Why Transnational Class and State? A Response to Ian Taylor

An Inductive Element

My first point is that in spite of the self-acknowledged “theoreticism,” ²⁶ there was a strong inductive element in his work (which is different from empiricism as discussed below). Conceptual developments in his first book ²⁷ were informed by his reading of historiographies of state development in England, France, and Germany and by empirical analyses by Marx, Engels, and other classics. His study of Fascism and Dictatorship drew, in addition to material from Marxist debates in the period, on more recent historiography, and Poulantzas himself characterized the work as “a study in political theory—which of course cannot be carried out without thorough historical research.” ²⁸

The next book, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, was about Europe at the time of writing and was clearly based on his close following of contemporary events, especially in France “because my own personal experience is situated here.” ²⁹ It also utilized empirical studies of transnational companies and was informed by French statistics, ³⁰ French discussions about industrial policy, ³¹ by studies of the French elite, census data, and more. ³² In the same way, the analysis of the democratizations processes in Southern Europe was a theoretical interpretation of unfolding events that he had followed closely. This book, however, also illustrates one of the weaknesses in Poulantzas’s method.

A Neglect of Concrete Analyses

The book was “addressed to a relatively well-informed readership, who have been following the events in these countries with a political interest, and [the book] can thus to a certain extent dispense with a factual description and concentrate on underlying causes and their explanation.” ³³ In other words: we all already know the relevant facts; here is my theoretical interpretation of them.

While underscoring the inductive element in his work, this also illustrates what Jane Caplan diagnosed as “a pervasive deficiency of method…an assumption, nowhere queried in the book, that at any given moment all the empirical knowledge required for the full expression of a theorized problem does, in fact, exist.” ³⁴ Importantly, Poulantzas himself was aware of this. He acknowledged that his “theoreticism” had led to “ultimately a certain neglect of concrete analyses.” ³⁵ Indeed, Poulantzas never really did engage in original empirical work himself. But still, many of his theoretical innovations were based on considerations of the evidence available to him about contemporary realities. This goes, for instance, for concepts such as “the internal bourgeoisie,” “the new petty bourgeoisie,” and “authoritarian statism” and for his pioneering analysis of “the internationalization of capitalist relations.”

The question, then, for those who want to do Poulantzian work, is whether the relative neglect of concrete analyses is to be emulated or remedied. My position is clear: Poulantzas acknowledged this as a weakness; it is not “Poulantzian” to emulate it.

Engaging with Methods Discussions

This distancing from empiricism has consequences for the understanding of the status of theoretical concepts. Thus, for instance, Poulantzas wrote about “an empiricist conception of knowledge which cannot recognize the proper autonomy of theory.” ³⁶ The context for these comments was a discussion of how Marxist concepts differed from “‘schemas’, ‘models’, or ‘ideal types’,” ³⁷ all of which he saw as ultimately relying on an empiricist conception of knowledge. There are two elements in his alternative; one is that a concept is not to be constructed by “an abstraction from […] real phenomena”; the second is that a concept should be elaborated in relation to other concepts; the concept of the capitalist state should be elaborated in relation to the concept of the capitalist mode of production.

This deserves a more thorough discussion than possible here. For present purposes, it suffices to say that the second point remains valid but that the first point can be read as if empirical information is irrelevant for theoretical work (“the autonomy of theory”)—contra the evident inductive element in his own work. It can also be read as a result of his first book’s carrying a valid point too far: the point that theoretical work is important in its own right and is a relatively separate activity, which is different from being “autonomous”; later, he acknowledged that his “theoreticism” had led to “an over-rigid epistemological position.” ³⁸

For present purposes, the important thing is that Poulantzas strived to be clear and explicit about the status and nature of his concepts. Furthermore, a telling footnote testifies not only to this but also to his willingness to acknowledge the shortcomings of his own immediate academic environment and to engage with and learn from discussions about such questions in the wider social sciences. On the “ideal type” versus Marxist concept discussion he wrote:

This important problem is in fact the key one in contemporary discussions concerning methods in the social sciences. As these discussions are at a rudimentary level in France, I refer to an excellent book in which they are presented: E. Topitsch (ed.), Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Cologne/Berlin, 1965. ³⁹

