When Doves Feed Hawks: Ottoman War Decision and European Powers Towards the Crimean War

Abstract

When does the war party win in the decision-making process? Why does the peace party lose even if war is too risky? In this article, we show that certain balancing acts of the peace party might increase the confidence of the war party. We examine how the Ottoman Empire’s risky Crimean War decision and its war declaration against Russia on 4 October 1853 were shaped by internal debating through time, foreign penetration, and dynamic interplay between the Ottoman decision makers and a changing European strategic environment. The large literature on the Crimean War does not include a systematic analysis of the Ottoman origins of the Crimean War and the Ottoman war decision. We trace the Ottoman decision-making process in the fateful months of 1853 to establish the origins of the Crimean War. We empirically demonstrate the gradual formation of the Porte’s war decision by showing how the peace front stumbled upon war by inadvertently changing the decision structure in favor of the war party within a year.

Keywords

crimean war ottoman war decision divided executive foreign penetration war party

Introduction

The Crimean War is an all-out war on a world scale, bringing many novelties and heralding transformations in modern warfare. The war ended the period of peace following the Napoleonic wars and saw (for the first time) two European great powers, Britain and France fighting on the side of the Ottoman Empire against another great power, Russia. Significantly, as Norman Rich (1985, p. 4) captured, the Crimean War “was not an accident” because it was “preceded by so lengthy a period of diplomatic crisis which provided time for passions to cool and statesmen to settle their differences.” For the Ottomans, the war declaration “against a far stronger Russia entailed considerable risk, because the Porte risked a devastating defeat that could ultimately lead to the collapse of the entire empire” (Gochal & Levy, 2004, p. 322). Russia was at the peak of its power in the early 1850s and had inflicted consecutive defeats on the Ottomans since the late 18th century. The Ottoman Empire was also troubled with a chronic financial crisis, perpetual insurgencies in the Balkans and the Middle East, and the failure to build a modern standing army. Although a tiny group within the Ottoman foreign policy executive saw the war as an opportunity to break Russia’s menace and regain some territories, the majority was well aware of the grave risk of losing the war, and had a very long time to decide. In addition, many opportunities arose to ease the tension in the long period from February 1853, when the crisis erupted, to October 1853, when the Ottoman war decision was made. If not for committing suicide, why then did the Porte declare war against its far stronger great power rival instead of using the opportunities for resolutions that emerged? How can we explain this perilous war declaration on 4 October 1853?

Why and how the Crimean War decision was made remains a curious subject despite numerous studies (Gooch, 1956; Turan, 2000; Bagdasarian & Tolstoy, 2002). Such passionate academic interest is understandable given that the Crimean War was the 19th century’s world war in which all great powers of the time took direct or indirect part in it, and their vast armies and navies fought on seven fronts for almost 3 years. Although many studies were conducted to explain the British and French motivations to declare war against Russia (e.g., Lambert, 2016; Snyder, 1991, pp. 158–165; Copeland, 2014, pp. 347–372), the Ottoman war decision that dragged those powers into an “undesirable” Crimean War has not been investigated systematically and theoretically. Although historians have increasingly made the Ottoman archive available to readers in a chronological way, the Ottoman war decision in October 1853 still awaits a systematic explanation. The present study primarily argues that non-war initiatives of the peace front within the Ottoman executive elites to strengthen the country in the face of the Russian threat indirectly reinforced the hand of the war front in the internal debates on the war option. To prove its argument, the paper uses process-tracing analysis from the start of the war debate to the date of the war decision.

We aim to contribute to both the Crimean War literature by studying the formation of the Ottoman war decision in the lead-up to the Crimean War with a special focus on the interaction between changing strategic environments and individual decision-makers. IR theoretical lenses guide research to slice an otherwise complex universe of the Crimean decision-making process. The former delivers analytical segments to meaningfully dissect the temporally composite Crimean war decision which involved both the Porte and the European great powers. The IR literature on the Crimean War often ignores the role played by the Ottoman Empire in the ignition of the war (Snyder, 1991, pp. 158–165; Richardson, 1994, pp. 69–80; Smoke, 1977, pp. 147–194; Copeland, 2014, pp. 347–372). The general explanation here is simply that the war broke out because Russia, France and Britain believed that their vital interest were in danger (Israeli et al., 20192021, p. 85; Ponting, 2011, p. viii). We address this lacuna by developing an alternative framework placing the Ottoman elites at the center of explanation.

In the broader literature, there are two main answers as to why the Ottoman leaders decided to go to war. The first explanation highlights the influence of the Ottoman public opinion, while the second focuses on the European balance of power. Temperley (1936; 1934, p. 138) and others (Palmer, 1992, p. 122; Badem, 2010, p. 91; Shaw & Shaw, 2002, p. 138) underline the pressure of public opinion over the decision-makers. They claim that no member of the Ottoman grand council, even those close to Russia and the Sultan himself, “dared [to] oppose the general feeling” (Temperley, 1936, p. 395). According to this account, the war party with the support of the public, wanted to respond to the looming Russian threat and exerted strong pressure on key decision-makers ultimately leading to the declaration of war. Studies focusing on the European balance of power point to the fact that Britain and France sided with the Ottomans to balance a rising Russian power as the main reason for the war. In this context, some scholars go one step further and argue that the pro-war British Ambassador convinced the Ottomans of the support of the great powers and dragged them into war (Köremezli, 2013, pp. 42, 57 and 66; Nechkina, 1953, p. 409; Saab, 1977, p. 72; Rich, 1985, p. 76). Shedding light on the Ottoman decision-making processes and its “decision units” (Hermann et al., 1987), our study integrates the role played by the Ottoman peace front into the explanation of the Crimean war decision. Instead of considering Ottoman elites as passive actors, we argue that the Ottoman elites as a whole actively participated in the construction of the strategic environment within which the war declaration was made possible. To explain this rather peculiar outcome, we employ the morphogenetic approach to integrate temporality as an independent variable in the analysis in order to demonstrate the interaction between the decision units and the changing European strategic environment.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we begin by laying out our theoretical framework. We primarily focus on the reciprocal interaction between the strategic environment and individual decision-makers as the key dynamic behind the war decision. Here, we also explain why a third variable, the time dimension, is needed to display how the changing strategic environment shapes the perception of actors and how their ensuing foreign policy acts reconstruct the existing strategic environment in which they decide. Second, we describe the systemic factors of the era when the crisis first erupted in February 1853, and detail the positions of Ottoman elites against the Russian threat. Third, we discuss how the balancing acts and other steps led to a renewed strategic setting and to changed responses of Ottoman leaders against the Russian threat. Methodologically, we focus on consecutive time frames prior to the war decision to expose the impact of the new strategic setting and thereafter on the changing positions of individual decision-makers finally reaching the war decision.

