Abstract
Mexico’s public security has suffered a militarization process for at least two decades. Although there is consensus on this trend at the national level in the specialized literature, little research has been conducted on its subnational impact. To amend this gap, this article inquires the way in which militarization has permeated the structure and operation of subnational security forces beyond the local autocratic dynamics that reinforce militarization. Specifically, this article focuses on police reconfiguration regarding interaction with military in the six most violent states in Mexico: Jalisco, Nuevo León, Guanajuato, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. The qualitative analysis presented is based on 15 interviews and 18 focus groups with police offices and public security officials of these states. We argue that military presence on the streets and the arrival of the military-to-executive positions in public security institutions contributed to the adoption of military operating modes by the state police during Felipe Calderón (Dec. 2006–Nov. 2012) and Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidential terms (Dec. 2012–Nov. 2018). Additionally, this article aims to explain how the military has permeated the state’s public security institutions at different levels and dynamics (management, training, and operation) that promote the adoption of formal or informal military features that enable state police institutions to behave alike and resemble the army in their everyday activities. From a theoretical and methodological perspective, this article calls for the construction of a research agenda that focuses on the local and subnational processes of the militarization of public security.
Introduction
The militarization of public security in Mexico is a long-evolving process (Moloeznik & Suárez de Garay, 2012). Some studies have traced this process back to the beginning of the 20th century (Pérez Ricart, 2018; Rath, 2013).
Nowadays, the militarization of public security in Mexico faces a new chapter, with the extinction of the Policía Federal (Federal Police), the emergence of the Guardia Nacional (National Guard), and its subsequent adherence to the Mexican army during President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term (2018–). These transformations confirm that military institutions are increasingly gaining relevance in collaborating with civil authorities on public security matters at national and local levels. However, current militarization cannot be explained without the blurring of boundaries between military and police tasks, and the participation of the military in the public security sphere.
The armed forces in Mexico have usually been subject to political power. However, in the last few decades, the military has gained space in tasks that once corresponded to civil institutions (Atuesta, 2018; Mendoza, 2016; Sandoval Palacios, 2000; Velazquez et al., 2021). Several analysts have emphasized the dangers of a broader military scope, considering its high level of autonomy and weak accountability (Moloeznkik, 2008).
In 2006, there was an intensification of the massive participation of the armed forces in public security. On the one hand, the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (Ministry of Defense) and the Secretaría de Marina (Ministry of the Marine) became members of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Council of Public Security), the highest decision-making body of the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Public Security System). This membership formalized its capacity to influence national public policies to fight crime. On the other hand, the “War on Drugs” of former President Calderón—a fight against “cartels” rather than an overarching war of drugs—deployed the Army (and subsequently the Marine) in operations against criminal groups around the country. What was once announced as a provisional measure intensified militarization by strengthening the army as the leading institution of national public security policies.
Consequently, the research on militarization in Mexico has mainly focused on what Hall and Coyne (2013) call direct militarization, understood as the army’s direct intervention in tasks regularly associated to police forces. However, little is known about the indirect militarization or militarization of the police. That is, the transformation of policing institutions under logics that resemble those of the armed forces regarding training, equipment, organization, and operation (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2021; Morales Rosas & Pérez Ricart, 2014, 2015).
Regarding indirect militarization, the specialized literature has documented how commanders arrived at executive positions in public security institutions in the largest states in Mexico since the war against drug trafficking started (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010; Barrachina & Hernández, 2012; Grayson, 2013; Moloeznik & Suárez de Garay, 2012). These authors associate the presence of military officers in local security institutions with the processes of militarization through mechanisms such as operative knowledge exchange and joint activities with the armed forces. After these contributions, it can be argued that the assignment, consignment, and transfer of military personal to executive positions of security institutions promotes the internal transformation of police institutions that give place to their militarization.
The aforementioned literature on direct and indirect militarization, mainly based on government and civil society organization reports and survey information, has provided a good account of the general national process. However, the subnational dimension opens a research agenda that must be nourished through empirical research of specific cases.
To address this, the present article describes the dynamics of public security militarization at the subnational level from the perspective of police officers. Our focus is narrative; it starts from the discursive reconstruction made by police themselves, specifically, regarding their experience working with members of the armed forces during the governments of Calderón and Peña Nieto. As explained in the methodological section, this approach allows us to establish inferences about the performance of the police commanders, starting from the conceptualization and assessment made by the actors about their own course of action and that of their military partners.
