of the indicators was allowed to load on this method factor and the theoretical constructs to statistically control for the effects of common method variance. The results of the CFA demonstrate that the 4-factor structure (χ² = 907.46, df = 127, Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = 0.99, Tucker–Lewis Index [TLI] = 0.99, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = 0.04) has a good fit to the data. The broadly accepted cut-off values for model fit indices are CFI ≥ 0.95, TLI ≥ 0.95, and RMSEA ≤ 0.05 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Also, the chi-square difference tests indicate that the 4-factor model has a better fit than the other factor structures. The CFA results are consistent for the internal and external whistleblower samples.

Table 1.

CFA Results and Model Comparisons.

	Chi-square	df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	Chi-square difference test
Four-factor model	907.46	127	0.99	0.99	0.04	–
Three-factor model 1 (attitude and norm combined)	1182.34	130	0.99	0.98	0.05	334.33** (3)
Three-factor model 2 (attitude and control combined)	1002.97	130	0.99	0.98	0.04	195.74** (3)
Three-factor model 3 (norm and control combined)	986.75	130	0.99	0.98	0.04	213.49** (3)
Two-factor model (attitude, norm, and control combined)	2280.69	132	0.97	0.96	0.07	988.03** (5)

Note. The CFA results are provided for the whistleblower sample. A single latent method factor is included in all CFA models to account for common method variance. The chi-square difference tests are conducted using the difftest option in Mplus. The difference in degrees of freedom (df) is shown in parentheses.

p < .05. **p < .01.

In addition, we used the method developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) to evaluate discriminant validity among the three whistleblowing-related belief factors. In the whistleblower sample, the attitude (towards whistleblowing) factor satisfies discriminant validity since the square root of its average variance extracted (AVE) is 0.66 and this value is larger than its correlations with the subjective norm (0.02) and perceived behavioral control (−0.15) factors. Both the subjective norm and perceived behavioral control factors also meet the threshold of discriminant validity since the square roots of their AVEs are 0.79 and 0.78, respectively, and these values are larger than correlations among the three whistleblowing-related belief factors, including the correlation between subjective norm and perceived behavioral control (0.48). Discriminant validity of the three whistleblowing-related belief factors are also met in the internal and external whistleblower samples.

The correlations among the variables for the three samples are presented in Table 2.

Table 2.

Correlations Among Variables.

	1	2	3	4	5
Whistleblower sample
1. Attitude towards whistleblowing	1
2. Subjective norm	.02	1
3. Perceived behavioral control	−.15**	.48**	1
4. Whistleblowing intention	.35**	.16**	.15**	1
5. Whistleblowing behavior	.12**	.03*	−.00	.31**	1
Internal whistleblower sample
1. Attitude towards whistleblowing	1
2. Subjective norm	.03	1
3. Perceived behavioral control	−.17**	.47**	1
4. Whistleblowing intention	.33**	.18**	.20**	1
5. Whistleblowing behavior	.09**	.05**	.06*	.28**	1
External whistleblower sample
1. Attitude towards whistleblowing	1
2. Subjective norm	.03	1
3. Perceived behavioral control	−.19**	.50**	1
4. Whistleblowing intention	.37**	.14**	.06*	1
5. Whistleblowing behavior	.23**	−.10**	−.29**	.44**	1

Note. N = 3,521 for the whistleblower sample; N = 3,160 for the internal whistleblower sample; N = 1,673 for the external whistleblower sample. All latent variables are standardized with the mean of 0 and the variance of 1.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Method

Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test our hypotheses. SEM is an appropriate choice because it allows us to construct attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and whistleblowing intention as latent variables, which are not directly observable, and examine relationships among them while accounting for measurement errors (Kline, 2005). In addition, we examined the indirect effects of the three whistleblowing-related beliefs on whistleblowing behavior through their impacts on whistleblowing intention. We used Mplus 8 to run the SEM models.

We used the weighted least squares mean- and variance-adjusted (WLSMV) estimator with the probit function. This estimator has been shown to perform more precisely than the conventional maximum likelihood (ML) estimator when the data are composed of at least one binary or ordered categorical dependent variable, particularly with a small number of categories (e.g., two or three categories), such as whistleblowing behavior in this study (Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006; Byrne, 2013). The WLSMV relaxes the unrealistic assumption that “underlying each categorical observed variable is an unobserved latent counterpart, the scale of which is both continuous and normally distributed” (Byrne, 2013, p. 131). Clustered standard errors by agency were used as survey respondents are clustered within federal departments or independent agencies in the 2010 MPS.

Findings

We ran three SEM models for the whistleblower, internal whistleblower, and external whistleblower samples. The results are presented in Figures 2 –4. The model fit indices (i.e., CFI, RMSEA, and TLI) indicate that each of the three SEM models has a good fit. Standardized coefficients are reported for the ease of interpreting coefficients and comparing their magnitudes. For a robustness check, we ran alternative SEM models including the following control variables (results available upon request): working years (ranging from “1 = less than 1 year” to “11 = more than 35 years”), ethnic/racial minority status (1 = minority, 0 = nonminority), education (1 = college or higher, 0 = less than college), and supervisory status (1 = supervisor, 0 = nonsupervisor). The results are consistent with those of the original models (without control variables) that are discussed below.