Time, Decision-Makers and Security Environment

The false hope of victory is the root cause of many wars (Van Evera, 1999, p. 14). But who falsely hopes for victory? What drives them to this fallacy? Many scholars point out the effect of uncertainty about relative power and blame decision-makers who exaggerate their country’s power compared to that of their opponents (Wittman, 1979, pp. 743–63; Blainey, 1988; Wagner, 2000, pp. 469–84; Fey & Ramsay, 2011, pp. 149–69). This basically means that greater clarity about the probable outcome of the war in the eyes of leaders increases the probability of war (Bas & Schub, 2016, pp. 1099–1128). However, the interaction between leaders and their strategic environment is rather complex. While a group of decision-makers might see winning as a possible outcome, another group might disagree. In addition, some actors in the second group may later join the first group (the war camp) or vice versa. Decision-makers not only calculate the power of the state they will fight, but also the strength of allies and their reliability. The uncertainty over allies’ intentions can make the situation more complicated. This multi-layered complex puzzle can only be solved by including a temporal perspective that closely examines the time intervals before the war decision, focusing on the decision-makers and the changing environmental conditions.

Decision-makers decide under a strategic environment composed of international and domestic constraints (RipsmanTaliaferro & Lobell, 2016). This is so because strategic environments determine what the actors know and what they infer from the behavior of others. However, this does not mean that the actors are condemned to a single decision (Hafner-Burton et al., 2017, pp. 1–31). While some actors choose one course of action, others can pick an alternative course of action. These different preferences create a new strategic environment in which actors can change their previous positions. Therefore, actors and structures do not work in isolation, they rather function co-constitutively.

Although time is a crucial component in the study of international politics and war, IR theory habitually conflates history with time, “marginalize dynamic processes and reify time as a static thing apart from social life” (Hom, 2018, p. 69; 2020). In order to show the dynamic interplay between systemic and unit-level variables that conditioned each other at the onset of the Crimean War, we apply the morphogenetic approach introducing the time dimension to the decision-making process (Archer, 1982, pp. 467–71; Balci et al., 2020). Originally introduced to Foreign Policy Analysis by Walter Carlsnaes, here we employ the morphogenetic approach heuristically to explain the time dimension to sort the relative weight of structural factors and unit-level factors as well as the dynamic/reciprocal interplay between them. The approach breaks the decision cycles into different time intervals so as to penetrate and explain the said interplay. As Carlsnaes put it cogently (1992, pp. 256–263), decision-makers make choices and through outcomes of those choices, they take part in the reproduction of structures that, in turn, influence their subsequent choices. Hence a third variable, the time dimension is vital for analyzing the interplay between actors and structural environments (Nishimura, 2011, pp. 96–112). A comparison of different moments in the lead-up to the Crimean War from the onset of the crisis to the final moment of the decision not only exposes changing strategic environments, but also demonstrates the effects of actor-preferences over systemic variables. It also empirically shows how timing plays out in foreign policy decision-making in a historical setting (cf. Beasley & Hom, 2021). Hence, we are able to argue that it is the preferences of the certain actors that create the strategic environment, which in turn can change the preferences of the actors who created it.

Before the moment of the final decision, foreign policy elites can differ significantly on the magnitude of the threat and how to react to it (Schweller, 2006, pp. 47–49). When there is less clarity about opportunities stemming from system-level variables (mainly the relative distribution of military capacities and allies) there emerges a greater room for political leaders to pursue their preferences based on individual and domestic constraints (RipsmanTaliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p. 50). If personal characteristics and domestic conditions prevail over systemic constraints, political leaders can decide on war without an adequate balance of power, namely underbalancing (Schweller, 2006, pp. 11–13). Therefore, a war decision results from the complex relationships between individual preferences, domestic constraints and systemic clarity. The key endeavor, then, is to understand how political leaders with different ideological and personal characteristics and under different domestic constraints, interpret systemic clarity. If decision-makers see less clarity because of the unfavorable distribution of military capacities and reluctant allies, they may then prefer a policy of appeasement and gaining time against the country that is the source of the threat. However, this preference, if it results in the postponement of war, opens up two important opportunities: seeking stronger and reliable alliances and military reinforcement.

As long as the threat continues, political leaders take some balancing steps against the threatening country even if they advocate options other than war. There is no guarantee that a policy of appeasement will end the threat. Therefore, political leaders even in the peace camp can simultaneously negotiate alliances with other countries against the source of threat and invest for military reinforcement. Balancing acts of the peace party reproduce systemic conditions which, in turn, influence the subsequent choices of its members. If the new systemic condition creates greater clarity, this may result in some members of the peace camp changing their minds, as well as allowing the war camp to defend its position more strongly. This does not mean that structural variables alone determine the level of clarity about potential options (RipsmanTaliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p. 3). For, if this was the case, all decision-makers would concur. This is true as long as systemic variables remain the same. However, the clarity of the external environment varies over time with systemic dynamics revealing different amounts of information about the strength of opportunities, as well as about the range of optimal strategic responses (RipsmanTaliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p. 51). When a change occurs in structural variables due to acts of political leaders, it redefines clarity, which, in turn, influences what leaders understand of systemic constraints. Consequently, it becomes critical to examine specific time frames before the decision moment to identify changes in systemic clarity, which are often the effects of individual acts. The following section explains the first “time frame” through which system structure and domestic balance of power figured prominently.

