Building the Garden and Making Arena Sports Big Time

Abstract

Foreshadowing the beginning of the Great Depression, George “Tex” Rickard succumbed to appendicitis in 1929. A leader and representative of sport marketing during the 1920s, Rickard altered the urban landscape in American cities by definitively showing that promoters could use sports in arenas (i.e., indoor) to help those venues be economically viable through the production of awe-inspiring spectacles. In this article, the authors critically examine sport marketing as a tool to help reframe the career of Tex Rickard and ultimately the development of Madison Square Garden III in the context of macromarketing. This historical and illustrative case study will also demonstrate that sport marketing is somewhat different than traditional marketing through an emphasis on media and community relations. Finally, we will show how Rickard made use of the traditional “marketing mix” (i.e., place, price, promotion, and product) to capitalize on the urban setting and other strategies employed to promote products and services.

Keywords

sports marketing marketing mix public relations sport history Tex Rickard macromarketing

Introduction

In the academic field of marketing, “Sports Marketing” is relatively young. Commonly, academics date the term and conception of a field to a 1979 issue of Advertising Age (Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007, p. 11). Yet, during the last three decades, the field of sport marketing has grown into its own area of academic inquiry with associations (e.g., Sport Marketing Association) that support journals such as Sport Marketing Quarterly (1992-), the International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship (1999-), and the International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing (2005-). Similar to most other marketing journals, scholars and editorial boards of these sport-oriented journals paid little attention to historical content or perspectives (Ross 2012). Further, there is a general belief among sport scholars that recent practices such as formalized market research and management began only in the 1980s (Ross 2012). In turn, most marketing journals also contain little content related to sport. Before the present article, the Journal of Macromarketing had only one article related to sport in its entire run (Jones and Shaw 2006; Ross 2012). Appropriately, an opportunity exists to widen marketing studies through examining sport as a context and for sport marketing scholars to recognize the implementation and creation of many techniques as pre-dating the assumed start of that discipline.

In an effort to examine sport marketing through a macromarketing lens, the authors show through a historical case study that George “Tex” Rickard embraced the “marketing mix” and the four P’s of product, price, plac, e and promotion in the sport industry during the early 1900s.¹ Further, this work supports that Rickard’s use of available media and community relations/public relations as promotional tools was critical toward his success. Specifically, the authors examined Rickard through a variety of newspaper accounts, biographies, historical monographs, and marketing texts which highlight his use of the marketing mix through sport in the early 1900s (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Photograph of Tex Rickard. Source: Bain News Service (n.d.).

Aycock and Scott (2012) described Rickard as “an empire builder; one of the premier fathers of the business of sport” (p. 15). Rickard is famous for reforming “Madison Square Garden” into what is now viewed as the world’s most famous sporting arena and important social anchor for New York City (Aycock and Scott 2012; de Wilde 2010; Waltzer 2011). Rickard’s other accomplishments include institutionalizing the National Hockey League in the United States—the reason why “Tex’s” Rangers are in New York—as well as experimenting with professional basketball (Nelson 1999). Most effectively, perhaps, Rickard produced and promoted boxing and the first “Million-Dollar Gate.” Further, Rickard shaped the professional athlete as a cult celebrity and reinforced the urban arena as a place for deity-like worship of athletic performances (Boddy 2008; Rader 1983). Aycock and Scott (2012) added, “Not until the arrival of Tex Rickard and his flair for promotion did boxing achieve the necessary media attention to give stars of the sport a real opportunity to become millionaires” (p. 4).

While Rickard innovated and changed the way professional sports operated, “there has been almost no scholarly work on his marketing methods” (Ross 2012, p. 477). Both older (Rickard and Oboler 1936; Samuels 1957) and more recent (Aycock and Scott 2012; Waltzer 2011) attention centered on numerous anecdotes regarding Rickard’s life with underdeveloped views about his ability to push boundaries in sport and capture and expand the imagination of individuals with subtle narratives and bold promotions. Rickard’s marketing strategies remain important to formally examine because they contribute to questions about Robert Keith’s (1960) “production era” and Fullerton’s (1988) recognition that entrepreneurs and marketers developed sophisticated marketing tactics and strategies well before the 1950s. In essence, while we acknowledge sports promoters were successful before and after Rickard, none captured or shaped the public’s imagination the way Rickard did for arena-based sports. Further, Rickard did this in the context of the 1920s when large companies were “scientifically” investing in research and advertisement, and used media, community and public relations to a degree never used before to help the development of Sport Management and to develop professional sports other than baseball as a major entertainment industry (Marchand 1985, p. 311).

Case Study and Four P’s Rationale

The authors chose the case study research approach as a strategy to examine the marketing mix in the sport setting. Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 544) contend “…rigorous case studies afford researchers opportunities to explore or describe a phenomenon in context…It allows the researcher to explore individuals or organizations…” Yin (1981, p. 59) added the discriminating attribute of the case study approach also revolves around its utility “to examine…a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context.” Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 25) further positioned case studies as “rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon…” and may involve “historical accounts or information.” In this work, the Tex Rickard case study will be employed for illustrating and will attempt to emphasize the promotional activities of Rickard within the marketing mix of sport in the early 1900s.

To support this research goal, Siggelkow (2007, pp. 21-22) posited that case study research is appropriate for illustrative purposes and specially noted “At first this may sound like a mundane use, but…by seeing a concrete example of every construct that is employed in a conceptual argument, the reader has much easier time imagining how the conceptual argument might actually be applied to…empirical settings.” Again, Yin (1981, p. 59) added “what the case study does represent is a research strategy, to be likened to an experiment, a history, or a simulation, which may be considered alternative research strategies.” Finally, a variety of scholars recognized that, as a research strategy, the case study approach provides the opportunity to generate and revise theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Siggelkow 2007). Considering the uniqueness of Tex Rickard’s behaviors and actions, a case study about his life appears to be the appropriate strategy to examine sport marketing and the marketing mix and our work, we hope, adds to discussions of sport and macro-marketing.

Within the sport marketplace, entrepreneurs and organizations regularly seek out methods to gain a competitive advantage (Barney 1991). One strategy implemented to create advantage centers on making use of the marketing mix (Arnott 2011; Filo and Funk 2005; Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007; Shank 2007). This approach to marketing management has remained ubiquitous among practitioners and scholars for over fifty years due to its simplicity and general applicability (Borden 1964; McCarthy 1960; McKitterick 1957; Rosenbloom and Dimitrova 2011; Shaw and Jones 2005). In the sport context, Arnott (2011) and Beech and Chadwick (2007) identified the marketing mix as an important and specific opportunity to achieve the desired match between organizational objectives and consumer/investor ambitions or choices. Other works by Arnott (2011), Westerbeck and Shilbury (1999), and Schineider and Bradish (2006) also looked at the impact of the marketing mix on lead marketing and specifically at place as a distribution point of sport development. Finally, marketing mix considerations and coordination was recognized as critical to address changing environments and promote desired responses out of consumers and potential investors (Arnott 2011; Beech and Chadwick 2007; Kotler and Armstrong 1994).

The Background of George “Tex” Rickard: “The King of Ballyhoo”

George “Tex” Rickard was “born in 1871 in Kansas City, Missouri, but after the age of four Rickard grew up in Texas” (Samuels 1957, p. 9; Waltzer 2011, p. 1). As a young man, Rickard dabbled briefly as a ranch hand and Texas Marshall, but in 1895 the Alaska Gold Rush lured Rickard north (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929; Waltzer 2011). After his prospecting attempt failed, he began work in Sam Bonnifield’s gambling shack in Circle City, Alaska (Waltzer 2011, p. 3-4). Rickard continued to work in and manage gambling halls, succeeding and failing several times, but eventually he opened a successful hall in July 1899 named the “Northern” (Kirksey 1929; Waltzer 2011). Shortly thereafter in 1902, Rickard left Alaska for California with his small fortune estimated at roughly $500,000 to follow the gold boom occurring in Nevada (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929; Samuels 1957; Waltzer 2011).

In April of 1906, a devastating earthquake struck San Francisco, the financial and banking center of the West. The subsequent fire destroyed much of the city and froze operations of the San Francisco Stock Exchange. A memoir of George Graham Rice (1913), notable newspaperman and mining stock promoter of questionable character, highlights that “Every bank in Nevada closed down, just as every California bank did. Nevada banks, as a rule, had cleared through San Francisco banks, and practically all of Nevada’s cash was tied up by the catastrophe” (p. 99). The businessmen of Goldfield, Nevada were especially hurt and wanted to improve their local economy. Knowing Rickard’s past success managing his various saloons and gambling establishments, the businessmen nominated Rickard as the one most capable of helping Goldfield become a more established city-like community (Aycock and Scott 2012).

