Reactions of the American Jews to Trump’s Jerusalem Embassy Move: Continuation of the Historical Pattern?

Abstract

Pro-Israeli politicians in Washington have long supported the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Nevertheless, contrary to the widespread belief, not all American Jews offer unconditional support to U.S. decisions taken in order to promote Israel’s national interests. In this article, interviews were conducted with representatives from various Jewish diaspora groups in United States shortly before and after the official declaration of the U.S. Embassy move in December 2017. This article documents that opinions of American Jews diverge significantly regarding Trump’s Jerusalem Embassy decision. This article argues that this divergence stems from Israel’s actions and policies toward the Palestinians since the late 1970s and political and religious divisions within the American Jewish community.

Keywords

American Jews American Jewish diaspora organizations Donald Trump the Jerusalem Embassy move the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

During an interview with American politician Mike Huckabee on Trinity Broadcasting Network in June 2018, the U.S. President Donald Trump stated that

I tell you what, I get more calls of thank you from evangelicals, and I see it in the audiences and everything else, than I do from Jewish people. And the Jewish people appreciate it, but the evangelicals appreciate it more than the Jews, which is incredible.

Trump’s words reflect his surprise about his (and also general) assumption that the overwhelming majority of American Jews provide unconditional support to any decision taken by the United States in accordance with Israel’s declared interests.

Interestingly, Trump’s decisions to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to relocate the U.S. Embassy there have received quite divergent reactions from Jewish Americans. Following his announcement on the Jerusalem Embassy move, many right-wing and mainstream American Jewish organizations expressed their support for the decision, while left-wing groups criticized it. In addition, comparative surveys of American and Israeli Jews carried out by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 2018 revealed the extent of the division among American Jews over the move. According to these surveys, while 85% of Israeli Jews supported the move, only 46% of American Jews supported it. Furthermore, while only 7% of Israelis opposed the move, 47% of U.S. Jews opposed it (AJC, 2018b).

In this study, we aim to explain the rationale of the divergence within American Jews regarding the Trump’s Embassy move. To this end, we conducted interviews with eight representatives from different diaspora groups in Washington, DC, and Maryland between November 2017 and March 2018. Two of the interviews were conducted via Skype, and the other six were face-to-face conversations. In these interviews, open-ended questions were directed to the interviewees.¹

This study is organized as follows. In the first two sections of the study, the positions of the American Jewish community and American Jewish diaspora organizations over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and their underlying causes are discussed. In the third section, the interview responses of the representatives from various American Jewish organizations on the Jerusalem Embassy move are documented and analyzed in a comparative manner. The last section summarizes the finding and discusses the implications of this study.

American Jews and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Since the late 1960s, significant changes have taken place regarding American Jews’ positions on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Israel more generally. American Jews were mostly indifferent to the newly established Israel (Barnett, 2016). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, they focused their attention on securing their civil rights within the United States (Rynhold, 2007). Only after the Six-Day War of 1967 did they start to place their attention on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Cohen, 2002). Israel’s victory in the war helped American Jews leave behind their sense of victimhood and gave them a sense of power and pride (Rosenthal, 2001; Waxman, 2016).

Consequently, after the Six-Day War of 1967, most American Jews started to support Israel vehemently (Barnett, 2016; Rosenthal, 2001; Seliktar, 2002; Waxman, 2016). While supporting Israel was counted as a condition of being a good Jew, criticizing Israel publicly was generally considered an act of betrayal (Waxman, 2016). As Tivnan (1987, p. 76) stated, “An American Jewish ‘leader’ could be married to a gentile, he could be a stranger to the synagogue, but if he became a public critic of Israel, he would soon become a former Jewish leader.” Elazar (2001) described the loyalty of American Jews to Israel in this period as “Israelolatry,” referring to some sort of idolatry. Woocher (1986) went on to say that Israel became a “new civil religion” of American Jews.

This situation, however, began to change in 1977 when the right-wing Likud party of Menachem Begin came to power, ending nearly 30 years of the Labor rule. The Likud’s ideal of “Greater Israel” and its hawkish approach to the Palestinian issue resulted in an increasing discomfort among American Jews (Seliktar, 2007; Waxman, 2016). The developments that took place in the 1980s, especially Israel’s invasion of Lebanon which led to the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the harsh reaction of the Israeli army toward the first Palestinian Intifada (between 1987 and 1991), perpetuated the critical stance of American Jews on Israel’s policies toward Palestine (Barnett, 2016; Waxman, 2016). In the eyes of many Jewish Americans, Israel was no longer the innocent side of the Arab–Israeli conflict (Waxman, 2016). After the beginning of the first Intifada, Vorspan (1988), a longtime leader of the Reform Judaism movement in the United States, expressed his feelings about Israel’s actions toward the Palestinians as follows:

New York, Jan. 19: As we get up in the morning, my wife, Shirley, and I listen as National Public Radio’s Israel correspondent describes a new Israeli Army policy of “breaking the bones” of Palestinian demonstrators. The army, he says, is dragging Palestinians out of their homes and deliberately breaking their bones. Palestinians with broken hands can’t throw stones, says an Israeli spokesman. We listen in stunned disbelief. Is this possible, or has some reporter gone crazy? No, it is not possible, it cannot be. My stomach is queasy. Shirley is near tears (…) Jan. 21: The New York Times confirms Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s proclaimed policy of administering “force, might, beatings” to deter violence in the territories. Shamir says this will put “the fear of death” in them. The hospitals are filling up with Palestinians whose arms and legs have been deliberately broken by soldiers and settlers. If all this is true, Israel has lost its moral compass, has become a nation in panic. Op-Ed columns are savaging Israel. I have been a Zionist since I was a child growing up in St. Paul. Is this the fruition of Zionism?

Interestingly, by 1990, half of the American Jews felt that the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank would harm Israel’s moral character and believed that Israel could be criticized in all respects (Rosenthal, 2001). The Oslo peace process, which began in 1993, actually gave the impression that Israel’s approach to the Palestinians was changing and offered American Jews a glimmer of hope (Barnett, 2016). American Jews, as Auerbach (2001, p. 109) put it, could once again “embrace the Jewish state without compromising their liberalism or their patriotism.” Nevertheless, both the failure of negotiations and the recent asymmetrical wars of Israel such as the 2006 Lebanon war and the Gaza wars since 2008 have led to a further exacerbation of criticism from American Jews (Waxman, 2016).

Today, Israel is quite far from constituting the focal point of American Jews’ lives and receiving their uncritical support. According to the Pew Research Center (2013) survey, only 43% of American Jews state that caring about Israel is central to their Jewish identity. Moreover, 89% of them think that a person can be both Jewish and strongly critical of Israel (Pew Research Center, 2013).

The Pew survey (Pew Research Center, 2013) also revealed that a significant number of American Jews are not satisfied with Israel’s policies regarding the Palestinian issue. For instance, 44% of U.S. Jews think Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank is detrimental to Israel’s security, while only 17% think that it strengthens its national security. In a similar vein, 48% of the respondents do not find the Netanyahu government sincere in its efforts to make peace with the Palestinians, whereas 38% of the respondents believe otherwise. Regarding the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 61% of the respondents believe in the possibility of an independent Palestinian state and its peaceful coexistence with Israel (Pew Research Center, 2013).

In a similar vein, a survey conducted by the AJC (2017a) in 2017 reveals that more than half of the American Jews (55%) support the establishment of a Palestinian state. Furthermore, according to the 2018 AJC survey (AJC, 2018a), almost 60% of the American Jews support Israel’s removal of some or all of the settlements in the West Bank if a permanent peace with the Palestinians is achieved.

The critical attitude of American Jews on Israel can be attributed to their attachment to liberalism. As observed by Liebman and Cohen (1990), for most American Jews, liberalism is at the heart of their understanding of Judaism and constitutes an essential component of being a good and caring Jew. American Jews’ initial interest in liberalism, which dates back to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, can be attributed to the economic and social challenges they faced as immigrants and mostly workers. However, in spite of their increasing prosperity over time and no longer being an underprivileged group, Jewish Americans have persistently maintained their commitment to the political principles of American liberalism, which advocates more government support for economically disadvantaged groups, compared to its European version (Auerbach, 1995, 1996; Glazer, 1995).

The engagement of American Jews with liberalism has been a crucial factor in shaping their attitudes toward Israel. The shift of Israeli politics to the right and Israel’s increasing aggression toward the Palestinians especially since late 1970s were contradictory to the liberal principles upholded by many American Jews (Auerbach, 1995, 1996). Before 1977, Israel, in the eyes of American Jews, was a country that attached great importance to economic and gender equality, to social democracy, and, above all, to peace. Consequently, American Jews’ commitment to liberalism and their loyalty to Israel went hand in hand (Waxman, 2016).

The policies of Israeli governments since 1977 (those of Likud-led governments in particular) that were in clear contradiction with the tenets of American liberalism can be singled out as factors that have prompted American Jews to question their commitment to Israel. In other words, while American Jews have remained committed to the principles of liberalism, their loyalty to Israel has waned significantly (Auerbach, 1996). As such, it can be stated that the support of American Jews to Israel to a large extend depends on how Israel complies with political liberal values (Waxman, 2016).

