Security Practices and the Production of Center–Periphery Figurations in Statebuilding

Introduction

News from the peripheries can be frightening. It is often dominated by reports of violence, criminality, strange, and sometimes cruel cultural practices. It frequently invokes a certain sense of otherness—the rules of the game in the peripheries seem to be quite different from those of the center. Such news imparts to the audience a mixture of—at best—curiosity to understand the other, disgust at their uncivilized behavior, and alarm that they might somehow find their way over here. These pictures and stories are obviously deeply rooted in colonial history. They make unequivocally clear that the colonial legacy still matters for how certain spaces and populations are represented, whether in the media, in politics, or in academic discourse. Postcolonial studies have explored these continuities intensively, especially with respect to a continued orientalist tendency evident in the representation of formerly—or to a certain extent still—colonized groups or countries.

This article aims to contribute to this body of research by exploring how security shapes center–periphery relations. It brings together perspectives from critical security studies, which views security as a mode of governing a territory and a population by imposing policies on them, and postcolonial studies, through which we can inquire into the historical legacies of security practices. A postcolonial perspective was only quite recently introduced into critical security studies through the seminal article by Barkawi and Laffey (2006), which criticized traditional security research for its Eurocentrism and called for a critical investigation of the historical geographies that inform its empirical analyses. Similarly, Bilgin (2010) has pointed to the “‘Western-centrism’ of security studies.” In response to these appeals, Hönke and Müller (2012), for instance, have provided a perspective on the entangled histories of (in)security governance in the (post)colonial world, while other scholars have introduced the concept of ontological (in)security into postcolonial security (see Cash & Kinnvall, 2017; Shani, 2017). Recently, too, the demand for incorporating a postcolonial perspective into critical security research was reiterated by Laffey and Nadarajah (2016).

In light of these scholarly developments, this article aims to introduce a postcolonial perspective into critical security studies through a particular conceptualization of center–periphery relations and how these are (re)produced by security practices and discourses. Theories of center–periphery relations have generally favored a more or less structuralist—and by that also to a certain extent statist—understanding of center and periphery; by referring to the concentration of capital or to dependencies, for example. By contrast, in what follows I suggest a more dynamic and relational understanding of center–periphery relations, which proceeds from the assumption that center and periphery are co-constitutive and that social practices and discourses are not driven primarily by structural asymmetries, but that they in fact produce and reproduce these asymmetries. Center–periphery relations are therefore understood as social figurations that constitute a specific social-territorial order, one characterized by a basic asymmetry. Thus, security practices and discourses can be understood as contributions not only to the fabrication of socioterritorial order but also as a specific mode of governing those spaces, places, and people considered to be part of either the center or the periphery.

Center–periphery relations can be found on different levels of social order and according to different references of scale. For example, world systems theory has made the point that center and periphery are sociostructural positions within the global economy, while others have argued that almost every social order produces peripheries through, say, process marginalization or segregation (Elsenhans, 2015). Although this article is principally concerned with center–periphery relations in statebuilding often driven by external actors, it also takes the notion of scale into account. Statebuilding (though not always) involves external, mostly international actors and sometimes former colonial powers. In this respect, center–periphery relations are part of the socioterritorial order of international society. However, center–periphery relations also structure the socioterritorial order of individual societies.

The article focuses on two different types of center–periphery figuration in statebuilding: internal colonialism and intervention societies. Internal colonialism has a particular resonance in the literature on colonial legacies within the states of the former colonial powers. The concept was originally intended to highlight structural, political, and economic inequalities between regions within particular nation states with marked histories of colonial domination. Indeed, advocates of the concept have argued that there is a continuity of oppression and social and moral discrimination against former colonized peoples within the societies of the former colonizer, for example, not only in the United States but also in the United Kingdom or in South Africa. However, internal colonialism as a specific center–periphery figuration can also be found in states of the Global South, where groups and regions, sometimes since the very first glimmers of the statebuilding process, have been marginalized, discriminated against and incorporated into a particular framework of statehood and nation-building which was very much imposed on them. Scott (2009) has shown how Upland Southeast Asia can be considered a striking example of this phenomenon, as can much postcolonial statebuilding in Latin America (Bortoluci & Jansen, 2013).