Following a trip to New York where he saw a fight between lightweights Terry McGovern and Jimmy Britt at Madison Square Garden II, Rickard decided that boxing should become the central business strategy for Goldfield (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929). Because McGovern and Britt fought to a draw, generating chaos and excitement before, during, and after the event, Rickard was convinced Goldfield should offer a prize of $15,000 for their rematch. Unable to secure rights to the event, Rickard and Goldfield lucked out when Billy Nolan, manager for lightweight champion Oscar Mattheus Nielsen (aka “Battling Nelson”), read a copy of the Goldfield Sun while staying at a hotel in Salt Lake City (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929). Within, Rickard had placed an ad for a Labor Day fight with lightweight Jack Clifford. Following a reply wire from Nolan, Rickard began negotiations with Nelson, the recognized “white champion,” and arranging for him to fight Joe Gans, an African-American boxer and former lightweight champion (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929).

To travel to small little Goldfield and suspicious of Rickard’s guarantee, both Nelson and Gans required $30,000 to be posted in escrow. Quickly raising the money from Goldfield’s mining activities and entrepreneurs, Rickard presented $30,000 in $20 gold bars to the boxers and their managers when they arrived (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929). Rickard got the idea to use the gold bars as a promotional tool and to assure the boxers they would be paid from his time in Nome, Alaska as owner of the Northern. Nome bankers advertised the prosperity and legitimacy of their bank through postcards of gold bars stacked in the windows (Aycock and Scott 2012). Promoting the “expense,” Rickard was able to attract an incredible amount of attention to Goldfield from fight fans, gamblers, and the media (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929). Specifically it was recognized that such a large purse had not been given previously, even to famous heavyweights such as John L. Sullivan, James J. Corbett, and Bob Fitzsimmons (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Tex Rickard, Teddy Gay, Larry Sullivan, and Billy Nolan at Cook Bank in Goldfield, Nevada. Source: Charles A. Dana photography (1906).

In addition to the gold bar strategy described above, Rickard’s promotions also included the development of other larger-than-life tactics (Waltzer 2011). For example, unlike most promoters, Rickard publicly announced that “high-society women from as far as New York” would attend the Goldfield, Nevada event (Waltzer 2011, p. 16). Such a promotion was first used to capitalize on Nelson’s desire to support “Ladies’ Day” at his training headquarters. Rickard found out Nelson had an appetite for the “ladies” and helped him set up exhibitions so that interested women could watch him workout without the presence of other men. Such a practice was innovative because generally women were not permitted to attend fights. Nelson’s manager, Billy Nolan, predicted the women would come and 80 women did about 2:30 p.m. on August 22^nd to close the full house ( Tonopah Daily Sun 1906). Rickard believed adding women to the spectator pool provided the event another promotional opportunity. Further, he enjoyed reporting on the “large number of reservations have been made by women singly and by many of the prominent men of the camp for their wives” ( Tonopah Daily Sun 1906). Rickard also advertised that Goldfield Athletic Club was arranging special accommodations for the needs of women, which included

specially sworn in officers who will see that nothing offensive is said or done. No one under the influence of liquor will be allowed within the gates and the officers will be instructed to eject any man who in any way transgresses the rules laid down by the club for the protection and comfort of the women ( Tonopah Daily Sun 1906, p. 1).

In the end, no one would debate the novelty added to this event.

Notably, Rickard recognized that racial attitudes and assumptions were highly debated in the latter part of the 19^th century following the 1859 publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species. Present in many libraries and discussed in all sorts of settings (e.g., work, saloons, country clubs, etc.), Darwin’s seminal book was used to analyze people from all races. As a foundation for Nelson’s description, Rickard promoted previous writings about Nelson as a having a “thick skull and slow-beating heart” which made it “next to impossible for anyone to kayo or out-distance him” (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 49). As an example, Dr. Dudley Allen Sargent of Harvard University, described Nelson’s jaw as so hard he felt it was impossible “to make him fell dazed” while others similarly suggested Nelson’s hard head was comparable to Neanderthal man (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 49). Famed author, Jack London (1905, p. 1), also commented about Nelson stating he “is lower down on the ladder of evolution than is intelligence, is more callous to pain and shock, has less sensibility. At the same time the abysmal brute in him gives him a tremendous capacity to move and to keep on moving.” Such rhetoric promoted by Rickard using the language and authority of others was critical to increasing interest in the “primitive” Nelson and his rugged style against his opponent positioned as the “black wizard of the ring” and “old master” of black champions (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 55). Tex also personally attested prior to the fight that Gans “displayed the patience of an Arizona monk” and was quite capable of the composure needed to win ( The Baltimore Sun 1903).

Overall, after securing another $10,000 in funds to build an 8,000-seat temporary fight bowl on Goldfield’s main street, the event garnered a “$69,715 gate and a $13,215 profit for Rickard” (Waltzer 2011, p. 17-18; Samuels 1957, p. 125-126). Following the event, Rickard was recognized as its architect by famous newspaper writers such as Bart W. Currie of the New York Morning and Evening World; Paul Cowles, acting manager of the Associated Press west of Denver; E. Van Loan, of the L.A Examiner; and R. A. Smith of the San Francisco Call. From this, Rickard built a name for himself and found that using subtle public relations code phrases, such as his line about high society women attending, and stereotypes to capture imaginations was useful to getting high prices for tickets in a boom town. More opportunity became available when San Francisco, the West’s entertainment hub, was not able to provide large-scale entertainment opportunities of any kind because of the earthquake and fire (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Photograph of Gans and Nelson. Source: Toll (2002).

Battle of the century

In 1910, Rickard further changed the course of his life when he promoted the highly anticipated and racially charged “Battle of the Century” for the world heavyweight title between former boxing champion Jim Jeffries and then current champion Jack Johnson, who was an African-American (Kirksey 1929; Roberts 1979, 1983). With the rise of Jack Johnson as the heavyweight world champion and the first official black champion in 1908, American promoters eagerly anticipated a charged bout between Johnson and the previously undefeated champion and “Great White Hope” Jeffries). Jack London, working as a newspaper man for the New York Herald, “had witnessed Johnson’s title victory in Australia, and started all of the ballyhoo that fanned the racist fires in the United States by petitioning Jeffries to come out of retirement to ‘wipe the golden smile’ from Johnson’s face” (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 86).

Rickard, still in Nevada, went for the rights by borrowing money from copper baron Thomas F. Cole and another gambling parlor owner/business partner, Jack Gleason (Waltzer 2011). Through their assistance, Rickard created a $101,000 purse for the Reno, Nevada fight and won the bid to promote the event. Next, Rickard backed his event with another unique promotional strategy that promised a fair fight and reiterated that the boxing affair was family friendly activity (Waltzer 2011). Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Scottish physician and the famous creator of Sherlock Holmes, was given the opportunity to referee the fight because of his fair and just nature (Rawson 1962). Rickard also claimed his staff had checked “forty baby carriages” at his Gans-Nelson fight to assure a safe atmosphere (Waltzer 2011, p. 34). In the end, Rickard staged the Johnson-Jeffries fight in a 20,000-seat temporary wooden stadium and produced a profit of $120,000 for himself through a gate of $270,755, the largest ever, and another $300,000 from film and picture sales (Waltzer 2011; Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Jeffries-Johnson Souvenir. Source: Boxing (1910).

From these experiences, Rickard clearly learned more about the importance of public relations and of the power of pundits in the newspaper press. Again, Jack London portrayed Rickard’s promotion of the Johnson-Jeffries fight as good versus evil to help develop Rickard’s narrative regarding the “Battle of the Century” fight. Writing a column for the New York Herald, London (1910, p. 1). stated:

“Johnson is a wonder. No one understands him, this man who smiles. Well, the story of the fight is the story of the smile. If ever a man won by nothing more fatiguing than a smile, Johnson won today. And where now is the champion who will make Johnson extend himself, who will glaze those bright eyes, remove that smile and silence that golden repartee?”

The smile to which London referred publicly emerged during the bidding for the fight by various competing promoters in Hoboken, New Jersey. As each check attached to a new bid exceeded the others, Johnson’s smile grew wider and brighter. Newspapermen associated this with Johnson’s greed, eventually boosted by Rickard when an envelope full of 15-$1,000 bills and a check for $5,000 fell on the table (Kirksey 1929). Like in Goldfield, Rickard again used the display of money to promote the event and to assure his potential clients he could guarantee their requests, which in Rickard’s bid also included the addition of another $30,000 in thirty days with the balance to be paid at least 48 days before the fight and 70% of the film rights. Before the fight, 3,000 press requests were received and Rex Beach (1910a) of the San Francisco Chronicle estimated that 150,000 words went out over the wire a week before the fight. No doubt this media activity was also prompted by some top journalists who received travel expenses and ten-cents a word from Rickard (Aycock and Scott 2012). Hot rhetoric about the competitors included Beach’s (1910b) comments that Jefferies “has the disposition of a tarantula. He’s got a diabolical gift of second sight” and Edward Cahill’s (1910) announcement that Johnson was a “grinning savage and perfectly trained.”

