SinghBaljit,
“An Overview,”AlexanderYonahFingerSeymour
(editors), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
(New York: John Jay
Press, 1977), p
8.
2.
ArblasterAnthony,
“Terrorism: Myths, Meaning and Morals,”Political Studies, vol 25, no
3, 1977, p 417.
3.
AronRaymond,
Peace and War (New York:
Doubleday, 1966), p
170. Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, Political
Terrorism (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), p 14.
4.
WalzerMichael,
Just and Unjust War (New
York: Basic Books,
1977), p 197.
5.
SchreiberJan,
The Ultimate Weapon (New
York: Morrow,
1978), p 17.
6.
JenkinsBrian,
“International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” paper
prepared for the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December
1974. Quoted in Schreiber, op cit, note 5, p
98.
7.
Schreiber,
op cit, note 5, p 17.
8.
Wilkinson,
op cit, note 3, p 23.
9.
On Robespierre's use of terror see Peter
Calvert, “Terror in the Theory of Revolution,” O'SullivanNoel,
Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution
(Brighton, England:
Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), pp
28–30. For a comprehensive study of how terror
was used by the Nazi's and Stalin to maintain order and suppress dissidence, see
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1973).
10.
Quoted in ChomskyNoam,
Turning the Tide (Boston:
South End Press, 1985), p
13.
11.
“Technocracy and
Repression in IDB Policies,”Washington Report on the Hemisphere, January 26,
1982. Quoted in Edward Herman, The Real Terror
Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p 206.
12.
This aid and training were not always made
public. See BrownCynthia
(editor), With Friends Like These (New
York: Pantheon Books,
1985), pp 196 and 197; and Stan Persky, America, The Last
Domino (Vancouver, Canada: New
Star Books, 1984), p
153.
13.
Herman, op
cit, note 11, p 130.
14.
AndersonMartin,
“Kissinger and the ‘Dirty War’”, The
Nation, October 31, 1987, p
477.
15.
Ibid, pp
477–486.
16.
Brown, op
cit, note 12, p 66.
17.
Chomsky, op
cit, note 10, p 110.
18.
For a detailed description of US stance
toward the Mujaheddin, see SickGary,
“Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses,”SAIS Review, vol 7, no 1, pp
15–20.
19.
Arblaster,
op cit, note 2, p 416.
20.
RapoportDavid,
“The Politics of Atrocity,”op cit, note 1, p 46.
21.
WeberMax,
“The Types of Legitimate Domination,”Economy and Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press,
1968), vol 1, pp
212–301.
22.
April 14 “Address to the
Nation,” transcript New York Times, April
15, 1986, p 7.
23.
AndersonPaul“The Libyan Context,”Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya
(London: Pluto
Press, 1986), p
92.
24.
HaleyP.
Edward, Qaddafi and the
United States Since 1969 (New York:
Praeger, 1984), p
171.
25.
FalkRichard,
“Rethinking Counter-Terrorism,” revised version of same
title in Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya, op cit, note 23,
unpublished manuscript, p 5.
26.
Haley, op
cit, note 24, p 12.
27.
Ibid, p
7.
28.
“Week of the Big
Stick,”Newsweek, April 7, 1986.
29.
Falk, op
cit, note 25, p 6.
30.
PashaAftab
Kamal, Libya and the
United States (New Delhi, India:
Detente Publications, 1984), p
11.
31.
ZimmermannTim,
“The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive
Diplomacy?”Survival, vol 24, no 33,
1987, p 206.
32.
OsseiranSanaa,
“The View from the Middle East,”op cit, note 23, p 112.
33.
Falk, op
cit, note 23, p 128.
34.
It may be argued that the reason the United
States did not strike at Syria or Iran is that they are more powerful than Libya
and would have put up a tougher fight. In addition, in Syria's case, its ties to
the Soviet Union would have raised the risks of the strike and thus attacking
Syria could have been seen as judiciously unwise. Moreover, that Syria was
thought to be potentially instrumental in recovering US hostages in the Middle
East, also must have been considered. Thus, the argument could be made that,
indeed, the United States was responding to terrorism—in fact, a series of
terrorist attacks against US citizens—but decided in the end not to attack the
real culprits directly but simply batter a weak nation with questionable ties to
the Soviet Union in an attempt to threaten those other countries. That is, the
United States wished to display its resolve toward combating international
terrorism. As such, it sought to do so in the least risky yet in a highly
visible way. Notwithstanding this argument, Libya still received the blow. And,
insofar as it does not engage in international terrorism to the same degree as
either Syria or Iran, it remains questionable as to whether Libya was hit
specifically to combat its sponsorship of international terrorism. In this
respect, it is significant to note that since the strike we have witnessed a
diplomatic warming to Syria and Iran. The United States has toned down its
accusations against Syrian and Iranian-sponsored terrorism, although little
evidence exists claiming that the level of such terrorism has
changed.
35.
BuckleyWilliamJr,
“Libya Anticipations,”National Review, May 23, 1986, p
54.