Phase I: System Structure and Domestic Balance of Power

In the spring of 1853, specifically from February to the end of May, the war declaration against Russia was too risky for the Ottomans for three reasons. First, the character of the then European international system was multipolar, and there was great uncertainty about the outcome of a possible war. For, in a multipolar system, a war-declaring state might face buck-passing (expecting others to confront threats) or entrapment (getting dragged into war over others’ interests) (Bas & Schub, 2016, p.1103). The European powers could leave the Ottomans alone in a possible war, or some of them could even join the side of Russia after the war broke out. That was indeed the case when Austrian envoy Count Leiningen was in Istanbul for a diplomatic solution regarding the Montenegro crisis in February 1853. He threatened the Porte with a joint Austro-Russian intervention (Rich, 1985, p.26). Second, the distribution of capabilities was in favor of Russia, which made the war outcome too risky for the Ottomans (assuming the war would be limited with these two states). For instance, the Russian Tsar signed off a plan of a sudden and decisive attack on Istanbul and the Dardanelles on 19 January 1853 and ordered a large number of troops to the frontiers bordering Turkey (Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Priviliges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey, No. 67, Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell, 20 January 1853, part I, p. 57). This was the most central concern of the Ottomans, and Mehmed Ali Paşa ordered Adolphus Slade, a British naval advisor, to determine defensive measures designed to forestall Russian capture of Istanbul when relations with Russia were getting increasingly tense (Palmer, 1992, p. 120; Lambert, 2016, p. 76). Third, the expected cost of fighting was simply unbearable for the Ottomans. Given the negotiations between Russia and Britain about how to share the Ottoman Empire among European powers, a war declaration would trigger the end of the Empire. Evidently, the Tsar met with Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador to Russia, to debate how to divide the Ottoman Empire between Britain and Russia on 20 January 1853 (Annual Register, 1853, p. 249).

In this strategic environment, the sound of the war drums in the Ottoman capital was very faint. This was so despite Russia’s moves that provoked the war. The Tsar was furious that the Holy Places issue (the everlasting wrangling between Greek Orthodox and Catholic Christians over the Holy Places in Palestine) was resolved in favor of the French. After French threats about invading Syria, the Sultan, in December 1852, issued an imperial order confirming the Catholic Church’s (and France’s) supreme authority over the Holy Places (Aksan, 2013, p. 438). Acting as the protector of the Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire since 1774, the Tsar ordered the mobilization of two army corps in southern Russia and sent an alert to naval forces in the Black Sea. In early 1853, the concentration of the Russian fourth and fifth army in Bessarabia alarmed the Ottoman Sultan (Badem, 2010, p. 74). More importantly, the Tsar sent his special envoy Alexander S. Menshikov to Istanbul in order to solve the issue of the Holy Places in Russia’s favor (BOA. A.}AMD. 50/56, 24 January 1854). Menshikov did nothing but impose Russia’s demands on the Porte. He acted provocatively like a colonial governor and violated all diplomatic courtesy during his stay in Istanbul (BOA. İ. HR.327/21,188, 9 April 1853). Additionally, Menshikov was accompanied by Artur Adamovich Nepokoichitskii, the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army in Bessarabia, and Admiral Vladimir Alekseievich Kornilov, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Those clear signals increased fear among the Ottomans about a possible Russian attack on Istanbul. In particular, the Kornilov mission to Athens was interpreted as a war preparation (Saab, 1977, p. 31; Aksan, 2013, p. 438). Despite the prevailing fear among the Ottoman ruling elite, the same developments mobilized the Ottoman public in favor of war. In May 1853, a poster on the wall of Şehzade Mosque called for a jihad against Russia and a petition signed by fanatical groups and religious leaders voiced the same demand. Some dervishes demanded the standard of the Prophet stored at Eyüp Mosque to lead them into the upcoming battle (Riedler, 2010, pp.19–20). However, Ottoman decision-makers prioritized diplomatic negotiations and preferred to make concessions to Russia over war. This was the case even when Menshikov gave his ultimatums in early May. As we explain in detail below, what emerged over time was a “contingent politics of meaning” on the pending war and the processes by which this meaning was “temporarily stabilized” thanks to the deliberations and negotiations of the Ottoman ruling elites with the European powers in a changing strategic environment. In other words, these negotiations and deliberations were the institutional mechanism by which the ruling “elite coalitions were forged’ and through which ‘policies were rendered legitimate” (Krebs, 2018, p. 264).

A closer look at the positions of the Ottoman decision-makers reveals that only a few of the names were supportive of the war option. On May 5, 1853, Menshikov gave an ultimatum leaving the Ottoman administrators 5 days for responding to his demands (the resolution of the Holy Places dispute in favor of Russia, and the declaration of a Sened or convention securing the Russian protectorate of Orthodox subjects of the Porte) (Türkgeldi, 1987, p. 266). The Ottoman Council of Ministers convened on May 10, 1853, to debate on how to respond to Menshikov’s demands. Mehmed Ali Paşa was alone in the call to take up arms against Russia. According to an account written later (Şeref, 1985, pp. 65–66), when Mehmed Ali repetitively called for war (“efendim, Moskof’a kılıç”—gentlemen, sword for Muscovite), he was silenced by Mehmed Emin Rauf Paşa, a former grand vizier. The Sultan was in favor of the continuation of negotiations with Russia and Mehmed Emin Paşa acted as the advocate of the Sultan’s policy at the meeting (Saab, 1977, p. 72). Interestingly at the time, Mehmed Ali Paşa was the acting grand vizier and he was silenced by someone out of the cabinet. Foreign Minister Rifat Paşa hinted at the lack of a clear Western assurance for support as a motivation for the pursuit of a peaceful policy. The Ottoman cabinet decided to continue negotiations despite the refusal of Menshikov’s demands (Correspondence Respecting, Inclosure 2 in No. 193, Rifaat Pasha to Prince Menchikoff, 10 May 1853, part I, p. 196). Moreover, the Sultan made a comprehensive revision in the cabinet and removed pro-war Mehmed Ali from his post of the Grand Vizier on May 13. This was a crucial step because Ottoman decisions concerning war were often made as a result of factional tensions within the ruling group (Faroqhi, 2004, pp. 5 and 48). However, the dismissal did nothing but push Mehmed Ali Paşa into a more hawkish position against Russia. As the war minister (Serasker) in his new and relatively lowered rank, he still continued to be part of the Ottoman decision-making body and lobbied for war against Russia. Also, he was an influential figure due to his being the son-in-law to the Ottoman palace and his strong connections with opinion leaders.