Following the controversy that ensued from Johnson’s convincing knockout on July 4, 1910, Rickard spent 1912 to 1915 in Paraguay to get away from the stigma of being the man who promoted a mixed-race fight (Aycock and Scott 2012; Kirksey 1929). In Paraguay, Rickard joined with a French-English syndicate to manage a 327,000-acre cattle ranch (Kirksey 1929). Making some money on the investment, Rickard continued to search for Johnson’s next opponent. After Johnson lost his title to Jess Willard in 1915 in Havana, Cuba, Rickard promoted several of Willard’s fights. With Willard, Rickard notably entered the New York market as a boxing promoter and started his relationship with Madison Square Garden ( The New York Times 1916). The match he promoted between Willard and Frank Moran generated a record indoor gate of $150,000 and resulted in Rickard’s decision to permanently stay in New York (Kirksey 1929). Following the experience and challenges promoting that fight, Rickard said he was “the man who controlled the largest arena in the east would control the promotion of every great sporting spectacle to come” (Rickard and Obler 1936, p. 274).

Boxing in the United States was a popular professional sport from the beginning of the 19th century, but it was illegal in most U.S. municipalities. So promoters including Rickard had to either hold events illegally or in more libertarian municipalities such as Utah or Nevada (Gorn 1986; Roberts 1983). In 1920, the New York State Legislature legalized limited boxing matches with the Walker Law. Subsequently, Rickard moved his operation to New York City. The Walker Law limited boxing to 15 rounds and required a physician to be present for all matches. The resulting limitations increased the likelihood that fighters would escape brutal beatings and that popular fighters would not burn out due to long or extended periods of fighting and a lack of poor medical care. A notable consequence of this law was the beginning of so-called “newspaper decisions.” The reduced length of fights in essence prompted more decisions from the judges and local media about the winner of major and even minor contests. The surrounding controversies also prompted and offered boxing the opportunity to seize greater recognition and popularity in the New York market than most other cities. Rickard recognized this as a possible outcome and sought to capitalize on the New York fight crowd full-time in Madison Square Garden II (Rader, 2009). Rickard envisioned a calendar full of Friday-night fights and frequent title fights in all divisions as Madison Square Garden II became the mecca of indoor sporting activities (Aycock and Scott 2012).

The Evolving Madison Square Garden: Struggle and Triumph

During the 1870s, P.T. Barnum transformed a former railroad terminal and open-aired car garage into a center for his circus and performances produced by military band director Patrick S. Gilmore (Burrows and Wallace 1999; Durso 1979; Moore 1964). Locally known as Gilmore’s Gardens and Barnum’s Hippodrome, William Vanderbilt changed the name of the “rickety show-place” to Madison Square Garden when he bought the property to support the National Horse Show and named the arena after the park where it bordered, Madison Square (Moore 1964, p. E8). Ironically, outside of competitive foot racers and walkers, “Sports were not a natural fit at Madison Square Garden”. Thus, in 1889, a group of prominent businessmen and horse aficionados decided to champion the construction of a new Madison Square Garden (MSG II) to better support the horse show in more “comfortable surroundings” (Moore 1964, p. E8). Prominent architect Stanford White was hired by a syndicate, which included Barnum, J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and W.W. Astor among other notables, to design a building also capable of supporting other social activities (Burrows and Wallace 1999; Durso 1979). Totaling $3 million, The New York Times (1890, para. 1) described the new venue as “one of the great institutions of the town, to be mentioned along with Central Park and the bridge of Brooklyn.”

The high cost and enthusiasm shown for Madison Square Garden II emerged from the expansive 12,000-seat hall, 1,200-seat theatre, and first-class restaurant, ballroom, executive rooms, and apartments near the main tower and roof garden that were climate controlled and enjoyed the new innovation of elevator access (Durso 1979; Moore 1964; The New York Times, 1890). However, as a new gathering place for the elites of New York society, the building soon required the presence of other types of events, outside those generally supported by the privileged (e.g., National Horse Show, orchestras, plays, concerts, and art exhibitions) to help the venue stay “in the black” (Moore 1964, p. E8). For example, some members of the syndicate supported Barnum’s procurement of MSG II for his circus, while others also accepted numerous fairs (e.g., Irish Fair), shows (e.g., Westminster Dog Show, Wild West, automobile), and sporting events (e.g., bicycle races, wrestling matches, pigeon-shooting, and exhibition prizefights) to join the venue’s events calendar before the end of 1892 based on finances (Durso 1979; Moore 1964). Rickard’s decision to manage MSG II after his 1920 full-time arrival in New York was a risky proposition because although several event promoters leased Madison Square Garden (e.g., P.T. Barnum), it struggled to stay afloat. The New York Times was sure it would be torn down around 1908 ( The New York Times 1908a, 1908b).² However, backed by circus impresario John Ringling, MSG II survived intact until 1920 when Rickard agreed to lease and manage venue for $300,000 over 10 years (Durso 1979; The New York Times 1920; Figure 5).

Figure 5.

Madison Square Garden. Source: Strobridge & Co. Lithographer (1900).

At this point, we would like to note that by the time Rickard moved back to the United States, and New York, the East Coast was very different and a much more structured place than it had been before the early 1900s. As a promoter, Rickard had many stakeholders with whom to deal including political figures, business men, lawyers, and a public in the midst of a shift from what historian William Leach (1993) described as a move from a “land of comfort” to a “land of desire” (p. 6-8). I n the land of desire, consumers increasingly looked to consumption for social status and happiness (Fullerton 1990). Further, as Leach (1993, p. 124) described, by the 1920s the Land of Desire was filled with formalized consumer spaces with music, designed environments and legal credit, which all lubricated both the human mind and wallet for mass consumerism.

Capitalists turned designing, distribution of inventory, and manager training into both arts and sciences. Schools of commerce—such as the Wharton School of Economics, Harvard Business School as well as art and retail specific institutions such as the New York School of Fine and Applied Arts and the New York University School of Retailing created an increasingly technical training (Leach 1993, p. 157-60). While these schools were fledgling during the first decade of the 20^th century, by the 1920s they were accepted parts of the educational world. Managerial capitalism, then, was king by the turn of 1920 (Chandler 1977). Entrepreneurs, who may or may not have had formal education survived, but they did so in a world dominated by big business striving for scientific efficiency and impersonal results. Citizens looked to wants and material desires as fuel to continue working and consuming in a land of impersonal, corporate factories filled with ruthless clocks and assembly-lines. Escape and the idea of escape became a common part of the urban psyche and helped to fuel the growing success of moving pictures and professional sports (Kasson 2001). Rickard was able, then, to connect his promotions to the tensions of urbanites.

During his first year managing MSG II, Rickard successfully supported 100 fights and helped produce a modest operating profit for the venue following the establishment of the world’s largest indoor swimming pool. The Garden Swimming Pool of MSG II was the highlight of the summer season of 1921 and a noted marvel of modern technology. The pool was a white-tiled giant 250 feet long by 110 feet wide capable of holding 1.5 million gallons of water within its three to fifteen foot depth. Hosting recreational swimming and amateur and professional swimming competitions along with a cascading waterfall, The New York Tribune (1921) described the pool as adding to New York’s fame and suggested “thanks to Tex Rickard” because the pool “surpasses anything ever before attempted for the benefit of sweltering New Yorkers” (p. 21). In addition to boxing and the pool, Rickard was also successful in using MSG II was to stage a variety of other events. For instance, Rickard was influential in bringing the 1924 Democratic Convention to the MSG II as well as Six Day Bicycle races, which saw their zenith with him at the helm (de Wilde 2010; Samuels 1957; Figure 6).

Figure 6.

1924 Democratic National Convention. Source: New York Public Library (1924).

Rickard built upon his previous strategy to include women as spectators of sporting events through special invitations to New York’s aristocracy. Specifically, he targeted Ladies Aid charities to align with boxing promotion. Again, Rickard believed “the participation by the New York women would not only increase the gate but also improve boxing’s image” (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 157). Rickard engaged in this tactic several times toward the collection of hundreds of thousands of dollars for charity like the one Ann Morgan, daughter of J.P. Morgan, supported for the American Friends of France aid agency in January of 1921. With Rickard, such events and the variety of activities encouraged a glamorous “coming out” for women. And with more elegant women attending boxing events (in that they were the ones who could afford the high prices Rickard charged for ringside seats), the sport became even more socially acceptable (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 158). Such community or public relations-related activities should not go unnoticed as transforming the pool for the 1924 Democratic convention cost MSG II $3,000 a day in lost revenues, not to mention what hosting charitable causes cost.