Engaging with Non-Marxist Work

Finally, this willingness to engage with wider debates pertained not only to methods; Poulantzas was also open to build on contributions from “contemporary texts in political science,” ⁴⁰ whether Marxist or not. Thus, in his first book, he mentioned many American political scientists, sometimes approvingly as when David Easton was credited with “two very important works.” ⁴¹ Indeed, a good case can be made that both Easton’s systems theory and the structural-functionalist approach developed by Gabriel Almond and others had some impact on Poulantzas’s state theory as argued by Clyde Barrow ⁴² whose reading of Poulantzas is much in line with the one suggested here. The decisive question for Poulantzas was whether such contributions were serious, and concerning this, “their Marxist or non-Marxist character does not in any way provide a relevant criterion of their seriousness or their lack of seriousness.” ⁴³

In summary, my understanding of a “Poulantzian reading” is characterized by the following: (1) it is based on his historical materialist problematique as defined by concepts such as mode of production, social formation, state, class, power bloc, hegemony, and more. (2) But it is also open to further theoretical developments and innovations, based inter alia on observations of contemporary realities, while also guided by the overall problematique and existing concepts. Indeed, theoretical innovation in response to observed societal change is a central feature of his work. Therefore, it is important not to neglect “concrete analyses.” (3) It engages—critically so, but still engages—with contemporary discussions in the social sciences about methods and the nature and status of different kinds of concepts. (4) Finally, it is open to and engages with analyses of contemporary society from other traditions and schools of thought as long as they are serious.

The Class Concept

Following Poulantzas’s rendition of Marxist class theory, “social classes are groupings of social agents, defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process, i.e. in the economic sphere.” ⁵⁰ This is, in Goertz’s terminology, the basic level of the definition. But already at this level, it is indicated that more is to come, and Poulantzas almost immediately moves on to the next level where additional dimensions are added. Still, the basic level is, indeed, fundamental and serves inter alia to distinguish classes from other groupings such as the state bureaucracy, the military, and the clergy—labeled social categories by Poulantzas—that also can play important roles in politics. ⁵¹ A basis in the production process is, then, the first dimension in the class concept.

To this dimension, Poulantzas adds political and ideological criteria and matters become a bit more complicated. He writes that “a class can be considered as a distinct and autonomous class, as a social force, only when its connection with the relations of production, its economic existence, is reflected on the other levels by a specific presence.” ⁵² But this “specific presence” comes in two varieties. One is exemplified by Marx’ analysis of the French peasantry in the 1848 revolution, an economic class that had neither a political organization nor an ideology of its own but still was the factor that could explain the rise of Bonapartism. ⁵³ Another and more recent example is the impact on French economic policy of “nonmonopoly capital,” showing that this “class fraction” that “exists in its own right but without constituting a social force” nevertheless has “pertinent effects” at the political level. ⁵⁴ The second variety of a “specific presence” is where a class has a political ideology and organization of its own and therefore qualifies as a “distinct and autonomous class, as a social force.”

A TCC?

Turning now to the question of a TCC, there seems to be agreement that such as class exists at the economic level. This is the implication of Taylor’s argument that “ruling classes have been progressively integrated into transnationalizing class structures.” Neither does Taylor dispute that these transnationalizing class structures have pertinent political and ideological effects, so the disputed question is whether a TCC exists in the strong sense of the word, as a social force. Does it has a political ideology and organization of its own?

When answering this, we note that the weaker criterion—pertinent effects—is contained in the stronger one—ideology and organization. Hence, we have a two-dimensional strong class concept: economic presence and ideology + organization. Both are necessary, together they are sufficient; class is a NSC concept. As there is no or only little disagreement about the first criterion, it is sufficient to consider the second. Whether this criterion is met is an empirical question, and there is robust evidence to show that this condition is fulfilled.

