Abstract
A minority group’s demand for a separate territory is usually understood as its protest against the majority rule in a democratic setup. While the minority’s demand for a separate territory is against the majority rule, it is certainly not against the principles of majoritarianism. In the process of resisting against the majority rule, the minority aspires to be seen as a majority in an exclusive territorial arrangement that it demands. In this case, the minority takes a majoritarian approach to achieve greater democratic rights. This can be called as majority–minority paradox in a democracy. The present article is an attempt to critically understand the Bodoland conflict in Assam; especially as to how the Bodos demand for an autonomous or separate territory on ethnic lines can be seen as a similarly majoritarian approach to democracy. The demand for a separate territory exclusively for the Bodos revolves around the concept of majoritarianism. This article finds a key contradiction in how majority rule is opposed and simultaneously majoritarianism is practiced by groups demanding a separate Bodoland. This article also investigates militant organizations that are allegedly fighting for the “Bodo” cause including the various factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. It also seeks to investigate what happens to the democratic rights of non-Bodos in the majoritarian “minority” politics of the Bodoland Territorial Area District.
Demands for separate and exclusive territorial arrangements based on ethnic identity are a commonality in the states of Northeast India, where multiple armed groups have made demands for separate territories based on ethnic identity. Ethnicity has become a dominant factor in local politics for a host of reasons, but one of the major factors is the perceived minority status of the ethnic groups in question. The Indian state-building process and the pursuit of “democracy” and “modernity” are in many ways interlinked with a sense of alienation and deprivation among ethnic minorities in India, which has consolidated ethnic consciousness as a political discourse that is used to mobilize collectively against deprivation, alienation, lack of representation, and exploitation created by a variety of social, political, cultural, and economic processes. However, resistance against dominance by the majority and demands for exclusive territorial arrangements by minority groups are not necessarily a fight against majority rule. Rather, minority groups often aspire to become a majority within an exclusive territoriality of their own.
Demands for a separate territory or special arrangement for a minority group are often justified by the need to protect minority rights. India has a strong federal structure, decentralization of power, a well-balanced legislative–executive relationship, and constitutional provisions to protect minority rights. The Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Part Three of the Indian Constitution guarantee basic rights to all which is a provision to protect the minorities against the “tyranny of majority.” At the same time, provisions in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution guarantee the autonomy of the tribal and the ethnic minority groups. Under the Fifth Schedule of Indian Constitution, the land and natural resources of the Adivasis (tribals) living in the scheduled areas of nine states (Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Rajasthan) are protected. Under the Sixth Schedule, the cultural identities, economic, and political interests of the original inhabitants of the eight states (Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Jammu and Kashmir) are also protected. Similarly, there are a host of provisions and special provisions within the constitutional framework of India that protect the underprivileged and the minorities against any attempt of domination by the majority rule.
In India, majority rule is often understood as “hegemony” and the cause of subjugation against minorities, which is perceived as “marginalization.” Majoritarianism as “hegemonic” reflects the superiority of the majority and its right to rule over minorities, whether in the sphere of politics, culture, or the economy. 1 The debate on “Hindu majoritarianism” implies supremacy of “Hindu” religion over India’s religious minorities. Scholars in India have highlighted the discrete but dominant cultural practices of the “Hindu majority” and thereby implicitly propounded a theory of majoritarianism. 2 The existence of multiple minorities in India can be best explained as nested in nature, much like a “Babushka doll,” where one can observe a minority within a minority, and further within another minority. For instance, “Hindus” are the majority in terms of religion, and among the Hindus, the upper castes have dominant positions. The same applies to the geographical divides within India. The majoritarian outlook of the “North Indians” has been one of the main issues of contestation by the non-North Indians. The principles of majoritarianism alienate and marginalize the minority groups based on various factors. For instance, the Hindu majoritarianism in India is seen as a major factor of alienation against religious minorities, tribals, lower castes, and smaller linguistic minorities. 3 While a democracy, in principle, is supposed to respect the interests and rights of minorities, majoritarianism is a belief in majority rule as an “exclusive” right to dominance by the majority over the minority.