Sport Promotion Part 1: Media Relations

A reporter in the 1920s asked Rickard how he knew what audiences wanted. He responded that he knew what people wanted just by “reading the newspaper” (Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007, p. 14). In turn, the famed promoter also knew how eager newspaper editors were to use sport to sell newspapers. During the 1920s newspapers expanded their emphases on sport and battled to introduce sport as its own separate section of the paper (Evensen 1993). To leverage his traditional promotions (i.e., sport performances and amusements) Rickard used several tactics with and through the media to build identification and event prestige with the public that went beyond press agentry (Grunig and Hunt 1984).

As an example, luxury seating did not begin with Rickard, but he did shape the construction and desire for “the ringside seat” through its location and various amenities ( The New York Times 1935). Illustrative of this mindset, for the Dempsey-Carpentier fight, Rickard insisted on reducing the actual boxing ring from 24 to 20 square feet to fit in another row of ringside seats. As noted above, boxing rings and stadiums were generally temporary ad hoc wooden structures often the domain of underworld hustlers, gamblers, and gangsters prior to Rickard’s arrival (Waltzer 2011). Therefore, attending boxing matches, as well as other sports, could be dangerous and not the same as attending a Broadway Show. Rickard, throughout his career as a boxing and arena-sports promoter, worked to change the perception and experience at sporting events to make them into a lower, middle, and upper class integrated “nights out.” While professional baseball entrepreneurs such as Charles Comiskey and Albert Spalding tried for decades to rebrand their professional sport as a respectable entertainment, Rickard was the leading light to do this for arena sports, especially with boxing (Boddy, 2008; Levine 1985; Riess 1999). At both the old MSG II and the soon to emerge Madison Square Garden III, Rickard used permanent brick and mortar to position those buildings as sport theatres. He also hired a chief usher by the name of Willie Stillman to train his large uniformed staff. Further, “tickets bore portal, aisle, section, and seat numbers…and special police and guards were on hand for protection and to keep order” (Gallico 1965, p. 191). With these practices in place, Rickard was able to attract different classes and genders to his spectacles (Boddy 2008) and was thus able to sell two tickets, where before he and others could only sell one (Gallico 1965).

In his retrospective on Rickard, sportswriter Paul Gallico also pointed out the importance of Rickard’s construction of athletes as “millionaires.” Before Rickard, the public and the press did take an interest in athletic prizes. However, “Tex” turned this small fascination into a national obsession. At the time, everyone knew of other millionaires such as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, but athletes were not in the same category until Rickard nudged them there in the eyes of the public. He steered the press towards not only the athlete as icon of physical prowess, but as representative of wealth and status. In the 1920s, no Rickard athletes represented this better than Jack Dempsey and Gene Tunney. As Gallico (1965, p. 184) recounted, “Control over a million-dollar asset, the title itself, was at stake and was liable to change hands at any moment and with considerable violence.” To play on this, Rickard made the back of his fight tickets gold and used special paper to make the tickets look and feel like real money (Figure 7).

Figure 7.

Dempsey-Carpentier Ticket. Source: International Ticket Company (1921).

To publicize the financing of the new Madison Square Garden (MSG III), Rickard promoted his “Six Hundred Millionaires” group (Gallico 1965, p. 180). Furthermore, as noted above, he created a “Madison Square Garden Club” where members could invest $1,000 into the new Garden in return for access to special seats and be part of developing and enjoying the building’s then state-of-the-art technology ( Fortune 1935b, p. 102). As a return on that investment, Rickard frequently spoke about MSG III’s ability to host multiple events and its five box offices, seven different entrances, and vast size which included ten 14-foot ventilation fans to recirculate air and control the climate in the building (Fortune 1935b).) Other modern engineering additions included a state-of-the-art “Western Electric public address system and telephone wires throughout” with lighting appropriate to stage any event under the watchful eye of 25 stations “manned by the Holmes Protective Service” (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 168). Rickard made the sporting event the social place to be seen and from his first boxing match re-branded sporting events into classy, even family, affairs.

Another one of the most effective marketing tools Rickard continued to rely upon and refine centered around portraying athletic events as “Good versus Evil.” Whether it was hockey or boxing, Rickard, no stranger to ethnically divisive promotion in a racially divided context, often promoted fighters and teams as battling nationalities or under the “David v. Goliath” frame (Boddy 2008). In the famous “1926 Gene Tunney versus Jack Dempsey” bout in Philadelphia, Rickard used this tactic to perfection. Understanding the desperate competitive struggles of newspapers, such the New York Herald and Times, he fed tidbits or seeds of stories that excitable writers brought to fruition as bouts of class or race; and good versus evil. As Evensen (1996) recounted, “(newspaper) Readers were told ‘two modern gladiators,’ one a ‘cave-man’ (Dempsey) the other ‘a student,’ would test the limits of ‘brute force’ and ‘brains’” (p. 83).

Even prior to Tunney versus Dempsey, the 1921 Dempsey-Carpentier fight promoted a contrast in character. Carpentier was the distinguished French World War I flying hero, while Dempsey was cast as a draft dodger, although he was acquitted of that charge in 1920 (Doyle 2008). Hence, many fans favored Carpentier. Equally important, this fight was one of the first events to be broadcast by radio and helped to sell the new technology (Doyle 2008). Rickard believed in the “radiophone” as a new innovation to carry sport to the masses and incorporated that technology into his sport venues (i.e., temporary structures and Madison Square Garden III). Creating agreements with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Rickard helped expose boxing and other sporting all over the East coast (Doyle 2008). The presence of invited celebrity guest workers such as Bat Masterson and Wyatt Earp as “self-appointed keepers of the peace” also “increased the grandeur of the spectacle” as they were described as posted at the main entrance of the arena to disarm individuals (Aycock and Scott 2012, p. 130).

Finally, Rickard was so concerned with how newspaper reporters portrayed his events and ventures that he went beyond strong-arming and developed a slush fund to pay certain reporters). Specifically, Rickard and other Garden staff had specific sportswriters on payrolls for as much as $4,000 (Kidd (1996). Newspaper publishers barely raised a brow because they were happy someone else was paying their reporters. These reporters were also happy to be invited to these special events with preferred seats near the affluent. At the Dempsey-Carpentier fight reporters sat near the likes of industrialists, entertainers, and prominent local residents (Doyle 2008). The list of individuals for this fight and others promoted by Rickard included

John D. Rockefeller, Jr. William H. Vanderbilt, George H. Gould, Joseph W. Harriman, Vincent Astor, and Henry Ford; Al Jolson and George M. Cohan; literary figures H.L. Mencken, Damon Runyon, Arthur Brisbane, and Ring Lardner; …and prominent Long Island residents, such as Ralph Pulitzer, Harry Payne Whitney and J.P. Grace; Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague; and New Jersey Governor Edward I. Edwards (Doyle 2008, paragraph 8).

Sport Promotion Part 2: Community Relations

Rickard’s public relations tactics did not end with the media and the public. He also needed the help of the aforementioned politicians, socialites, and businessmen who could help his venture regardless of class. This tactic was essential when MSG II ceased operations in 1925 and an example of how “The ambitious Rickard would not let the potential of New York City in the ‘Golden Age of Sport’ escape his grasp or ambitions” (Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007, p. 14). In New York, Rickard aimed to create a new building, MSG III, for the consumption of magnificent sporting and entertainment events. In order to accomplish this objective, Rickard did something unprecedented in the sports world at the time: he established the Madison Square Garden Corporation (MSGC) with help from the community. The “Corporation” was an investment and public relations tool that Rickard used to lure and involve investors in Madison Square Garden (Neil 1929). The MSGC consisted of Rickard’s famed “600-millionaires” a term that made use of the cultural resonance of “millionaire” and Rickard’s social capital among the wealthy. Rickard started the corporation after visiting a major contracting magnate, Richard F. Hoyt of Hayden Stone & Co. who offered to help generate the $5.6 million necessary for the new MSG III and to construct the new arena.

MSGC fronted most of the $5.6 million, but Rickard generated an additional roughly $500,000 from a subsidiary called the “Madison Square Garden Club” ( Fortune 1935b). Essentially inventing a finance instrument today’s sports promoters call a personal seat license, Rickard promoted the club as an opportunity for the public to invest in the arena for the first right of refusal to purchase tickets at any and all events: “you could buy a membership in the club for 125 shares of stock” for $1000, which “carried.the privilege of buying one seat in the Garden at box office prices for any event” ( Fortune 1935b, p. 93). It was an unprecedented tactic that sport entrepreneurs would eventually adopt in the 1980s through personal seat license strategies in which fans and investors purchase the rights to buy tickets to a particular seat (Howard and Crompton 2004). John Ringling, who had been the savior of the Garden in the teens, was also made the corporation’s chairman of the board, a position he held until he stepped down in 1928. Finally, the Corporation appointed Rickard president and MSGC gave him a $30,000 salary per year ($408,374 in 2013 via Bureau of Labor Statistics cost inflation calculator) to manage, create, and promote events for the new MSG III.