The study of “the global corporate elite and the transnational policy-planning network” by Carroll and Sapinski ⁵⁵ clearly brings this out. To substantiate further and elaborate in relation to the subdimensions of the class concept, I will summarily mention a few examples. The first is The International Chamber of Commerce, which describes itself as “the world business organization” […] “With a global network of over 6 million members in more than 100 countries,” representing “business interests at the highest levels of intergovernmental decision-making” and working “to promote international trade, responsible business conduct and a global approach to regulation.” ⁵⁶ The second example is the Business20 or B20; “the private sector’s voice of the G20 community. It addresses the global challenges and priorities defined by the G20 countries, by building solid consensus amongst business leaders, international organizations (IOs) and civil society regarding how they should be approached.” […] “B20’s trademark is the development of consensus based concrete policy proposals from the private sector” […] “The process involves the constitution of taskforces (TFs) of around 100 business representatives of the entire G20 and invited countries.” The B20 submits “its policy recommendations to the G20 leaders.” ⁵⁷

These two examples suffice to show that a TCC do exist in the Poulantzian sense of the concept. The second and more restrictive criterion—the presence of an ideology in the sense of an articulated understanding of shared interests and political organizations tasked with pursuing those interests—is met. It is an empirical fact that the “transnationalizing internal bourgeoisies” have come together, articulated their shared interests and created organizations to pursue these interests politically.

The next example nuances the picture by bringing in the next levels of the class concept, where divisions and conflicts within the class between fractions, strata, and, in this case, industries are introduced. I refer to the range of industry-specific global business associations such as The World Semiconductor Council, ⁵⁸ The Institute of International Finance, ⁵⁹ and the many organizations listed as having consultative status with the United Nations (UN), for example, International Organization of Automobile Manufacturers, International Textile Manufacturers Federation, World Steel Association, International Council of Forest and Paper Associations, International Council of Toy Industries, and the International Motorcycle Manufacturers Association. ⁶⁰

In Poulantzas, we find the distinction between industrial and banking capital, between “monopoly” and “nonmonopoly” capital, and contradictions between industrial monopolies, for instance, over public finance and state support; and between “banking monopolies,” for instance, struggles for control over the money market. ⁶¹ Elaborating on the category of “contradictions between industrial monopolies,” we can say more generally that this is about sections of capital whose accumulation strategies are affected differentially by present or prospective state policies. A major case in point in today’s world is the conflict between green and black capital, taking opposing positions to climate change politics and other sustainability issues. ⁶²

This conflict also has “pertinent effects” in the form of transnational class formation, as evidenced by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development which describes itself as “a global, CEO-led organization of over 200 leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world.” ⁶³

In sum, the structure of the class concept is such that it recognizes the existence and importance of divisions within the capitalist class but maintains that these are precisely divisions within a class. Whether there is a class or not is decided on the basis of the dimensions of the first two levels of the concept; the third level adds new dimensions and complexity to the picture of this class.

In consequence, Taylor’s first argument against the TNC concept misses the point. The argument was that “the idea that a TCC exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it underestimates the horizontal socioeconomic and political competitiveness and contestations between individual capitals.” Claiming that a TCC exists in the sense of identity, articulated shared interests and organizations is not the same as claiming that it is a “unified bloc” nor does it deny the possibility or reality of conflicts and tensions between the nationally constituted parts of this class. Therefore, to some extent, the critical arguments forwarded by Sean Starrs ⁶⁴ also miss the point. The fact that capital is much stronger organized at the national level does not preclude the possibility that it also is organized transnationally, and it does not preclude the existence of important cleavages and conflicts within the transnational power bloc. Indeed, no capitalist classes are “unified blocs,” and the fact that some fractions or sections of a class are more powerful than others, as shown convincingly by Starrs in the case of US capital, ⁶⁵ does not preclude the existence of important shared strategic interests between them and the capacity to pursue those interests accordingly.

Taylor’s second argument against the TNC concept is twofold: that state sovereignty and territoriality still exist and that “class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.” ⁶⁶ These arguments bring in the state; and for good reasons in a Poulantzian context. Poulantzas was a state-and-class theorist, insisting that classes should be understood in their relations to the state and that conversely, a class perspective is essential in understanding the state. Therefore, these arguments are addressed (and largely refuted) in the next section.

Levels and Dimensions in the State Concept

Poulantzian state theory is complex with several themes and subthemes. At the basic level, the state is defined by its function as the factor of cohesion for a class-divided social formation or “the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system” ⁶⁷ and as being a “material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions.” ⁶⁸ This is the broadest definition of the state, covering all states including the capitalist state. Narrowing the definition to the latter, this type of state has several “fundamental characteristics” ⁶⁹ or defining features; that is, what in Goertz’s terminology are the dimensions of the concept.