Nevertheless, not all American Jews embrace political liberalism. The Pew survey (Pew Research Center, 2013) indicates that while about half of the Jewish Americans describe themselves as liberal, 20% say they are politically conservative (the remaining 30% define themselves as moderates). Even though they constitute a small part of U.S. Jews compared to liberals, politically conservative Jews make their voice heard more loudly, especially when it comes to issues related to Israel. They also feel emotionally more attached to Israel and show a hawkish stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Waxman, 2016). A survey conducted in 2010 (Sasson, Phillips, Kadushin, & Saxe, 2010), for instance, found that conservatives were more opposed to the partition of Jerusalem and the dismantling of settlements in the West Bank, whereas liberals were more supportive of making concessions to the Palestinians as part of a permanent peace.

In addition, the Pew survey (Pew Research Center, 2016) shows that only 43% of conservative Jews believe in the possibility of a two-state solution, compared to 70% of liberals. Another disagreement between liberal and conservative Jews is related to the level of U.S. support for Israel during the Obama administration. In 2013, 55% of conservatives claimed the United States did not support Israel enough, while just 17% of liberals shared this view (Pew Research Center, 2016). It is thus reasonable to assert that the U.S. policy toward Israel under President Trump is in line with the political agendas of conservative Jews.

The structure of denominational differences among American Jews regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict largely resembles the ideological divide in terms of both population composition and content. Orthodox Jews who constitute the minority (10%) of the American Jewish community generally express more hawkish views, whereas Reform and unaffiliated Jews—those who do not identify with any denomination—that make up the majority (35% and 30%, respectively) tend to exhibit more dovish stance (Pew Research Center, 2013; Waxman, 2016). The views of denominationally Conservative Jews vary depending on specific issues. For example, Conservatives take a more positive approach to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the dismantling of settlements in the West Bank. On the other hand, they oppose the division of Jerusalem (Sasson, 2009).

The divergent positions of Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict can be said to result from the discrepancies between their conceptions of Judaism. As Sasson (2009) put it, Judaism provides intellectual ground for many different political views from left to right. In this respect, Orthodox Jews in general stress aspects of Judaism that emphasize particularism, whereas Reform Jews tend to stress its universalistic elements. A large part of Orthodox Jews argue that the Jews are a chosen people and focus on the responsibility of all Jews for each other. Most Reform or liberal Jews, by contrast, think that all human beings are created in the image of God and that every single person, Jewish or not, has inherent dignity and value. In turn, particularism motivates Orthodox Jews to place the Jewish historical narrative in a more privileged position and therefore to support more hawkish political views, while universalism encourages non-Orthodox Jews to be more open to different historical narratives and thus to hold more dovish views.

As the Pew survey reveals, 84% of Orthodox Jews believe that Israel was given by God to the Jewish people. In contrast, only 35% of Reform and 24% of unaffiliated Jews share this belief. Furthermore, most of Orthodox Jews (92%) said that they had a special responsibility to care for Jews in need, compared with 64% of Reform and just 39% of unaffiliated Jews (Pew Research Center, 2013). On the whole, compared to non-Orthodox Jews, Orthodox Jews are far less likely to believe in the possibility of a two-state solution (64% vs. 30%) and more likely to think the settlements serve the security of Israel (15% vs. 34%; Pew Research Center, 2016). Orthodox Jews are also much more likely than non-Orthodox Jews to believe that the Israeli government is truly pursuing a peace deal (61% vs. 36%; Pew Research Center, 2016). As for the current United States–Israel relations, it can be argued that the vast majority of Orthodox American Jews approve the Trump administration’s approach to Israel. AJC’s (2017b) survey of American Jewish opinion finds that 78% of Orthodox Jews view Trump’s performance favorably, compared to 50% of Conservative and only 31% of Reform Jews.

Divisions Among American Jewish Diaspora Organizations

Israel’s handling of the Palestinian issue since the late 1970s has also resulted in significant disagreements among Jewish diaspora organizations in the United States. With the exception of the left-wing organization Breira (“Alternative” in Hebrew), which was founded in 1973 and forced to dissolve in 1977 under intense pressure from Jewish community leaders and professionals for its vigorous criticism of Israel and its advocacy of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories (Waxman, 2010), Jewish diaspora organizations that provide unconditional support for the positions of Israeli governments, particularly the American–Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents (CoP) of Major American Jewish Organizations, did not face any serious challenge from within the Jewish community until the early 1980s (Elazar, 2001; Gertheiss, 2016; Sasson, 2014; Waxman, 2016).

In addition to the right-wing and centrist organizations, from the 1980s onward, many new left-wing and liberal Jewish groups, including Americans for Peace Now (APN), Israel Policy Forum (IPF), and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), that are critical of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians have been established (Waxman, 2016).

As such, American Jewish groups are today highly far from constituting a united front vis-à-vis the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Issues such as the future of the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war (the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem), the possible solutions to the conflict (one state, two states, or a binational state), and the extent of U.S. support for Israel can be listed as the main points of disagreements among diaspora groups.