Figure 2.

SEM results for full whistleblower sample (N = 3,521).

Figure 3.

SEM results for internal whistleblower sample (N = 3,160)

Figure 4.

SEM results for external whistleblower sample (N = 1,673).

We start with interpreting the model for the whistleblower sample (see Figure 2). First, consistent with our hypotheses, attitude towards whistleblowing (β = 0.37, p < .01), subjective norm (β = 0.07, p < .05), and perceived behavioral control (β = 0.17, p < .01) are positively associated with whistleblowing intention. These findings lend support to Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Next, whistleblowing intention is positively associated with whistleblowing behavior (β = 0.31, p < .01), offering support for Hypothesis 4. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in whistleblowing intention corresponds with 0.31 standard deviation increase in whistleblowing behavior. According to Keith (2019), this standardized coefficient, which is above 0.25, suggests a meaningfully strong relationship between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior. Different from our expectations, however, we find a negative relationship between perceived behavioral control and whistleblowing behavior (β = −0.05, p < .05). Regarding the indirect effects, attitude towards whistleblowing (β = 0.11, p < .01), subjective norm (β = 0.02, p < .05), and perceived behavioral control (β = 0.05, p < .01) have positive effects on whistleblowing behavior through their impacts on whistleblowing intention. Since perceived behavioral control has both direct and indirect paths to whistleblowing behavior, its total effect was estimated by combining the direct and indirect effects. The total effect of perceived behavioral control on whistleblowing behavior is not statistically significant (β = 0.003, n.s.).

We further conducted separate SEM analyses for the internal and external whistleblower samples (see Figures 3 and 4, respectively). The results yield both similarities and differences. First, for both samples, we found that attitude toward whistleblowing (β = 0.36, p < .01 for the internal whistleblower sample; β = 0.38, p < .01 for the external whistleblower sample) and perceived behavioral control (β = 0.24, p < .01 for the internal whistleblower sample; β = 0.10, p < .05 for the external whistleblower sample) have positive and significant relationships with whistleblowing intention. Second, subjective norm has a positive and significant association with whistleblowing intention (β = 0.08, p < .05) in the external whistleblower sample while it is not significantly related to whistleblowing intention in the internal whistleblower sample (β = 0.05, n.s.). Again, whistleblowing intention is positively and significantly related to whistleblowing behavior in both the internal whistleblower sample (β = 0.28, p < .01) and the external whistleblower sample (β = 0.46, p < .01). Again, these two coefficients suggest a meaningfully strong relationship between whistleblowing intention and whistleblowing behavior (Keith, 2019). Contrary to our expectations, perceived behavioral control is negatively associated with external whistleblowing (β = −0.31, p < .01) while it is not significantly related to internal whistleblowing (β = −0.001, n.s.).

In terms of indirect effects, in the internal whistleblower sample, attitude toward whistleblowing (β = 0.10, p < .01) and perceived behavioral control (β = 0.07, p < .01) have positive effects on whistleblowing behavior through their impacts on whistleblowing intention, but the indirect effect of subjective norm is not statistically significant (β = 0.01, n.s.). In the external whistleblower sample, on the other hand, attitude towards whistleblowing (β = 0.17, p < .01) and subjective norm (β = 0.04, p < .05) have positive effects on whistleblowing behavior through their impacts on whistleblowing intention while the indirect effect of perceived behavioral control is not statistically significant (β = 0.05, n.s.). Finally, the total effect of perceived control is positive and significant in the internal whistleblower sample (β = 0.07, p < .05) while it is negative and significant in the external whistleblower sample (β = −0.26, p < .01).

Discussion

Discussion of Findings

The purpose of this study is to better understand the psychological process of bureaucratic whistleblowing by examining the relationships among whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and actual whistleblowing. Building upon the TPB, we propose that whistleblowing be viewed as planned behavior that is performed as a result of an individual’s intention to engage in such behavior, which is shaped by the individual’s attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. The empirical findings of this study indicate that attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control each are positively and significantly related to whistleblowing intention, except for the insignificant relationship between subjective norm and whistleblowing intention in the internal whistleblower sample. Moreover, whistleblowing intention is positively and significantly associated with actual whistleblowing, whether it be internal or external whistleblowing.