To accomplish this objective, the article begins by establishing the methodological parameters of the study and the minimal definitions of direct and indirect militarization. Second, it describes how the profiles of police institution’s commanders have changed since ex- and military officers started to occupy such positions. Third, it describes how police and military officers have become closer, both at the management and street levels. The fourth section describes how military influence occurs from a vertical perspective in security-policy management. The fifth section explores the role of military practices in the training and professionalization of police officers. Lastly, the article illustrates the ways in which the police officers patrol alike the military officers, as part of their daily activities.
Methodology and Research Design
The methodological approach to this research is based on an analysis of the narratives of state police members. Narratives are analytical constructions referring to a series of past actions and episodes (Abbott 1990; McCullagh 1978). From a sociological perspective, Griffin (1993)—taking up Giddens’ (1979), Abrams’ (1982), and Sewell’s (1992) theoretical approaches—argues that narrative is the way in which we describe events through which we enter a structure, that is, a deep theoretical knowledge on the interaction of the agency and the social structure.
A narrative perspective does not aim to verify the truthfulness of the accounts, but to comprehend their meaning in the context of production (Forero Medina, 2019). The narrator defines and organizes a series of actions in a particular time sequence for a specific purpose (Griffin, 1993). The narratives account for the experiences of the narrator, but they also consider the way in which their social group of reference uses and gives them value (Sirimarco, 2017). Therefore, narrative identity is part of a general performative identity created by actors within their social roles (Fludernik, 2007). They allow us to understand how a group, with certain roles, represents itself and the ways in which it relates to others.
Thus, analyzing the narratives of state police officers during the Calderón and Peña Nieto’s terms allows us to identify elements to answer the following questions: What aspects of the armed forces do police officers value the most? Do they consider the armed forces a necessary agent in the field of public security? How do police officers perceive the influence of military commanders intending to exercise on police forces? What are the consequences of military commanders’ arrival at the police?
These questions allow us to approach, analytically, the main question of this paper, namely, how the military presence on the streets and the arrival of military commanders to executive positions in public security institutions contributed (or not) to the development of army-like operations in the states’ police between 2007 and 2018.
The research design rests on interviews and focus groups where state police offices and authorities of the Secretarías de Seguridad Pública Estatal (Ministries of State Public Security) of six federal entities participated: Jalisco, Nuevo León, Guanajuato, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. These were conducted between July and September 2019.
The selection of states responded to practical criteria, the availability of authorities, and their willingness to interview personnel. However, all visited institutions shared that they have been involved in joint activities with the military and/or marines and have had at least one head of security from the armed forces during Felipe Calderon’s and Enrique Peña Nieto’s terms. In addition, these six states had the highest violence rates during the study period. Hence, we selected these states considering them as the most extreme cases of militarization in the country. The inferences from our results consider this case profile.
The research visits to the states lasted between three and five days and included exchanges with state police officers, instructors, heads of police operational areas, and some Secretarios de Seguridad Pública (Public Security Ministries). For every case, we interviewed authorities of analogous ranks. Interviews and focus groups were conducted on the premises of each public security agency. This also allowed us to examine the work environment, academies, and garrisons. This was particularly useful to identify traits and processes of militarization inside the institutions and, to some extent, compared to what was said by interviewees. In total, 15 interviews and 18 focus groups were conducted, and 105 people directly related to state public security issues were contacted.
The Army’s Penetration in the Local Police During Calderón and Peña Nieto’s Terms
This section has three main objectives: First, to present the context in which the state police operated during Calderón and Peña Nieto’s terms; second, to examine the development program of the local police during those years; and third, to show the overall picture of the way in which armed forces personnel took over command positions in different state polices in the country between 2006 and 2018.
State Police
The state police in Mexico comprise a group of 32 institutions, one for each federal state that is in charge of public security in its territory. Their intermediate positions between the Federation and the municipality make their duties wide and diverse. They work closely with the population, addressing misdemeanors and minor crimes, mostly in municipalities that do not have a police force on their own or where their police have very limited capacities. However, they also undertake serious crimes, patrolling in sparsely populated and/or conflict zones, and engaging in clashes with armed groups. Their sizes are not homogenous and can vary according to each state.