The new Madison Square Garden opened with a Six Day event on November 24, 1925 (de Wilde 2010). At MSG II, Six-Day bicycle racing was a bi-annual mainstay popular for the speed and the raw endurance it required of riders. Since its inception in 1891, promoters liked the event because it kept spectators paying for events for 144 hours. Teams of paired riders would compete, one at a time, for 6 days for 24 hours each day, to ride for as long as they could. By the 1920s, sprint points, which promoters scheduled at popular times and “premes” or spectator initiated sprints when spectators paid a bit more for a show, helped to stoke excitement. The premier jazz musicians of the age were also hired to play live until the early morning hours at Six Day events as a community relations tool ( Fortune 1935a). Under Rickard’s leadership in the new MSG III, promoters had the largest Six-Day prize purses in their history to reach a previously unimaginable $75,000 (or about $1 million in 2013) in prize money ( The New York Times 1927). The huge prize purses, as well as simultaneously hosting the best jazz musicians, made the Six Day races into week long, all night festivals, which occurred usually in December and March of every year (de Wilde 2010; Figure 8).

Figure 8.

Six-Day Bicycle Racing. Source: New York Public Library (1925).

While Rickard worked to improve traditional Garden mainstays such as Six Day bicycle racing and circuses, he also saw the potential for growth with several relatively new recreational and spectator-sport opportunities favored by a variety of individuals. These included professional basketball and professional hockey, which was a new spectator sport in the U.S. (de Wilde 2010; Nelson, 1999; Wong, 2005). Basketball opened in MSG III shortly after the Six Day bicycle race when on December 6, 1925 the original New York Celtics played the Washington Palace Five ( The New York Times 1925a). However, basketball did not generate enough of a crowd during the 1920s to be a mainstay or the primary tenant of MSG III.³ Boxing was instead considered the marquee activity of that arena. It began on December 8, 1925 when Johnny Erickson defeated flyweight champion Jack McDermott and then continued three days later when defending light-heavyweight champion Paul Berlenbach fought Jack Dalaney to a decision in front of 17,575 fans for a payout of $55,000 ( The New York Times 1925b; Rice 1925; Williams 1925). Overall, boxing secured a regular place on the MSG III booking calendar with scheduled contests on Friday nights. Sundays were reserved for hockey and officially opened MSG III on December 15, 1925 when the Montreal Canadiens defeated the New York Americans 3-1 (Hallahan 1925; Williams 1925; Figure 9).

Figure 9.

Madison Square Garden street view. Source: New York Public Library (1925).

Convinced by a friend, Colonel John Hammond, Rickard chose hockey as an official opening activity because he thought a rink would work well and would be another attraction in New York City during the winter season (Wong 2005; Ross 2008). Rickard also decided professional hockey would be a great addition to MSG III after visiting Montreal with friend Damon Runyon and watching the Montreal Canadiens stylish and sublime play ( The New York Times 1924). As Andrew Ross described in his dissertation (2008), Rickard had choices with hockey. The National Hockey League games had been drawing crowds in Canada, but it was still a very new league with a lot of infighting among owners. It was not clear that the Canadian-based National Hockey League was an advisable league to join. And there were rumors that Rickard and company were proposing an all-American league themselves (Ross 2008, p. 113). The United States Amateur Hockey Association had made inroads in Boston with amateur play and the Boston area, which built a hockey culture. In contrast, the New York area had much less hockey culture. Rickard, though, saw an opportunity and, convinced by Hammond, allowed the National Hockey League New York Americans, who were actually owned by a Canadian Tim Duggan and an underworld mobster named William (Bill) Dwyer, to play at Madison Square Garden (Ross 2008, p. 76-138; Wong 2005, pp. 58, 74, 94).

Convincing fellow MSGC members that hockey would sell in New York City, Rickard installed ice in MSG III and quickly rented the rink to the Americans ( Rochester Evening Journal 1925). After seeing the success the New York Americans generated at MSG III in their first season, Rickard and the members of the MSGC next decided New York City could support a second team ( Ottawa Citizen 1926). Thus, under Rickard leadership, MSGC hired Conn Smythe to provide direction to the newly formed New York Rangers who began play on November 17, 1926 in front of 13,000 against the Montreal Maroons (Lawrence 1926; The New York Times 1926a). Notably, the opportunity to provide hockey teams was justified through MSG III’s 12.5 miles of piping incorporated to freeze water under the terrazzo floor (Figure 10).

Figure 10.

1926-1927 New York Rangers in Madison Square Garden. Source: New York Rangers Hockey Club (1926).

The New York sports world at that time was also unusually diverse and consisted of members of both the well to do as well as hardscrabble sports fans. Thus the addition of basketball, hockey, and boxing was an appropriate promotional strategy to fill MSG III. Other annual events also contributed to the growth of MSG III and to the notion that MSG III was a community facility with great modern technology. For instance, Rickard invited upper class society people to host the Westminster Kennel Club annual dog show at MSG III and continued to do so in 1926 with a record $15,000 in prizes ( The New York Times 1926b). Paavo Nurmi, a nine-time Olympic gold medalist and former world record holder of the 1500 m and 20 k was also recruited to participate in the Finnish-American Athletic Club Games ( The Baltimore Sun 1924; The Boston Daily Globe 1924). Similarly, the Millrose Games, a track & field spectacular, was organized and planned for the new MSG III (The Evening Independent 1925). Overall, the collection and continued success of these annual, new, and special events promoted and hosted at MSG III highlighted the stature and importance of the arena.

To further highlight the diversity of New York City and the community connection, the Madison Square Garden Corporation’s members represented various groups and helped with the promotional and product mix. Famed boxing promoter Mike Jacobs, who later promoted Joe Louis, assisted with the financing of many Rickard promotions and was a member of the MSGC during the early years of MSG III. Jacobs’ connection to Rickard dated back to Goldfield, Nevada in 1905, and Rickard’s gambling hall, the Northern Saloon, first big boxing promotion, the Gans-Nelson fight of 1906. As a noted ticket scalper, Jacobs was also Rickard’s connection between Madison Square Garden management of the 1920s and the New York underworld.

The Madison Square Garden neighborhood was also home to ‘ticket agents and bookies,” that attended events at the arena in the evenings and spent their days in nearby hotels and bars. A block away from the Garden, between 49th and 50th streets, the east side of Broadway was known as “Jacob’s Beach” because “The fight promoter and his pals were likely to camp out there” (Field 2008, p. 41).

A 1935 Fortune article characterized Jacobs as “The Cash” because he raised significant amounts of money for Rickard, often below the table, for projects and promotional activities Rickard wanted to pursue. For example, Jacobs helped create and advertise opportunities to join Rickard’s famous “Ring Side” investor seats ( The New York Times 1953). Further, as the “King of Broadway Ticket Sellers,” Jacobs, would also share in “the speculators cut by the simple expedient of selling his own ticket at a premium above the box-office price” (Field 2008, p. 41). Overall, Jacobs was one of the “many people [who] had a finger in Rickard’s pie” ( Fortune 1935b, pp. 90-94).

Rickard’s linkage to more respectable members of society came through Colonel John Hammond, Colonel John Reed Kilpatrick, and William F. Carey (Founder of Seims-Carey Railway and Canal Company). Hammond, who helped sell Rickard on hockey, had a long association with him. They first met in Buenos Aires when he was a lieutenant in the United States Army assigned as an attaché in Argentina. After promoting the infamous Jack Johnson-Jim Jeffries fight in 1910, Rickard asked Hammond where he should invest the $400,000 (nearly $10 million in 2013) he earned. Hammond replied that Rickard should look into purchasing cattle in Paraguay, which he did. They continued their relationship all the way up to Rickard’s death. Kilpatrick, a Yale graduate bought stock in Rickard’s company and helped to book fights, while Carey helped with construction connections. After Rickard’s death in 1929 all three men fought to control the business.⁴

Rickard’s Legacy: Big Time Arena Sports

Rickard’s goals did not end with New York’s Madison Square Garden. Rickard envisioned networks of teams and arenas around the country. With hockey in particular, he saw an opportunity to bring multiple franchises to New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Boston and, at the time of his death, he was looking into building an arena in the tropics of Miami, Florida (Ross 2008, p. 113). By 1928, his company, MSGC, had built and opened the illustrious Boston Garden, which was originally called the “Boston Madison Square Garden” (Ross 2008, p. 173). The arena came to define the strong hockey culture and entertainment culture of the city of Boston. While Rickard did not directly control Chicago, he certainly inspired promoters such as Paddy Harmon, who built large arenas and attracted National Hockey League franchises as well as other spectacles such Six Day bicycler races in the same model of Rickard. It was a vision that was ahead of its time, but that ultimately has come to full fruition half-a-century later. Rickard’s promotional influence was so overwhelming that he had the power to threaten entire leagues and to push reluctant promoters into line with his visions.