Despite the constitutional safeguards that put checks on majoritarianism and aim explicitly to protect minority rights, many sections of Indian society feel alienated as they continue to be dominated by some majority group or the other. Constitutional provisions that allow majority rule, or rule by the greatest number, are a major cause of political domination, alienation, and imposition of social and cultural “superiority” of some groups over others; hence contributing to the prevalence of majoritarianism in India. The mechanisms of Indian democracy are designed to create minorities at all levels, while the dominance of majority groups and subjugation by majority rule prompts minority groups to resist. Minority resistance takes the shape of autonomist, regionalist, and secessionist movements, which seek official recognition for distinct interests, rights, and identities. In this process, minority groups seek to establish their “exclusive supremacy” against the majority within a defined territorial boundary. Minority groups thus apply majoritarianism as a principle in the hope of achieving the democratic rights guaranteed within the constitutional framework. While seemingly fighting against majority rule, groups demanding the protection of minority rights and identity do not necessarily discard the idea of majoritarianism. It is under this conceptual framework of minority rights and majoritarianism that this article engages with the Bodoland conflict in the Northeast Indian state of Assam.
The Bodoland Conflict
The demand for a separate Bodoland in the state of Assam is one of the oldest conflicts in India. Dating back to the early 1930s, the Bodoland movement has passed through many stages as the nature of the demands, issues, and contenders keeps changing at each stage of the conflict. The existing literature traces the issues such as ethnicity and identity, conflict over resource distribution, “domination of Ahom nationalism,” alienation, and lack of representation to the demand for a separate Bodoland. The movement has gone through many stages, starting from peaceful demand for a separate state for the ethnic Bodos and other tribal groups in the plains of Assam to violent militant activities. The violent movements demanding greater autonomy of the Bodos were first waged by the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) followed by various factions of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Although special arrangements to accommodate the demands and rights of the Bodos have been made, the conflict refuses to die down, as some groups still continue to resort to violence. At the same time, the issues relating to the rights and status of the non-Bodos living in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) are also contributing to the conflict. The next section of this article describes several of stages of the Bodoland conflict.
The Bodos are one of the major ethnic minority communities in India, living in the states of Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh. Small Bodo communities also live in the neighboring countries of Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. The term “Bodo” may include a large number of tribes—the Garos of Meghalaya, Tippera of Tripura and Boro-Kacharis, Koch, Rabha, Lalung, Dimasa, Hajong, Chutia, Deuri, and Moran, inhabiting Assam as well as other states in Northeast India. The majority of the Bodos live in Assam, where they constitute a little more than 30 percent of the state’s total tribal population. In Assam, the Bodos mostly live in the lower and middle parts of the Brahmaputra valley, covering the districts of Golpara, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup, and Darrang. The Bodos are patriarchal and follow Bathauism, a form of animism, 4 although over time the majority of Bodos have converted to Hinduism and some have converted to Christianity. Traditionally, the Bodos used to depend on farming for their livelihood. Shifting cultivation or jhum used to be the main method of cultivation practiced by the Bodos.
At present, the majority of Bodos in Assam inhabit four districts, popularly known as the BTAD, which was carved out of the eight districts of Kokrajhar, Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup, Darang, and Sonitpur, following the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) Accord between the BLT, the Assam government, and the Government of India (GoI) in 2003. The BTAD is administratively ruled by the BTC, within the Sixth Schedule provisions of Indian Constitution.