The meetings that followed further exposed the divided character of the Ottoman ruling elite. The Council of Minister met again to decide how to respond to Menshikov’s revised ultimatum (11 May) on 13 May, and Reşid Paşa gave a passionate speech about the possible consequences of refusing Menshikov’s demands. Underlining that the army was unprepared, he said that war was not a reasonable option and directly asked the following question: “let us consider war [with Russia]: are you prepared for it; our fleet, our armies, are they in a condition to sustain it?” (Saab, 1977, p. 44). His conciliatory policy against Russia was embraced by most of the participants including Fethi Ahmed Paşa, former finance minister and at the time director of the arsenal at Tophane, and the Sheikh-ul Islam Arif Hikmet Bey. Fethi Ahmed Paşa’s position was crucial because he was famous as the undersecretary of the Sultan (müsteşâr-ı saltanat) due to his close connections to Abdülmecid (Sunay, 2020, pp. 748–749). This was probably why he advocated for the peace front setting aside his personal animosity with Reşid Paşa. On the other hand, Mehmed Ali Paşa, now as the minister of war, together with Namik Paşa, the minister of finance, stood tight in their pro-war position (Saab, 1977, p. 44). It is clear that the majority in the cabinet was against the war with Russia, and their most important supporter in this regard was the Sultan himself (Cevdet Paşa, 2019, p. 54). The main reason for those who opposed the war was that the strategic environment did not offer clarity about winning the war. Just as the Ottoman army was far from balancing the Russian army, there was no guarantee that the European powers would help the Ottomans against Russia.

In order to prepare the answer to Menshikov’s ultimatum, the Grand Council with a broader participation convened on 17 May to discuss in detail the option of war with Russia. The Grand Council meeting gathered all the incumbent ministers, dismissed grand viziers and ministers, notable ulema (clergy) and other statesmen. Reşid Paşa, who chaired the meeting, invited all related officials to consider whether the Empire was ready for a possible war (Şeref, 1985, p. 66). The speakers not only painted a rather pessimistic picture for the Ottoman power capacity, but also pointed to the vital dangers such as Russia’s sudden attack on the Straits (Saab, 1977, p. 46). The Ottomans were clearly ill-prepared for even protecting their capital. When Reşid Paşa invited the Sheikh-ul Islam Arif Hikmet Bey to the stage, he gave way to Refik Efendi (Ayar, 2014, pp. 203–205), the Custodian of the Fatwa, instead of speaking himself. Refik Efendi did not give a detailed speech and had just to say this: “It is imperative to be strong for war, if you have power, fight” (Şeref, 1985, p. 66). In the face of those who expressed their opinion that Russia could easily be defeated, Ali Paşa could not be patient and replied, “Sir, you cannot go to Petersburg if you do not get a passport from the Russian embassy” (Şeref, 1985, p. 66). After lengthy discussions, the Grand Council decided to reject Menshikov’s demands, but favored the continuation of negotiations instead of the war option (Temperley, 1936, p. 611, 615; Saab, 1977, p. 47) Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Ottoman Decision-Making Structure during the Crimean War Decision (See: Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye, Sene 1269; Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye, Sene 1270) Names mentioned in our text are in italics.

Phase II: Divided Executive and Foreign Penetration

The period from July to mid-August 1835 is marked by a different decision-making logic and strategic environment. To begin with, declaring the end of his mission Menshikov left Istanbul on May 21, 1853, with his whole staff at the Russian embassy. On May 31, 1853, Russia reacted with a tougher ultimatum, giving the Ottomans 8 days to accept Menshikov’s demands, otherwise the Russian army would invade the Danubian Principalities (Badem, 2010, p. 80, Shaw & Shaw, 2002, p. 137). Alarmed by Menshikov’s departure, Reşid Paşa immediately requested aid from France and Britain (Saab, 1977, p. 53). His demand was met by the British cabinet, which was concerned about reports of massive Russian military preparations on the Ottoman frontiers (Correspondence Respecting, No. 194, The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 31 May 1853, part I, p. 199). On June 2, Admiral Dundas, commander of the British fleet in Malta, was ordered to sail toward Beshica Bay lying off Turkey’s Aegean coast and 10 miles south of the entrance to the Dardanelles (Correspondence Respecting, No. 198, The Earl of Clarendon to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 2 June 1853, part I, p. 210). Already excited by the failure of the Menshikov mission, the Ottoman public opinion now became dangerously provoked “by tales of foreign warships heading to the Straits in support of the Ottoman cause” (Palmer, 1992, p. 121). However, although this move by the British fleet was an important signal of support in the eyes of Ottoman statesmen, it was not a guarantee of an alliance in a possible war against Russia. Furthermore, the British and French fleets in Beshica Bay were not good enough to defend Istanbul in a sudden Russian raid. While warships from Beshica could arrive in Istanbul within 2 days, the Russian fleet entering the straits from the Black Sea could cause great damage to Istanbul in just a few hours (Lambert, 2016, p. 76).