Presumably, the violent crisis in Mexico started in 2007 as a consequence of a misguided security policy on drug trafficking. To this end, the federal government tried to identify key challenges to articulating a national public security policy. The new design attempted to correct past mistakes. One was the existence of over 600 municipal police corporations, most of which had with very limited capabilities. The alternative offered by the Calderon administration was that the state police absorbed the municipal police, thus creating 32 police corporations capable of facing the violent crisis and virtuously collaborating with the Federation. To address this major challenge, state governments were in charge of strengthening state police institutions through the implementation of policies designed by the Federation as mentioned below.
First, the Federation created two funds for states and municipalities to strengthen their police: Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública (Fund of Contributions for Public Security: FASP) and Subsidio para la Seguridad Municipal (Subsidy for Municipal Security: Subsemun). Second, the Modelo Nacional de Evaluación y Control de Confianza (National Model of Evaluation and Trust Controls) was created to enable states to build evaluation centers to determine the physical, psychological, toxicological, socioeconomic, and polygraph capabilities of officer candidates in security and justice positions. Third, the Policía Estatal Acreditable (Creditable State Police) program aimed at providing every state police with operational guidelines for implementing three basic units: investigation, tactical analysis, and operations. Finally, a single chain of command strategy was meant to promote the incorporation of municipal police into the state police. Although this scheme has not completely accomplished, it is still in use in different coordination mechanisms between state and municipal police forces.
These four efforts continued without substantial changes during Peña Nieto’s term. There were no sanctions for states that did not follow the Federation’s guidelines during either period. This promoted an uneven development of state police corporations. Alvarado and Padilla (2021) show that five years after these transformations, 15 of the 32 state police organizations had limited strength, low public trust, and a negative perception of their performance.
The Military Deployment
The attempt to strengthen and reorganize local police happened simultaneously with the national militarization process. Figure 1 shows how the deployment of the army along the country, to fulfill tasks related to the “combat against drug-trafficking” increased during Calderón’s presidency. Subsequently, during the initial years of Peña Nieto’s government, there was a decrease that coincided with a reduction in national homicide rates. By the end of his term, however, the presence of the army throughout the country rose again, with over 50,000 soldiers deployed around 2018. Soldiers deployed in “combat against drug-trafficking” tasks. Source: Author’s own elaboration based on information provided by SEDENA through information request 0000700118418.
Official data on military deployment disaggregated at the state level was only available for 2012 when Calderón was in office. Figure 2 shows, how the presence of the army was concentrated in Sonora, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Chihuahua, states that exceeded 2000 deployed soldiers. Subsequently, there was a group of 16 states that had between 1000 and 2000 deployed soldiers. Finally, there was a group of 12 states in which the military presence was lower than 1000 soldiers.
1
These numbers depended on decisions made by the Federation authorities, mainly motivated by severe violence crises in the states. Soldiers deployed by federative entity to “combat drugtrafficking” (2012). Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data provided by SEDENA through information request 0000700118418.
States that Signed a Public Security Agreement with the Army and Number of Soldiers Deployed per Year.
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the information provided by SEDENA through information request 0000700154420.
States that Signed Public Security Agreements with the Marine.
Source: Own elaboration based on the information provided by the Ministry of the Marine through information request 0001300075620.
Military Commanders in State Police
The arrival of military commanders at police corporations is a practice that precedes, by far, our period of study (see Pérez Ricart, 2018). Nonetheless, as we shall see, in the last decades and, particularly, from the deployment of the Army onwards—as the paper of Pansters and Serrano (2023) in this issue shows—this practice has spread.
Through information requests, we built a registry of Public Security ministers and heads of state police with military background. Figure 3 illustrates these trends from 2004 to 2018.
2
Ministers (Secretarios), and Heads of Public Security (Directores) with a military background on a state level. Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the information provided by the State Public Security Ministries through different information requests.
The arrival of soldiers and marines to different executive positions became relevant from 2005 onwards. During the last stage of Calderón’s term, most armed force commanders were hired as ministers. The highest point was reached in 2011, when almost half of the state´s public security institutions had a minister with a military background. In the case of police heads, the trend is similar but with significantly lower numbers. The year with the highest number of military heads of police was 2014. 3
Figure 4 presents the cumulative number of ministers and heads of public security with military background per state between 2004 and 2019. Almost without exception, there are cases in which military commanders have taken executive positions in civilian police corporations. The states with the largest number of military commanders were Tamaulipas, Aguascalientes, and Sinaloa, with the smallest number being Yucatán, Chihuahua, Tabasco, and Sonora. Four out of every five Public Security Ministries have been occupied, at least once by a person from the armed forces. The ministries of Nuevo León, Guerrero, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas were managed by the military most of the time. In contrast, Baja California, Sonora, and Yucatán did not have a minister from the military during the study period. In the case of states with the largest number of public security heads from the military, Sinaloa, San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, and Tamaulipas stand out. Ministers (Secretarios), and Heads of Public Security (Directores) with military backgrounds per federative entity 2004–2019. Source. Own elaboration based on the information provided by the State Public Security Ministries through different information requests.