The history of Bodo movements demanding a separate state dates back to the British colonial period. The organized territorial demand started consolidating in the 1930s. The separation of the Naga Hills Districts and the Tuensang areas of North East Frontier Agency from Assam to form the state of Nagaland was one of the major factors that prompted the Bodos to form a political forum to carry the movement forward. To this end, the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) was formed in 1967, and the demand for a Union Territory for the Bodos and other tribal groups in the plains was put forward. The PTCA also demanded that the proposed Union Territory be named “Udayachal.” One of the important aspects of the PTCA demand was that it did not exclusively agitate for the rights and status of the ethnic Bodos only. Rather, it united all other tribal groups in the Plains against the “majoritarian policies” of the ruling Ahoms. However, a parallel sociopolitical organization, the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) was formed in 1967, mobilizing around a different set of demands as they pressed for a separate state only for the Bodos. The ABSU demand was to “divide Assam 50–50” to carve out a separate Bodoland state on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra river. ABSU mobilized around issues of Bodo identity, exploitation, unemployment, and socioeconomic and political injustice in their demand for a separate homeland for the Bodos. The ABSU movement went through a gradual paradigm shift, from a peaceful and democratic movement to a violent one. PTCA and ABSU differed fundamentally as far as the rights and status of the “Bodo minority” was concerned. Despite the fundamental differences, ABSU and PTCA worked in tandem until 1979, when ABSU decided to work independently without PTCA’s support. One of the main reasons for the breakup between PTCA and ABSU was related to the representation of the Bodo cause. Since PTCA also claimed to represent the interests of other tribal groups along with those of the Bodos, it was accused of not delivering justice for the Bodos. Unable to promote the interests of the Bodos, PTCA underwent a major split in 1984 when the United Tribal Nationalists’ Liberation Front (UTNLF) was formed under the leadership of Binai Khunger Basumataray. The UTNLF and ABSU united to work for the Bodos and submitted a joint memorandum to the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, for a separate home land for the Bodos. 5
There was a striking difference in the narrative used by PTCA and ABSU during this phase of the conflict. The ideological narrative of PTCA was largely related to the minority rights of the ethnic groups of the proposed Udayachal area. PTCA did not exclusively fight for Bodo rights, while ABSU fought exclusively for the Bodos. The initial failure of these forums can be attributed to two major factors. First, all these forums failed to identify the majority against whom they constructed their minority narrative. Mere narratives of resistance against exploitation and deprivation and demands for social, political, economic, and cultural rights did not allow them to achieve much. Second, all these forums became a part of the pro-Assam movement in the 1980s, led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU). 6
The mass movement led by AASU and its political wing Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) was primarily aimed against the alleged “foreign nationals” living in Assam, who were mostly “illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.” The movement demanded the identification and eviction of these “foreign nationals” to ensure that Assam would be only for the Assamese, a majoritarian narrative that ended with the signing of Assam Accord in 1985. The Assam Accord was signed between the GoI and the leaders of the Assam Movement as a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) on August 15, 1985. The Accord came into force after several rounds of talks between the GoI and the leaders of Assam Movement. The Accord dealt with issues relating to “infiltration by foreigners,” development and economic safeguards, citizenship certificates, and restoration of normalcy.
AGP came to power in 1986 riding on the larger narrative of Assam identity versus the “outsiders” or “illegal Bangladesh immigrants.” After AGP came to power, Bodo organizations that had supported the AASU movement felt deceived, as the newly elected government hardly did anything for the autonomy of the Bodos. Under the active leadership of ABSU, the demand for a separate Bodoland outside the state territory of Assam was intensified. The demand for “greater autonomy” was initiated on March 2, 1987, with ABSU making three central demands: Formation of a separate state named Bodoland on the north bank of the Brahmaputra. Establishment of autonomous district council in the tribal dominated areas on the south bank of Brahmaputra. Incorporation of the Bodo Kacharis of Karbi Anglong in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution.
