Abstract
In short, Attentional Engines is a book about cognitive science and art. Thus, it should be relevant for any cognitive scientist or psychologist interested in art (and aesthetics). But it is also very much “a book for philosophers of art interested in the role cognitive science can play in explanations of art and aesthetic practices” (p. 23). Nevertheless, “it is also a book for neuroscientists and psychologists interested in the kinds of ontological questions that structure the philosophy of art” (p. 23). So, the potential audience of Attentional Engines is quite large and essentially interdisciplinary.
Concerning the usefulness of cognitive science for explaining art, William P. Seeley takes the position of moderate optimism. While extreme optimists argue from a reductionist perspective that all questions about art could be ultimately answered by cognitive science (or neuroscience), extreme pessimists state that cognitive science cannot provide any relevant explanations of art (because questions about art are questions about normative conventions). Moderate pessimists would take a somewhat in-between position and concede that cognitive science can contribute to the understanding of art but only minimally. However, as mentioned earlier, Seeley is a moderate optimist. He thinks that by modeling psychological processes of our engagement with art, cognitive science can provide helpful information about the nature of art and thus contribute to the philosophy of art.
As mentioned in the first paragraph, the book is also about ontological questions. Therefore, one would expect that it tries to propose an answer to the question what art is. However, and perhaps wisely, Seeley does not want to give a final definition of art. Instead, he asks how to “locate” art (i.e., how to disambiguate artworks from other objects). Essentially, Seeley provides two related answers. First, “artworks are powerful communicative devices, cognitive stimuli intentionally designed to express some point, purpose, meaning, or idea” (p. xvii). And second: “Artworks are attentional engines. They are artifacts structured to draw attention to themselves, to draw attention to the way they have been set up to express their content” (p. xvii). The second answer more or less represents the key idea of the book and gives a first impression why Seeley thinks that cognitive science is relevant for understanding art.
Thus, the focus of the book is on the communicative function of art and how artworks can achieve this function by guiding our attention (utilizing knowledge about normative artistic conventions). The main contribution and theoretical core of the book is the development of a diagnostic recognition framework that is intended to serve as a unified framework for interdisciplinary research in philosophy of art and cognitive science. It can be seen as a theory of our interactions with artworks. Its central claim is that artworks are attentional engines that direct our attention to their artistically salient features.
Seeley dedicates the first three chapters of the book to the development of the diagnostic recognition framework. Specifically, he criticizes neuroaesthetic approaches for failing to locate art (i.e., failing to distinguish the perception of artworks from the perception of other objects by solely relying on common perceptual mechanisms) and suggests instead to focus on the cognitive processing of diagnostic cues in artwork that allow their classification as art. This also requires to appropriately contextualize the artworks and identify the category of art they belong to. The following middle part consisting of four chapters focuses on the application of the framework to visual art, dance, music, and movies. For instance, the diagnostic recognition framework suggests that sensorimotor processing contributes to the perception of diagnostic features, especially for dynamic media like dance and movies. The next chapter illustrates how important the right cognitive framework is for locating art by putting attention on the diagnostic features of an artwork. Finally, the last chapter wraps up the different arguments and provides a recapitulation of the diagnostic recognition framework. The essence could be summarized in Seeley’s own words as: “The puzzle of locating art is ultimately a puzzle about how to recognize (locate, identify, and articulate) the artistic salience of artworks. [ …] The solution to the puzzle of locating art is to orient discussions in cognitive science to the role played by categorization processing in our interactions with artworks” (p. 234).
In sum, my feelings about this book are somewhat mixed. Coming mainly from the fields of psychology and empirical (visual) aesthetics, I’m certainly pleased that a philosopher finds cognitive processing relevant for the study of art. But I might have wished a bit more emphasis on visual art and discussions of psychological models of art and aesthetic appreciation. On the other hand, the attempt to apply the proposed diagnostic recognition framework to a broad range of artistic media is certainly no shortcoming. Furthermore, the ontological questions asked in the book are questions that psychologists often don’t ask at all and that they usually leave to philosophers. So, one could ask: Did I really fully understand every philosophical argument in the book? I’m not sure. Do I fully agree with every argument? Probably not. However, this book definitely made me think a lot and opened new perspectives for me. And I suppose that this is the most important feature of a philosophical treatise. Thus, I recommend Attentional Engines for anyone interested in a moderately optimistic view how cognitive science can help to understand art and to connect empirical research with philosophical theories about art.