The number of military officers that have occupied executive positions in public security institutions allows us to understand how often governors outsource the responsibility of public security to military authorities. Nevertheless, occupying an executive post is insufficient to transform an institution. An alternative to estimate how much influence the military had on the institutions they led was to consider the time they occupied the position. Figure 5 shows the months during which state police institutions were managed by military officers between 2004 and 2019. Months in which statal police institutions were managed by military officers 2004–2019.
In some states, such as Aguascalientes, Sinaloa, and Nuevo León, the military occupied executive posts for more than 7 years. 4 The case of Guerrero stands out, with more than a decade of military personnel in executive posts in the Public Security Ministry.
Another interesting phenomenon that can be observed in Figure 5 is the simultaneity in the occupation of posts. That is, in most states where the military were ministers and heads of public security, the length of their stay was very similar, which suggests, as a hypothesis, that the arrival of military personal to executive posts increases the arrival of more military elements to executive positions. This allows us to identify three clear patterns of what happened during Calderón and Peña Nieto’s terms.
First, military deployment, although with some fluctuations, remained high and fostered opportunities for coordinated or fortuitous encounters between members of the armed forces and the state police. Second, the arrival of military officers to executive posts in state public security institutions was a recurrent strategy in almost all states. Third, in most of the states where military officers occupied these posts, they stayed there enough time and were there in the right position that enabled them to significantly change structures and dynamics.
Considering these trends, we present the narratives of the interviewed police officers and authorities in the following section. Drawing on these narratives, we explore the impact of these three processes on the state police during the study period.
Of the Coordination Between Commanders to the Disjunction on the Streets
The massive deployment of military officers across the country urged the establishment of coordination mechanisms between the armed forces and police forces on the three levels of government. Against this backdrop, security workgroups were created for this purpose. Their main goal was to find coordination spaces between the Federation and each state to jointly define public security policy priorities beyond political interests.
From the high commander’s perspective, the said working groups were prolific in establishing coordination between the armed forces and police. The next three testimonies of two heads of police (Guanajuato and Zacatecas) and a minister of security (Sinaloa) point in that direction. Although they refer to the features of their respective states or regions, their narratives are representative of a general perspective. We have the Guanajuato’s working group, okay? Thus, there was a general of the zone and the general of the region. So, we coordinated the raids there. The relationship has been very close during the [police] operations. If there is an event and the state [police] arrives, the municipality shares the information of the place, okay? We’re there and the municipals (local police) arrive, and the National Guard (Gendarmerie) and we give the information, I mean, we are not jealous of who will keep the information (Head of Police—Guanajuato). When the governor Quirino Ordaz Coppel’s administration began, the support of the Ministry of the Marine was requested, in the form of 1200 officials of the Military Police, so that the officers helped us and well; the intention was to join efforts. When a high-impact criminal act is committed, the municipal police turn up, as do the state police, the National Guard, the personnel of Defense [SEDENA], and personnel of the Marine. Therefore, we believe that there is an example of coordination in the state that has helped us maintain a downward trend in the incidence of crime (Minister—Sinaloa). Yes, we have a very good relationship with the army. As I told you, fortunately, they have seen us well, uhm… I have not heard that we have had any problems with them. On the contrary, we see goodwill on their behalf and consequently, we also try to help in whatever is asked of us (Head of Police—Zacatecas).