The second type of center–periphery figuration consists of so-called intervention societies (Bonacker, Daxner, Free, & Zürcher, 2010; Daxner, 2017), which were also examined as examples of internationalized rule (Schlichte, 2008, 2015) or as parts of the “liberal empire” (Chandler, 2006; Duffield, 2007). Intervention societies are markedly shaped by the presence and policies of international donors, international organizations, and international non-governmental organizations. In such cases, statebuilding comprises complex relationships between governments and external actors which are structured not least by different notions of center and periphery.

One of the main differences between these two types of center–periphery figuration in statebuilding is that, in the case of internal colonialism, the center and the periphery are parts of the same territory. At least in theory, the center has direct control over its periphery—which is meant quite literally, because the periphery is not something that simply exists or is defined naturally (e.g., through its remoteness), but it is in fact a place or space which is constructed as peripheral from the perspective of the center. Conversely, in intervention societies, the periphery is not normally under the direct command of a force considered to be the center of international society. This has stimulated comparisons between the indirect rule of former colonial administrations and contemporary international statebuilding, as conducted by United Nations (UN) missions, for example (Veit, 2010).

The following shows how security—as a key mode of governing in statebuilding—shapes center–periphery relations in the two figurations of internal colonialism and intervention societies in order to find similarities and differences between them. The overall aim here is to provide a new theoretical perspective by intertwining critical security and postcolonial studies and to stimulate empirical research on how security functions as a principle of socioterritorial ordering. Against the background of the existing literature on securitization and statebuilding, I make the argument that security is more than just the construction of threats and related policies of protection. It contributes to a fabrication of socioterritorial order and thereby impacts the lives of people and groups within the targeted society.

The article is organized as follows. In the second section, I situate the article within the recent discussion on securitization and statebuilding before the third section briefly summarizes existing theoretical approaches on center–periphery relations in order to argue for a more relational and constructivist understanding. In the fourth section, I introduce two center–periphery figurations taken predominantly from the literature on internal colonialism and on the development–security nexus. The fifth section discusses five center–periphery relations in greater detail before the sixth section closes the article with some conclusions on the similarities and differences between the two figurations and the role security plays in both of them.

Securitization and Statebuilding

In modern politics, the state is understood as the key provider of security for the people belonging to it and/or living on its territory. As Dillon has argued, this conceptualization of the state has the structure of a promise, the promise of achieved security (Dillon, 1996). Security

can therefore be seen as a modern—even teleological—narrative of progress: insecurity (in the past) necessitates the promise of security (now) and the ultimate achievement of security and all that security implies (in the future). In short, in the modern political imagination, “security” has traditionally revolved around the principle of modern state sovereignty. (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 14)

It is unsurprising, given the centrality of security to the concept of modern statehood, that research on statebuilding in International Relations is largely concerned with security. Whether in the context of research on “governance and limited statehood” (Risse, Börzel, & Draude, 2018), or on security sector reform as a key feature of consolidating peace (Schröder, Chappuis, & Kocak, 2014), security has generally been depicted as a major feature of statebuilding policies. The same goes for the policy field itself. Now more than ever, international organizations and governments center their statebuilding approaches around the security function of the state. Recent statebuilding and peacebuilding missions now aim primarily at the creation of stability and security, rather than contributing to democratization and enhancing civil society—goals which, for some time, took center stage in post–Cold War multilateral UN missions. This has provoked critical comments on the securitization of statebuilding and a conservative shift in peacebuilding:

As a result, the statebuilding and liberal peace project appears to be subject to an ideology of state security and Western hegemony, camouflaged by claims about emancipation and universal rights. Along with the virtual state there also emerge “non-states” that represent the interests of certain groups, often ideologically opposed to liberalism, but accepting and even simulating the notions of statehood and sovereignty. These hang in international limbo, rarely providing a functioning state and easily dominated by nationalist or predatory elites, able to subvert the process of democratization. (Richmond, 2014)

Almost all of these statebuilding efforts take place in postcolonial societies which are portrayed, sometimes accurately, for different reasons, as profoundly unstable, insecure, and vulnerable. However, the “postcolonial moment” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006) in international statebuilding does not refer exclusively to the historical situation of formerly colonized territories, but also to the continuity of the relationship between the former colonizers and the new states. This relationship is very much characterized by a continuity of securitized perceptions. From the perspective of donors and governments in the Global North, postcolonial states still often do not seem capable of providing security and other core public goods for their citizens—a perception that might recall the doubts expressed by former colonial powers about independence and reiterates the story of the White man’s burden.

