Reassessing Turkey’s Soft Power: The Rules of Attraction

Debating Power and Soft Power

Power is an elusive, contested, and difficult to measure concept (Nye, 2011b). Boulding (1989) defines power as the ability to get what one wants. Power, although different than force, entails a component of threat power (the power to destroy), economic power (the power to produce/exchange), and integrative power (the power to create relations; Boulding, 1989).

Power has been an integral part of international relations since the early writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli, and its solid foundations were laid out in the realist school of thought. In the realm of international relations, power and politics are intertwined and the two cannot be separated from each other (Carr, 1941). Classical realist E. H. Carr argues that actors in international politics pay significant attention to power. States, as main actors in international politics, pursue power at the expense of one another (Mearsheimer, 2005). Furthermore, the foreign policy interests of states consist of preserving and accruing this power (Kuntz, 2010). Therefore, Carr (1941) argues that power is an essential part of politics and an indispensable part of governments.

Dahl (1957) defines power as the ability of one actor to influence the actions of another actor. Morgenthau (1954) suggests nine different elements of national power, and these include geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government. Additionally, the elements of national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government are associated with intangible sources of power (Fan, 2008).

The three norms in international power that are military, economic, and power over opinion are essential capabilities to exert power (Carr, 1941; Nye, 2011b). All three norms of power are different but interconnected means to exert influence in international politics. The three norms of international power are conveyed through tangible and intangible resources, which are the raw materials or vehicles that underlie power relationships (Nye, 2011a). As such, scholars in the realist tradition define power by means of the material capabilities that states possess (Mearsheimer, 2001). For Mearsheimer (2001), these material capabilities are tangible assets that will eventually determine the military strength of a nation. Political scientist Kenneth Waltz (2010) similarly defines power as the capabilities that are comprised of the size of the population and territory, the number of resources, the economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence of the country.

Along with this line of thought, in which power is defined in hard terms, Nye (2011a) also categorized the use of force, payment, and agenda as hard power. International prestige and reputation are the cornerstones of power that draw from hard power resources in the form of military and economic assets. Although prestige and reputation in the post–Cold War period have been overwhelmingly associated with soft power, hard power resources also greatly contribute to the international reputation of nations. Morgenthau’s (1954) definition of the policy of prestige asserts that the desire for prestige among nations represents an expression of power. Gilpin (1981) expresses similar points in regard to the role of prestige among states and the role it plays among political authority. Gilpin argues that

…the hierarchy of prestige in an international system rests on economic and military power. Prestige is the reputation for power and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power. (p. 31)

In the post–Cold War age, foundations of power have been moving away from an emphasis on hard power and instead toward a reliance on persuasion by other means and therefore the intangibles of power (Nye, 1990). Power in the information age, together with the catalyzing force of liberal international order, has been equally utilized in noncoercive ways mainly in the developed North (Nye, 2004). Globalization, advances in communication technology, the end of the Cold War, and the shift in international power dynamics facilitated the emergence of the concept of soft power, coined by Nye (1990). An additional dimension of power that is essential for ensuring security and cooperation, soft power is getting others to want the outcomes that you want through culture, politics, and foreign policy rather than coercion and payments (Nye, 2004, 2008). Soft power achieves policy outcomes through attraction and because others also want the outcome that what you want (Keohane & Nye, 1998). It sets the agenda through influence and the ability to entice and attract (Nye, 2008).

Soft power resources are the assets that produce attraction (Nye, 2008). The three basic soft power resources—culture, politics, and foreign policy—“can translate into the behavior of attraction that can influence others towards favorable outcomes” (Nye, 2011b, p. 84). Nye (2004) further posits that a country should be able to establish emotional ties, such as attraction, with desired foreign audiences to assure policy objectives. Nye argues that “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries-are admiring its values, emulating its example, and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” (p. 5). According to Nye, soft power is a behavioral trigger that is led by attraction and example. Correspondingly, soft power is a referent power that is based on identification and attraction (Fan, 2008).