Commanders refer to key dynamics: the accompaniment—supervision, processes of feedback, and monitoring—between the different institutions to handle high-impact criminal acts, the information exchange between institutions, and the conduction of joint operatives. For commanders, these mechanisms occur fluidly and contribute to the improvement of their state’s security situation. However, police officers who patrol the streets have a very different perspective on the work carried out by the armed forces. The following three testimonies of State Police Officers of Zacatecas, Guanajuato, and Jalisco are representative of this. (…) Well, if before it was nonexistent, now it is even more absent. There is no interaction because when something comes up, they handle it internally; all the support is for them, but when we ask for it, they do not come or they do, but only to gather information, they stay for half an hour and leave. So, you could say that coordination is nonexistent (State police officer—Zacatecas). We have worked with the Army, but the Army likes to play smart and says: “hey you, state police, you are going to do all the paperwork, I am only here to back you up.” I think that is wrong because supposedly they had to fulfill police tasks and they do not do it, that is why there have been quarrels (State police officer—Guanajuato). Come close to a convoy and you will realize who is in charge, you can tell because it is the one everyone looks at. The soldier does not look at you, does not address you, you cannot ask for the soldier’s help, and if he helps you, it’s because his commander has already ordered him to do so. Here [in the police], if I, as the person in charge, see that one of my colleagues doesn’t do what he must do, I am compelled to, maybe not humiliate him, but to tell him “Back up, do it” (State Police officer—Jalisco).
State police officers perceive coordination strategies to be deficient. From their perspective, these strategies do not lead to some type of support from the armed forces. The accompaniment that the military commanders brag about—without giving any precision of its meaning—it is synonymous with being present in the crime scene but not with real cooperation. In the best scenario, the soldiers are involved in strictly operational issues, but never in the analysis and arrest processes. The bureaucratic tasks of justice officials are left exclusively to police officers without soldiers intervening. The lack of active participation on soldiers’ behalf in the detention process could be due to the justice system’s own limitations, but it also exhibits soldiers’ reluctance to fully integrate themselves into public security tasks. That is, at the very least, how they are perceived by state police officers. 5
From the police’s perspective, the formation and strategies of the military are obstacles for them to perform adequately in the public security field. In their narratives, police officers acknowledge that what differentiates them from soldiers is their own training, which is more suited for citizen services, and their improvisation capacity before crimes or eventualities specific to the public security field. The following interview extracts of state police officers in Nuevo León, Zacatecas, and Sinaloa provide evidence of this: Now, regarding the Civilian Force [the police], here, to tell you the truth, it is not that you want to study; here, it is mandatory, why? Because you walk on the streets, because on the streets you are going to make a person get out of a vehicle, you have clear reasons to make him get out and imagine he’s a law student. I approach him and he says no, I am not going to get out because it’s my vehicle and closes the window. You must get him out of your car. What grounds do you go to get him out? So here you practically have to study, even if you do not want to, you have to prepare yourself and in the army you do not; in the army, the best soldier is the one that stands well and steadfast (State Police officer—Nuevo León). (…) For example if there is a notice in the 911 system, if we are close to it during our patrol we handle it, if we were, for instance, behind a set objective, then it was bars and saloons, and we were going to handle a notice or bring back up and we got away from the convoy, they said [the soldiers] that it was wrong and that they were going to report it to their commanders (State Police officer—Zacatecas). The training of the Military Police is different from ours, they are more prepared for war or very difficult situations, more about global problems than socializing with people or handling a citizen complaint or an investigation of a criminal act, it’s more about something else, another functionality, so that also complicates their work in the city, the work close to the citizens is complicated for them, why? Because they are not there, they do not have sufficient or adequate training to do their job correctly (State Police officer—Sinaloa).
The constraints pointed out by the police officers are relevant in themselves. A research question for the future, however, is to detect the extent to which those perceptions are a result of their collaboration or prejudices against the Mexican military.
Despite their criticism of the work of the military, police officers acknowledge that some aspects of military training should be incorporated into police institutions to achieve a better performance. Discipline and physical training are important elements. The following interview extracts, taken from two instructors from Sinaloa and Sonora and a state police officer in Guanajuato, allow us to observe the following: So, the Army is an organism, an institution that gives you the rank and you keep going up in rank because of the knowledge and it allows you to have an exceptional discipline. Within our public security institutions, we have had a big problem of lacking discipline and today, in the past few years, it was very notorious. Thus, the behavior between federal institutions and that today the Mexican army is going to contribute, must promote that discipline that has been disappearing (State Police officer—Guanajuato). Of the military training, I think there has been something really strong [outstanding] in them that is the physical (voice in the background: there is discipline) and how they stay physically fit during their service. We mut look for a way to strengthen that in police corporations, the physical endurance. They regularly do this during shooting practice. They give us shooting practice after very long periods or almost none at all (Instructor—Sinaloa). I have had experiences with military training, and trainers have a lot of knowledge; they have a lot of preparation, and it is useful for us, but as my colleague said, also in certain areas, more operational, more tactical, more belligerent, that serve the police in certain areas, but not in all (Instructor—Sonora).