At this second level, the state is defined by the ideological, political, and economic functions or modalities of its overall function as the factor of cohesion. These modalities are then further subdivided and specified at the third level of the concept. The political function, for instance, is to organize hegemony by organizing the power bloc and disorganizing the dominated classes; a basic economic function is to secure private property and other fundamental legal and institutional requisites for a capitalist economy.

The next dimension is that the capitalist state is materialized in state apparatuses that have a relative autonomy from the dominant classes, ⁷⁰ apparatuses that are running on bureaucratic principles and staffed by a professional bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. At the third level, these are further specified into administrative state apparatuses, repressive (police, military, etc.), ideological (education and church), and economic (economic policy, infrastructure, and social services) apparatuses.

The third constitutive dimension—or “fundamental characteristic”—of the concept is the state’s structuring of sites of political contestation. Depending on the form of regime, ⁷¹ this can be an open political scene—for example, a parliament,—where political parties openly compete for influence, but this is only a subset of the wider field of politics. ⁷² Political contestation can also take place inside the various state apparatuses where social forces can engage through interest groups and other channels. In “exceptional forms” of the capitalist state (dictatorships and fascist states), this is the dominant pattern; normal capitalist states are liberal democracies where, however, the gravity of power has moved from the legislative to the executive. ⁷³

Next come some equally important Weber inspired characteristics of the capitalist state. It “holds a monopoly of legitimate physical violence,” a feature that Poulantzas accepts as constitutive for this type of state but not for all types. ⁷⁴ The capitalist state is also characterized by the rule of law, it is based on and upholds a legal order that “forms a set of abstract, general, formal, and strictly regulated norms,” ⁷⁵ differentiating it from noncapitalist legal orders. Thus, “the legitimacy of its concentration of organized force is a “rational-legal” legitimacy based on law.” ⁷⁶ Finally, the capitalist state is a centralized territorial state. The monopoly on violence relates to a territory with fixed borders and to the population in that territory. ⁷⁷

In short, the dimensions of the concept of the capitalist state are the power relations, state functions, state apparatuses, structured sites of contestation, monopoly on violence in relation to a fixed territory, and a codified rational legal order based on abstract principles.

A TNS?

There can be little doubt that this concept of the state is of the NSCs type. A state that does not have all of these characteristics is not really a capitalist state according to the Poulantzian definition. The conclusion in the present context is obvious: based on this definition, there is no transnational capitalist state; one observation is sufficient to make this clear: there is no transnational or global centralized monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Some would claim that the US state—the world’s only military superpower—serves this function. ⁷⁸ This, however, is debatable. US military power undoubtedly has been important for the construction of global capitalism, as also shown by Panitch and Gindin, ⁷⁹ but its reach has never encompassed the whole globe and it has always been and remains being contested. To argue that this amounts to a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence is, in my opinion, to take the argument too far.

Referring to a “TNS,” therefore, clearly is stretching the concept. But conceptual stretching is not necessarily a bad thing, as argued by Collier and Mahon ⁸⁰ and Goertz, ⁸¹ provided it is done explicitly, precisely, and with a clear understanding of the consequences. It may mean, for instance, that the concept is transformed from an NSC to a family resemblance concept. It also calls for a consideration of the analytical costs and benefits of this upscaling operation.

It is fair to say that proponents of the TNS concept have paid insufficient attention to this, and this is why the critique of and opposition to the concept to some extent are self-inflicted. But before considering the consequences, costs, and benefits of this operation, let us look at the empirical evidence for the relevance of a family resemblance concept of the TNS.

TNS Apparatuses

Based on this definition of the state concept, the question is whether there is a TNS or rather in what way it makes sense to talk about the TNS? What are the phenomena that fall under the dimensions of the capitalist state concept?

There are state apparatuses that perform or contribute to the performance of state functions and are transnational in nature. Looking at the economic modality of the state’s overall function, this includes the provision of the institutional requisites for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. ⁸² In this regard, we can point to the IMF, the BIS, and the Basel Committee, IOs that working with national ministries and central banks, that is, being transnational, maintain and develop the payment infrastructure and monetary system that enables the swift transfer of money from one jurisdiction and national currency to another. The regulation of finance is similarly performed through transnational networks centered on these organizations.