7
The ABSU demand for greater autonomy for the Bodos and other plain tribes was raised on behalf of a multitude of economic, political, language, and ethnic identities. For the first time, ABSU highlighted the protection of Bodo minority rights and the rights of other plains tribes against the nontribal majority, especially the Ahoms. Within the demands for the protection of minority rights, the rights of the Bodos were emphasized. Although explicitly vouching for the autonomy of the Bodos, ABSU was not in a position to exclude other tribal minorities during this time, perhaps because other tribal minorities were not perceived as a threat to the Bodo cause. As thousands of protestors were put behind bars, the movement for greater autonomy only grew stronger. The “repressive policies” of the state and central government against the Bodo agitation only strengthened the antimajoritarian narrative against the Assam government, which was perceived to be led by the Ahom majority. The hopes and aspirations for a separate Bodoland state were also boosted by political developments in the neighboring states during this period such as the accords signed between the GoI and the Mizo National Front in 1986, the Tripura National Volunteers in 1988, and the Gorkha Hill Council Pact with the Gorkha National Liberation Front in 1988. 8
A closer analysis of the Bodoland movement during this phase reveals that sociopolitical and economic factors were responsible for the consolidation of a sense of minority identity among the ethnic Bodos. On the social front, issues pertaining to identity and language thus played important roles in consolidating the movement for a separate Bodoland. Both the Bodo language and identity were perceived to be dominated by a majoritarian Assamese discourse. The perceptions of losing the Bodo identity were strengthened thanks to certain provisions in the Assam Accord of 1985. Clause 6 of the Assam Accord ensured constitutional, legislative, and administrative provisions to protect, preserve, and promote the cultural, social, and linguistic identity and heritage of Assamese people, 9 causing much apprehension among the Bodos of the prospect of losing their social, cultural, and linguistic identity to the larger Assamese identity. The Bodo groups feared that Clause 6 of the Accord would provide legitimacy to the Assamese majorities to impose Assamese identity on them. As a result of such fear of losing their identity, Bodo groups demanded a separate Bodo state and expressed their unwillingness to be identified as Assamese.
Forums such as ABSU and Bodo Sahitya Sabha made attempts to counter the efforts of the Ahom majority to “Ahomise” Assam. 10 Several policy initiatives by the state government of Assam further added to the fear of the Bodos. The identity issue was also linked to the sense of alienation among the Bodos, due to the language policy followed by the Assam government. The Assam Official Language Act (1960) 11 made Assamese the official language of Assam. The Bodos perceived the Act as an imposition of Assamese language on them, which prompted them to demand before the GoI to include the Bodo language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution in order to protect the language and identity of the Bodos. On the identity issue, Bodos along with other tribal groups of the plains felt threatened by the successive governments’ policy (including the AGP-led government) of complete assimilation of minorities within the larger Assamese identity. 12 The democratically elected successive governments in Assam were perceived by many Bodos and other tribal minorities as proponents of oppressive majoritarian rule.
On the political front, the rising political consciousness among the Bodos, especially among the youth, drove the movement further. Separate territorial arrangements within the constitutional framework of India for the smaller tribal groups in the neighboring states made the demand for a separate Bodoland seem legitimate, in light of coercive measures by the Central and State governments. To a great extent, the use of force to uphold law and order was perceived as an act of majoritarian imposition against the Bodo minority, and political activism against security forces thus became an important means of sustaining the movement.
On the economic front, Bodos and other plains tribals experienced alienation from resources such as land and forest. There were two important causes of land alienation, as perceived by the Bodos and other tribal groups. One was the “infiltration of nontribals” especially “illegal Bangladesh immigrants” into tribal areas. The other was the appropriation of tribal lands by the Assam government for development projects. According to one source, the Udayachal Movement in Assam raised the issue of government appropriation of 600,000 acres of land for several projects. 13 The “infiltration of outsiders” into tribal areas was also seen as a cause of large-scale unemployment, as the “outsiders” laid claim to limited resources.