Promoters and politicians have emulated Rickard’s actions and accomplishments in almost every North American city. It is a good bet that if almost anyone in North America were asked the purpose what an urban arena was for, they would respond that they are for “Big Time” basketball, hockey, and other sporting events. This is Rickard’s legacy in the United States: an arena for every city and a team for every arena. Rickard was not solely responsible for arenas as centers of sport. Promoters, such as P.T. Barnum and Patrick Powers, among others, held “sporting” events at the Garden. Yet, Rickard was the one who in the 1920s that brought an older culture of events. Further, Rickard’s model perpetually challenged the Garden and other future arenas to discover newer possibilities of corporate finance, to schedule a variety of events for all classes of people, and to recognize teams as representatives of an entire city and region.

Today, Street and Smith’s Sport Business Journal estimates the sport industry as a $250 billion phenomenon in the U.S. (Milano and Chelladurai 2011). Professional sports are incredibly ubiquitous today. They are talked about in workplaces and are one of the most searched for topics on the Internet. Professional, “million-dollar” athletes, too, have the same status in many cases as celebrity actors and are celebrities in their own right. In the 1920s, Rickard did several things that either directly affected this outcome or served as a catalyst. His actions and legacy as a sports entrepreneur fit well in the Four Ps of marketing: Price, Product, Promotion and Place.

Price

Rickard knew the psychological power of price and price points. Unlike many contemporaries of his age, he did not follow a one-size-fits-all ticketing system. He created different price points for enjoyment by people of different classes. Rickard was one of the first to effectively manipulate the price of admission and the power of tickets. From advertising rows of “ringside” seats to creating a “club” for interested persons to invest in the new MSG III in the mid-1920s, Rickard split ticket packages and created multiple price points to garner a sizable audience. Sports promoters did not catch on to tactics similar to Rickard’s until the 1980s, at which point many had forgotten Rickard existed in the first place. Rickard’s Madison Square Garden club also can be seen as an early attempt at Personal Seat Licenses. Again, Rickard’s system is very similar to the one professional sport franchises utilize and that universities have used for a long time where a certain level of donation is required before alumni can be eligible to purchase a specific level of seat. In so doing, Rickard avoided one of the main pitfalls of spectator sport marketing, myopic strategies, by building consumer connections with his schemes.

Product

Rickard proverbially cut-his-teeth with boxing, but his endorsement of team sports in arenas produced a bigger impact. As he learned from his 1906 title fight promotion, tapping into psychology and emotions created interest. Not unlike the tactics of later baseball promoter Bill Veeck, who believed that product extensions and entertainment filled stadiums as much as quality on-the-court play, Rickard knew professional sports was a business wrapped up in emotions (Masteralexis, Barr, and Hums 2012). By developing arena team sports with season long schedules, such as his Rangers hockey team, Rickard built a long term emotional connection that city residents felt. This laid the ground work for sports to become big business and big politics with public funding after World War II (Howard and Crompton 2004).

Scholars associate the sport product with tangible items like equipment and events (Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007). However, some such as Smith (2008) and Shank (2007) posit that “product” also involves many intangibles. Customer services, elaborate displays, use of impressive technological devices (e.g., indoor swimming pool, radiophone, and ice rink), and the overall quality of the core product all provide intangible value to the total sport product available for consumption. In the end, Daniel and Johnson (2004) suggest sport organizations should carefully select events which match target markets and communicate how their sport product helps meet the needs of current and potential consumers and investors. Clearly, Rickard effectively developed his products and his market with respect to this orientation.

Another prime example of product development was the boxing ring Rickard developed for MSG III. Recognized as Rickard’s finishing touch, the new boxing ring of MSG III was equipped with red lights on each ring post that began to flash following the knockdown of a fighter. The lights were accompanied by bells and a specially coordinated timing system that flashed for 10 seconds ( The New York Times 1925c). The floor of the ring was also made of more durable and safer material able to help avoid slipping and noted as so well-appointed that any boxer should be glad to be knocked out in it! (Aycock and Scott 2012). As part of the weekly calendar, boxing and its ring grew to be highly connected to the history of MSG III.

Promotion

Rickard, as few others were, was adept at using and manipulating the media to make his spectacles into larger-than-life narratives with which people of all genders could identify. Perhaps this was best illustrated by his promotions of Jack Dempsey fights where he would use “brain versus brawn” or the perennial favorite “good versus evil” storylines. Such narratives allowed Dempsey to become the first fighter to generate more than a $1 million in gate receipts, a feat he accomplished five times in the 1920s through the help of Rickard’s promotions (Roberts 1979). Again, Rickard was a master at reading and understanding people’s emotions and manipulating those emotions through newspaper headlines and stories to invest themselves in his spectacles. Social identity-theory related sport management research has shown this has been incredibly effective at creating engaged audiences (Seifried and Clopton 2013).

Additional build-up for the promotion was also spearheaded by Rickard’s ability to organize people’s thoughts about specific boxers in relation to other boxers. Rickard helped develop The Ring magazine as a working vehicle to rank fighters within nine established weight classes. Edited by his friend Nat Fleischer, The Ring also became Rickard’s voice to educate Americans on the top international boxers for prospective match-ups ( The New York Times 1925d). Following the pre-1925 college football rankings established by Walter Camp and Frank Dickinson, Rickard would continue to publish his boxing rankings until his death in 1929.

Promotions can improve acceptance of price and highlight place as anchor for the exchange process (Arnott 2011; Kyle, Kersetter, and Guadagnolo 2003). Stressing important aspects for consumers and investors to focus upon is critical to improving their connection to the products and services offered by a sport organization (Armstrong and Kotler 2011; Smith 2008). Bradish, Lathrop, and Sedgewick (2001) suggest environmental factors (internal and external) should be a priority and main point of emphasis for sport marketers because they can help improve the value of the exchange process for potential customers and investors. Comparisons with previous events and promotions, highlighting new improvements to facilities, providing better customer service attention, and hiring new personnel (players and management) can improve the value and attractiveness of the exchange process (Seifried and Clopton 2013). In his time, Rickard was a case study of effective promotion with respect to these points through his promotion of MSG III’s amenities and technological advancements. By reinforcing desired images, increasing awareness, and effectively communicating important information about events, products, and services, Rickard evoked the reaction from target markets his organization and promotional partners desired.

Rickard’s most effective tool for both studying potential markets and communicating messages with potential audiences was the newspaper (Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007, p. 14). Again, Rickard was a street-smart promoter who used newspaper writers as pundits to have a two-way communication with his audience. Rickard subtly manipulated narratives to make audiences identify with his sports product and he did so in a way that was not very different than what department stores were doing to promote business and the overall culture of consumption prominent in that era (Fullerton 1990). This public relations technique was the key to Rickard’s success as the audiences were unconsciously consuming and identifying with his products in their homes when they read the newspaper.

Place

Place is the last critical aspect of the marketing mix. Rickard promoted and utilized the new MSG III as the epicenter for important sport and entertainment activities in New York City and its specific target markets. Notably, Rickard recruited William F. Carey (Founder of Seims-Carey Railway and Canal Company) and Richard F. Hoyt (Partner in the Hayden Stone Company and Chairman of Wright Aeronautical Corporation) to achieve this and realize a building or venue worthy of those activities. Appropriately, Rickard also promoted MSG III as an incredible opportunity for investors and consumers to realize immediate value for their through the variety of events offered and amenities/services he made available. Overall, Rickard used place as the anchor for other areas of the marketing mix to help him, the Madison Square Garden Corporation (MSGC), and partnering promoters achieve important goals and objectives. Again, as illustrated by the great risk he had in moving to New York, Rickard understood the old real estate adage of “Location, Location, Location.” He was absolutely correct in the branding power and recognition of having an arena in America’s city of cities, New York. The city made his events “premier” and vice versa so that after World War II, governments commonly used public money to build arenas and attract professional teams (Hardy, Norman, and Sceery 2012; Howard and Crompton 2004). Before 1920, arena sports were usually nothing more than bi-annual shows and odd spectacles (e.g., fairs, circuses, shows, etc.) typical of today’s convention centers.