There seems to be a growing interest in statebuilding from a critical security perspective. Distler and Ketzmerick (2017), for example, have recently explored the role of elections in the international security politics of postcolonial and postwar states. In the same volume, Bonacker and Ketzmerick (2017) showed how the independence movement in Cameroon in particular in the 1950s and 1960s gained agency through securitizing moves directed toward an international audience. Hönke and Müller (2016) have discussed the impact of global policing on postcolonial states and societies. For the statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, Kühn examined the link between security and development, while Koopman, as well as Wilkinson and von Boemcken et al., have studied state-related security practices in non-Western states (Koopman, 2011; F. P. Kühn, 2010; von Boemcken, Boboyorov, & Bagdasarova, 2018; Wilkinson, 2007). But despite the growing interest indicated by these contributions, there is still relatively little research on the link between security and statebuilding in general, and especially on how security contributes to socioterritorial ordering in statebuilding. This article aims to stimulate precisely such empirical research by elaborating on the link between security and the construction of center–periphery relations, which could also contribute to the growing body of knowledge about how international statebuilding works (de Guevara, 2012; Distler, 2016; Lemay-Hébert, 2014).

Stories From the Center, Stories From the Periphery

Statebuilding always means ordering—ordering space, ordering place, and ordering people, for example, by drawing borders, creating administrative units, organizing mobility, erecting buildings, and regulating properties. Somehow, this process inevitably seems to initiate dynamics of centralization and peripheralization. In this respect, the categories of center and periphery capture different outcomes of social processes, for example, of the concentration of people, capital, and power. At the same time, these outcomes impact these social processes because they create path dependencies: Big cities attract more and more people, whereas the periphery is confronted with a “brain drain” due to a lack of opportunities. Indeed, much of the literature on center–periphery relations depicts both poles as asymmetric positions that result from prior social dynamics. Polarization theories, for example, have defined center and periphery in regard to the amount of technological, economic, and social innovation in a given area (Friedmann, 1973), whereas social inequality theories, especially in sociology, have defined peripheries as marginalized regions of comparative economic disadvantage. As M. Kühn (2015) shows, a sociological understanding of center–periphery relations focuses more on their social dimension, that is, inequality of life chances for different groups. Wacquant (1999) adds an irreducible territorial dimension of center–periphery relations by introducing the concept of advanced marginality, which combines a sociospatial order (e.g., the ghetto and the banlieue) with class- and/or race-based social stigmatization. The periphery is thus constituted through—or produced by—a spatial concentration of the disadvantaged and socially excluded. Fischer-Tahir and Naumann (2013, p. 13) have argued in a similar vein that peripheries “emerge from the intrinsic logic of uneven development in capitalist societies” as a consequence of capital investment policies and political decision-making.

In International Relations, dependency theories and world system theories are perhaps the most prominent approaches that deal with center–periphery relations. Emerging in the 1960s, Marxist dependency theories have analyzed international power structures in terms of a domination of the periphery of so-called underdeveloped states by capitalist states. According to this perspective, peripheral states are dependent on the global bourgeoisie mainly because of an unequal exchange in trade between low-value resources and high-value goods. World systems theory developed this approach further, with Wallerstein arguing that the capitalist world economy is a stratified social system which consists of centers—that is, politically strong states with higher productivity of higher value goods—and peripheries with politically weak states existing at a basic level of production (Wallerstein, 2011).