To this, we can add the large body of international commercial law that is a requisite for international trade and investment, along with the array of globalized business regulations and standards that are required for the routinized crossborder exchange of commodities. This is solidly documented in Braithwaite and Drahos’s comprehensive and empirically rich study of global business regulation ⁸³ and discussed by me in a state theoretical context. ⁸⁴ Beyond these areas, we can also point to essential services such as the World Meteorological Organization’s role in facilitating cooperation among national weather services to provide weather forecasts to shipping, aviation, and so on.

Another function is securing the reproduction and qualification of the labor force. ⁸⁵ This involves education and training, health issues, labor standards, housing, and more. IOs such as United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), working with national governments, contribute to the performance of various aspects of this state function.

The OECD deserves a special comment for two reasons. The first is that although it mainly has developed capitalist countries as members, its statuary purpose includes promoting global growth; furthermore, over the last several decades, nonmembers have increasingly become directly involved in its work. ⁸⁶ Hence, its relevance in the present context. The second reason is that the OECD epitomizes the transnational mode of operation of many IOs. It was aptly described by Anne-Marie Slaughter:

The OECD is the quintessential host of transgovernmental regulatory networks, as well as a catalyst for their creation. Its primary function […] has been to convene government officials in specific fields to figure out the best ways to fix a common economic or regulatory problem and sometime to promulgate a model code for its solution. ⁸⁷

Moving on from state apparatuses and functions, we can also point to elements of a transnational legal order. International commercial law has already been mentioned; to this, we can add the body of international law that regulates relations between states, as well as conventions and treaties on human rights and more.

Concerning sites of contestation the closest to an open political scene that resembles the parliaments typical for normal capitalist states probably is the UN General Assembly. More importantly, however, are the semiopen governing bodies of the IOs, semi-open in the sense that meetings are not open to the public but agendas and decisions are published. Participants in these bodies are generally state representatives, but the IOs are generally and increasingly giving access to nonstate actors, whether such access is formalized or not. ⁸⁹ Furthermore, much of the work in the IOs is done in lower levels committees, working groups, and so on, and here nonstate actors none the least from business organizations are often involved.

Finally, the last constitutive characteristic of the capitalist state is the centralized monopoly of violence. As already said, such a monopoly does not exist at the global level, the formal charter of the UN Security Council notwithstanding. Still it is worth mentioning that there are features pointing in this direction, such as international police cooperation and cooperation in the fight against terror and against piracy in the Bay of Aden. There obviously is very little in this glass, but it is not completely empty.

In conclusion, concerning four of the five basic characteristics of the capitalist state, there is solid empirical evidence to back up the claim that a TNS exists. This implies that the concept is changed from an NSC concept to one of family resemblance; a theoretical move that carries both costs and benefits as will be discussed later.

Going back to Taylor’s arguments, it is telling that he not really addresses the questions of state apparatuses, functions, sites of contestation, and legal order. In other words, he fails to consider and counter the empirically based arguments that are at the core of the TNS concept. Instead, the core of his critique is based on two arguments relating to nation-states. The first argument is the claim that “class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.” ⁹⁰ The second is that proponents of the TNS downplay or ignore the role of nation-states and especially that they ignore the significant differences between them. Let me consider these in turn.

The Nation-state as the Primary Terrain

The claim that the nation-state will remain the primary terrain where contradictions are resolved will come as a surprise to most students of international political economy. The reason is that there is a considerable amount of research that shows a different picture. The following examples should suffice to make this point.

The Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights agreement, signed in 1994, resulted from an international negotiation process where organized business interests played a major role. Indeed, northern business interests got almost everything they wanted in the agreement, and this was the result of the successful mobilization of and lobbying by a coalition of American, European, and Japanese business associations, targeting both their respective governments and the international negotiations. ⁹¹

A few years later, a rather different process took place. OECD member states launched negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would considerably strengthen the hand of transnational firms against governments and was intended to eventually be broadened to non-member states. When the proposed agreement was leaked from the Canadian government, it triggered a large scale transnational mobilization.