Conclusion

Rickard’s approach to promotion and marketing management was legendary among entertainment entrepreneurs by the time of his death, but his exploits remained notable more than 80 years after his passing. At the core of his strategy was an emphasis on strong fundamentals. He had a strong grasp on what marketing scholars would call the marketing mix in the 1960s (Borden 1964; McCarthy 1960; McKitterick 1957; Rosenbloom and Dimitrova 2011; Shaw and Jones 2005). For sport, Rickard developed excellent products and customer services and used news-catching displays, impressive technological devices, and quality core products to deliver value to the total sport product available for consumption (Smith 2008; Shank 2007). With price, he tried to add value rather than to discount. Westerbeck and Shilbury (1999) describe value as what people obtain in exchange for their money, and whether or not those prospective gains meet their expectations. Rickard made sure that people’s perceptions matched their expectations of his developed place of Madison Square Garden II and III. The famed arenas became a mythic location where purchase and consumption happened simultaneously (Arnott 2011; Mullin, Hardy, and Sutton 2007; Westerbeck and Shilbury 1999). It was central to helping Rickard brand his promotions and served as a marketing strategy and psychographic tool to help determine price and improve promotional quality (Schneider and Bradish 2006; Westerbeck and Shilbury 1999).

More broadly, Rickard’s actions showed entrepreneurs they could shape public opinion and imaginations and demonstrated that promotional activities are as essential as the athletic performances themselves. Such a sport culture defined by Rickard has lasted for close to a century. While historian Roland Marchand showed in Advertising the American Dream (1985) that college educated marketers used sophisticated tactics to define modernity and desire in the 1920s, “Tex” used fundamental techniques with the media to define urban arenas and winter as places and seasons for team sports. In the 1920s, the arena-as-sport-business came to fruition as a mature consumer experience as part of a landscape of desire (Leach 1993; see Figure 11). Consumers could visit art museums, shop in department stores, and/or attend the games, shows, and competitions of Rickard’s Garden. Today, arenas continue as one of the most prominent marketing platforms in North America and exist as very important social anchors of cities (Seifried and Clopton 2013). Teams within them can become so popular that city residents may come to see professional sport teams as the “souls” of their respective cities, which may be the reasons why residents and politicians today continue to identify, spend and fight over them (Seifried and Clopton 2013).

Figure 11.

Boston Garden Official Program. Source: Crosscup Post Inc. (1928).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

1924 Democratic National Convention (1924), New York Public Library Digital Gallery, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://nygeschichte.blogspot.com/2010/08/madison-square-garden-ii-interior.html].

1926-1927 New York Rangers (1926), New York: New York Rangers Hockey Club, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://cdn.nhl.com/rangers/images/upload/2009/07/192627_lg.jpg].

Aycock

Colleen

Scott

Mark

(2012), Tex Rickard: Boxing’s Greatest Promoter. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.

Armstrong

Gary M.

Kotler

Philip

(2011), Marketing: An Introduction, 10th ed. Boston, MA: Prentice Hall.

Arnott

Ian

(2011), “Effective Marketing Communication Efforts of Sports Development Initiatives: A Case Study of the Public Sector in the United Kingdom,” International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, 1 (1), 8–21.

Bain News Service (n.d.), Tex Rickard. Washington, DC: Library of Congress and Photographs Division, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.32373].

Barney

Jay

(1991), “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Journal of Management, 17 (1), 99–120.

Baxter

Pamela

Jack

Susan

(2008), “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers,” The Qualitative Report, 13 (4), 544–559.

Beach

Rex

(1910a), “Great Fight Draws More Scribes Than Russo-Japanese War,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 3, 1.

10.

Beach

Rex

(1910b), “Jeffries Will Win If…,” Reno Evening Gazette, July 1, 3.

11.

Beech

John

Chadwick

Simon

(2007), Managing Sport Products and Services: The Marketing of Sport. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

12.

Boddy

Kasia

(2008), Boxing: A Cultural History. London, UK: Reaktion Books Ltd.

13.

Borden

Neil H.

(1964), The Concept of the Marketing Mix. Journal of Advertising Research, 4 (2), 2–7.

14.

Boston Daily Globe (1924), “Board Tracks Bother Nurmi,” December 16, 10.

15.

Boston Garden Official Program (1928), Boston, MA: Crosscup Post Inc., November 17.

16.

Bradish

Cherie

Lathrop

Anna. H.

Sedgewick

Whitney

(2001), “Girl Power: Examining the Female pre-Teen and Teen as a Distinct Segment of the Sport Marketplace,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 10 (1), 19–24.

17.

Burrows

Edwin G.

Mike

Wallace,

(1999), Gotham: A History of New York City until 1898. New York, NY: Oxford.

18.

Cahill

Edward F.

(1910), “Another Case of Too Much Johnson, Grinning Savage Perfectly Trained,” San Francisco Call, July 5, 1.

19.

Chandler

Alfred D.

Jr (1977), The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

20.

Daniel

Kerry

Johnson

Lester W.

(2004), “Pricing a Sporting Club Membership Package,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 13 (2), 113–116.

21.

Dempsey-Carpentier Ticket (1921), Summit, NJ: International Ticket Company, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.pophistorydig.com/?tag=tex-rickard].

22.

de Wilde

Ari

(2010), “Dizzy Race to Nowhere: The Business of Professional Cycling, 1891-1940,” doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.

23.

Doyle

Jack

(2008), “Dempsey vs. Carpentier, July 1921,” PopHistoryDig, (September 8), (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.pophistorydig.com/?tag=tex-rickard].

24.

Durso

Joseph

(1979), Madison Square Garden: 100 Years of History. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

25.

Eisenhardt

Kathleen M.

(1989), “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management Review, 14 (4), 532–550.

26.

Eisenhardt

Kathleen M.

Graebner

Melissa G.

(2007), “Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges,” Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1), 25–32.

27.

Evensen

Bruce J.

(1993), “‘Cave Man’ Meets ‘Student Champion:’ Sports Page Storytelling for a Nervous Generation during America’s Jazz Age.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 70 (4), 767–779.

28.

Evensen

Bruce J.

(1996), When Dempsey fought Tunney: Heroes, Hokum, and Storytelling in the Jazz Age. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.

29.

Field

Russell D.

(2008), “A Night at the Gardens: A History of Professional Hockey Spectatorship in the 1920s and 1930s,” doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

30.

Filo

Kevin

Funk

Daniel C.

(2005), “Congruence between Attractive Product Features and Virtual Content Delivery for Internet Marketing Communications,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 14 (2), 112–122.

31.

Fortune Magazine (1935a), “For Six Days,” March, 10, 88–124.

32.

Fortune Magazine (1935b), “Madison Square Garden,” October 1, 88–108.

33.

Fullerton

Ronald A.

(1988), “How Modern is Modern Marketing? Marketing’s Evolution and the Myth of the “Production Era,” Journal of Marketing, 52 (1), 108–125.

34.

Fullerton

Ronald A.

(1990), “Art of Public Relations: U.S. Dept. Stores, 1876-1923,” Public Relations Review, 16 (3), 68–80.

35.

Gallico

Paul

(1965), The Golden People. New York, NY: Doubleday.

36.

Gorn

Elliot

(1986), The Manly Art: Bare-knuckle Prize Fighting in America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

37.

Grunig

James E.

Hunt

Todd

(1984), Managing Public Relations. Fort Worth, TX: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

38.

Hallahan

John

. (1925), “Professional, College, and Amateur Hockey on Tap for Local Fans this Week,” Boston Daily Globe, December 14, A16.

39.

Hardy

Stephen

Norman

Brian

Sceery

Sarah

(2012), “Toward a History of Sport Branding,” Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 4 (4), 482–509.

40.

Howard

Dennis R.

Crompton

John L.

(2004), Financing Sport (2nd ed.). Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

41.

Jeffries-Johnson Souvenir (1910), Strand, London: Boxing, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://tonyofnewyork.blogspot.com/2012/10/johnson-jeffries-fight-of-1910.html].

42.

Jones

D. G. Brian

Shaw

Eric H.

(2006), “Historical Research in the Journal of Macromarketing, 1981-2005,” Journal of Macromarketing, 26 (2), 178–192.

43.

Kasson

Joy S.

(2001), Buffalo Bill’s Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.

44.

Keith

Robert J.

(1960), “The Marketing Revolution,” Journal of Marketing, 24 (3), 35–38.

45.

Kidd

Bruce

(1996), The Struggle for Canadian Sport. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

46.

Kirksey

George

(1929), “He Was My Pal Said Many Men in Varied Walks,” Waterloo Evening Courier, (January 9), (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://boxingbiographies.com/].

47.

Kotler

Phillip

Armstrong

Gary

(1994), Principles of Marketing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

48.

Kyle

Gerard T.

Kersetter

Deborah L.

Guadagnolo

Frank B.

(2003), “Manipulating Consumer Price Expectations for a 10 k Road Race,” Journal of Sports Management, 17 (2), 142–155.