Credibility and reputation are the cornerstones of soft power (Keohane & Nye, 1998). A nation’s attractiveness relies on the legitimacy and credibility of its intangible assets (Nye, 2008). In other words, a nation’s soft power depends on the credibility of the government and its actions (Nye, 2011b). In turn, desirability and credibility are built on a cluster of qualities that are derived from benignity, competence, and charisma (Nye, 2011b, p. 92). These qualities are either existent in a nation or are crafted to meet a strategy. Olins (2007), nation branding expert, argues that nations have historically tried to manage their reputations in an effort to create loyalties and gain influence in other countries. In an ever-interconnected world where image is more important than reality, the perceptions held by others are influenced by the actions of countries and the words of policy makers (Benoit, 1995). As a result, nations manage their reputations and compete for a favorable global image in order to advance their interests in the international arena (Wang, 2006).

In summary, soft power refers to the capacity of one country to indirectly influence the behavior of another country that results in behavioral change (Dowding, 2012). Although soft power is about behavioral change, there are different operational frameworks in achieving behavioral change. Communications scholar R. S. Zaharna (2007) posits two frames of analysis of soft power: wielding and creating soft power. In this respect, wielding soft power is exerting influence in a one directional way that serves the interests of nations with limited room for reciprocity. When nations wield soft power, they have the intention to change attitudes or behavior of a target audience. Creating soft power, on the other hand, is comparatively a two-way engagement that is more inclusive of diverse cultural perspectives and is more reciprocal in terms of message exchange. Creating soft power emerges from changing communication dynamics defined by the actors and their communication styles. These new dynamics are the diffusion of information, the emergence of culture as a component of international relations, and the new communication of actors and technologies. Hence, creating soft power rests on a network communication approach, which is reflective of nonstate sources such as nongovernmental organizations. The network paradigm does not deliver a message in efforts to wield soft power, but it ends with a cocreated message or story that creates soft power (Zaharna, 2007, 2010).

The concept of soft power, which in and of itself is a liberal construct, has drawn significant criticism from academic circles. These criticisms encompass the scope of the concept (Kearn, 2011), the lack of a systemic and rigorous analysis (Gallorotti, 2011), the linkage between hard and soft power (Kearn, 2011), and the role of hegemony in soft power (Fan, 2008). Furthermore, the concept became a buzzword that is often misused. For example, soft power is often interchangeably used with public diplomacy, which is the complex communication strategy in achieving soft power. The conflation of the two concepts causes further confusion of when to use the appropriate terms (Snow, 2009). Furthermore, soft power is also used as a justification for public diplomacy (Hayden, 2017). Discussions on soft power can stretch the concept to describe both soft power resources, as well as its impact. Resources that comprise culture, political values, and foreign policy carry the potential for a nation’s soft power. However, unless these resources are realized by a government as assets and converted into soft power, we cannot assume these resource constitute soft power (Fan, 2008; Treverton & Jones, 2005). In other words, the existence of soft power resources does not justify the existence of soft power. In addition to state-based soft power resources, various other nonstate actors such as leaders in civil society and celebrities have the potential to generate soft power (Fan, 2008). Nonetheless, there needs to be intentionality by the state, a clear blueprint on how to best utilize state and nonstate resources, to translate these nonstate actors into actual soft power assets.

Contrary to its nature as an analytical concept soft power is treated as a stand-alone theory. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to quantify soft power and determine how much soft power contributes to a nation’s global reputation. Thirdly, soft power is treated as an alternative to hard power when in reality they complement one another since, without resources and hard power, soft power on its own does not translate into substantial initiatives. For example, the practice of yoga has been historically ingrained in India’s traditions and became popular throughout the world in the twentieth century. Only with India’s economic development and implementation of yoga diplomacy into its foreign policy apparatus, India has been capitalizing on the widespread popularity of yoga (Jaishankar, 2018; Mazumdar, 2018). In other words, recognition of the soft power resources and the economic power to communicate these resources to foreign audiences are necessary to translate them into soft power assets. Fan (2008), who argues soft power is a cultural power, supports this idea by suggesting that a country’s policy plans and foreign policy cannot be separated from hard power. He further argues that foreign policy is, in fact, a manifestation of hard power, as a nation needs to invest money, thus hard power, to develop its sources into soft power. For example, although foreign aid—a form of hard power—is a theme in soft power analyses, it has been understudied and is not assumed to have a pivotal role in explaining soft power (Pamment, 2018). While the efforts of U.S. Agency for International Development has had significant role since the Cold War in expanding American soft power (Cull, 2008; Essex 2013), more recent debates around China’s foreign aid to African countries furthered the debate on the role of hard power elements in generating soft power (King, 2013).