What we can take from these approaches is that, first, center and periphery are co-constitutive concepts. There is no center without a periphery and vice versa. Second, center and periphery not only have a social but also a territorial (or at least a spatial) dimension. And third, the relation between the center and the periphery is asymmetric. The problem with these approaches is that they do not focus primarily on the social construction of center–periphery relations but rather present both as outcomes of a zero-sum game: The more the center gets, the more the periphery loses. In this article, by contrast, I suggest a perspective that takes into account the constitution of center–periphery relations through social practices—in this context, through security practices. Although center and periphery do undoubtedly emerge as an outcome of social and socioeconomic processes, they also constitute each other through, in this case, security practices, for example, through representations of the dangerous other (whether this danger derives from the center or the periphery), through the introduction of security-related policies such as policing, or surveillance, or through an insinuation of a lack of trustworthiness. These practices contribute to or generate a specific center–periphery relation—for instance, that the center feels itself compelled to assume responsibility for the security of (or, indeed, feels itself compelled to actively secure) the people in the periphery or, conversely, that the periphery perceives itself as threatened by a domineering center.

Peripheries are not always territorially—that is, through a regional concentration of excluded and marginalized groups or by out-migration from an economically disadvantaged region. Nonetheless, this article is in particularly concerned with “spatially organized inequality” (Fischer-Tahir & Naumann, 2013, p. 18) insofar as security discourses and practices contribute to a particular imagination that constitutes center–periphery distinctions. As Eriksson argues, center–periphery relations are often associated with and shaped by images and representations but also through stories (Eriksson, 2010). Frequently, the periphery is not only marginalized but also idealized through orientalist and romanticizing stereotypes. The countryside can be both remote and unattractive but also the symbolic and economic heart of the nation. Adhering to traditions can be seen as a symptom of backwardness but also of authenticity and a sustainable communal life. The periphery comes across as a place with no history and/or no future, but at the same time also as a secure, even idyllic place. But despite the sheer variety of different conceptualizations that circulate around complex center–periphery relations, they are always “infused with semantics of (racially or otherwise defined) notions of superiority and inferiority” (Albert & Vasilache, 2017), and they represent a specific, although dynamic, socioterritorial order. This order is territorial because the distinction between center and periphery implies a territorial reference, but it is also social because life chances and power are distributed unequally between them.

Internal Colonialism and Intervention Societies

Statebuilding occurs largely (though not exclusively) in two different (ideal) types of center–periphery figurations which can be defined as (a) internal colonialism and (b) intervention societies. A figuration is, according to Elias (2000, p. 249), a “web of interdependences formed among human beings and which connects them: that is to say, a structure of mutually oriented and dependent persons.” My argument here is that center–periphery figurations can be understood as interdependencies between individuals or groups that constitute a social structure. Thus, both terms, internal colonialism and intervention societies, represent two different social structures, that is, two processes by which social interdependencies emerge and impact individual lives. Both are characterized by a prominent sense of asymmetry and domination. With respect to scale—in the case of internal colonialism, statebuilding first transpires within a given society, although it is often affected by international and global factors. In the case of intervention societies, statebuilding is an international policy of governments, INGOs, and IOs, although it is also shaped by domestic elites and actors. Empirically speaking, individual cases can encapsulate both forms of postcolonial statebuilding—that is, statebuilding in an intervention society can also create a certain form of internal colonialism. Both figurations are shaped by what we might call the postcolonial situation, in which the colonial legacy is present and in which colonial representations continue to operate.

The academic concept of internal colonialism emerged in the 1960s—initially as part of an anti-colonial critique developed in Latin America—and it was recently taken up again by postcolonial scholars (D. Cowen & Lewis, 2016; Etkind, 2011; Turner, 2017). From the beginning, the concept has had an obvious political thrust, being frequently used by anti-colonial writers and Black activists. Originally, it was introduced to capture structural discrimination and the subordination of racially defined groups, first and foremost Black Americans. In his seminal 1969 article on “internal colonialism and ghetto revolt,” Robert Blauner argued that the predicament of Black Americans in the United States could be compared to those in former external colonies. Both internal and external colonization are characterized first by the fact that racial groups enter the dominant society involuntary, that is, by force, and second by the fact that the colonizing power carries out policies which constrain, transform or destroy indigenous values and ways of life. Third, in internal and external colonization, members of the colonized group tend to be administered through their outside management and manipulation and according to ethnic status. Fourth, in both cases, racism appears as a principle of social domination (Blauner, 1969; Hicks, 2004). Allen (1970) explicitly made a strong case for highlighting the similarities between colonial rule and Black oppression, which he considered very much a neocolonial control tactic (Pinderhughes, 2011, p. 249):

He documented the major move from direct to indirect rule over Black American colonial subjects, delineating some of the neocolonial tools used for managing internally colonized Black communities; and he evaluated the various class interests within the African American community that operated in contention around that oppression. He also clearly defined the Black bourgeois and petty bourgeois class interests which were hijacked by corporate imperialism to carry out these internal colonial management functions.