These narratives show that the state police’s perception of the military is ambiguous. On the one hand, they consider that the police have greater capacities in the field of public security, such as citizen service, detention records, and that they have a more flexible model that allows them to better undertake insecurity problems. On the other hand, the police perceive the Army as an institution of reference from which they could incorporate their career system, as well as their training and operation strategies that are useful to stay alive in high-risk scenarios. Both these aspects are discussed in the following section.
Top-Down Military Influence: The Military Leading the Police
The arrival of military commanders at executive posts in police institutions is, by itself, a militarization trait. However, what effects does their arrival have on the police? How do they assess their leadership and management? The following narratives are examples of how, in some cases, the military method is positively evaluated, while in other case, it is problematic. Look, it is much easier when an officer does not achieve a high rank in the army. And I say this with respect. When an element, a general, for instance, comes and tries to integrate to a security ministry it becomes very complicated because in the Army they’re used to calling him “my general,” they see them as demi-gods, do I make myself understood? And what he says will be done, and that, eventually, is very difficult, do you understand? I mean, it’s much easier when it is someone who received a lot of education and all, but is ordinary, to say it like that, okay? (State Police Officer Guanajuato). If you assign a civilian commander, the way of working changes: “get close and go with that guy, go to the proximity, oh, gather a unit here because I need you to make yourself present, that it is evident,” then that reactive unit starts going down, going down and we begin to be in proximity, a situation of forced change to those companies, or those units that go out in the beginning, I am one of those, which forced us to make contact with the citizens when we were [originally] trained for reaction. Organizational changes were made, and a military commander was reinstated, which produced that some groups went out: Wolf Group, Soe Group, Research Group, they all came back. and a military commander arrived, and it was reactivated, and the groups started going out, Wolf Group, Soe Group, Research Group… (State Police Officer—Nuevo León). Look, when “the general” was there, this is not to compliment him, but we worked differently and the results were different, there was backup, that is what matters, he didn’t bow his head before criminality, he didn’t let himself be intimidated. For example, in the case of aggression towards one of our peers, the criminals did think a bit before messing with a cop or a worker, a staff member, because they knew there would be a reaction and now there isn’t, there is not, there is nothing, they can come, take one of us, there’s nothing. When “the general” was in charge, if you messed with a cop: big mistake, it was like messing with the whole police force (State Police—Zacatecas). In my case, well… I have only been a soldier, I am retired, I was in service for 24 years, as they say, I am retired. I came here with a past executive officer that was a good man, and I was his driver; I came to work for him, umm, first with a leave of absence, then, after fulfilling my 24 years I told my family “well, I’ve gotten a bit more used to it,” I retired, umm, my position as a bodyguard with this man ended and I stayed here in the Civilian Force (State Police—Nuevo León).
The narratives account for different appreciations on behalf of police officers towards soldiers who occupy executive positions in police institutions. However, no absolute perspective exits.
This negative appreciation is related to the fact that police officers are very unlikely to share the same values as military commanders. Knowing that they will not be led by a professional police officer—a person with civil training and who has police experience in their state—can lead to a certain distancing and a lack of common experience.
On certain occasions, the arrival of a retired general implies a change in general institutional police routines, especially the incorporation of symbolic military elements and rituals that foster respect for and obedience to commanders. According to the same police officers, these strategies are useful in maintaining an adequate exercise of the chain of command; however, from the police perspective, many of these symbolic and disciplinary elements are not necessary for their adequate operation, and they can even be obsolete.
From a more positive perspective, police officers identify that the work method changes when military commanders take over. A more reactive approach to group work and territorial control was preferred. Many police officers consider the way in which the military leads an institution to be positive. They particularly appreciated that they personally led the groups during raids, and that they took decisive action when an officer died or was injured after a clash with and armed group. This type of decision-making can be useful in uplifting the morals of the police during difficult times, but it also fosters a public security approach based on confrontation and the creation of an enemy.