Considering the positions they have taken on issues concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, American Jewish organizations can be divided into three categories: right-wing, centrist, and left-wing groups (Sasson, 2014; Waxman, 2010). Right-wing groups—namely, Americans for a Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA)—tend to see the Palestinians not as potential partners with whom they can come to the table for reconciliation but rather as Israel’s fierce enemies, and as such, they believe that the use of hard power will lead to more effective results than diplomacy and negotiations (Waxman, 2010).

Consequently, these groups reject any Israeli territorial concessions to the Palestinians. They support settlement construction and Israeli domination in the West Bank and persistently oppose the division of Jerusalem and the two-state solution (Fleshler, 2009; Rynhold, 2015; Waxman, 2010). The Jewish right-wing organizations argue that the establishment of a Palestinian state is unnecessary by claiming that the Palestinians are not the real owners of the land but rather an artificially created nation (Waxman, 2016). For instance, Morton Klein, the ZOA’s longtime president and a prominent figure on the American Jewish right, asserted at ZOA’s 2017 gala that Palestine has never been sovereign Arab land (Jewish Broadcasting Service [JBS], 2017). He went on to argue that:

…if it was their sovereign land, how could that be that they would have named it “Palestine”—a Roman name, not an Arab name? We are the only significant organization making it clear to Congress and the media and in public speeches that there is no occupation. This is holy Jewish land, it has never been sovereign Arab land. (JBS, 2017)

Likewise, at the 2014 conference of the Israeli–American Council, Sheldon Adelson, an American Jewish billionaire and a major financier of right-wing organizations, said, “the Palestinians are an invented people,” adding that “the purpose of the existence of Palestinians is to destroy Israel” (Stoil & Staff, 2014).

Compared to those of the Jewish right-wing organizations, the positions of centrist organizations, including AIPAC, the AJC, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the CoP, on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are ambivalent. In principle, Jewish organizations located in the center of the political spectrum support a two-state solution based on territorial compromise. However, they neither enthusiastically promote peace initiatives nor demonstrate sufficient opposition to the Israeli steps that prevent the very establishment of a Palestinian state.

Centrist groups, such as AIPAC, the ADL, and the CoP, viewing U.S. support as an indispensable element of Israel’s security act as an intermediary between the two countries (Waxman, 2010). They are of the view that the expression of critical thoughts about Israel’s policies in public could damage the United States–Israeli alliance. Therefore, they support the idea that disagreements should be resolved behind closed doors (Fleshler, 2009; Gertheiss, 2016; Waxman, 2010). For instance, while right-wing groups, the ZOA in particular, campaigned against the Oslo peace process and the Gaza disengagement in 2005 at the expense of confronting the Jewish State, centrist groups, led by AIPAC and the CoP, gave their support to both, despite being half-hearted (Fleshler, 2009; Gertheiss, 2016; Sasson, 2014; Waxman, 2010, 2016).

The American Jewish left consists of organizations such as Ameinu, APN, IfNotNow, IPF, J Street, Partners for Progressive Israel (PPI), the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (RAC), the Union for Reform Judaism (URJ), T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, and JVP. The Jewish left-wing organizations in the United States adopt a critical stance toward the policies of Israeli governments toward Palestinians. In addition, a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, with land swaps, is regarded by the large majority of these groups as the only viable way to ensure peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians (e.g., see APN, n.d., About Us: Mission Statement section; J Street, n.d., Policy: Borders section; IPF, n.d., Statement of Principles section). As such, it is in their best interest to see a neutral U.S. administration, which can apply pressure on the Israeli government when necessary, taking on a leading role in order to achieve this outcome (Fleshler, 2009; Rynhold, 2015; Waxman, 2010).

However, the critical posture of left-wing groups should not be interpreted as their indifference to Israel’s interests and security. Quite the contrary, many groups in this category describe themselves as pro-Israel, and by criticizing it, they actually intend to “save Israel from itself” (Waxman, 2010, p. 12). Interestingly, these groups oppose the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and advocate for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, not only because they believe that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination in a state of their own but because they view the two-state formula as essential to ensure Israel’s security and continuity as a Jewish and democratic state. To put it another way, they are of the believe that if the two-state solution collapses, Israel will either be an apartheid-like state or lose its Jewish identity. In this context, Ben-Ami (2011), founder and president of the “pro-Israel, pro-peace” organization J Street, warns that:

Our voice must speak the truth as loudly and clearly as possible: The present path that the state of Israel is on is unsustainable. The occupation of another people and the denial of their national aspirations and their rights is not only morally unacceptable, it is a fatal threat to the entire enterprise of the State of Israel. (p. 223)