From the perspective of the internal colonialism literature, statebuilding and state formation in former colonial powers—which include the United States and Russia—can still be considered forms of statebuilding in the sense that the societies of these states and their state institutions have been extensively and profoundly shaped by colonial legacies. However, internal colonialism also seems to be a frequent consequence of statebuilding in formerly dependent countries of the Global South. In this regard, Calvert argued that—somewhat paradoxically—decolonization actually accelerated the process of internal colonization. According to Calvert (2001, p. 61),

the new governments were led by the same logic as their colonial predecessors to seek to expand the production of minerals and cash crops for export. Only, unlike their colonial predecessors, they had much less choice about what to exploit and where to exploit it.

Calvert has extended this notion of internal colonialism to describe a similar center–periphery figuration for relations between the cities, especially the capital, and the countryside, especially when valuable natural goods are located there (as in recent cases of land grabbing). The destruction of rural habitats was hardly noticed by urban-based political elites because, from their point of view, urbanization and exploitation only bring advantages.

Political elites, certainly, depend in a variety of ways on the establishment and/or maintenance of international trading patterns. In particular, the maintenance and indeed extension of plantation agriculture owes much of its vigor to the special role of land as a combined badge of social distinction, insurance against loss of income and hedge against inflation. The growth of cash crops for export is much more pro-table than traditional subsistence agriculture and it does require access to international markets to work at all. The rulers of the South, therefore, are particularly sensitive to any alteration in the terms of trade, but not to the extent that they are willing to give up their power or their privileges, because their ability to make use of the outside world depends critically on their ability to colonize their own countries. (Calvert, 2001, p. 62)

In intervention societies, on the other hand, international actors play the main role in constituting a center–periphery figuration. Such societies often emerge in the aftermath of conflict as a consequence of postwar reconstruction efforts undertaken by international donors, INGOs, and international and regional organizations. They are constituted through both military and civilian support. Typical characteristics of intervention societies include a prominent presence of international actors—again civilian and military—on the ground, a dependency of the state budget on external donors and an involvement of international advisers in government institutions and administration on all levels. Of course, such characteristics are not limited to postconflict societies; as Schlichte (2008) has shown, many states of the Global South and especially Subsaharan Africa are subject to “internationalized rule.” He illustrates this point with the case of Uganda:

The Ugandan state resembles a patchwork quilt much more than it does a unitary actor. It is deeply embedded in a conflictive network of agencies that are sometimes at odds and sometimes in line with the idea of unitary statehood. Without its numerous supporting agencies, be they international agencies, NGOs or the political apparatus of the NRM, the state of Uganda would probably not exist. In this sense the state is not only dependent; it is suspended between international agents and local actors and their practices and expectations. It remains unclear whether this state in suspense will ever get closer to its social ground or whether its power will continue to reside in its external linkages as much as in its local nexus. If the latter is the case, then rule will become even more internationalised than it is already. In Uganda, some sort of “global governance” is already in place. But it would probably be more appropriate to call it internationalised rule. (p. 380)

Security and the Making of Center–Periphery Figurations

Existing scholarship on internal colonialism, as well as on intervention societies and internationalized rule, is fairly unambiguous on the significant role played by security in the emergence of both figurations. In historical cases of internal colonialism, the incorporation of territories into a state has often gone hand in hand with the deployment of security forces and implementation of protection measures. In cases of settler colonialism, such measures were intended to secure new settlements or establish state authority in the new territories. Where territory-based exploitation of resources occurs, the state needs to secure the sites of exploitation, for example, mines or oil fields. Prominent examples of settler colonialism include the territorial integration of indigenous peoples and their territories into the United States and the expansion of the Russian state into the Kazakh steppe (Sabol, 2017). But there are also many other instances of the extension of state power into indigenous communities which are then internally colonized (Scott, 2009), including cases in which security forces protect the exploitation of resources for state revenues (e.g., in Nigeria or Papua New Guinea), or where communities are placed under surveillance in order to prevent the destruction of resource extraction facilities. For internal colonies, it could be argued that security is defined first and foremost as state security, settler security, or the security of extraction companies—none of which necessarily implies security for the colonized. Security, then, is clearly an important tool for internal colonization, and one which often serves a very specific purpose, for example, economic exploitation or the political devaluation of certain groups and regions. In what follows, however, the emphasis lies on security as a practice that contributes to a center–periphery figuration through particular imaginations of, for instance, threats related to the periphery.