These findings provide overall support for all five of our hypotheses regarding whistleblowing as formulated on the basis of the TPB. Specifically, employees are more likely to intend to report the observed wrongdoing and to actually blow the whistle as they perceive the consequences of whistleblowing more favorably (H₁: attitude towards whistleblowing), feel higher social pressures to disclose misconduct from important referents within and outside of the organization (H₂: subjective norm), or have greater confidence in their ability to report due to managerial support and organizational resources (H₃ and H₅: perceived behavioral control). Our findings bridge the gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence regarding the significant and positive relationship between whistleblowing intention and behavior (H₄: whistleblowing intention). As mentioned above, previous studies on whistleblowing used either intention or behavior to gauge actual whistleblowing, without examining the empirical relationship between the two. We found a reasonably strong and significant relationship between the constructs by using large-N data. Although we cannot confirm that the intention variable can be used as a proxy measure of actual behavior (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), our study observes the entire whistleblowing process in the context of the TPB.

While these findings are generally consistent with what the theory suggests, it requires our attention that perceived behavioral control is not significantly associated with whistleblowing behavior in the full whistleblowing sample, when both its direct and indirect effects are taken into account. It should be noted that perceived behavioral control can play a key part in predicting behavior to the extent that the perceptions are accurate and realistic and closely reflect the degree of actual control (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). Importantly, the TPB postulates several boundary conditions for the role of perceived control, stating that “perceived behavioral control may not be particularly realistic when a person has relatively little information about the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, pp. 184–185). This may be the case for whistleblowing because performing this action involves substantial risks and uncertainties in terms of personal and organizational outcomes. Despite the establishment of formal reporting channels and whistleblower protection laws and policies, individuals still encounter numerous personal, organizational, and social barriers to disclosing organizational misconduct. Therefore, the gap between perceived and actual control may lead the former to have little predictive power in the case of overall whistleblowing.

Interestingly, comparing the total effect of perceived behavioral control on whistleblowing behavior between the internal and external whistleblower samples yields a notable pattern of differences. Specifically, in terms of the total effect, perceived behavioral control is positively associated with internal whistleblowing while it is negatively related to external whistleblowing. According to the TPB, in the whistleblowing context, a person is able to disclose unethical conduct when he or she has requisite resources and adequate opportunities to act, and this ability would have a direct, positive effect on whistleblowing behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002)

However, our findings suggest another possibility. With the enhanced confidence and self-efficacy associated with perceived behavioral control, federal employees may be motivated to try to solve ethical problems internally rather than making disclosures through external channels, thereby increasing the likelihood of internal whistleblowing and reducing that of external whistleblowing. This might be because unveiling organizational wrongdoing to outside channels would have considerable repercussions for the organization’s reputation and cause serious retaliation against and hostility toward whistleblowers (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998), which are the outcomes that potential whistleblowers would wish to avoid. Our findings are also consistent with Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) who argue that internal whistleblowers tend to experience bureaucratic obstacles to making their reports public—which external whistleblowers are likely to bypass—so the effect of perceived behavioral control would be more significant for internal whistleblowing than for external whistleblowing.

In addition, there is a meaningful difference in the total effect of subjective norm on whistleblowing behavior between the internal and external whistleblower samples. For subjective norm, the total effect is the same as the indirect effect because there is no direct path between subjective norm and whistleblowing behavior. Subjective norm has a positive and significant indirect effect on external whistleblowing, but its indirect effect on internal whistleblowing is not significant. Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) claim that subjective norm, or key referents’ expectations about or tolerance for whistleblowing, would be a more important predictor for external whistleblowing intention than for internal whistleblowing intention, given that external whistleblowers are likely to face more serious retaliation, workplace discrimination, and other negative consequences due to their disclosures than internal whistleblowers. Relatedly, Dworkin and Baucus (1998) state that whistleblowers “tend to report externally when the context seems unfavorable . . . if the organization does not tolerate dissent” (p. 1284). Our findings are consistent with these arguments.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

This study can contribute to the theory and practice of public administration in several ways. First, our findings provide empirical evidence that supports the validity and usefulness of the TPB as a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the whistleblowing process. Despite the long-standing scholarly and practitioner interests in this topic, there has been relatively little research on the psychological process that underlies individuals’ decisions to make whistleblowing claims. Explicating and predicting whistleblowing behavior is not an easy task because it takes place through a highly complex process. The TPB allows us to model and to test the cognitive mechanism of potential whistleblowers by identifying and examining the three key antecedents of their whistleblowing intention, which, in turn, affects the likelihood of actual whistleblowing. Although the theory has been applied to whistleblowing research across various occupations and work settings, including police officers, accountants, and auditors (Brown et al., 2016; Latan et al., 2018; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009), a large majority of those studies have tested only a portion of the theoretical model, focusing on whistleblowing intention, not actual whistleblowing. Our study presents one of the first attempts to assess the entire TPB model in the context of the U.S. federal government.

Second, this study offers additional insights into the linkage between whistleblowing intention and actual whistleblowing. Previous research has repeatedly stated the difficulty in examining whistleblowing behavior due to the sensitive nature of the action and the resultant limitations to data collection. Instead, earlier studies have often relied on whistleblowing intention as a proxy of actual whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 2015; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). A meta-analytic review of the whistleblowing literature by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) shows that only a couple of studies have examined the relationship between whistleblowing intention and behavior, and the average correlation between the two is found to be weak at best. Thus, the question about the intention-behavior link has remained largely unanswered due to a dearth of research evidence. Taking advantage of a large-scale federal survey, we were able to empirically investigate this relationship and find that there exists a positive and significant association between whistleblowing intention and actual whistleblowing, which holds for both internal and external whistleblowing. This finding is meaningful in that it confirms the widely held but mostly untested assumption that intention is a valid and important predictor of behavior in the case of whistleblowing.