At this point, JVP and IfNotNow, which fall on the far left of the political spectrum and whose positions do not coincide with the general tendency on the left, should be briefly mentioned. Unlike the temperate opposition of other left-wing organizations that seek to build a harmony between Israel’s long-term interests and the Palestinians’ aspirations, these two organizations take a more critical stance that centers especially on the Palestinians’ rights. They prefer not to designate a particular solution to the conflict—a binational state, two states, or another alternative—as their official position (IfNotNow, n.d., Our Principles section; JVP, n.d., FAQ section) and mainly focus on the problem itself—the occupation, which they similarly define as “a system of violence and separation by which Israel denies Palestinians freedom and dignity by depriving them of civil, political, and economic rights” (IfNotNow, n.d., Our Principles section; JVP, n.d., Israel Palestine Conflict 101 section). Accordingly, IfNotNow strives to dissuade the American Jewish community from supporting the occupation through direct actions including demonstrations, marches, rallies, and sit-ins (e.g., see Nathan-Kazis, 2017; Sales, 2016). JVP, too, gets actively involved in such actions in pursuit of ending the Israeli occupation, but it stands out with its advocacy of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, which was initiated by Palestinian civil society groups in 2005 in order to force Israel to comply with international law by methods such as boycotting goods produced in West Bank settlements.

All in all, from the left to the right of the political spectrum, American Jewish organizations’ positions on issues concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict provide important insights for understanding why the organized Jewish community has not maintained a monolithic stance vis-à-vis the Jerusalem Embassy decision. In the next section, we document and analyze the interview responses conducted with representatives from various American Jewish groups.

American Jewish Organizations and Trump’s Jerusalem Embassy Move

The Trump administration’s one-sided policies toward Israel, especially its decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017 not only escalated tensions between the Palestinians and the Israelis but have further exacerbated the polarization among American Jews on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

A survey conducted by the AJC (2017a) a few months before the official announcement of the decision revealed that only 16% of Jewish Americans supported an immediate relocation of the embassy. In contrast, 36% of the respondents favored moving it at a future date in conjunction with Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, and 44% opposed the embassy move. Likewise, in a more recent AJC study (2018a), 46% of American Jews expressed their support for the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to move the U.S. embassy there, while 47% said they were against it.

Given their sharply divergent views, one can clearly state that there is no consensus among American Jewish organizations over the Embassy move, which reversed the decades-old U.S. policy on the status of Jerusalem. Not surprisingly, many right-wing and centrist organizations voiced their satisfaction with the decision immediately after its declaration, but those on the leftist spectrum severely criticized this unilateral move, highlighting the risks it poses for the Israeli–Palestinian relations.

That being said, it is worth noting that there is a considerable nuance between statements made by right-wing and centrist Jewish groups as well, despite their similar remarks pointing out the “historic importance” of the President Trump’s decision. Right-wing groups, in most cases, issued statements emphasizing the place of Jerusalem in Jewish history and defending that Trump did what needed to be done since the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act² but turning a blind eye to Palestinian claims to the city (e.g., see The Orthodox Union, 2017; ZOA, 2017).

ZOA’s President Morton Klein criticized the President Trump who stated in his speech that “Jerusalem is not just the heart of three great religions.” He further noted that “…Trump inaccurately stated today that Jerusalem is the ‘heart’ of Islam; Mecca and Medina are Islam’s holiest cities. There is a holy Muslim place in Jerusalem—but the city is not holy to Islam” (ZOA, 2017). Centrist groups, by contrast, preferred to use a more cautious language. For instance, in their joint statement, the ADL leaders Marvin D. Nathan and Jonathan A. Greenblatt underlined that the U.S.’s Jerusalem decision should not hinder peace talks. They went to say that:

…this important and long overdue step should not preclude the imperative of peace negotiations—including discussions over the final status of Jerusalem. We urge the U.S., Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community to work together to reduce tensions and create conditions conducive for the rapid resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations leading to a two-state solution. (ADL, 2017)

At the other end of the spectrum, AIPAC states that it has always supported the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel but maintains that

relocating the embassy to Jerusalem does not in any way prejudge the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, to include establishing two states for two peoples and resolving Palestinian claims to the eastern portion of the city and the disposition of holy places. (AIPAC, 2017)

In our interview with Alan Ronkin, regional director of AJC Washington, DC, he responded to the question regarding the status and future of Jerusalem in the following manner:

Well, depends what you call Jerusalem. The municipal boundaries of Jerusalem have been expanded a number of times over the years. I’m not only talking about the annexation part, I’m talking about including certain neighborhoods that were never considered Jerusalem as part of the city. They did it primarily for tax base reasons, you know, civilian, pedestrian kind of stuff. I believe personally that there has to be some sort of negotiated agreement about where the boundaries of Israeli Jerusalem and Palestinian Jerusalem have to be. I don’t think either side can get the whole enchilada. The main issue, of course, is the holy basin that’s really where the rubber hits the road. We’re not talking about Abu Dis, we’re not talking about Qalandia, we’re not talking about those neighborhoods. We are talking about what do you do with that one square mile around the holy sites. And that’s going to be tough. It’s going to be a really tough negotiation. (…) But look, this week, the Administration said they couldn’t imagine a settlement of the peace agreement without the Western Wall remaining in Israeli hands. Palestinians were all up in arms. They have this fantasy that somehow they’re going to be able to retain the entire Old City. I don’t think that’s going to happen. (…) Now, when you talk about the Muslim Quarter, when you talk about the Christian Quarter, there’s room to negotiate there. And I think, as long as you’d have an arrangement that would allow everybody access to their holy sites unencumbered by the other party, so the Waqf continues to control entrance to the Temple Mount, and Israelis don’t have to get involved in Muslim holy sites. They just what the Muslim community, what the Palestinians handle it. The Christians handle the Christian stuff as it works today. That to me seems more reasonable, more just way of doing this, but I don’t see a situation where the Jewish community, where the Jewish world would ever allow the Jewish quarter of the Western Wall, any of that, to ever be outside of Israeli sovereignty. Nor should they. That makes no sense to me that whatever happen.

Look, what Trump said is very complex. It wasn’t as simple as everybody made it out to be. Since 1995, the United States through Congress has accepted Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. You go there, every foreign dignitary goes there, goes to Jerusalem to meet with the prime minister, to go to the Knesset. You can’t deny that it’s there. I mean it’s absurd to have this fantasy that Jerusalem is not Israel’s capital. Now again going back to my original statement, what’s considered Jerusalem? Are we talking about West Jerusalem, are we talking about East Jerusalem or are we talking about this weird municipal boundary that they’ve drawn? That’s where the negotiation and Trump’s statement clearly talks to that. He speaks to that, he speaks to a two state solution, he speaks to not prejudging what the final outcome of borders and boundaries are. As long as he says that, as long as that door is open to having an agreement that would address the Jerusalem question, I’m fine with him. (A. Ronkin, personal communication, December 20, 2017)

It can be asserted that conflicting attitudes of centrist organizations result from a search for a formulation that will serve most to the security and interests of Israel, while keeping the prospect open for the two-state solution. In this respect, the President Trump’s decision can be evaluated as a move that could strengthen Israel’s hand in future talks with the Palestinians on Jerusalem’s final status rather than an act that would block peace negotiations. Despite his determined stance that Jerusalem has to be shared, Ronkin unequivocally describes what should be the minimal boundaries of Israeli Jerusalem while leaving ambiguous which parts of the city should belong to the Palestinian state.

Differing from the ambiguous and sometimes contradictory attitudes of centrist organizations, our interviewees from left-wing groups clearly expressed their views on how Jerusalem should be divided between the Palestinians and the Israelis, even though each of them presented different pictures. For instance, IPF Policy Director Michael Koplow speaks of a model that does not exclude alternatives but has distinct boundaries:

I don’t think there’s any chance that the Palestinians ever agree to a two-state solution in which Jerusalem is not their capital. So the obvious solution to my mind is West Jerusalem and the other Jewish neighborhoods of north, south, and east Jerusalem become part of Israeli Jerusalem, the rest of East Jerusalem becomes Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine; and (as for) the Old City, some arrangement has to be worked out. You can either divide the Old City itself where Israel keeps the Jewish Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter and Palestine keeps the Christian Quarter and the Muslim Quarter. You can have some sort of shared sovereignty over the entire Old City, you can have it administered by some type of international body. There are different ways to do it, but there’s no question to me that Jerusalem has to be shared (…) Both nations want to have Jerusalem as their capital, that has to be respected in some way. So when the current Israeli government talks about never dividing Jerusalem, I think that’s completely unrealistic. Jerusalem will have to be divided. It’s just a matter of coming up with a formula where each side can sort of claim victory. (M. Koplow, personal communication, November 14, 2017)

Also in an explicit way, PPI’s President Paul L. Scham says he favors a settlement that reflects the pre-1967 borders:

Well, I think Jerusalem has to be shared. I accept the European model that they will recognize West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital when they can recognize East Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital. I don’t think there is any solution without sharing preferably or dividing Jerusalem. It has to be and can be shared. And I think that Israelis have to be assured of access to the Temple Mount whether there is a separate administration or I don’t think Israeli sovereignty over the Mount itself is possible. (P. L. Scham, personal communication, February 5, 2018)

Showing a different approach than the other people we interviewed from left-wing groups, Seth Morrison, a member of JVP’s board of directors, argues that Jerusalem has to be an international city. Nevertheless, he emphasizes the importance of Jerusalem to both the Palestinians and the Israelis and voices his discomfort regarding the practices of Israel. He goes on to say that:

I am Jewish. I believe in the Jewish religion. I believe that Jews have historic religious ties to Jerusalem. This is very important. However, I recognize that both Christians and Muslims have similar ties and I don’t believe that whatever historic ties exist justify taking over the city and saying that “it’s a Jewish or Israeli city.” I also want to say that it hurts me when I hear some Palestinians say Jews have no ties and that there never was a temple. Well, I don’t know if there was a temple or not. This is not about history. But the fact that my people believe that there was a temple. I do understand why Jews are hurt when people say there’s no tie. But I definitely believe that Jerusalem has to be an international city. I also believe that it’s a segregated city (…) When I walk in the Jewish Quarter and I go to the Wall, I feel spiritual, but when I walk in the Muslim areas and I see Israeli flags, I get mad. (S. Morrison, personal communication, via Skype, November 2, 2017)

It should be noted at this point that an overwhelming majority of the organizations on the left actually have no objections to the recognition of Jerusalem (needless to say, not the entire Jerusalem) as Israel’s capital (see, e.g., APN, 2017; IPF, 2017; J Street, 2017). However, the main reason for their opposition to the decision is that it was taken without any compromise between the parties. In the interview we had shortly before Trump officially declared his decision, APN spokesman Ori Nir noted that:

Now I have to say there have been other candidates in the past who have spoken about moving the embassy before they became presidents and didn’t do it after. And Obama spoke about that. Not in the way that Trump did. I think Trump came into it without really realizing what would be the ramifications of moving the embassy. I think it’s something that should not be done in the context of the status quo. It has to be done either once there is real movement toward peace or I think, preferably so, once a settlement on Jerusalem is reached. Because the status of Jerusalem is still undefined and unrecognized internationally, the U.S. should not be the one leading a fait accompli approach toward Jerusalem. So (…) hopefully they will wait with it until really the diplomatic moment comes. (O. Nir, personal communication, November 10, 2017)

Besides expressing his concern regarding the timing of the decision, Ilya Braverman, the Deputy National Political Director of J Street, warns that the U.S. Embassy move would weaken the prospects for peace and lead to a loss of confidence on the Palestinian side in the U.S. mediating role. He argues that:

The recent announcement of the Trump administration to move the embassy and to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is not a move we supported. We think that when it comes to the actual implications of this, it’s not going to move us towards peace. We both as J Street and I think as American Jews understand that Jerusalem is an important city for Jews, for Arabs. And ultimately Jerusalem is going to serve as the capital of Israel. But that’s not a move that needs to be made or should be made unilaterally at this point. And I think there’s probably agreement as well that East Jerusalem or parts of Jerusalem will also serve as a capital for a future Palestinian state. But again, that’s something that the two parties need to decide. Moves like that just get us farther and farther away from peace. But it is one of the biggest sticking points, it’s one of the final status issues, and the United States President we don’t think should be making these moves. And I know that his reaction was “well, I took that issue off the table,” as if now that is off the table, it’s not an issue anymore, it’s not a point of contention. It’s the opposite. We might have not seen the violent reactions that some might have expected. But I think there’s every day after that move and other moves that the Trump administration has made or comments they’ve made, I think the Palestinian people, the Palestinian leadership does not trust the United States and does not see it any longer as a leader on this issue. And that’s dangerous. Because the two parties themselves have shown that they can’t reach a solution between themselves. And if we as the United States are not leading on this, there’s a leadership vacuum, someone’s going to fill it or it’s going to continue to lead to violence on the ground. (I. Braverman, personal communication, February 16, 2018)

Sarah Brammer-Shlay, a founding member of IfNotNow, criticizes the U.S. Embassy move by arguing that the decision disregards Palestinian claims on the status of Jerusalem and the demographic composition of the city. Furthermore, she states that the move is shown as if it were taken with the support of the Jewish community but that it was mainly supported by evangelical Christians. She notes that:

I believe that Jerusalem is a holy city for Jews, Muslims, and Christians. I think what we saw with the embassy move announcement is again actually somewhat saying out loud the status quo that already exists. (…) It was also, to me, a form of like guts and chutzpah, for a lack of a better word, that both Trump and Netanyahu were able to say “we actually can do this now.” It’s a total slap in the face to Palestinians to not recognize their right and their connection to the land. (…) And on a personal level, Jerusalem is an extremely important city for the Jewish community and it’s a city that I really really love. So there was a level personal like heartbreak when this announcement came, too, because I think it’s not a game. It’s not only the Jewish community but in the Jewish community, we’re both looking at Jerusalem as a state of aspiration. But also it is a real city with real people. I think that this announcement from Trump around the embassy move was just totally not understanding that. And I do want to say that, you know, that move was primarily pushed by evangelical Christians. I think it’s another way that Jews are actually used, American Jews specifically, to further the occupation in ways that are anti-Semitic actually, and perpetuates the occupation and says “we’re doing this because we’ve stood by the Jewish community.” With the embassy move, we’re actually like “no, you do this, because Christians United for Israel is like a huge lobbying force that lobbies in the U.S. political government.” (S. Brammer-Shlay, personal communication, via Skype, March 6, 2018)