The literature on the development–security nexus has shown that, in terms of the center–periphery figuration of intervention societies, security can also be considered an instrument for governing territories and people. From the very beginning of international development policy, development as the key feature of and justification for intervention has been closely linked with security. During the Cold War, “development” served to secure the loyalty of postcolonial states to either the Western or the Communist blocs. Even the Marshall Plan can be considered a major U.S. contribution to Western security policy in then-peripheral Europe. And after 9/11 at the latest, international development policy became strongly linked with security. As during the Cold War, the assumption was that the development of the periphery directly enhanced the center’s security. Duffield (2007) has argued that, since the colonial period, development has invariably been associated with security, because development functioned and continues to function as a biopolitical security mechanism acting on particular populations and transforming them into agreeable “liberal subjects” while expelling the dangerous and the unruly:

As a liberal design of power, development always acts in the name of protecting and bettering life. It functions as a technology of security, consolidating the West’s sovereign frontier by supporting and including that life which is useful and capable of self-organization while excluding the useless and destabilizing. (p. 232)

A first security practice that contributes to the emergence of a specific center–periphery relation treats the periphery as a serious threat and thereby leads to a securitization of the periphery. For internal colonialism, it seems clear that the deployment of Special Forces is a frequently used governing tool, as well as the surveillance of the perceivably threatening indigenous population (through, e.g., drones). In this respect, populations in the periphery are constructed as outstandingly violent or criminal and therefore legitimate targets for extraordinary security policies. Against this background, police violence in ghettos, highly segregated areas, slums, or the banlieues seems to be a predictable outcome of such a securitization. Certain places, such as mosques, community centers, or main stations, are often represented as hot spots, either for radicalization or for riotous assemblies which might increase the likelihood of violence. In this vein, specific groups, such as “radicalized Muslim youths,” are specifically surveilled, for example, in Central Asia, but also in the West.

In internal colonialism, then, securitization of the periphery often leads to a high degree of social control and sometimes even direct violence from state security forces. Conversely, in intervention societies, international actors typically respond with policies which aim to strengthen security forces and the capacity of the state to provide security. Only in extreme cases in which state stability is acutely threatened by violence do securitizing actors directly intervene, perhaps because of a war (such as in Afghanistan in the early 2000s) or a high degree of organized criminal violence (such as in Haiti during the same period; Walby & Monaghan, 2012). However, both the failed state discourse and the human security approach portray states in the Global South as vulnerable to state failure and thus incapable of providing security for their citizens. Since the 1990s, these discourses have led to a huge expansion of diverse international actors and policy programs which are concerned with measuring security risks, creating early warning tools, and developing policies to respond to the emergence of violence and instability. In some cases, governments perceive themselves to be threatened by their peripheral neighborhoods, often because they fear migration or a spillover of conflict. One interesting example is the deployment of troops and policemen by Australia in the Salomon Islands, which went hand in hand with the introduction of a new security language within the Australian public sphere in order to sell the troop deployment to a domestic audience. The Salomons were portrayed as a peripheral country on the brink of failure (Lambach, 2006). That said, the human security discourse has convinced broad sections of international society that underdevelopment in the periphery should not only be addressed for moral reasons (as in the colonial past), but that it is dangerous for the people in the periphery itself.