The MAI negotiations were targeted by hundreds of grassroots environmental, consumer, and development organizations and condemned by critics ranging from labour union leaders to movie actresses […] More than 600 organizations in nearly 70 countries expressed disapproval of the talks. ⁹²

The regulation of finance is, as mentioned above, an international matter. It is robustly documented that these regulations, both before and after the great financial crisis of 2008, are created in transnational networks that involve IOs, national state apparatuses, and private-sector representatives. ⁹⁵

Another important contemporary issue is the struggle against tax evasion and harmful tax competition, a battle that includes several IOs, nation–states, and nonstate actors. ⁹⁶ A large international coalition of nongovernmental organizations, centered on and to some extent driven by the Tax Justice Network, ⁹⁷ is active at all levels: nationally, regionally, and globally. For instance, the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, ⁹⁸ initiated by the Tax justice Network, listed as “Advocacy targets” for its Global Week of Action in 2017 “National-level decision makers. This can include your Head of State, Finance Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and UN Permanent Representatives. […] Regional and international decision-makers. This can include your representatives at regional fora such as the African Union and European Union”; […] “Local decision-makers. This can include municipal councils and other local bodies.” ⁹⁹

Last but not least climate politics must be mentioned. Obviously, in this area, decisive action has to be global, based on agreements between all major states, and relies therefore both on national and international political processes. In this case also, nonstate actors both from business and civil society are important and active at both levels. The high level of engagement from the private sector at the global level is, for instance, documented by Corporate Europe Observatory. ¹⁰⁰

In all of these examples, it would be wrong to claim that the domestic level is irrelevant or insignificant. But it would be equally wrong to claim that the international and global level does not matter. What is decisive is the combination and integration of the two levels, and the fact that in major policy areas action at both levels is necessary and that the international level often is the decisive one. Thus, it is misleading and going against a considerable amount of robust research to claim that the nation-state is and will remain the primary terrain. A possible counterargument to this could be, of course, that action at the international level only can happen as a result of decisions made at the national level. But then all major states would have to agree on the policy in question, and this in turn points back to the criticality of the international level. Indeed, it is not very illuminating to insist on identifying one of these levels as the primary one when both are critical.

This being said, however, there is some justification for Taylor’s critique. Firstly because it is true that Robert Cox’s went too far in downplaying the role of the domestic level when he in effect asserted that the nation-state is reduced to a transmission belt for decisions made internationally. ¹⁰¹ The same can be said about William Robinson who argued that “The nation-state is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but is being transformed and absorbed into the larger structure of a TNS.” ¹⁰² But both of them were actually more nuanced; Cox being more tentative and searching in his formulations, and Robinson giving a more nuanced discussion than simply positing of a fully-fledged transnational capitalist state. ¹⁰³ Similarly, Martin Shaw—also a target for Taylor’s critique—in spite of the title of his book made clear that he was referring to an emerging “global layer of state,” a layer that was added to and interacting with the still relevant nation-states. ¹⁰⁴ The same goes for the present author who in an article having the TNS in the title, explicitly said that “strictly speaking there is no transnational state […] and that the ‘transnational state’ refers to the unevenly and partially globalized aspects of statehood.” ¹⁰⁵

Ignoring the Domestic Level?

But even if this call for a more nuanced reading of proponents of the TNS concept is accepted, there is some justification for the critique that they have ignored or seriously downplayed the importance of the domestic level and especially ignoring the substantial differences between national political economies. This is the second element in Taylor’s critique, and it is true that TNS scholars have written little about the domestic level.

This, however, is not a limitation that is inherent in the concept. On the contrary, the word transnational rather than global is chosen precisely to keep open and underscore the combined national–international/global nature of political contestation over state functions performed by national and international state apparatuses in combination. The concept as such does not imply a denial that states are “meaningful nodal points,” indeed, states are central to the argument but only along with IOs and the transnational networks states are involved in. It is not a question of globalization leaving the nation-states irrelevant, as claimed by some hyperglobalists, but rather, as also argued by Barrow and Peck, ¹⁰⁶ that nation-states are transformed by political globalization and integrated in transnational networks that include IOs, networks in which nation-states remain basic building blocks. This is what the notion of the TNS refers to.