To be sure, internal balancing (i.e., enhancing own military strength) was the safest way to get clarity about the probable outcome of the war with Russia. Although naval preparations got underway in March 1853 for the defense of Istanbul against Russia’s possible sudden attack, preparations progressed very slowly until May (Herkless, 1975, p. 504). This was so because the then Grand Vizier Mehmed Ali Paşa feared that any premature military action would anger the Russians, leading to the breakdown of negotiations (Saab, 1977, pp. 33–34). On May 26, Reşid Paşa informed the Austrian, British, French, and Prussian embassies that the Ottoman Empire would take military measures on the Danube, Anatolian shores and the Straits in order to protect itself (Şimşir, 1994, pp. 82, 83). As a first step, a fleet of 22 sailing ships was deployed to the Black Sea entrance of the Bosporus on May 30. However, it was insufficient for a defense against Russia’s powerful Black Sea fleet, and the new ships ordered to shipyards could not be delivered on time (Lambert, 2016, p.76). Therefore, on June 16, in his reply to the Russian ultimatum of May 31, Reşid Paşa contented himself with softly condemning Russia’s threat to invade the Principalities. Also, in the same reply, he declared the Porte’s intention to send an ambassador with extraordinary powers and resume negotiations (Şimşir, 1994, pp. 82–83). In an environment where the military preparations progressed very slowly and there was no clear-cut support from the great powers, the Ottoman statesmen once again preferred the policy of appeasement.

On June 17, 1853, the Porte decided to write to the governors of Egypt and Tunisia, regarding the immediate dispatch of the requested soldiers from Egypt (BOA İ. HR. 328/21,222, 17 June 1853). Another document in the Ottoman archive, dated June 26, justifies the precautionary sending of troops and ships from Egypt with the protection of the Empire (BOA. A.} MKT. UM. 138/25, 26 June 1853). With no reply from Egypt yet, the news that shook Istanbul came from the Danube region. The Russian army under the command of Gorchakov crossed the Prut River and started to invade Bogdan (today Moldavia), one of the Danubian Principalities, on July 2, 1853 (BOA. HSD. AFT. 1/51 24 July 1853). The immediate effect of the Russian act was a cabinet crisis in Istanbul. The Sultan dismissed both the Grand Vizier (Mustafa Naili) and Foreign Minister Reşid Paşa on the ground that their failure in the negotiation invited the Russian menace into Ottoman territory on 8 July (Aksan, 2013, p. 441). Although Mehmed Ali was able to convince the Sultan about Reşid’s passive reaction to the Russian occupation, Stratford took the lead and changed the Sultan’s decision (Temperley, 1934, p. 266; Saab, 1977, p. 55). In such a difficult moment, the Egyptian Governor Abbas Hilmi Paşa wrote an official answer to the Porte on July 10, 1853 and promised that 12 ships would be prepared in 30–40 days, and soldiers and equipment would board the ships (Özcan, 2012, p. 47). Neither the presence of the Anglo-French fleet in Beshica Bay nor the positive response from Egypt was sufficient to reduce the risk of losing the war. Therefore, the Ottomans needed more time to decide. When the Board of Executive (with Reşid Paşa and other 19 participants) met on 14 July, it decided that the Russian invasion of the Principalities could not be treated as casus belli (BOA.İ. HR.329/21,238, 15 July 1853). Although the majority of the Council now preferred war, they gave in to the option to continue negotiations due to three facts: incomplete Ottoman war preparation, the danger of revolution in the Balkans, and the determined stance of the peace front on the support from the great powers (Saab, 1977, pp. 56–57).

In the summer of 1853, Ottoman decision-making elites were extremely divided over which course to take against Russia. For instance, in a New York Times article written on June 3, 1853, (published on June 18, The New York Times, 1853, p.1), a detailed speculation about the positions of the members of the Ottoman cabinet can be found. Although containing some misprints, the report reads as follows: “Independent Turkish and therefore War Party: Mustapha Pacha, Grand Vizier, (the richest man of Turkey, once Governor of Candia); Mehemet Ali, Seraskier, (brother-in-law of the Sultan, a brave fellow, formerly Grand Vizier); Mehemet Pacha, Commander of the Guards. Russian Party: Rifaat Pacha, President of the Grand Divan, (late Minister for Foreign Affairs). English Party: Rechid Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs (mouthpiece of Lord Redcliffe); Nahmid Pacha, Minister of Commerce. Anti-Rechid Party: Feti Ahmed Pacha, (Grand Master of Artillery).” The fact that the cabinet was extremely divided had some important implications. First, Sultan Abdülmecid I, who occupied a key position in the decision-making unit, was largely able to maintain his pro-negotiation policy. As long as the Sultan got support and reasonable justifications from the peace front, he could maintain this position. Second, the determination and increasing influence of the pro-war front was paradoxically one of the most significant dynamics, which forced the peace front to prepare the empire for a possible war. More specifically, the war front kept alive the feeling of the impending war and obliged the peace front to act faster in the war preparations and search for an alliance with the great powers.