Although the so-called infiltration of foreigners into Assam was a common issue between the Assamese majority and the Bodo minority, the policies followed by the Assam government with regard to the appropriation of land and the implementation of the Official Language Act were clear instances of majority rule versus minorities. As mentioned above, since the AGP-led government had failed to address the grievances of the Bodos and continued to follow policies that were perceived as equally oppressive as compared with the previous government, the sense of alienation among Bodos was further consolidated. Based on this, one can argue that the Bodoland conflict, in more than one way, was a fight against the majoritarian rule of the Ahoms. Since peaceful and democratic ways of putting forward their demands yielded limited results, some groups among the Bodos took to arms in order to establish a separate Bodoland.
Militancy and the Bodoland Conflict
Eventually, various Bodo groups took up arms and engaged in targeted attacks on non-Bodos in the Bodo-dominated areas, in the name of demands for a separate Bodoland. Most of the violent activities were carried out under the banner of ABSU. With the formation of the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC) in 1988, stray acts of violence were organized into political violence for the Bodo cause. The BPAC, accused of being the armed wing of ABSU, was responsible for targeting non-Bodos within Bodo-dominated villages in Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Barpeta, Nalbari, Darrang, and Sonitpur districts. 14 The violent activities of BPAC cadres were not only confined to non-Bodos, they also targeted the members of PTCA, and those Bodos who opposed separation from Assam. The assertion of Bodo identity over non-Bodos highlights a sense of minority grievance among the Bodos. Through identity assertion, the Bodos attempted to dominate a specific territory as a majority group.
The formation of the Bodo Security Force (BSF) under the leadership of Ranjan Daimary is considered to be an important landmark for the Bodo movement. BSF was rechristened as the NDFB on November 25, 1994. The objectives of the group are to liberate Bodoland from the Indian expansionism and occupation; free the Bodo nation from the colonialist exploitation, oppression, and domination; establish a Democratic Socialist Society to promote liberty, equality, and fraternity; and uphold the integrity and sovereignty of Bodoland. 15 BSF resorted to secessionist violence with the agenda to “liberate the Mongoloid dominated Indo-Burman region.” 16 As the BSF was not succeeding in achieving its objective, some members of the group floated a new militant organization, the BLT, under the leadership of Prem Singh Brahma, founded on June 18, 1996. This was the period when both groups were targeting each other over the issue of representing the Bodo cause better. Despite the differences between the two groups, aggressive nationalism was used by both, as an instrument and justification for asserting Bodo rights. It was evident that the movement for a separate Bodoland, led by various Bodo groups, was essentially based on the minority card. However, the “majority” that the movement was fighting against was not clearly defined, as different groups had varied opinions on this issue. It can thus be argued that “Bodo nationalism” emerged through a multifaceted contestation: against the Indian state, against the “dominance of the Assamese nation,” and in clashes with other minority identities. 17 On the one hand, the movement was fighting against the majoritarian rule of the state government, and on the other hand, it was trying to acquire dominance over other non-Bodo groups, in a clearly majoritarian approach to politics. The Bodo majoritarian approach can be observed in violence against non-Bodos perpetrated by groups like BLT. The violence of the BLT and the counterviolence by the state made the situation worse, until both the parties eventually agreed to enter into negotiations.
The Accord of 2003: Recognition of a Bodo Majority?
An MoS was signed between the GoI and Government of Assam on one side and the BLT on the other on February 10, 2003 for the creation of BTC. This agreement is also popularly known as the Second Bodo Accord. 18 As per the Accord, the jurisdiction of the BTC extends over 3,082 villages, and the BTC has been given legislative powers over forty subjects in these villages. According to the Accord, the forty subjects are: small, cottage and rural industry; animal husbandry and veterinary; forest; agriculture; Public Works Department (PWD); sericulture; education (primary education, higher secondary including vocational training, adult education, and college education [General]); cultural affairs; soil conservation; co-operation; fisheries; panchayat and rural development; handloom and textile; health and family welfare; public health engineering; irrigation; social welfare; flood control; sports and youth welfare; weights and measures; library services; museum and archaeology; urban development—town and country planning; tribal research institute; land and revenue; publicity/public relations; printing and stationery; tourism; transport; planning and development; municipal corporation, improvement trust, district boards, and other local authorities; welfare of plan tribes and backward classes; markets and fairs; lotteries, theatres, dramatic performance, and cinema; statistics; food and civil supply; intoxicating liquors, opium and derivatives, and so on; labor and employment; relief and rehabilitation; and registration of births and deaths. The preamble of the Accord reads:
The GoI and the Government of Assam have been making concerted efforts to fulfill the aspirations of the Bodo people relating to their cultural identity, language, education, and economic development. Toward this end, a series of talks were held between GoI, Government of Assam, and BLT since March 2000. As a result, it is agreed to create a self-governing body for the Bodo Areas in the State of Assam.