Third, in this study, we have identified and investigated three key variables—attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control—which shape an individual’s whistleblowing intention. The TPB emphasizes that intention is a central motivational force that leads to the actual performance of a specific behavior, and hence it is important to understand the factors that influence the intention to engage in that behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Although a wide array of personal and situational characteristics has been studied as potential antecedents of whistleblowing intention and behavior, previous research has yielded mixed findings and, thus, has failed to elucidate the immediate predictors of whistleblowing in a consistent and systematic manner (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008). Our study takes a theory-based approach to comprehend the course of whistleblowers’ decision-making by focusing on three specific types of whistleblowing-related beliefs. The findings can shed new light on the psychological process through which individuals come to report ethical misconduct based on their whistleblowing-related attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control and how this process may vary between internal and external whistleblowing.

On practical grounds, this study provides several lessons for organizations and managers that hope to encourage employees to voice their concerns about illegal and unethical organizational practices. Specifically, our findings suggest that they pay careful attention to how to improve or strengthen employees’ attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perception of behavioral control. Attitude towards whistleblowing is closely related to employees’ positive and favorable assessments of the consequences of whistleblowing. Thus, organizations should offer them adequate rewards—both intrinsic and extrinsic—by ensuring that their reporting can prevent harm to the organization’s operations, reduce corruption, and safeguard public interests and by providing whistleblowers with proper recognition and praise.

Managers and political leaders also need to focus on promoting an ethical culture and climate, designing and implementing ethics training programs, providing political support mechanisms for bureaucratic whistleblowers, and establishing and upholding organizational rules and policies for protecting whistleblowers from reprisal. These efforts can help employees believe that their voices will be heard and their disclosures will be supported by important referents such as coworkers, supervisors, leaders, executives, political appointees, and external watchdogs. In addition, supervisory support can play a critical role in mitigating the psychological barriers that deter employees from speaking up about the wrongdoing they have observed. Importantly, to minimize the negative impact of perceived behavioral control on external whistleblowing, organizations should try to reduce the discrepancy between perceived and actual control so that employees feel truly confident that they can successfully blow the whistle and corrective action will take place. These factors can independently and jointly influence whistleblowing intention, which, in turn, can help induce employees to choose to make actual disclosures.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

We note the study’s limitations and present directions for future research. First, the data for the empirical analysis are derived from a single survey, the 2010 MPS, and the main variables of the study were measured using self-reported survey items, which may lead to concerns about common method variance. Moreover, while our constructs are theoretically and conceptually distinct, some readers might be concerned that a considerable overlap exists among the measures of the constructs. Because this study aims to examine an individual’s psychological decision-making process, we believe that responses from individual employees can provide more accurate and reliable information about their own beliefs, intentions, and behavior and serve as the best source of data for research of this kind. Also, we accounted for potential common method variance by estimating the CFA models through use of the single unmeasured latent method factor approach, as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003, 2012). In addition, we were able to obtain evidence of discriminant validity by comparing the CFA models as well as applying the Fornell and Larcker (1981) method. The latent variables have low to moderate correlations ranging from 0 to 0.5, which suggests that common method variance is less of a concern in this study. Still, a more fundamental solution to the problem might be taking procedural remedies in the data collection process. For example, in future research, further efforts should be made to separate the measurement of variables over time, obtain objective data for actual whistleblowing to complement the self-reported measure, or use measures from multiple sources (Podsakoff et al., 2003).

In addition, as we used cross-sectional data, it is difficult to draw causal conclusions about the relationships between whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and actual whistleblowing. Although our research model and hypotheses are developed based on the TPB, it is desirable for future research to conduct experimental or quasi-experimental studies to clarify and validate the causal mechanism in the whistleblowing process. Also, attitude towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control can be measured in a more elaborate way. As we mentioned earlier, the items used to measure these constructs are not entirely consistent with the original operationalizations by Ajzen (1991). Although our measurement approach is aligned with those of previous studies that have used more parsimonious measures of whistleblowing-related beliefs (Chang et al., 2017; Cho & Song, 2015; Chudzicka-Czupała et al., 2016; Ferdous et al., 2014; Latan et al., 2018; Rustiarini & Sunarsih, 2017), we acknowledge that there is room for improvement in terms of operationalizing and measuring these variables.