The third implication of the divided Ottoman executive was the penetration of foreign ambassadors into the decision-making process (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 83). The British Ambassador Stratford, who had a solid influence over Reşid Paşa and even the Sultan, met with other European ambassadors in Istanbul on 16 July and they together convinced Reşid Paşa to send a conciliatory letter to the Russian Prime Minister Nesselrode (Correspondence Respecting, Memorandum of Conference of the Four Representatives with Reshid Pasha, Inclosure 1 in No. 18, 20 July 1853, part II, p. 11). While the letter was on its way to St Petersburg and Vienna, the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Karl Ferdinand von Baul convened ambassadors of four great powers (Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria) on 24 July to prepare a text aiming to solve the crisis between Russia and Ottoman Empire, which would be later known as the Vienna Note. The note embodied the concessions which the Ottoman Empire could make to Russia without risking its independence (Taylor, 1971, p. 55). When the note reached Istanbul on 9 August, the Ottomans were disappointed because the great powers would not support the Porte in case of war with Russia. The British position—as a critical factor in the decision unit for war with Russia—was still unclear for the Ottomans by mid-August. On the one hand, Britain together with other European powers pressured and urged the Porte to accept the Vienna Note suggesting Ottoman concessions to Russia (BOA. İ..HR. 330/21,382, 30 August 1853; Lane-Poole, 1888, p. 292). Even Stratford advised Reşid Paşa to send a conciliatory letter to Russia to avoid war. On the other hand, the Porte kept getting reports from London about the pro-Ottoman attitude of British public opinion and from the members of the British cabinet as well (Rich, 1985, p. 75). Furthermore, the British government, on August 8, 1853, announced that the immediate and complete evacuation of the Danubian Principalities would be the sine qua non of any settlement (Gooch, 1956, p. 41).

There emerged two broad policy positions in the Ottoman Cabinet dealing with the Vienna Note on August 14, 1853 (Lane-Pole, 1888, p. 292; Goldfrank, 2002, p. 240). First, Mehmed Ali Paşa and half of the Cabinet including the Sheikh-ul Islam Arif Hikmet Bey, the Finance Minister Ahmed Muhtar, and Kapudan Mahmud Paşa (Kaptan-ı Derya, the Grand Admiral of the fleet of the Ottoman Empire) advocated an outright rejection of the Vienna Note and a war with Russia at any cost. Second, Reşid Paşa suggested the acceptance of the Vienna Note with some modifications and a dispatch of a stronger ultimatum demanding the evacuation of the Danubian principalities. Although Reşid’s position was supported by Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Paşa, he was concerned that the support for the Vienna Note would not get the majority vote among the Ottoman decision-makers (Lane-Pole, 1888, p. 293). During his conversation with Stratford on the following day, Reşid Paşa expressed his deep disappointment with the great powers in the following words: “It would have been better for Turkey… to have yielded at the first, than after so much support from the Powers to be now unseasonably abandoned” (Lane-Pole, 1888, p. 293; Rich, 1985, p.76; Badem, 2010, p. 83). Once again, the lack of clarity (a clear signal) from the European great powers regarding alliance in a war against Russia influenced the final decision. Although the Porte tried to corroborate the information coming from the European sources through the reports by its ambassadors in London (Kostaki Musurus Paşa) and Paris (Veliyüddin Efendi) (BOA. İ..HR. 329/21,241, 19 July 1853), decision-makers needed more than verbal expressions of support. After heated debate, the Ottoman Grand Council in the meeting of August 20, 1853, followed Reşid’s suggestion and decided to ask for revisions in the Vienna Note (Goldfrank, 2002, p. 240).

Phase III: Internal and External Balancing

The final war decision matured in the period between mid-August and the end of September 1853. While the disappointment over the Vienna Note fell on Istanbul, the news from Egypt was a great source of morale, particularly at the Caucasian and Danubian fronts. On August 12, 1853, the Egyptian fleet arrived and anchored off the Golden Horn. Through this, the Ottomans received “an enormous moral [e] and material accession of strength”, bringing 35,000 well-trained and disciplined men to augment the Sultan’s army (Temperley, 1936, p. 272; Palmer, 1992, p. 123). Together with newly-constructed warships, the Egyptian fleet increased confidence in the defense of Istanbul. At the Caucasian and Danubian fronts, the Ottomans managed to mobilize a large number of soldiers throughout the summer of 1853 (Balcı, 2019). The Ottomans had around 40,000 soldiers at the beginning of 1853 on the Caucasian front (in Erzurum, Kars and Batumi regions) and they managed to increase it to over 70,000 with the support from the Arab and Kurdish regions in early September (Klapka, 1855, p. 38). Besides, Sheikh Shamil, a Circassian religious leader seeking an alliance with the Ottoman Empire to succeed in his revolt against the Russians, gathered around 10,000 irregular fighters at the beginning of September (Gammer, 1994, p. 268). His successful summer campaigns against Russian targets in the Caucasus had already been an important source of morale for Istanbul (BOA. A.} DVN. 90/15, 23 July 1853; BOA. İ. DH. 276/17,341, 9 August 1853). In addition, the 35,000 Egyptian and Tunisian well-trained soldiers who arrived in Istanbul in the middle of August, was transferred to the Danubian front in September (Temperley, 1936, p. 272; Palmer, 1992, p. 123).

This internal balancing act, however, was still insufficient for the declaration of war against Russia. According to a document that gave information about the number of Russian soldiers on July 3, 1853, 288,000 soldiers, 128,000 on the Danube and 160,000 on the Caucasian front, were stationed against the Ottoman Empire (Besbelli, 1977, p. 36). Therefore, the Ottoman army was scarcely prepared in terms of number of soldiers and technological superiority was on the Russian side. Despite extensive mobilization, the Ottoman Empire was still able to deploy fewer soldiers than Russia on the war fronts. In the meeting of ministers and high officials (most of which were Grand Council members) dated on September 11, the Ottoman ruling elite extensively discussed whether war preparations alone were good enough to declare war on Russia (Badem, 2010, p. 93). Ömer Paşa, the commander of the Rumeli Army, said he needed 40,000 regular troops in addition to the present forces. Even the war party leader Mehmed Ali Paşa was pessimistic about the state of the Anatolian army. Hence, Ottoman decision-makers could not rely on their armies to declare war on Russia. During the meeting with the Sultan at the same night, Mehmed Ali was still alone in his idea of an immediate war declaration, and other participants Mustafa Naili Paşa, Reşid Paşa, and the Sheikh-ul Islam suggested waiting until the Russian response and getting the clarity of great power support (Saab, 1977, pp. 86–87). However, the Ottoman Empire had reached the limit of its military preparedness and the army, now mobile, was becoming a huge burden on the economy. Clearly, it was difficult and expensive to maintain a mobilized military (Köremezli, 2013, p. 55). Hence, the Ottoman leaders were left with two options; either the army had to be demobilized or the Porte would need to secure an alliance with Britain or France.