Finally, the role of hegemony has not been well researched in soft power debates, even though after the Cold War, soft power was in vogue. Nonetheless, soft power at its core is a power strategy for a means-end in achieving favorable foreign policy outcomes. As a result, soft power is comprised of liberal values but is not a form of idealism or liberalism. In Nye’s (2007) words, soft power “…is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes” (p. 170). Soft power was also conceptualized in the Western discourse and pertained to U.S. foreign policy in the aims to claim U.S. hegemony as the bastion of the international order. In this respect, soft power is a reflection of Western, liberal values that embody liberal democracies in North America and Europe. In Nye’s original articulation, image, reputation, and attraction occur when a nation possesses democratic values that are defined by liberal democracy. Consequently, soft power inherently favors nations that are liberal democracies and omits other nations, though they may still enjoy relative attractiveness in developing countries. Existing indices examining soft power such as the Portland Soft Power Report and the Monocle Soft Power Report are reflective of the bias.

Fan (2008) and Thussu (2014) both criticize Nye’s soft power concept as ethnocentric. They argue that the condescending approach in defining and conceptualizing soft power assumes the superiority of American culture and disregards the potential soft power of non-Western nations. Scholars (Liu, 2018; Nye, 2018; C. Walker & Ludwig, 2017) are revisiting the original conceptualization of soft power as numerous illiberal democracies turn to soft power as a means to influence world politics. While the earlier iterations of soft power build on the values of liberal democracies, others such as China and Russia are offering an alternative where sustainable economic development is not dependent on democratization. Therefore, nations do not have a monopoly on soft power, and in fact, any country and culture can develop and wield soft power.

The pull effect of soft power depends on how a foreign audience perceives the nation’s qualities and whether finds these qualities appealing (Fan, 2008). In other words, the image and reputation of an illiberal democracy could easily be unfavorable in a liberal democracy, whereas the same country may have a favorable image in other parts of the world. In another words, a country may possess soft power in one country and not possess any credibility in another. To illustrate, China’s image in developing countries, mainly in Africa, where China delivers significant development aid and investment, is more favorable than in Western Europe and North America (Pew Research Center Survey, 2018). Likewise, Russia enjoys a certain pull in former Soviet nations (Velikaya, 2018). Both are the results of hard investments, in forms of development aid and military cooperation. Correspondingly, the recent surge in populism across the globe has been reshifting the focus to hard power, coercion, and inducements. The anti-immigration wave in Europe and the United States, the decline of multilateralism in American foreign policy, and the appeal of undemocratic yet militarily strong states such as China and Russia all play into the decline of the soft power discourse. Soft power, which is a by-product of the liberal world order and a reflection of globalization, is becoming less popular in everyday political discourse despite states’ continuous efforts in seeking recognition and recognition, reputation, and attraction are moving toward hard material resources. In other words, soft power has been losing its momentum in leaving the international political scene for hard power.

Soft and hard power are mutually inclusive and can only operate successfully if they are utilized as part of a broader strategy to boost influence. The idealistic approach to position soft power as the fundamental avenue to exert influence in the era of globalization fell short of the reality on the ground where security, economic prosperity, and technological advances are vital to global competition for power. In other words, softer forms of national attractiveness are still crucial in determining a nation’s global appeal; however, without the existence of hard power assets, soft power by itself will not render the desired results. For example, Portugal, Greece, and Argentina are among the global soft power nations; however, none of them have global influence as other soft power nations such as Japan and the Netherlands (Soft Power 30, 2018).