Furthermore, we propose that future research expands the whistleblowing model tested in this study by exploring the factors that play a role in shaping the whistleblowing-related beliefs. Specifically, it would be important and meaningful to investigate how various individual characteristics and organizational practices can alter employee attitudes towards whistleblowing, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. Special attention should be given to those aspects that are particularly relevant to public sector organizations, such as public service motivation, political control, and accountability pressures. For instance, the roles of presidential leadership and institutions concerned with whistleblower protection deserve further investigation. Because this study used the survey conducted in a single year, we could not account for potential commonalities and variations in different political contexts. Future research might replicate our theoretical model to examine whether and how presidential leadership has influenced whistleblowers’ attitudes towards whistleblowing, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral controls. For example, during the Trump administration, which attempted to suppress whistleblowers, political and administrative leaders’ negative reactions to whistleblowing may have undermined federal whistleblowing. In order to effectively protect whistleblowers, it is important to reinforce the legal roles of whistleblowing institutions such as IG and OSC.

Besides, the relationships among whistleblowing-related beliefs, whistleblowing intention, and actual whistleblowing might be more complex than suggested by the TPB. Indeed, Ajzen (1991) pointed out that intention and perceived behavioral control might interact with each other in predicting behavior, although empirical evidence for the interaction is limited. In addition, perceived behavioral control may lead to a higher likelihood of actual whistleblowing when it is coupled with more positive attitudes towards whistleblowing and/or stronger subjective norms about the behavior. In other words, perceived behavioral control may have greater predictive power under certain conditions.

Finally, the TPB—the micro-level psychological theory—may not adequately consider the roles of unique organizational cultures. While the theory alludes to an individual’s perceptions toward the organization (perceived behavioral control) and institution (subjective norm), it does not account for other organizational factors that can shape whistleblowing intention and behavior. For instance, according to research on the blue wall of silence, police officers are often dominated by their group norm of shared loyalty, which can hinder an individual’s ability to blow the whistle in street-level bureaucracy (Johnson, 2005; Shockey-Eckles, 2011). Given the high risks and uncertainties associated with whistleblowing, it is worth studying the organizational culture of silence around reporting colleagues’ misconduct and its implications for whistleblowing intention and behavior.

Conclusion

The application of the TPB to bureaucratic whistleblowing can help advance our knowledge of its overall process and provide managerial leverage to effectively promote whistleblowing among public employees. Public management scholars and practitioners should make sustained efforts to better understand and improve the psychological process underlying employee decisions to report observed misconduct and further develop and test the whistleblowing model based on theory and research. Collectively, these endeavors will contribute to encouraging potential whistleblowers to step forward and voice their ethical concerns in a positive and constructive manner.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix.

Variables and Measures from the 2010 MPS.

Construct	Items used
[SAMPLE RESTRICTION]
Wrongdoing observers	During the last 12 months, did you personally observe or obtain direct evidence of one or more illegal or wasteful activities involving your agency?
[WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR]
Whistleblowing intention	How likely would you be to “blow the whistle” when the wrongdoer is: 1. Your supervisor 2. A higher level supervisor 3. A coworker (in your work group) 4. A political appointee in your agency 5. A federal employee outside your work group
Whistleblowing behavior: Internal	Did you report this activity to any of the following? (mark ALL) 1. Co-worker 2. Immediate supervisor 3. Higher level supervisor 4. Higher level agency official 5. Agency Inspector General (IG)
Whistleblowing behavior: External	Did you report this activity to any of the following? (mark ALL) 1. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 2. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 3. Law enforcement official 4. Union representative 5. News media 6. Congressional staff member or member of Congress 7. Advocacy group outside government
[THREE BELIEFS: ATTITUDE, NORM, AND CONTROL]
Attitude towards whistleblowing	How important, if at all, would each of the following be in encouraging you to report an illegal or wasteful activity? 1. The activity might endanger people’s lives 2. The activity was something you considered serious in terms of costs to the government 3. Something would be done to correct the activity you reported 4. The wrongdoers involved in the activities would be punished 5. You would be eligible to receive a cash award
Subjective norm	If you were to report wrongdoing to one of the following organizations, to what extent do you believe the organization would give a careful consideration to your allegations? 1. My agency’s Office of the Inspector General (IG) 2. The U.S. Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) 3. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 4. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 5. The U.S. Congress 6. The Media
Perceived behavioral control	1. My agency actively encourages employees to report wrongdoing 2. I feel that I could disclose wrongdoing without any concerns that the disclosure would make my life harder 3. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate is the protection against reprisal for federal employees who report wrongdoing?

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Hongseok Lee

Minsung Michael Kang

Sun Young Kim

Author Biographies

Hongseok Lee is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at University at Albany, State University of New York. His research focuses on human resources management, workforce diversity and representation, ethical issues in the workplace, and organizational theory and behavior.

Minsung Michael Kang is a PhD candidate in Public Administration and Policy at Rockefeller College, University at Albany―SUNY. His research interests in public and human resource management include organizational justice, performance, bureaucratic whistleblowing, and frontline empowerment.

Sun Young Kim is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Her research focuses on public management, organizational behavior, human resource management, and public service ethics.

References

Ajzen

(1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211.