Rabbi Jonah Dov Pesner, the Director of the RAC, notes that he was initially hopeful because of the work the Trump negotiating team carried out but emphasized that the process that started with the U.S. Jerusalem Embassy decision has greatly diminished his expectations for a two-state solution:

I’ve actually met with the negotiating team, Jason Greenblatt’s team. They’re actually doing a lot of interesting work. They’ve been talking a lot to the Palestinians, they’ve been talking to the Jordanians and the Israelis, they’ve been talking to the Saudis. They’ve been listening. You know they met with refugees. So I was optimistic and then the unilateral decision on Jerusalem which the timing was very complicated and then the Likud Party in Israel basically passes a resolution saying that they want to annex the West Bank. I am worried that this administration will be the administration in which we see the end of the two-state solution and we see some kind of one state which is really problematic. I am worried that we’ll see one state which is basically an Israeli state in which a Palestinian minority continues to be treated as kind of a captive community. It’s morally reprehensible. And I don’t think it’s sustainable from a security perspective. You want to manage millions of people living in your country that are not citizens, have no enfranchisement, are economically oppressed. (…) He (Trump) says he’s going to make the biggest deal ever. So we’ll see. (J. D. Pesner, personal communication, January 11, 2018)

In summary, the interview results indicate that there are three different attitudes toward the Jerusalem Embassy move within the organized American Jewish community. Right-wing groups provide unconditional support for the move, while centrist groups, despite expressing satisfaction with it, emphasize that it should not constitute an obstacle to negotiations between the parties and a two-state solution. On the other hand, left-wing organizations are strongly opposed to the decision, especially since it has ignored Palestinians claims on Jerusalem and has undermined the prospects for peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to provide a comprehensive explanation of the divergent responses of American Jews to the Jerusalem Embassy decision. To this end, we have examined the policies of Israel toward the Palestinians since the late 1970s and the political and religious divisions within the American Jewish community as the main causes behind these divergent responses. We have also documented and analyzed how the decision has been perceived by different American Jewish organizations through interviews with their representatives.

Despite the intense opposition from a large number of American Jews, the Trump administration continues to implement policies that upset the fragile balances in the Israel/Palestine region. The decisions to cease funding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, an organization that provides vital assistance to the Palestinian refugees, and to close the Palestine Liberation Organization’s office in Washington, DC, clearly show that the Trump administration does not aim to achieve a long-lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. In this regard, although President Trump’s Middle East peace plan, which he calls the “deal of the century,” has yet to be announced, it can be anticipated that the administration will come up with a plan that will make the creation of an independent Palestinian state practically impossible.

U.S. policies toward Israel reflect the wishes of Jewish right-wing organizations in the United States. In this respect, these organizations, seeing that the course of the conflict is evolving in the direction they desire, might begin to voice their arguments in a more insistent and more vocal manner. Moreover, the evolution of the process toward a one-state outcome might force centrist and left-wing American Jews to change their positions on the conflict. The biggest dilemma facing the centrist Jews in the coming period will presumably be whether to change their stance on the two-state solution.

If the Trump–Netanyahu axis points to a one-state formula, centrist groups that attach a primary importance to the United States–Israeli alliance might probably reduce their emphasis on the two-state solution and develop a new discourse appropriate for the new process. This may be a nonnegotiable discourse that argues that if a Palestinian state is to be established, it must renounce its claims to East Jerusalem and to the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Such an attitude will inevitably move the centrist organizations to the right of the political spectrum.

Needless to say, this process will leave the American Jewish left facing more challenging issues. Given that the majority of left-wing organizations regard the two-state solution as the only alternative, they might first seek to convince the U.S. administration to come up with a settlement plan that the Palestinian side could also agree on. If this initiative fails, they might have to choose between two positions: either to struggle for a democratic but non-Jewish Israel or to continue the pursuit of a two-state solution that is no longer practicable. Considering that the second position would require ignoring the apartheid policies of the Jewish state, left-wing groups might probably reconsider their persistent stance on a two-state solution.

Currently, there is already an increasing number of people in the far-left camp that are skeptical of the two-state solution due to Israel’s expansionist policies and therefore are struggling to transform Israel into a binational secular and democratic state (Waxman, 2016). In this respect, a significant portion of left-wing American Jews, who, at the moment, see the two-state solution as the only way out of the conflict, could participate in this segment, moving further to the left, and strive for a non-Jewish democratic state. Consequently, this process, which has begun with President Trump’s Jerusalem decision and has been evolving toward a one-state outcome, might result in further polarization of American Jews between the right and left of the political spectrum in the medium and long run.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the members of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland, and especially Paul Scham, executive director of the Institute, for their unique contributions in the process of conducting the interviews. The authors are also grateful to each of the interviewees for devoting their precious time to share their valuable views with us.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received financial support from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for this research (Grant Number: 53325897-115.02-243381).

ORCID iD

Hamza Yavuz

Notes

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