Furthermore, the increasing global appeal of the economic development of particularly the Chinese model of governance and wave of populism is undermining the existing definitions of soft power. As the critics of soft power argue, non-Western nations also have the ability to exert soft power, giving way to nontraditional interpretations of soft power (Jeanne, 2015; Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019; Wilson, 2015). Despite the decline in the traditional soft power rhetoric, the practice of soft power is still imperative to advance national interests regardless of the different ways soft power is executed.

The Literature on Turkey’s Soft Power

The concept of soft power was first introduced to the higher echelons of Turkish politics during the mid-2000s, following a more assertive foreign policy agenda under the (AKP, Justice and Development Party). The entrance of soft power, first into the Turkish foreign policy lexicon, and then later into its popular discourse intersects Turkey’s activism and its reforms. Turkey’s foreign policy activism emerged in the Balkans and the Middle East, which are considered former Ottoman hinterland (Ongur, 2015). In turn, the soft power debates in Turkey were initially shaped by Turkey’s interest and activism in the Middle East and the Balkans (Altunışık, 2008; Baskovic, Reljic, & Vracic, 2015).

External and internal dynamics laid the groundwork for Turkey’s interest in the role of soft power in foreign policy formulations. An important external dynamic is the Western effort to brand and present Turkey as a role model for the broader Middle East. This understanding stems from Turkey’s secular, modern, and Western identity, which was reinforced by reforms that were encouraged by the European Union (EU) accession process. The West, particularly the Obama administration and its advisors in the United States, believed that Turkey anchored in the West with connections to the Middle East would have demonstrative ability to change the region and lead by example (Parris, 2009; J. Walker, 2010). In turn, efforts in presenting Turkey as a role model cultivated domestic discourse on Turkey’s soft power. Thus, discussions on Turkey’s soft power are interconnected to Europe’s and the United States’s need for security and to locating a moderate Muslim voice in the Middle East.

Although the aforementioned drives exist for the heightened discourse on Turkey’s soft power, there are a number of pivotal elements that exist to foster a similar debate in the domestic political sphere. To begin with, Turkey’s relative economic prosperity, which came at a time when the European Union and the United States were undergoing financial turbulence, became an influential force. Turkey’s relative economic progress has enabled it to invest in its foreign policy by emphasizing a softer approach to power, which was made possible as a result of its hard power resources. Turkey’s growing economy helped boost its diplomatic presence across Africa, and the expansion of Turkish Airlines’ air travel routes was instrumental in Turkey’s soft power approach (Özkan, 2010; Selçuk, 2013).

Second, soft power as a foreign policy concept in Turkey took form under Ahmet Davutoğlu’s strategic depth vision, a policy approach that draws from Turkey’s historical, geographical, and cultural ties to nearby states. ² Within this framework, Turkey relies on its cultural affinity with the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia, which the doctrine assumes is of mutual interest to Turkey and the aforementioned regions. Underlining Turkey’s cultural affiliations was a fundamental element in the Davutoğlu era foreign policy doctrine, in which Turkey sought better ties with the nations that were established in former Ottoman territories and then envisioned these ties as Turkey’s soft power. Furthermore, Turkey acted as a mediator in the Middle East given its close ties with Israel and a majority of the Arab states up until 2010 (Aras, 2009, 2014). Throughout the first decade of the ruling AKP government, Turkey exerted itself as a rising regional actor by pursuing a value-oriented foreign policy and engaging in dialogue with Somalia, Myanmar, and Syria (Panayırcı & İşeri, 2014). Consequently, Turkey under Davutoğlu emphasized desecuritization and a foreign policy approach where cultural affinity, attraction, and leading by example were cornerstones. Endeavors during the strategic depth and zero problems era underscored Turkey’s relations with its immediate region and aimed to make Turkey more appealing as a role model in the Middle East.