Two critical developments in early September significantly changed the British position, the pro-war riots in Istanbul threatening the survival of the Sultan, and Russia’s “violent” interpretation of the Vienna Note. When Nesselrode handed out a statement on 7 September, claiming that the note provided Russia with the right for the protection of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte (Correspondence Respecting, Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, 7 September 1853, part II, p. 99; Taylor, 1971, p. 56), British and French governments stopped pressuring the Porte to accept the note (Correspondence Respecting, The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland, No. 101, 21 September 1853, part II, p. 111; Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon, Paris, 20 September 1853, part II, p. 113). With the excuse of pro-war riots on September 11, the British government decided to send the British fleet from Beshica Bay to Istanbul “for the protection of British life and property, and if necessary, the person of the Sultan” (Correspondence Respecting, The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley, No. 108, 23 September 1853, part II, p. 107). On September 13, 1853, two French and two British steamers reached Istanbul, signifying the support of two great powers to the Porte in case of the outbreak of war (Temperley, 1936, p. 278). On 16 September, Clarendon threw over the Vienna Note and the French followed him the next day. More importantly, Lord Clarendon instructed to dispatch the British fleet at the Beshica Bay to Istanbul on 23 September (Temperley, 1936, p. 360). Although Clarendon’s decision had yet to reach Istanbul, Reşid Paşa grew increasingly confident about the support of great powers. This is why and unlike the previous meetings, Reşid Paşa did not cite the ambiguous attitude of the great powers as a reason for staying out of the war at the Grand Council meeting held on September 25.

What made Reşid Paşa and other key figures more confident about the British and French support? Were Britain’s past behaviors in favor of the Ottoman Empire, a pro-Ottoman public opinion in Britain (Badem, 2010, p. 87) and the arrival of a few British (and French) warships to Istanbul sufficient to have the confidence about the credibility of British commitments? These factors were important. However, they still did not guarantee that Britain would keep its word once the war broke out. Even if a state is highly resolved, it still may back down under very unpromising circumstances (Jervis et al., 2021, p. 170). Well aware of this possibility, Reşid Paşa, during the Grand Council meeting, admitted that the prospect of withdrawing two French and two British steamers from Istanbul was always conceivable (Türkgeldi, 1987, pp. 316–17). The credibility of British commitments for help was critically sought because only such a reliability could make the potential victory over Russia a clear prospect in the minds of Ottoman decision-makers. For this very reason, some of the participants of the Grand Council kept pushing Reşid Paşa: “Will the great powers be with us or against us if we start the war?” (Türkgeldi, 1987, pp. 316). Pointing to the religious similarities of Russia, France and Britain (Christianity), other participants asked how to trust the European great powers. Nonetheless, Reşid Paşa convinced them by saying that the clash of interests between the great powers was much stronger than religious brotherhood (Türkgeldi, 1987, pp. 317). Eventually, Reşid Paşa and other Ottoman decision-makers were persuaded by an insider about the credibility of Britain’s words for help. This is exactly what the British Ambassador Stratford Canning had undertaken since his arrival to Istanbul in April 1853. Although the Assembly decided to declare war, this decision had to be approved by the Sultan and the Ottoman army had to make the first move for the war to begin.

At this precarious moment, however, every step would be misinterpreted and peaceful attempts were of little value. Seeking an honorable exit from the crisis, Russia made a last-minute attempt for a peaceful settlement in Ölmutz, where the Tsar met with the Austrian Emperor on 26 September. Because of the unclear reports from Ölmutz, the Ottomans interpreted this meeting “as a war council” (Aksan, 2013, p. 442). The official Ottoman war declaration was issued on October 4, 1853. Soon after, Reşid Paşa (or the Sultan) requested French and British embassies to bring their fleets to Istanbul through the Dardanelles on October 9 (BOA, HR. SYS, 1189/5, 9 October, 1853). This was the final test for the credibility of French and English commitments. On the same day, Ömer Lütfi Paşa, the first commander of the Danubian (Third) Army, sent an ultimatum to Gorchakov, commander of the Russian armies, and asked for a transfer of the Principalities back to the Ottoman Empire within 15 days (BOA, HR. SYS, 903/2_37, 39, 4 October, 1853). Although the news of the war declaration reached St Petersburg on October 14, a final step was needed for the Ottomans. It came out on October 20, when Stratford issued his order to summon the British fleet into Istanbul (Temperley, 1936, p. 283, Palmer, 1992, p. 123). Finally, on October 22 when the great power fleets anchored off Istanbul, the Ottoman army under the command of Ömer Lütfi Paşa crossed the Danube and attacked the Russian targets.

Discussion and Conclusion

Weaker states’ war declaration against stronger states are rare (Levy & Thompson, 2011, p. 56). The war declaration of the Ottoman Empire against Russia (one of the great powers of the time) in 1853 particularly in its declining era provides many rich insights into the explanations of weaker states’ war decisions. As this study showed, the Ottoman Empire’s Crimean War decision was made by a divided executive which reached its final decision after long deliberations from February to October of 1853. While there exist many accounts about the decision in the literature, this study has developed an alternative framework by examining the changing interactions between unit-level and systemic factors within specific time frames. It scrutinized the gradual formation of Ottoman war decision by a careful empirical examination of key decision-makers and their changing preferences over time. It then demonstrated how the latter took shape in interaction with the dynamics of European balance of power and a changing strategic environment with Russia.