Furthermore, the scant attention to the domestic level can be seen as stemming from practical limitations. There simply is a limit to how many issues you can deal with seriously within the confines of a research paper or journal article, and even a book, especially if you want a solid empirical basis for your arguments. Thus, the relative neglect of the domestic level is the cost of calling attention to important transnational political institutions and processes and making them the focus of analysis. In a more positive light, it can also be seen as resulting from a sensible and productive division of labour among scholars.

Still, on this point, proponents of the TNS concept must bear some responsibility for the critique by not being sufficiently explicit about the delimitations of their arguments. But on the other hand, it is not justified for critics to assume that focusing on one aspect of current transformations necessarily means that other aspects are deemed irrelevant. This illustrates one of the costs of upscaling the state concept to the global level: you risk being misunderstood and attributed positions you don’t take. This leads on to a brief consideration of the costs and benefits of upscaling.

The Costs of Upscaling

In addition to the just mentioned risk, a more important one, from a scientific point of view, is the risk of losing some of the insights and explanatory principles that are inherent in the concept, in the case of the state the insights into the causal links between the dimensions of the concept. Specifically, state theoretical arguments that hinge of the monopoly of violence as a constituent feature cannot be replicated at the transnational level or only be so in a weakened form. But this does not distract from the relevance of the arguments that can be upscaled.

Another cost is that upscaling increases complexity. This is well illustrated by Phil Cerny’s upscaling of neopluralism to the global level. Where domestic neopluralism studied “iron triangles,” that is, stable networks of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups dominating decision-making in delineated policy areas, Cerny suggested that transnational neopluralism should focus on “ flexible Pentangles” that include states, IOs, and nonstate actors at both levels. ¹⁰⁷ Upscaling the state concept carries similar complexities.

This cost, however, is a consequence of changes in the real world. Policy processes have become more complex because they so often take place in transnational networks that involve a broader range of actors and institutions than previously was the case at the domestic level, and this must be reflected in theory.

Benefits of Upscaling

When considering the benefits, it is worth first pointing out that proponents of the TNC and TNS concepts are not alone in finding upscaling of concepts useful. Cerny has already been mentioned and so has Slaughter who described the “conceptual shift” that was at the heart of her book in this way:

stop imagining the international system as a system of states […] Start thinking about a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments—legislation, adjudication, implementation—interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. ¹⁰⁸

The benefits of transnationalizing the concepts of class and state, with due attention to the consequences for the structure of the concepts, are straightforward. It enables the application to international and global political phenomena of insights developed in state theory into power relations, apparatuses, functions, and sites of contestation and how these dimensions impact, condition, and interact with each other. It serves to call attention to and help analyze international and global class relations, using Poulantzian notions of the power block, hegemony, class alliances, supporting classes, and so on, and it enables the use of his understanding of different types of political crises, that is, crisis of hegemony within the power bloc, crises between the power bloc and popular social forces, and fundamental crises. And beyond Poulantzas, transnationalizing the class and state concepts also enables the activation of the larger body of relevant theory in historical materialism to the study of what more descriptively is called global governance.

Finally, the alternatives should also be considered. Taylor offers no real alternative or a very weak one at best. While acknowledging that “it is equally true that many pivotal economic, social, and political processes have become transnationally oriented,” ¹¹⁵ the only suggestion he makes is that scholars should base their analyses on “the internal bourgeoisie” and “an enduring state system and an evolving global capitalism.” ¹¹⁶ Given that Poulantzas introduced the concept of the “internal bourgeoisie” to capture an important transformation that had taken place in the two decades preceding his analysis, it is odd to argue that there is no need for further theoretical innovation after four decades of globalization. In reality, this amounts to ignoring the rise of global governance, the rise of climate politics and other sustainability issues, the rise of global business associations, and so on.

Global governance is a possible alternative concept. It is widely used, and it is convenient for descriptive purposes and can serve to identify an object for study and further theorization. But leaving it at that, without drawing in historical materialist theory, would mean ceding this terrain to the various liberal, neopluralist, constructivist, realist, and other approaches to global governance. In other words, it amounts to abstaining from making historical materialism a participant in and contributor to theoretical debates over important global political realities.