The arrival of the military to commanding positions promoted the incorporation of more military officers at different levels of the institution in all ranks. That is how, for example, in the Sinaloa and Tamaulipas police, the integration of armed forces commanders, during the period of study of this article, experienced a considerable increase of soldiers and marines in high and middle executive positions. Likewise, the arrival of former military officers, as a result of the ease with which military commanders can enter the institutions, was a common practice in the state police that we visited, and that in future research will have to be specifically studied to understand the possible repercussions in the militarization processes of the police.
Military Education in Police Training
In some of the literature, it is common to find that the arrival of military commanders has modified the training process to which police officers are exposed. However, this dynamic has not been empirically analyzed. During our encounters with members of the police, references to the involvement of the military in their education processes were recurrent, which confirms the centrality the army has acquired in police training for several years. We present testimonies that exemplify this matter: The creditable state police are divided into three areas: operations, research and tactical analysis. Thus, the peers that left the operational unit participated in military training, while those in research and tactical analysis did not (State Police officer—Zacatecas). In fact, there was a time in which the army trained us. As my peer says, we have an almost equal degree, a qualification called accreditation. You were accredited by training for three months with the army. It was centered on the use of automatic weapons, so we could use a caliber like the one they use (Instructor—Guanajuato). Regarding the stages of the civil force, each generation, until the twelfth, received a month of military instruction. That month, the staff is taught reaction exercises, prevention exercises, ambushes, management of multitudes, counter-ambushes, practice, ascent and descent, they’re basically intervention exercises, reaction exercises, yes, that they were taught during the last month, and it is a very hectic month, very active so the people see that it goes beyond “oh, we’re going out…” (State Police—Nuevo León).
The testimonies agree that the training offered by the military was focused on ambush exercise and other operational techniques to face criminal groups with high fire power. Police officers referred to the practices that have been of great use; that is, they recognize that among their entities, there are social dynamics in which the Army’s training results are very useful. This has driven them, not only to positively value the operational tactics of the Army but also to adopt them on certain occasions. However, there is a lack of research on this topic that allows us to understand the reconfiguration of military instruction once the military commander has left his position and has been [been replaced] by a civil commander. Furthermore, we know very little on how training varies between states and the challenges each one of them faces. While this ought to be studied, it goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Of the Police Patrolling as Soldiers
As has been shown thus far, the strengthening of police institutions during Calderón and Peña Nieto’s terms implied the incorporation of militarized aspects concerning doctrine, formation, and operation. One of the biggest changes of the police in militarized operation strategies can be appreciated in the way they patrol the streets of each State and some rural roads. On this topic, we took the following extracts from an interview with two state police officers in Nuevo León and Zacatecas, and a head of police from Sinaloa. The initial purpose of the Civil Force was that it had the necessary reaction knowledge; that is why each person in the five places (of the van) had a role, the driver, the commanders and the three security people who provide 360 degrees security, obviously a shooter that has an unbreakable vision, right? Because he is the first line of security of what the driver and commander cannot see, and the ones behind that must be seated because if there is an ambush, it is easier for them to get immediately out of the car, right? That is why, in the beginning, the reaction units did not have the rear covered, because it got in the way to get out of the car, that is, you lost time (State Police—Nuevo León). It varies. Patrolling varied according to the information possessed. For example, in the state’s surroundings, let us say Durango, our squads included at least four vehicles. There is more police presence because we know that criminals move in larger convoys, seven or eight vehicles, and many people. Therefore, we also have to put more people out (State Police—Zacatecas). Here, it is implemented because of the characteristics of the area, and it is not just Sinaloa anymore. It is the whole state, meaning that it is crucial that there is a force of more than three or four officers together on the streets, because of the characteristics of the area. That allows us to have, or try to have, groups organized in units (Head of Police—Sinaloa).
After the ambushes, police officers killed in combat, and operations obstructed by criminal groups, the police learned that they ought to patrol in groups and spread out in a way that allowed them to respond quickly before any threat and to avoid being battered. In this sense, the vans became the most used vehicle by the state police. Those who covered their faces during the patrols started to wear bulletproof vests and even helmets regularly. They also started using semiautomatic weapons. Some police institutions, like Guanajuato’s, Jalisco’s, and Sonora’s, started wearing camouflaged uniforms.