Ajzen

(2002). Perceived behavioral control, self-efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32(4), 665–683.

Ajzen

(2006). Constructing a TpB questionnaire: Conceptual and methodological considerations. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.601.956&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Beauducel

Herzberg

P. Y.

(2006). On the performance of maximum likelihood versus means and variance adjusted weighted least squares estimation in CFA. Structural Equation Modeling, 13(2), 186–203.

Beck

Ajzen

(1991). Predicting dishonest actions using the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 25(3), 285–301.

Bhal

K. T.

Dadhich

(2011). Impact of ethical leadership and leader–member exchange on whistle blowing: The moderating impact of the moral intensity of the issue. Journal of Business Ethics, 103(3), 485–496.

Biaggio

Duffy

Staffelbach

D. F.

(1998). Obstacles to addressing professional misconduct. Clinical Psychology Review, 18(3), 273–285.

Bowman

J. S.

(1980). Whistle-blowing in the public service: An overview of the issues. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 1(1), 15–27.

Brewer

G. A.

Selden

S. C.

(1998). Whistle blowers in the federal civil service: New evidence of the public service ethic. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(3), 413–439.

10.

Brown

J. O.

Hays

Stuebs

M. T

Jr . (2016). Modeling accountant whistleblowing intentions: Applying the theory of planned behavior and the fraud triangle. Accounting and the Public Interest, 16(1), 28–56.

11.

Browne

M. W.

Cudeck

(1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In Bollen

K. A.

Long

J. S.

(Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136–162). SAGE.

12.

Byrne

B. M.

(2013). Structural equation modeling with Mplus: Basic concepts, applications, and programming. Routledge.

13.

Caillier

J. G.

(2012). Agency retaliation against whistle-blowers. Public Integrity, 15(1), 29–50.

14.

Caillier

J. G.

(2015). Transformational leadership and whistle-blowing attitudes: Is this relationship mediated by organizational commitment and public service motivation? The American Review of Public Administration, 45(4), 458–475.

15.

Caillier

J. G.

(2017). Public service motivation and decisions to report wrongdoing in US Federal Agencies: Is this relationship mediated by the seriousness of the wrongdoing. The American Review of Public Administration, 47(7), 810–825.

16.

Caillier

J. G.

(2017). Do transformational-oriented leadership and transactional-oriented leadership have an impact on whistle-blowing attitudes? A longitudinal examination conducted in US federal agencies. Public Management Review, 19(4), 406–422.

17.

Chang

Wilding

Shin

M. C.

(2017). Determinants of whistleblowing intention: Evidence from the South Korean government. Public Performance & Management Review, 40(4), 676–700.

18.

Chiu

R. K.

(2003). Ethical judgment and whistleblowing intention: Examining the moderating role of locus of control. Journal of Business Ethics, 43(1–2), 65–74.

19.

Cho

Y. J.

Lewis

G. B.

(2012). Turnover intention and turnover behavior: Implications for retaining federal employees. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 32(1), 4–23.

20.

Cho

Y. J.

Song

H. J.

(2015). Determinants of whistleblowing within government agencies. Public Personnel Management, 44(4), 450–472.

21.

Chordiya

Sabharwal

Relly

J. E.

Berman

E. M.

(2020). Organizational protection for whistleblowers: A cross-national study. Public Management Review, 22(4), 527–552.

22.

Chudzicka-Czupała

Grabowski

Mello

A. L.

Kuntz

Zaharia

D. V.

Hapon

… Börü

(2016). Application of the theory of planned behavior in academic cheating research–cross-cultural comparison. Ethics & Behavior, 26(8), 638–659.

23.

Cohen

(2013, August 14). 10 famous/infamous whistleblowers. Politico. https://www.politico.com/gallery/2013/08/10-famous-infamous-whistleblowers-001083?slide=0

24.

Cohen

Blake

R. S.

Goodman

(2016). Does turnover intention matter? Evaluating the usefulness of turnover intention rate as a predictor of actual turnover rate. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 36(3), 240–263.

25.

Cooper

T. L.

(1998). The responsible administrator: An approach to ethics for the administrative role. John Wiley.

26.

Dalton

D. R.

Johnson

J. L.

Daily

C. M.

(1999). On the use of” intent to . . . ” variables in organizational research: An empirical and cautionary assessment. Human Relations, 52(10), 1337–1350.

27.

DeVellis

R. F.

(2016). Scale development: Theory and applications (Vol. 26). SAGE.

28.

Devine

(1997). The whistleblower’s survival guide: Courage without martyrdom. Fund for Constitutional Government.

29.

Dozier

J. B.

Miceli

M. P.

(1985). Potential predictors of whistle-blowing: A prosocial behavior perspective. Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 823–836.

30.

Dworkin

T. M.

Baucus

M. S.

(1998). Internal vs. external whistleblowers: A comparison of whistleblowering processes. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(12), 1281–1298.

31.