Third, the reform period during the mid-2000s, which was fostered as a result of Turkey’s EU (European Union) bid, served as a launching pad to set the groundwork for Turkey’s soft power discourse, which led to a substantial soft power resource. Democratizing reforms in Turkey included improving the rule of law, government transparency, religious freedoms, and minority rights.

These issues slowly began to see some reforms in the social and political sphere starting from mid-2000s. Several attempts on political reforms in regard to minority communities were important for Turkey’s democratization process (Öniş, 2013). These positive developments taking place within Turkey became the drivers for Turkey’s international communication. Consequently, state-sponsored publications, documentaries, exhibitions, concerts, and conferences highlighted this change. ³ Therefore, Turkey’s soft power and its public diplomacy at that time were a direct result of its democratic reforms as emphasized by Kalin (2011).

Fourth, Turkish foreign aid, such as its humanitarian and development aid, has been an integral component in Turkey’s soft power discourse. Turkey has a strong network of government and nongovernment actors that provide foreign aid, which in turn helps Turkey’s brand as a benevolent nation (Çevik, 2015). Turkey’s humanitarian and development aid have been integral to Turkey’s public diplomacy with its attempts to brand the country as a “donor state” and “benevolent country” (Bacık and Afacan, 2013; Çevik & Sevin, 2017). The politics and rhetoric of its humanitarian aid highlight the ways in which Turkey embraces the image of the Ottoman Empire as a benevolent Empire and its contemporary aid initiatives. This overarching narrative historically situates Ottoman Empire and Turkey as safe harbor for immigrants and carries that historical narrative to current day. For example, the notion of Turkey as a safe harbor takes credence from the Ottoman benevolence toward Sephardic Jews, Balkan migrations during the early 20th century and in the 1980s, as well as the Kurdish refugee influx from Iraq between 1988 and 1991. ⁴ The Syrian refugee crisis is a cornerstone of Turkey’s humanitarian aid, with its 21 refugee camps and over 3 million Syrian refugees, Turkey is demonstrating an open-door policy. The Syrian refugee crisis also serves as a functional and a communicative perspective. Turkey’s relief efforts are instrumental in communicating its benevolent nation brand and have thus become a soft power resource (Çevik & Sevin, 2017). In 2015, Turkey was ranked as the second most generous donor country, which was partially due to its US$3.2 billion donation toward Syria and Syrian refugees. In 2017, 98% of Turkey humanitarian expenditure was allocated for supporting Syrian refugees making Turkey the most generous donor based on volume (GHA, 2016, 2018).

The cumulative economic and political drivers of Turkey’s soft power discourse have prompted the establishment of institutions of public diplomacy in aims to build Turkey’s soft power infrastructure. These state institutions emphasize cultural and educational exchanges, particularly with regions of strategic importance to Turkey and Turkey’s diaspora. This is done in order to expand Turkey’s sphere of influence across former Ottoman territories. The Yunus Emre Cultural Institute (YEE) was established in 2007 to ensure cultural exchanges between Turks and citizens of other countries. As a partner in the Global Public Diplomacy Network, it aims to create soft power through various cultural activities across its global branches. Turkey also sought to establish better ties with its diaspora in recognizing the political power of diasporas in their host countries. As a result, the Directorate of Overseas Turks (YTB), Turkey’s diaspora agency, was established and assumes numerous programs in diaspora engagement. Moreover, Turkey recognized the importance of building on the cultural affinity and kinship with people living in former Ottoman territories.

Thus, the function of The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was expanded to include engagement with Muslims as part of its soft power strategy (Öztürk, 2017). Diyanet also serves as a platform to enforce Turkey’s patronage, especially onto the Balkans, and to impose a state ideology (Öztürk, 2016). The Maarif Foundation is Turkey’s official overseas educational foundation. The establishment of The Turkish Maarif Foundation aims to realize Turkey’s objective of curbing the influence of the Gülenist network in Africa and Central Asia. ⁵ The Maarif Foundation’s motto, “Our aim is to raise good willed people around the world,” overlaps with Turkey’s self-acclaimed role as a value-oriented, benevolent nation. ⁶