We have taken certain structural variables which might influence war decisions as constant. First, the assessments of the threat posed by a belligerent Russia would normally be taken as decisive in the Ottoman war decision. There were also credible signals about the adversary’s intention to engage in warfare. Indeed, Russia exercised certain predatory acts in its negotiations with Britain about how to divide and share the Ottoman Empire or such military actions as the concentration of the Russian army within the Ottoman borders. Crucially, however, all these signals had been there since the beginning of the crisis, and yet the Ottoman executive did not turn the signals into the justification for declaring war against Russia (Glaser, 2010; Yarhi-Milo, 2014). The second variable we take constant is the ‘balance of threat’ in Europe in the mid-19th century. States balance against revisionist and threatening states rather than against the strongest one in the system (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008, p. 35). This explains why great powers of Europe came to the aid of the Porte to prevent Russia’s aggressive policy from threatening their interests. Still, even though this aid provided a systemic clarity for the Ottomans, they refused to jump right into it. Rather, they preferred to seek clear guarantees that this balance would work in their favor in the event of war. The said two structural factors often appear in the historiography of the Crimean War. Many historical studies present either Russia’s aggressive behaviors or the balance of power in Europe as the main causes for the Ottoman war decision.

Our study, however, departs from the existing, mostly Western accounts of the Crimean War. It sheds new light on the role of a divided Ottoman executive in the decision-making process by employing three distinct time intervals (see Richardson, 1994, pp. 69–80) and changing assessments and preferences about the probability of winning the Crimean War. In doing so, we find that seeking clarity (in a divided Ottoman executive) about the outcome of war and intentions of European powers were the most significant dynamic influencing the Ottoman war decision. Other notable factors included the non-war defensive initiatives of Ottoman leaders such as Reşid Paşa’s remarkable efforts to secure an alliance with Britain against the looming Russian threat; the mobilization of a large army on the Russian borders and building a strong fleet harboring around Istanbul. All these dynamics increased the clarity about the probability of winning the war in the eyes of Ottoman decision-makers.

Significantly, however, the required clarity was not something “out there” (in the acts or signals of European powers), rather, it was built incrementally with the active participation of Ottoman decision-makers. In order to show the reciprocal interaction between the strategic environment and acts of political elites, we employed the morphogenetic approach and introduced temporality as a causal factor by dividing the pre-war period into consecutive time segments. We used the morphogenetic approach methodologically to break the Ottoman decision cycles into three time intervals in order to enter the interplay between decision units and structural factors. With this method, we showed that it was the perception of clarity (a unit-level attribute) rather than the belligerent mobilization of the Russian military or European balance of power (systemic stimuli) that finally produced the Ottoman war declaration in the autumn of 1853.

The study has three main findings. First, for the ultimate decision unit of the Ottoman Empire, the clarity (about the prospect of winning) had a more substantial impact on the war decision than credible signals about the adversary’s intentions to engage in warfare. The Ottoman Empire was a weak state compared to Russia and its divided executive was influenced by the foreign penetration of European ambassadors. The existing European balance of power did not speak for itself to be taken for granted by the Ottoman decision-makers to wage the Crimean War. Rather, it had to be continuously negotiated and constructed inside and outside in favor of the Porte so that the latter could confidently declare war. Third, the morphogenetic approach helped us empirically demonstrate the movements of the Ottoman war decision. Rather than a rationalist or innenpolitik approach to decision-making that assumes individual or group control over deliberations and preferences, this approach enabled a process-oriented analysis, vitally sensitive to temporal changes and pressures.

By studying the Crimean War decision from within the 19th century Ottoman imperial context, the study also delivers an alternative to the prevalent “methodological Eurocentrism” (Barkawi, 2017: 60) while providing a non-western context for global interconnectedness. More specifically, our study contributes to the realist research program by timing it through the morphogenetic approach and by presenting an empirical investigation into an understudied inquiry, namely, the role of a divided executive in security policy. Contrary to the existing accounts that reduce war declarations to either the parochial decision-makers or the European balance of power; we demonstrated how both unit-level and systemic factors played reciprocal roles in sequential forms. In other words, the morphogenetic approach helped us link the differential Ottoman unit-level inputs with the systemic stimuli of mid-19th century Europe and wrench the relative weight of the agential and structural factors culminating in the Crimean War decision. This alternative framework makes important contributions to the literature on the causes of the Crimean War, temporal turn in IR and war decisions in general.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Archival Documents

BOA, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of the State Archives)

Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi (Foreign Ministry Political) (HR. SYS)

İrade Dahiliye (Firman Internal Affairs) (İ. DH.)

İrade Hariciye (Firman Foreign Affairs) (İ. HR.)

ORCID iDs

Ali Balci

Yıldırım Turan

Author Biographies

Ali Balcı is a Professor at the Department of International Relations in Sakarya University, Turkey. His recent research focuses Ottoman international politics and the UN Security Council. His most recent publications appeared in journals such as Cambridge Review of International Affairs, International Studies Review, Geopolitics, Global Policy, and Journal of Contemporary European Studies.

Tuncay Kardaş is a Professor of International Relations in Middle East Institute of Sakarya University. He holds a PhD degree from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. His main research areas are critical security studies, sociology of war, international relations theory and media semiotics. His recent works have been published in International Politics, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, War and History, Middle East Critique, and Turkish Studies. Prof. Kardaş also co-edited two books: Exploring Samuel Huntington’s Faultlines, from Al-Andalus to Virtual Ummah, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Non-State Armed Actors in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave, 2017).

Yildirim Turan is an assistant professor of International Relations. He received his PhD from Sakarya University. His main research areas are Middle Eastern politics, Democratization in the Middle East, and war studies. His recent works have been published in Bilig, Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, and Journal of Academic Inquiries.

Ismail Ediz is an associate professor of International Politics. He received his Bachelor degree from Middle East Technical University, Department of History, M.A. from Hacettepe University and PhD from the Istanbul University. His main research areas are European political history, history of the late Ottoman Empire and diplomatic history of Turkey. He is the author of Diplomasi ve Savaş İngiliz Belgelerinde Batı Anadolu’da Yunan İşgali 1919–1922 (Diplomacy and War: Greek Occupation of Western Anatolia in British Documents) (Ankara, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi)

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