Ferdous

C. S.

Mallin

Ow-Yong

(2014). Corporate governance in Bangladesh: A comparison with other emerging market countries. In Boubaker

Nguyen

(Eds.), Corporate governance in emerging markets (pp. 395–420). Springer.

32.

Fornell

Larcker

D. F.

(1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), 39–50.

33.

Graham

J. W.

(1986). Principled organizational dissent: A theoretical essay. Research in Organizational Behavior, 8, 1–52.

34.

Harrison

D. A.

Newman

D. A.

Roth

P. L.

(2006). How important are job attitudes? Meta-analytic comparisons of integrative behavioral outcomes and time sequences. Academy of Management Journal, 49(2), 305–325.

35.

Hassan

(2015). The importance of ethical leadership and personal control in promoting improvement-centered voice among government employees. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(3), 697–719.

36.

Hassan

Wright

B. E.

Yukl

(2014). Does ethical leadership matter in government? Effects on organizational commitment, absenteeism, and willingness to report ethical problems. Public Administration Review, 74(3), 333–343.

37.

Hicks

(2014, July 31). 5 of the most famous federal whistleblowers. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/07/31/5-famous-whistleblowers-from-the-federal-government/

38.

Hill

C. J.

Lynn

L. E.

Jr. (2015). Public management: Thinking and acting in three dimensions. CQ Press.

39.

L. T.

Bentler

P. M.

(1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1–55.

40.

Jeon

S. H.

(2017). Where to report wrongdoings? Exploring the determinants of internal versus external whistleblowing. International Review of Public Administration, 22(2), 153–171.

41.

Johnson

R. A.

(2005). Whistleblowing and the police. Rutgers University Journal of Law and Urban Policy, 1(3), 74–83.

42.

Keenan

J. P.

(1990). Upper-level managers and whistleblowing: Determinants of perceptions of company encouragement and information about where to blow the whistle. Journal of Business and Psychology, 5, 223–235.

43.

Keenan

J. P.

(2000). Blowing the whistle on less serious forms of fraud: A study of executives and managers. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 12(4), 199–217.

44.

Keil

Tiwana

Sainsbury

Sneha

(2010). Toward a theory of whistleblowing intentions: A benefit-to-cost differential perspective. Decision Sciences, 41(4), 787–812.

45.

Keith

T. Z.

(2019). Multiple regression and beyond: An introduction to multiple regression and structural equation modeling (3rd ed.). Routledge.

46.

Kline

R. B.

(2005). Methodology in the social sciences: Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (2nd ed.). Guilford Press.

47.

Kwon

Jeon

S. H.

Ting

(2021). The Impact of Predisposed Traits and Organizational Factors on the U.S. Federal Employee Perception of Whistleblowing. Public Personnel Management, 50(2), 258–282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0091026020938828

48.

Latan

Ringle

C. M.

Jabbour

C. J. C.

(2018). Whistleblowing intentions among public accountants in Indonesia: Testing for the moderation effects. Journal of Business Ethics, 152(2), 573–588.

49.

Lavena

C. F.

(2016). Whistle-blowing: Individual and organizational determinants of the decision to report wrongdoing in the federal government. American Review of Public Administration, 46(1), 113–136.

50.

Lee

(2020). The implications of organizational structure, political control, and internal system responsiveness on whistleblowing behavior. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 40(1), 155–177.

51.

Mesmer-Magnus

J. R.

Viswesvaran

(2005). Convergence between measures of work-to-family and family-to-work conflict: A meta-analytic examination. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 67(2), 215–232.

52.

Miceli

M. P.

Near

J. P.

Dworkin

T. M.

(2008). Whistle-blowing in organizations. Psychology Press.

53.

Miceli

M. P.

Roach

B. L.

Near

J. P.

(1988). The motivations of anonymous whistle-blowers: The case of federal employees. Public Personnel Management, 17(3), 281–296.

54.

Miceli

M. P.

Van Scotter

J. R.

Near

J. P.

Rehg

M. T.

(2001). Individual differences and whistle-blowing. In Academy of management proceedings (Vol. 2001, No. 1, pp. C1-C6). Academy of Management.

55.

Miller

L. E.

Grush

J. E.

(1988). Improving predictions in expectancy theory research: Effects of personality, expectancies, and norms. Academy of Management Journal, 31(1), 107–122.

56.

Near

J. P.

Jensen

T. C.

(1983). The whistleblowing process: Retaliation and perceived effectiveness. Work and Occupations, 10(1), 3–28.

57.

Near

J. P.

Miceli

M. P.

(1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4(1), 1–16.

58.

Park

Blenkinsopp

(2009). Whistleblowing as planned behavior—A survey of South Korean police officers. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(4), 545–556.

59.

Park

Blenkinsopp

Park

(2014). The influence of an observer’s value orientation and personality type on attitudes toward whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 120(1), 121–129.

60.

Parker

Manstead

A. S.

Stradling

S. G.

Reason

J. T.

Baxter

J. S.

(1992). Intention to commit driving violations: An application of the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77(1), 94–101.