This shows that, for intervention societies, the securitization of the periphery is frequently linked with what F. P. Kühn (2010) has called “developmentalization” (p. 216). When viewed as a security practice, developmentalization means that aid is intentionally provided to help the periphery come to terms with its own security threats. Such threats do not have to be threatening beyond the periphery itself, although at present, fears of unregulated migration are clearly associated with development policies. Against this backdrop, social work appears within both figurations as a common security practice aimed at improving living conditions, for example, education, in order to respond to ongoing violence or to reduce the risk of radicalization and violent uprising. Under extreme conditions, especially in the context of large-scale violence and/or sustained violent protests, this could become “armed social work,” an “attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at” (Kilcullen, 2006). This includes community organization, welfare, mediation, domestic assistance, or economic support in a highly securitized situation. Obviously, this combination of social work and security has a colonial legacy, as Owens (2013) shows for the context of U.S. counterinsurgency policies: “The United States counterinsurgency doctrine seeks to constitute governable national ‘societies’‚ with distinct ‘social realms’ in which populations are managed by ‘social policy’ intervention and the expansion of ‘social’ forms of control.” Turner (2017) explicitly points to the colonial legacy by arguing that contemporary “armed social work” shares a rationale with earlier forms of colonial social work which

promised the domestication of colonial populations and internal “others” across empires—such as those imposed on indigenous groups, peasants, migrant families and the urban residuum. As with older colonial practices of social control, those resisting pacification (i.e., “undevelopable” insurgents) need to be eliminated with despotic and violent force. (p. 16)

In both internal colonialism and intervention societies, it is not only the periphery but also the center that can be the subject of securitization. This securitization of the center portrays the center as a dangerous place for those living in the periphery. Reasons for this might include the prevalence of an amoral modern urban lifestyle, which is associated with promiscuity and excessive alcohol, as well as rampant professional ambition, selfishness, and disrespect for traditional values and authority. In order to shield the population from this possible, perceived destruction of communal and familial bonds and prevent the transformation of peripheral subjects into uncontrolled and uncontrollable beings, official policies advocate for traditional values and for limiting expectations of life. This, of course, is also deeply rooted in colonial history, where the colonized were viewed as children who had to be guided, reared, and protected from the inauthenticity of modern life (Cohen, 1970). Indeed, since the 19th century, a prominent task for development has been to balance the drive for modernization with its supposedly disintegrative effects on indigenous peoples, in the form of commercial exploitation, impoverishment, and unchecked urbanization, while emphasizing the need for societal order (M. Cowen & Shenton, 1995; Duffield, 2005). Duffield observes a strong parallel with today’s developmental focus on self-reliance and resilience, which frequently takes the form of programs on coping mechanisms, supporting livelihoods and promoting inclusion and local ownership in the Global South and colonial-era native administration. This

was seen as a means of countering the growing threat of urban nationalism (and), with its encouragement of social cohesion, was a way of mobilizing “traditional” rural populations against this new and disruptive manifestation of the “modern.” The town, once the bastion of direct rule over the countryside, became an increasingly ambiguous and unpredictable political space subject to insurgency and the international circulation of nationalist agitation. (Duffield, 2005, p. 150)

Last but not least, the periphery can be directly or indirectly silenced, so that its inhabitants are not in a social or political position to securitize the policies of the center. Such a silenced periphery might be an actual consequence of extreme power asymmetry, especially in the case of internal colonialism, in which a particular population is not accustomed to speaking and acting publicly. Of course, one effect of marginalization is that people are disempowered and “unable to join the securitisation game” (Booth, 2007). In this respect, the center is simply the power holder which has the sovereign authority to, for instance, declare a humanitarian emergency that threatens peace and security. The same more or less applies to intervention societies in which the intervention itself can be regarded as an expression of this sovereignty, although peripheral governments certainly retain agency here. Furthermore, a number of scholars have argued that, for interventions, the framework of a liberal peace and development provide hegemonic blueprints which the periphery is hardly in a position to challenge. At the same time, silencing can have sources other than this soft power—it can take the form of a direct threat against those who are willing to speak up or who agitate for goals which conflict with the vision of a “liberal democracy.” Nationalist or secessionist leaders, both in internal colonies and in intervention societies, are frequently targeted as unruly troublemakers and sometimes, at least in internal colonies, imprisoned or exiled.

