Problems of US Counter-Terrorism: The Case of Libya

Singh Baljit , “An Overview,” Alexander Yonah Finger Seymour (editors), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), p 8.

Arblaster Anthony , “Terrorism: Myths, Meaning and Morals,” Political Studies, vol 25, no 3, 1977, p 417.

Aron Raymond , Peace and War (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p 170. Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), p 14.

Walzer Michael , Just and Unjust War (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p 197.

Schreiber Jan , The Ultimate Weapon (New York: Morrow, 1978), p 17.

Jenkins Brian , “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” paper prepared for the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December 1974. Quoted in Schreiber, op cit, note 5, p 98.

Schreiber , op cit, note 5, p 17.

Wilkinson , op cit, note 3, p 23.

On Robespierre's use of terror see Peter Calvert, “Terror in the Theory of Revolution,” O'Sullivan Noel , Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), pp 28–30. For a comprehensive study of how terror was used by the Nazi's and Stalin to maintain order and suppress dissidence, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1973).

Quoted in Chomsky Noam , Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p 13.

“Technocracy and Repression in IDB Policies,” Washington Report on the Hemisphere, January 26, 1982. Quoted in Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p 206.

This aid and training were not always made public. See Brown Cynthia (editor), With Friends Like These (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), pp 196 and 197; and Stan Persky, America, The Last Domino (Vancouver, Canada: New Star Books, 1984), p 153.

Herman , op cit, note 11, p 130.

Anderson Martin , “Kissinger and the ‘Dirty War’”, The Nation, October 31, 1987, p 477.

Ibid, pp 477–486.

Brown , op cit, note 12, p 66.

Chomsky , op cit, note 10, p 110.

For a detailed description of US stance toward the Mujaheddin, see Sick Gary , “Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses,” SAIS Review, vol 7, no 1, pp 15–20.

Arblaster , op cit, note 2, p 416.

Rapoport David , “The Politics of Atrocity,” op cit, note 1, p 46.

Weber Max , “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), vol 1, pp 212–301.

April 14 “Address to the Nation,” transcript New York Times, April 15, 1986, p 7.

Anderson Paul “The Libyan Context,” Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya (London: Pluto Press, 1986), p 92.

Haley P. Edward , Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969 (New York: Praeger, 1984), p 171.

Falk Richard , “Rethinking Counter-Terrorism,” revised version of same title in Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya, op cit, note 23, unpublished manuscript, p 5.

Haley , op cit, note 24, p 12.

Ibid, p 7.

“Week of the Big Stick,” Newsweek, April 7, 1986.

Falk , op cit, note 25, p 6.

Pasha Aftab Kamal , Libya and the United States (New Delhi, India: Detente Publications, 1984), p 11.

Zimmermann Tim , “The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive Diplomacy?” Survival, vol 24, no 33, 1987, p 206.

Osseiran Sanaa , “The View from the Middle East,” op cit, note 23, p 112.

Falk , op cit, note 23, p 128.

It may be argued that the reason the United States did not strike at Syria or Iran is that they are more powerful than Libya and would have put up a tougher fight. In addition, in Syria's case, its ties to the Soviet Union would have raised the risks of the strike and thus attacking Syria could have been seen as judiciously unwise. Moreover, that Syria was thought to be potentially instrumental in recovering US hostages in the Middle East, also must have been considered. Thus, the argument could be made that, indeed, the United States was responding to terrorism—in fact, a series of terrorist attacks against US citizens—but decided in the end not to attack the real culprits directly but simply batter a weak nation with questionable ties to the Soviet Union in an attempt to threaten those other countries. That is, the United States wished to display its resolve toward combating international terrorism. As such, it sought to do so in the least risky yet in a highly visible way. Notwithstanding this argument, Libya still received the blow. And, insofar as it does not engage in international terrorism to the same degree as either Syria or Iran, it remains questionable as to whether Libya was hit specifically to combat its sponsorship of international terrorism. In this respect, it is significant to note that since the strike we have witnessed a diplomatic warming to Syria and Iran. The United States has toned down its accusations against Syrian and Iranian-sponsored terrorism, although little evidence exists claiming that the level of such terrorism has changed.

Buckley William Jr , “Libya Anticipations,” National Review, May 23, 1986, p 54.