61.

Patel

(2003). Some cross-cultural evidence on whistle-blowing as an internal control mechanism. Journal of International Accounting Research, 2(1), 69–96.

62.

Peffer

S. L.

Bocheko

Del Valle

R. E.

Osmani

Peyton

Roman

(2015). Whistle where you work? The ineffectiveness of the federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the promise of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 35(1), 70–81.

63.

Perry

J. L.

(1993). Whistleblowing, organizational performance, and organizational control. In Frederickson

H. G.

(Eds.), Ethics and public administration (pp. 79–99). M.E. Sharpe.

64.

Perry

J. L.

Hondeghem

Wise

L. R.

(2010). Revisiting the motivational bases of public service: Twenty years of research and an agenda for the future. Public Administration Review, 70(5), 681–690.

65.

Podsakoff

P. M.

MacKenzie

S. B.

Lee

J.-Y.

Podsakoff

N. P.

(2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903.

66.

Podsakoff

P. M.

MacKenzie

S. B.

Podsakoff

N. P.

(2012). Sources of method bias in social science research and recommendations on how to control it. Annual Review of Psychology, 63(1), 539–569.

67.

Rehg

M. T.

Miceli

M. P.

Near

J. P.

Van Scotter

J. R.

(2008). Antecedents and outcomes of retaliation against whistleblowers: Gender differences and power relationships. Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240.

68.

Richardson

B. K.

Wang

Hall

C. A.

(2012). Blowing the whistle against Greek hazing: The theory of reasoned action as a framework for reporting intentions. Communication Studies, 63(2), 172–193.

69.

Rothschild

(2008). Freedom of speech denied, dignity assaulted: What the whistleblowers experience in the US. Current Sociology, 56(6), 884–903.

70.

Rothwell

G. R.

Baldwin

J. N.

(2006). Ethical climates and contextual predictors of whistle-blowing. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 26(3), 216–244.

71.

Rustiarini

N. W.

Sunarsih

N. M.

(2017). Factors Influencing the whistleblowing behaviour: A perspective from the theory of planned behaviour. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 10(2), 187–214.

72.

Seifert

D. L.

(2008). The influence of organizational justice on the perceived likelihood of whistle-blowing [Doctoral dissertation]. Washington State University.

73.

Seifert

D. L.

Stammerjohan

W. W.

Martin

R. B.

(2014). Trust, organizational justice, and whistleblowing: A research note. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 26(1), 157–168.

74.

Sheeran

(2002). Intention-behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. European Review of Social Psychology, 12(1), 1–36.

75.

Shockey-Eckles

M. L.

(2011). Police culture and the perpetuation of the officer Shuffle: The paradox of life behind “The Blue Wall”. Humanity & Society, 35(3), 290–309.

76.

Sims

R. L.

Keenan

J. P.

(1998). Predictors of external whistleblowing: Organizational and intrapersonal variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 411–421.

77.

Smaili

Arroyo

(2019). Categorization of whistleblowers using the whistleblowing triangle. Journal of Business Ethics, 157(1), 95–117.

78.

Smith

H. J.

Keil

Depledge

(2001). Keeping mum as the project goes under: Toward an explanatory model. Journal of Management Information Systems, 18(2), 189–227.

79.

Taylor

(2018). Internal whistle-blowing in the public service: A matter of trust. Public Administration Review, 78(5), 717–726.

80.

Trevino

L. K.

Weaver

G. R.

(2001). Organizational justice and ethics program “follow-through”: Influences on employees’ harmful and helpful behavior. Business Ethics Quarterly, 11(4), 651–671.

81.

Trongmateerut

Sweeney

J. T.

(2013). The influence of subjective norms on whistle-blowing: A cross-cultural investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(3), 437–451.

82.

Ugaddan

R. G.

Park

S. M.

(2019). Do trustful leadership, organizational justice, and motivation influence whistle-blowing intention? Evidence from federal employees. Public Personnel Management, 48(1), 56–81.

83.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2016). Department of energy: Whistleblower protections need strengthening. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-618

84.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2019a). Whistleblowers: Key practices for Congress to consider when receiving and referring information. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-432

85.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2019b). Whistleblower protection: Analysis of DOD’s actions to improve case timeliness and safeguard confidentiality. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-198

86.

U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. (2010). Whistleblower protections for federal employees. https://www.mspb.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=557972&version=559604&application=ACROBAT

87.

Vroom

V. H.

(1964). Work and motivation. John Wiley.

88.

Warren

D. E.

(2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 28(4), 622–632.

89.

Wright

B. E.

Hassan

Park

(2016). Does a public service ethic encourage ethical behaviour? Public service motivation, ethical leadership and the willingness to report ethical problems. Public Administration, 94(3), 647–663.

90.

Zakaria

Razak

S. N. A. A.

Yusoff

M. S. A.

(2016). The theory of planned behaviour as a framework for whistle-blowing intentions. Review of European Studies, 8(3), 221–236.