The preamble of the Accord lays more stress on issues related to ethnic Bodos, as compared to the other tribal groups living in these areas. The culture, identity, language, and economic development of the Bodos are highlighted in the preamble, without any mention of other groups. However, the Accord also has provisions to accommodate the rights and aspirations of other ethnic minorities living in these areas. Highlighting the protection of minority rights of the non-Bodos, provision 4.2 under the status of BTC says that: A provision will be made in Para 2(1) of the Sixth Schedule for increasing the number of members for BTC up to 46 out of which 30 will be reserved for Scheduled Tribes, 5 for non-tribal communities, 5 open for all communities and 6 to be nominated by Governor of Assam from the unrepresented communities for BTC area of which at least two should be women. Nominated members will have the same rights and privileges as other members, including voting rights. Election from the 40 constituencies of BTC shall be on the basis of adult franchise. The term of the elected members of BTC shall be for 5 years.
19
Safeguards for the settlement rights transfer and inheritance of property, etc. of non-tribals will be suitably incorporated in Para 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Any such law as may be made by the BTC in this regard will not, in particular.
20
The Majority–minority Debate within BTAD
The majority–minority issues in the context of the Bodoland conflict can be observed in more than one perspective and spheres. Despite being numerically a majority group within the BTAD, some factions of Bodos perceive themselves as a minority, as compared to the other ethnic groups put together. The individual ethnic groups, including Koch-Rajbangshis, Rabhas, Adivasis, tea tribes, Assamese, and Bengali Hindus and Muslims, are clubbed together to manufacture such a narrative. Similarly, the majority–minority debate also seems to be prevalent among the Bodos at multiple spheres and spaces. The next section of this article analyzes the majority–minority debate within the BTAD.
In BTAD, the perception that rights of the Bodos have been neglected and Bodos have been reduced to a minority continues to prevail. Such perceptions, combined with the political developments around these issues, lead to conflict situations between Bodos and non-Bodos in BTAD. The Bodos, who constitute about 30 percent of the BTAD population, are perceived to be both a majority and a minority at the same time. It is the largest ethnic group, which makes it the majority, but it is a minority compared to all the non-Bodos put together, who constitute around 70 percent of the BTAD population. NDFB thus manufactures a non-Bodo majority against the Bodo minority by clubbing together all other ethnic minorities within the territory of BTAD. The NDFB derives legitimacy for such a narrative by rejecting the provisions of the Bodo Accord of 2003, which NDFB believes has sacrificed the interests of the Bodos. NDFB dismisses the Accord outright, terming it illegitimate because the state government of Assam has failed to delegate actual power to any of the forty departments as promised.
22
In a memorandum presented to the government, the NDFB-Progressive (NDFB-P) asserted that: These Accords are full of loopholes which rather have threatened the land rights of the Bodos and other indigenous people, nullifying the provisions of Tribal Belts and Blocks. The BTAD has attracted swarms of infiltration of undeserving elements. So the Bodo and other indigenous tribal people of the region want to have a separate state as they have every right to it on the basis of unique history and distinct identity with rich cultural heritage.