The convoy style of patrolling, as well as technical and tactical military training, is useful for the state police when it is necessary to set roadblocks and inspection posts; they are equally functional when they must attend unpopulated and/or neighboring regions where clashes with criminal groups are frequent. In that sense, in a context where the police operates is considered unsafe, it will be easier for the police to develop militarized operation strategies to feel more protected while patrolling the streets. The limitations of this strategy, as can be seen in one of the testimonies, are related to the needs of the state and its way of governing. When armed group interventions decline, other crime-related priorities emerge that require a closer approach from the police to its citizens. This tension in which state police are in, has given place to a disorganized and interrupted militarization process: one accompanied with the reluctance of the Army to turn into a quasi-police force in a sort of constabularization, policializing itself and the reluctance of the police to work towards an absolute militarization.
Conclusion
This article aimed to illustrate the way in which militarization processes occurred at a subnational public security level in Mexico during Felipe Calderón’s and Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidencies.
The data presented in this article show that the Army and the Marine became central in the field of public security during the period of study, and how this process of achieving such a core position has unfolded. Drawing on narratives of state police officers, we identified how direct militarization processes allowed soldiers and marines to incorporate themselves into public security institutions, not only as high-ranking executives but also as instructors, and even officers. According to our analysis, this phenomenon has given rise to militarization at different levels. Far from being a process harmoniously orchestrated by the Federation and the states, it happened to occur intermittently and in tandem. Most of the time, militarization is a product of political negotiations and tensions within the same police institution.
This research allowed us to document the extent to which the militarization of state police at the subnational level occurred during Calderón’s and Peña Nieto’s terms. Two main findings arise from this research. First, the arrival of military-to-executive posts in public security institutions was a growing and recurrent strategy. Second, the permanence of military officials in public security executive positions was sufficient, in most cases, to perform a meaningful transformation of local police institutions and practices. The main transformations are military management, a reactive and confrontative approach to territory control rather than prevention, military training and operative techniques, patrolling practices, and even military symbols and rituals in everyday routines. Military deployment leads to fortuitous encounters between the state police and the military, which feed into the general militarization process since it increases the chances of exchange.
The narratives we analyzed confirm the findings of relevant literature on local militarization dynamics in Mexico and beyond. However, they also provide evidence of new tensions emerging from Calderón and Peña Nieto’s terms. As we have shown, police perceptions of the military are much more ambiguous than usually assumed by scholars in policing and security studies. In this regard, it is possible to draw two conclusions.
First, although police officers perceive themselves as having greater capabilities within the public security field and citizen services, they see the Army as an example in terms of their professional and operational structure, as well as their training. These characteristics are useful deemed useful for preserving life in high-risk settings. Second, even if the arrival of a military commander to the state police is usually negatively perceived by police officers—a measure they sometimes even deemed unnecessary—because of their confrontational approach, which negatively affects civilian protection, police officers do value the usefulness of their command style in high-risk security operations. In other words, police officials positively assess military operative capacities and techniques in specific situations, especially in social contexts where they perceive insecurity to be greater.
These tensions and ambivalences can be explained (to a certain extent) by the same changes of the security challenges. Even if the relationship is not linear, the militarization process mates the intensification of armed groups’ activities. However, when activity diminishes, closeness with civilians returns to play. This tension in which the state police are in, has given place to an uninterrupted and chaotic militarization process, accompanied by push-back on behalf of the soldiers to policialize themselves (Resteigne & Manigart, 2019), constabularized (Flores-Macías & Zazkin, 2021), and the police to work towards a more candid militarization.
The armed forces, mainly the army, have successfully communicated their point of view to the police regarding the insecurity crisis. As a result, police officers’ training programs have become more reactive. Preventive approaches are less valued, as police education (and training) focuses more on the combat of criminal groups rather than on citizen proximity.
The evidence presented in this article points to growing militarization within police institutions through different processes that gradually pervade institutions with military values and practices. The more protagonism the armed forces are given in the field of public security, the more likely it is for militarization to expand. As more military officers occupy executive posts, the number of training sessions conducted by the army will be greater, and a larger number of police officers will conduct themselves as soldiers. However, this last dimension relies largely on the extent to which criminal dynamics affect the state.
This article presented a first approach towards articulating a research agenda focused on the subnational features of militarization. Narrative analysis is useful as a first approximation, but it still has limits in comprehensively understanding these processes. The main limitation is perhaps the difficulty in replicating the data, as well as the inability to study how the process of militarization moves forward in time. New research with different methodologies must overcome these limitations and explore a process that, despite being obvious, remains terra incognita for academic research.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