49.

Lawrence

Seabury

(1926), “Ranger Six Wins Debut in Garden,” The New York Times, November 17, 11.

50.

Leach

William

(1993), Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture. New York, NY: Pantheon.

51.

Levine

Peter

(1985), A. G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball: The Promise of American Sport. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

52.

London

Jack

(1905), “How Different People View Fighters: Brain Beaten by Brute Force,” San Francisco Examiner, September 10, 1.

53.

London

Jack

(1910), “Negro Never in Doubt, Fear, or Trouble Played all the Time,” The New York Herald, July 5, 1.

54.

Madison Square Garden Street View Postcard . (1925), Postcards New York Public Library, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://nygeschichte.blogspot.com/2010/08/madison-square-garden-iii-1925-1968.html].

55.

Marchand

Roland

(1985), Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity 1920-1940. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

56.

Masteralexis

Lisa

Barr

Carol

Hums

Mary

(2012), Principles and Practice of Sport Management, 4th ed. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

57.

McCarthy

E. J.

(1960), Basic Marketing: A Managerial Approach. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

58.

McKitterick

John B.

(1957), “What is the Marketing Management Concept?” in The Frontiers of Marketing Thought and Action, Bass

Frank

ed. Chicago, IL: American Marketing Association, 71–82.

59.

Milano

Michael

Chelladurai

(2011), “Gross Domestic Sport Product: The Size of the Sport Industry in the United States,” Journal of Sport Management, 25 (1), 24–35.

60.

Moore

Thomas F.

(1964), “A Grand Time for All at the Garden,” Sports Illustrated, 20 (11), E7–E8.

61.

Mullin

Bernard J.

Hardy

Steven

Sutton

William A.

(2007), Sport Marketing, 3rd ed. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

62.

Neil

Edward J.

(1929), “Story of Tex Rickard’s Life Reads Like Something Lifted from Work of Fiction,” The Hartford Courant, January 7, 14.

63.

Nelson

Murry

(1999), The Originals: The New York Celtics Invent Modern Basketball. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press.

64.

New York Tribune (1921), “A Roof Over an Ocean,” July 10, 10–12.

65.

Ottawa Citizen (1926), “Second New York Hockey Club Admitted to National League, April 19, 6.

66.

Rader

Benjamin

(1983), “Compensatory Sports Heroes: Ruth, Grange, Dempsey,” Journal of Popular Culture, 16 (4), 11–22.

67.

Rader

Benjamin

(2009), American Sports from the Age of Folk Games to the Age of Televised Sports, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.

68.

Rawson

Mitchell

(1962), “A Case for Sherlock: The Jeffries-Johnson Title Prize Fight Nearly had Arthur Conan Doyle as its Referee,” Sports Illustrated, March 5(accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1134899/1/index.htm].

69.

Rice

George G.

(1913), My Adventures with Your Money. Boston, MA: The Gorgam Press.

70.

Rice

Grantland

(1925), “Berlenbach Nearly out in Fourth but Batters way to Victory before 23,000 at New Garden,” Boston Daily Globe, December 12, 7.

71.

Rickard

Maxine

Obler

Arch

(1936), Everything Happened to Him: The Story of Tex Rickard. New York, NY: Frederick A. Stokes Co.

72.

Riess

Steven

(1999), Touching Base Professional Baseball and American Culture in the Progressive Era, Rev. ed. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

73.

Roberts

Randy

(1979), Jack Dempsey. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

74.

Roberts

Randy

(1983), Papa Jack: Jack Johnson and the Era of White Hopes. New York, NY: Collier MacMillan Publishers.

75.

Rochester Evening Journal (1925), “Rickard to Dabble in Professional Hockey,” February 6, 79.

76.

Rosenbloom

Bert

Dimitrova

Boryana

(2011), “The Marketing Mix Paradigm and the Dixonian Systems Perspective of Marketing,” Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 3 (1), 53–66.

77.

Ross

Andrew

(2008). Hockey Capital: Commerce, Culture and the National Hockey League, 1917-1967, doctoral dissertation, University of Western Ontario, Canada.

78.

Ross

Andrew

(2012), “Guest editorial,” Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 4 (4), 476–481.

79.

Samuels

Charles

(1957), The Magnificent Rube: The life and gaudy truth of Tex Rickard. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

80.

Schneider

Ray. G.

Bradish

Cherie

(2006), “Location, Location, Location: The Marketing of Place and Super Bowl XL,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 15 (4), 206–221.

81.

Seifried

Chad S.

Clopton

Aaron W.

(2013), “An Alternative View of Public Subsidy and Sport Facilities through Social Anchor Theory,” City, Culture, & Society, 4 (1), 49–55.

82.

Shank

Matthew D.

(2007), Sports Marketing: A Strategic Perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

83.

Shaw

Eric H.

Brian Jones

D. G.

(2005), “A History of Schools of Marketing Thought,” Marketing Theory, 5 (3), 239–281.

84.

Siggelkow

Nicola

(2007), “Persuasion with Case Studies,” Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1), 20–24.

85.

Six-Day Bicycle Racing (1925). New York Public Library Digital Gallery, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://nygeschichte.blogspot.com/2010/08/madison-square-garden-iii-1925-1968.html].

86.

Smith

Aaron

(2008), Introduction to Sport Marketing. Oxford, UK: Butterworth& Heineman.

87.

Smudde

Peter. M.

(2004), “Implications on the Practice and Study of Kenneth Burke’s Idea of a ‘Public Relations Counsel with a Heart,’” Communication Quarterly, 52 (4), 420–432.

88.

Strobridge & Co. Lithographer (1900), Madison Square Garden. New York Public Library Digital Gallery Billy Rose Theatre Collection, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/].

89.

The Baltimore Sun (1906), “Today’s Big Fight: Crowds Flock to Goldfield to Take Their Places beside the Ring,” September 3, 13.

90.

The Baltimore Sun (1924), “Nurmi to Compete in Garden Games,” December 16, 31.

91.

The New York Times (1908a), “Year More of Life for the Old Garden,” November 13, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

92.

The New York Times (1908b), “Start Plan to Save Madison Square Garden,” November 16, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

93.

The New York Times (1916), $45,000 to Willard Bout with Moran,” January 13, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

94.

The New York Times (1917), “Madison Square Garden Deficiency,” January 13, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

95.

The New York Times (1920), “Tex Rickard Gets Madison Square Garden,” July 12, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

96.

The New York Times (1924), “Rickard to Confer Rink for Garden,” March 11, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

97.

The New York Times (1925a), “Celtics Nose Out Palace Five, 35-31,” December 7, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

98.

The New York Times (1925b), “Tex Rickard Ranks 90 Leading Boxers,” January 12, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

99.

The New York Times (1925c), “Larger than the Old,” November 22, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

100.

The New York Times (1925d), “Knockouts Aplenty Thrill 10,000 in First Fistic Show at New Arena,” December 8, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

101.

The New York Times (1926a), “New York Rangers Start Ice Training,” October 20, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

102.

The New York Times (1926b), “Westminster Show Opens before 10,000: Record Crowd Storms Exhibition,” February 12, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com] .

103.

The New York Times (1927), “Spencer and Winter Win 6-Day Bike Race,” December 11, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

104.

The New York Times (1935), Features of the Fight Outside the Ring. July 3, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

105.

The New York Times (1951), “W. F. Carey Is Dead,” February 24, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

106.

The New York Times (1953), “Mike Jacobs Dies of Heart Attack,” January 25, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

107.

The New York Times (1960), “John Reed Kilpatrick, 70, Dies,” May 8, (accessed July 10, 2013), [available at http://www.nytimes.com].

108.

Toll

David. W.

(2002), The Complete Nevada Traveler: Description and History of Goldfield. Virginia City, NV: Gold Hill Publishing.

109.

Tonopah Daily Sun (1906), “Goldfield Women Take in the Nelson Exhibition: Fighter’s Quarters Stampeded Until Standing Room only Remains,” August 23, 1.

110.

Waltzer

Jim

(2011), The Battle of the Century. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC.

111.

Westerbeck

Hans. M.

Shilbury

David

(1999), “Increasing the Focus on “Place” in the Marketing Mix,” Sport Management Review, 2 (1), 1–23.

112.

Williams

Joe

(1925), “Tex Rickard,” Beaver Falls Tribune, December 28, 10.

113.

Wong

John

(2005), Lords of the Rink: The Emergence of the National Hockey League, 1875–1936. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

114.

Yin

Robert K.

(1981), “The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 26 (1), 58–65.

115.

Zontanos

Grigorios

Anderson

Alistair R.

(2004), “Relationships, Marketing and Small Business: An Exploration of Links in Theory and Practice,” Qualitative Market Research, 7 (3), 228–236.