23
Religion has played a major role in the majority–minority paradox of the Bodoland conflict. Over the years, there has been influx of “illegal Bangladesh immigrants,” which is seen as a serious threat to the Bodos and other indigenous tribes. Thus, attacks on non-Bodo tribal groups by Bodo militants can also be seen from a religious angle. The Hindu Bodos, who constitute a majority among the Bodos, feel threatened by the rising Christian and Muslim population. It is important to mention here that NDFB is believed to be a militant organization of Christian Bodos against the erstwhile BLT, which was a militant group representing Hindu Bodos. These religious fault lines have been instrumental in strengthening majority–minority narratives among Bodos. Religion may also have played an important role in the rising factionalism within NDFB. NDFB has now split into three groups: the group led by Dhiren Boro (known as NDFB-P) and the group led by Ranjan Diamary (NDFB-R) are engaged in peace talks with the government. The group led by I. K. Songbijit (NDFB-S) continues to carry out violent militant activities.
While the Bodos have been fighting for special status, there is also a counternarrative to the Bodo dominance among non-Bodo groups living in BTAD. This counternarrative presents another perspective on the majority–minority debate in the region. Of late, there have been growing assertions of minority rights among non-Bodos, under banners such as All Bodoland Minority Students Union (ABMSU), which is mainly an organization for Muslims, and “Sankhyalagu Aikhya Mancha” (Minority United Front). ABMSU has even demanded proportionate employment for Muslims and reservation for minority students and has asked political parties to reserve at least three seats for minorities in constituencies where they are in absolute majority. 25 Non-Bodo tribal groups have also taken up arms to protect their rights and counter violent attacks by Bodo militants. Armed groups such as the All Adivasi National Liberation Army and Birsa Commando Force, representing some of the ethnic minorities, have been formed to defend their territories and properties from Bodo attacks. Armed conflict in BTAD illustrates the increasing valorization of the majoritarian principle, based on ethnic identities and their geo-cultural linkages with a territory.
Conclusions
The demand for a separate Bodoland is based on majoritarianism as a principle. Over a long period of time, Bodos have been using the issue of minority rights to access special status and separate territorial arrangements. The formation of the BTAD is one example of an arrangement based on the principle of majority rule. The provisions of the Bodo Accord of 2003 provide more advantages to the Bodos as compared to other ethnic groups living in BTAD. The Bodo party BPF has been in the helm of political affairs ever since the Bodo Accord was signed. However, a majority section of Bodos have yet to come to terms with certain provisions of the Accord, as these provisions ensure the rights of non-Bodos within the territory. There is still a demand for privileges exclusively for the Bodos.
The Bodoland conflict has more to do with the perception of being dominated by a majority group than with genuine grievances. For instance, some Bodos are manufacturing a majoritarian narrative by clubbing all non-Bodo groups against the Bodos, making the Bodos a minority within the BTAD. It should be noted that no individual ethnic group in the BTAD has more numbers than the Bodos.
The Bodoland movement, since its inception till date, has been based on the majoritarian approach toward achieving democratic rights. While the demand for a separate Bodoland for the minority Bodos is based against the majority rule or dominance of the majority, it essentially accepts principles of majoritarianism as democracy. The “democratic” forums that claim to be representing the Bodos do not seem to be democratic in a deeper sense, as these groups aim to be a majority in each stage of their movement. The Bodo demand for a separate state and autonomy reflects their objective of being a majority. Various instrumentalities such as identity, culture, economic, and political interest are being used in attempts to achieve such objectives. As discussed in this article, an autonomous territory, greater administrative powers, and preferential treatment for Bodos would not resolve the ongoing conflict. A case in point is the failure of the BTC to satisfy the demands of both the Bodos and the other ethnic minorities in BTAD. Taking a lesson from the case of the Bodoland conflict, it can safely be argued that in India, majority rule is at odds with the spirit of democracy. At the same time, minority demands for exclusive territorial arrangements testify to the prevalence of the principle of majority rule.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.