Gatzia,D. E.,& Brogaard,B. (Eds.). The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception claims to be the first edited philosophical volume to take the limelight off visual perception, which has dominated the field of the epistemology of perception thus far. Instead, it dedicates itself to expanding the field to include the multitude of perceptual experiences, which are non-visual yet may also have consequences for the justification of our beliefs.

As one would expect from such a title, the range of topics covered by this volume is extremely broad. While discussing the more commonly researched exteroceptive senses of audition, touch, olfaction, and gustation, it also tackles less defined “senses” such as proprioception, interoception, and our range of emotions. While often studied in isolation, the chapters in this volume acknowledge that these senses (and ultimately our perception) are influenced by each other, as well by our cognitive states, through the processes of multisensory integration and cognitive penetration. Thus, in tackling these complex influences, this volume encourages us to view the epistemology of perception through new “eyes.”

The editors begin with an overview of the current landscape of epistemology and common approaches to epistemic justification, before introducing each of the chapters and the epistemic challenges they present. These comprise an impressive range of themes including multisensory integration and mental imagery, aspect perception, representation and accuracy, epistemic privilege, event perception (experiences of duration), emotional experience, and interoception.

Each stand-alone chapter, written by experts in their respective fields, then offers a fascinating portal into how we might perceive and understand various aspects of our world: from the flavour of food (Smith, Chapter 1, p. 29), to the emotions of artworks (Copenhaver and Odenbaugh, Chapter 9, p. 213). Comprising such a wide variety of philosophical disciplines, what makes this volume a fascinating read also poses some structural challenges. The first couple of chapters are loosely connected under the umbrella of multisensory perception, while the last few refer to more interoceptive senses such as emotion and our sense of virtue. Supported by each other, these chapters felt like the more developed “sections” of this volume. Unfortunately, this sense of development was lost in the middle, where I found myself leaping from one sense and epistemic challenge to another. This made establishing a sense of continuity and balance difficult: not the fault of the individual authors themselves but perhaps a reflection of the current lack of balance across the field itself.

This volume raises many questions throughout which serve to demonstrate the need for further discussion across the field. One key question that emerges quite late in the game is the lack of agreement upon the definition of what constitutes a sense (Kuhle, Chapter 10, p. 249). I felt that the volume as a whole would have benefitted from more time spent discussing such key concepts, whose agreement is vital to facilitating the further cross-disciplinary discourse this volume wishes to promote. A conclusion of some sort would have thus been a welcome aid to help the reader to make sense of so many heavily loaded topics, some more readable than others. How do the approaches of each modality relate to one another; what are their commonalities and differences; and how do they together challenge or support current epistemic theories? Where are the gaps in the research, where do we need to focus our attention most, and what would this ultimately mean for the field of perception in general, whether visual or not?

Furthermore, why does the epistemology of non-visual perception matter in the wider scheme of things? Not only do such questions have implications for the justification of our beliefs, but for the decisions we make as a result of those beliefs. A non-visual approach has implications for how we design our built environments, with the potential to render it more inclusive to those with visual impairments or other sensorial capabilities. It can also have implications for the way people feel in these environments (Copenhaver and Odenbaugh’s discussion of emotion expressed in artwork could, for example, also be applied to architecture and design). Greater awareness of our range of senses, including our emotions, and their role in our perception would also help us better understand our relationships with other people, whether they are autistic or psychopathic (two non-neurotypical conditions also discussed in this volume). Furthermore, it also has implications for how we function as a society (the final chapter on “The Perception of Virtue” alludes to this). And while these are perhaps questions for another volume further down the track, it is important to keep in mind the reasons why we have chosen to invest our time in such philosophical discussion in the first place.

The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception has boldly put non-visual perception on the epistemic map, showcasing the variety of important questions which are begging for our attention. For this, it is to be commended, having achieved its primary aim of highlighting the diversity of approaches, the challenges they present to existing thought and encouraging further discussion. As often happens when breaking new ground, there are cracks in the landscape which need to be filled. However, this volume has taken the foundational step in levelling the field.