These multiple dynamics and institutions produce and reproduce Turkey’s soft power discourse. Moreover, they lay the groundwork for its soft power resources. These dynamics also serve as discursive elements in the same way that the Turkish political elite constructs the ideational outline of “new Turkey,” which is manifested in their publications. Although soft power as a discursive element has become a trend, it has often been misused. It is often mistakenly used to imply concepts such as powerful, popular, attractive, appreciated, appealing, and desirable. Moreover, soft power was introduced in Turkey without any substantial context, basis, or justification. In this regard, the pioneers of Turkey’s soft power debate have assumed that Turkey had soft power without providing substantial evidence for it. They misinterpreted culture, heritage, and history as soft power. A number of initial debates also reflect the authors’ mental imagination of Ottoman and Turkish history. Soft power and public diplomacy have been used interchangeably. The current soft power narrative assumes Turkey’s soft power resources, the instruments to wield that potential soft power, and the actors in converting resources into power as proof of Turkey’s soft power.

Kalin (2006), the former adviser of the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was one of the first public figures to introduce soft power to the Turkish foreign policy lexicon in a 2006 opinion editorial. In this editorial piece, Kalin, who later became the first director of the Office of Public Diplomacy and moved onto becoming the presidential spokesperson, posits that soft power rests on the credibility and attractiveness of a nation, as well as the mobilization of its nonmilitary resources. Kalin (2006) further suggests that Iran, Egypt, and Turkey are the only three nations in the Middle East that possess soft power due to their rich histories and their political and cultural experiences. He argues

Turkey has soft power in its own unique way. This power stretches from the Balkans to Central Asia. Turkey’s soft power in these regions do not come from its military superiority but from its historical and cultural depth. The Ottoman Empire was present in the 500-year experience of a unified Muslim nation in the Balkans. The deep marks left by the Ottoman Empire is a reflection of its soft power (p. 1).

Oğuzlu (2007) argues that Turkey’s soft power potential increases as it moves away from an emphasis on security. Furthermore, he posits that the binary categorization of hard and soft power is flawed, adding that it misrepresents the dimensions and means of the power that is utilized. Kalin (2011), in his next attempt to explain Turkey’s interest in soft power, takes Oğuzlu’s desecuritization argument further and suggests that Turkey’s soft power comes from its strengths. To Kalin, these strengths are Turkey’s history, geography, cultural depth, economic strength, and democratic experience. Kalin further argues that soft power is rooted in a value-based definition of power, which explains how attractive and worthy a country is in others’ eyes. In Kalin’s writing democracy and vibrant civil society are presented as two pillars of Turkey’s soft power. Despite the attempt to clarify Turkey’s soft power, Kalin’s essay offers a vague outline and fails to deliver substantial evidence on whether these resources are converted into soft power. Earlier attempts at explaining soft power extrapolate Turkey’s cultural pull, particularly in the Middle East, and use this pull factor interchangeably with soft power. For example, Turkey’s use of nonmilitary tools in the Middle East, its political and economic reforms, and its eagerness to play a third-party role in the resolution of regional conflicts are explained as the Arab World’s admiration for Turkey. In turn, this admiration is justified as Turkey’s increasing soft power (Altunışık, 2008).

In many of these attempts to establish soft power as a conceptual approach, there remains confusion about its content and scope. Turkey’s soft power resources, the instruments to wield that potential soft power, and the actors in converting resources into power are altogether presented as Turkey’s soft power. Furthermore, the academic and public discussions on Turkey in regard to soft power assumes that Turkey’s soft power assets are translated into actual soft power, specifically in the Middle East and the Balkans. The aforementioned literature on Turkey also implies that Turkey developed its soft power assets under the AKP, giving credit to the consecutive AKP governments’ engagement with Turkey’s regional proximity. Under both premises, the public opinion in the Middle East and the Balkans regarding Turkey is generalized and Turkey’s relations with different factions within are oversimplified to represent their relations with AKP government.