Conclusion

How does security contribute to center–periphery figurations and how does this shape the socioterritorial order in statebuilding? This article has offered a perspective which combines critical security studies with a postcolonial reading of center–periphery relations. I have suggested that center–periphery figurations are produced and reproduced through social practices—and in this context, through security practices. By comparing two different ideal types of center–periphery relations, five security strategies were identified that to some extent serve similar functions in terms of creating center–periphery asymmetries in statebuilding. Notably, all five security practices empower the center to govern and construct a socioterritorial order in which the periphery is not only socially marginalized but also territorialized. Put simply, the dangerous ghetto is indeed both dangerous (i.e., those who live there are perceived as potentially threatening, vulnerable or suspicious) and a ghetto (i.e., the territory is marked out in a specific way with more or less clear boundaries and borders). Governing the ghetto or the failed state is considered to be the responsibility of the center, which is portrayed as capable and morally prepared to assume this responsibility.

With respect to the role of security practices in generating this socioterritorial order, this article has suggested that the figuration of intervention societies does not differ dramatically from internal colonialism. However, an important difference is that, in the case of intervention societies, the center is located with reference to international rather than domestic society. Indeed, it might be argued that intervention societies can be considered as internal colonies within international society. At the same time, however, the question of scale is also of great significance for determining which governing strategies are selected and applied to a given periphery. Internal colonies are normally subjected to the control and policies of a government, whereas, in intervention societies, security practices are embedded in more complex interactions between international actors, governments, donors, and local actors. Consequently, internationalized rule is reminiscent of indirect colonial rule (in contrast to internal colonies, which call to mind more direct forms of colonial rule).

This article has mainly depicted the periphery as subordinated, whether as internally colonized or as the subject of an intervention. Nonetheless, its agency in statebuilding should not be underestimated. Peripheries can, for example, be recentered by adopting the internal colony-analogy, which scandalizes the center’s policies. For the figuration of internal colonialism, clear cases include the Black Power and more recently the Black Lives Matter movements, which in their protests have insistently drawn on the metaphor of colonial domination, helping to lend them global attention and agency. Conversely, in cases of intervention societies, the experience of Timor Leste is striking. In order to force Australia to renegotiate revenues from maritime oil fields (which Australia had refused to do in the early 2000s), the president of Timor Leste, Xanana Gusmão, portrayed his country as a failed state. He thereby adopted a securitized language normally used by international actors to justify interventions. “By threatening its wealthy neighbor with its own state failure, East Timor attempted to use the label as a discursive resource” (Lambach, 2006, p. 415). Both examples demonstrate that security practices can also be used to recenter the periphery without, of course, entirely inverting the fundamental asymmetry.

The socioterritorial order that emerged out of these myriad security practices exerts a profound influence on the way in which postcolonial statebuilding is conducted as a mode of governing territories and populations. Furthermore, however, it also impacts the lives of people living in what is constructed as the periphery. Security practices might secure the center, development policies, exploitation facilities, or elites. They might even sometimes enhance the security of the inhabitants of the periphery. But at the same time, they also contribute to a securitization which brings the periphery back into the news—and usually not as good news.

In a broader sense, this article has aimed to combine postcolonial perspectives on statebuilding with critical security studies by examining how center–periphery relations are shaped and produced by security discourses and related practices. As argued at the outset, postcolonial studies have shown that in statebuilding—whether postindependence or international statebuilding—particular forms of socioterritorial order emerge, for example, a differentiation between powerful centers and dependent peripheries. This article has argued that security discourses and practices contribute to this asymmetric ordering, for example, by portraying the periphery as a dangerous place which needs to be governed by special means.

Furthermore, by comparing internal colonialism and intervention societies as two distinctive center–periphery figurations, this article has also advocated for a historical perspective. Such a perspective can enormously enrich any exploration of the similarities and differences in how security has shaped the socioterritorial ordering of statebuilding in different historical constellations. For example, although internal colonialism remains a typical center–periphery figuration in statebuilding, historically it emerged alongside modern statebuilding when groups and regions were placed at the margins of centralized power.

From the perspective of further research—and especially in scholarship that focuses on the dynamics of statebuilding—it might be fruitful to examine how security has contributed to broader processes of peripheralization and marginalization. However, also of considerable importance is the question of how the periphery has, in a variety of historical contexts, successfully mobilized for resistance against the domination of the center. How has security functioned in such contexts, both as a discourse for portraying the center as an existential threat and as a practice in order to—for example—organize an armed struggle for independence?