Turkey’s Soft Power: An Illusion or Partial Reality?

There have been international efforts to quantify soft power since the concept became a buzzword. The New Persuaders by the IfG-Monocle is the first of these attempts to introduce a soft power ranking in 2010. The IfG-Monocle Index provides composite metrics that go beyond opinion polling. It also moves beyond Nye’s three pillars of soft power and instead expands the pillars into a set of five categories: business/innovation, culture, government, diplomacy, and education. Additionally, the index includes subjective criteria such as the reputation of embassies and diplomats, the appeal of soft power icons, the quality of national airlines, cultural output, cuisine, and international political leadership. According to the IfG-Monocle 2010 index, Turkey ranks 25th. This, based on the report, is linked to Turkey’s EU candidacy and ambitious reform agenda. Alongside of these domestic developments, the IfG-Monocle 2010 index also points out Turkey’s foreign policy approach to transform into a regional actor through the exercise of soft power. The following year, in 2011, Turkey moved up from 25th to 23rd. According to the report, Turkey’s approach to building international influence focused on improving two of the three pillars of soft power: political institutions and foreign policy conduct. The report emphasizes Turkey’s expanding diplomatic network, democratic institutions, and multilateral approach. In 2012, the IfG-Monocle 2010 index ranked Turkey as the 20th as a result of its cross-cultural appeal and smart positioning. The Portland Soft Power 30 builds on the IfG-Monocle index and includes international polling data and digital diplomacy data which uses 65 metrics. Turkey ranked 28th of 30 in 2015, barely making in the global soft power index but still outdoing many other emerging powers. However, due to its domestic and international crises, it fell out of the top 30 in 2016. Turkey returned to the Soft Power 30 in 2017, taking the 30th spot as a result of its high engagement score, refugee policy, development aid, and multilateral engagements. Nonetheless, Turkey still ranked at the bottom of the opinion poll as a result of negative perceptions about its domestic and international affairs. In 2018, Turkey once again dropped out of the Soft Power 30.

Benhaim and Öktem (2015) argue that Turkey’s soft power discourse parallels the rise and fall of Turkish foreign policy and thus has gone through comparable cycles. They suggest that with the decline of Turkey’s assertive foreign policy and declining international credibility of soft power discourse, which served the AKP’s political agenda, soft power became an irrelevant concept (Benhaim & Öktem, 2015). In fact, Davutoğlu’s departure from office in 2016 and the continuous crisis mode in Turkey resulted in a de-emphasis on soft power attraction. The decline in Turkey’s soft power discourse is interconnected to Turkey’s domestic turbulence. For example, following the parliamentary elections in 2015, the reforms, vis-à-vis minorities, lost momentum due to the rising nationalistic sentiments and security priorities took precedence. The Kurdish opening and reforms toward other groups came to a stall. The AKP’s fallout with the Gulenist network also exacerbated Turkey’s decline in its soft power discourse. In the earlier periods of the AKP governments, the Gülenist schools, their cultural organizations, and think tanks were major components of establishing Turkey’s international communication network and were considered an extension of Turkey’s soft power. Following the fallout, the Turkish state can be argued to have lost its access to various communities across the globe, particularly in Africa and the United States. ⁷

An additional angle that is often overlooked is the blurring lines between the image of the state of Turkey and the image of Turkey under president Erdoğan. Since his election as Turkey’s president in 2014, Turkey became synonymous with Erdoğan’s persona. The eradication of checks and balances as a result of Erdoğan’s ever-growing political power has been centralized in the presidential seat. In turn, Turkey’s global reputation is connected to Erdoğan’s global image. While his image could be favorable in parts of the world his rhetoric or ideology resonate with, in other parts of the world, his image could suffer as a result of the same reasons. In other words, President Erdoğan is a reference point for foreign audiences in their perception of Turkey. This overlap in the image of Turkey and Erdoğan can be a curse and a blessing at the same time. Given Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric against the West, the Erdoğan era epitomizes disengagement from the soft power discourse, differing strikingly from the earlier stages of the Davutoğlu era.